Two States, One Nation: The Koreas and the Policy/Culture Nexus

Jacqueline Willis

Institute for Culture and Society
University of Western Sydney

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

© 2013
Acknowledgements

I would like to especially thank my principal supervisor Professor James Arvanitakis for the unfailing guidance, encouragement and support he has given me throughout my candidature. His academic expertise, enthusiasm and assuring presence have provided the motivation, confidence and direction needed to complete this intellectually stimulating, though sometimes daunting task. I gratefully acknowledge and extend immeasurable thanks for his mentorship, editorship and invaluable feedback, without which this thesis could not have been written.

I would also like to acknowledge the input of my co-supervisor Professor Brett Neilson, whose expert knowledge and recommendations have proven invaluable to the development and completion of this thesis.

Special thanks and acknowledgement must also be given to Shin Yoon Ju for providing Korean-English translations, as well as to Brian J. McMorrow, Grete Howard, Eric Testroete, Chris Wood, Raymond Cunningham and fellow Korea researcher, Christopher Richardson, for generously allowing me to use and reproduce their personal photographs.

Thanks too to those affiliated with the Institute for Culture and Society at the University of Western Sydney, for their committed nurturing of my academic development and ambitions over the course of my doctoral enrolment.

Finally, I would like to extend gratitude to my family, friends and colleagues for always encouraging me in my academic endeavours. Their patience, unwavering support and steadfast faith in my ability have been powerful incentives, driving and sustaining me in my scholarly pursuits.
Statement of Authentication

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

...............................................................................
(Signature)
# Table of Contents

**LIST OF TABLES** ........................................................................................................ III
**LIST OF FIGURES AND ILLUSTRATIONS** ................................................................ IV
**ABBREVIATIONS** ....................................................................................................... VI
**ABSTRACT** .................................................................................................................... VIII
**NOTE ON ROMANISATION** ......................................................................................... X

**INTRODUCTION** .............................................................................................................. 1

RESEARCH FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES .......................................................................... 4

METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................ 15

ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS ...................................................................................... 28

1. **IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL ARTEFACTS** .............................................................. 37

1.1 THE SCHOLARLY VALUE OF CULTURAL ARTEFACTS ............................................. 38

1.2 THE MUSEUM EXHIBITION AND THE CASE OF KOREA ...................................... 42

1.3 MUSIC AND PERFORMANCE AND THE CASE OF KOREA ................................... 51

1.4 GLOBALISATION: A DETERMINISTIC OR APPROPRIABLE PROCESS? .............. 60

1.4.1 Understanding the ‘Deterministic’ Argument ......................................................... 62

1.4.2 Hybridity.................................................................................................................. 66

2. **JUCHE VERSUS SEGYEHW: DIVERGENT VIEWS ON GLOBALISATION** ............. 73

2.1 DECONSTRUCTING JUCHE AND SEGYEHW .......................................................... 75

2.1.1 Understanding Juche .............................................................................................. 75

2.1.2 Scrutinising Segyehwa.......................................................................................... 85

2.2 THE INS AND OUTS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ........................................... 90

2.2.1 Enforcing Juche: Social Control, Rewards, Punishment and Performed Belief ....... 90

2.2.2 Implementing Segyehwa: Fostering Hybridity ..................................................... 101

2.3 POLICY AS ARTEFACT: CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS OF JUCHE AND SEGYEHW ... 110

2.3.1 Juche in Propaganda Poster Art ......................................................................... 110

2.3.2 Segyehwa and fusion ‘Gugak’ ............................................................................ 125

3. **HISTORICITY OF THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT** ............................................ 138

3.1 INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE AND ACCORDS ...................................................... 139

3.2 SKIRMISHES, TERRORISM AND FOILED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS .............. 148

3.3 ENGAGING THE NORTH: SUMMITS AND SUNSHINE........................................ 159

3.4 THE SUNSHINE FADES............................................................................................. 167

4. **KOREA’S REGIONAL RELATIONS: INFLUENCE AND IMPACT** ....................... 173

4.1 HISTORICAL IMPERIALISM: REAL AND POTENTIAL! ......................................... 175

4.2 US TROOP PRESENCE AND ITS IMPACT ............................................................ 193

4.3 THE INFLUENCE OF CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION .................................... 204

5. **NEGOTIATING THE NUCLEAR ISSUE** .................................................................. 221

5.1 NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR AMBITION AND JUCHE ........................................ 232

5.2 POST 9/11 AND GEORGE W. BUSH .................................................................. 237

5.3 SIX PARTY TALKS: A REFLECTION OF JUCHEIST CULTURE ................................ 249

6. **MUSEUMS AND EXHIBITIONS** .............................................................................. 257

6.1 MUSEUMS AND EXHIBITIONS IN NORTH KOREA .............................................. 258

6.1.1 Museums of the Revolutionary Merit of the Great Leader and the Dear Leader .... 258

6.1.2 Conventional Museums in North Korea ............................................................. 265

6.2 MUSEUMS AND EXHIBITIONS IN SOUTH KOREA ............................................. 285
7. MUSIC AND PERFORMANCE........................................................................................................... 303
  7.1.1 Music in North Korea.............................................................................................................. 304
  7.1.2 Juche Gymnastics: North Korea and Mass Games ................................................................. 315
  7.2 MUSIC IN SOUTH KOREA: K-POP AND THE SEGYEWA POLICY ........................................... 330
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 343
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 364
APPENDICES ....................................................................................................................................... 396
  APPENDIX 1: MAP OF KOREA ........................................................................................................ 397
  APPENDIX 2: TIMELINE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN KOREA’S HISTORY .................................. 398
  APPENDIX 3: NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT ........................................................................ 412
  APPENDIX 4: AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NONAGGRESSION AND EXCHANGES AND 
  COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH .......................................................... 413
  APPENDIX 5: ROK-DPRK JOINT DECLARATION OF THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN 
  PENINSULA ....................................................................................................................................... 417
  APPENDIX 6: NORTH-SOUTH JOINT DECLARATION ...................................................................... 418
  APPENDIX 7: DECLARATION ON THE ADVANCEMENT OF SOUTH-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS, PEACE 
  AND PROSPERITY .......................................................................................................................... 419
  APPENDIX 8: MUTUAL DEFENCE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF 
  KOREA ............................................................................................................................................. 422
  APPENDIX 9: AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE 
  DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA .............................................................................. 424
  APPENDIX 10: JOINT STATEMENT OF THE FOURTH ROUND OF THE SIX-PARTY TALKS ........... 427
  APPENDIX 11: INITIAL ACTIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT .......... 429
  APPENDIX 12: SECOND-PHASE ACTIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT... 431
  APPENDIX 13: LYRICS ...................................................................................................................... 433
    Appendix 13.1: Song of General Kim Il Sung .................................................................................. 433
    Appendix 13.2: Song of General Kim Jong Il ............................................................................... 434
    Appendix 13.3: No Motherland without You ............................................................................... 435
    Appendix 13.4: North Korean National Anthem - Aegukka (The Patriotic Song) / Achimūn 
    pinnara (Let Morning Shine) ........................................................................................................ 436
    Appendix 13.5: Footsteps – Song of Kim Jong Un ........................................................................ 436
    Appendix 13.6: Soldiers Load your bullets .................................................................................... 437
    Appendix 13.7: Let our Righteous Bayonets Strike Like Lightning ............................................. 437
    Appendix 13.8: Hangugin (Koreans) – MC Sniper ........................................................................ 438
  APPENDIX 14: SOUTH KOREAN SONGS CD – TRACK LIST ............................................................. 440
List of Tables

Table 1: Summary of Six Party Talks ................................................................. 251
Table 2: Summary of Hybrid Features ................................................................. 331
Table 3: South Korean Songs CD Track List ..................................................... 440
List of Figures and Illustrations

Image 1: North Korea Animation 1: A Pencil Cannonball ............................................ 94
Image 2: North Korea Animation 1: A Pencil Cannonball ............................................ 94
Image 3: Let’s inherit and develop the cause of the Juche revolution! .................. 113
Image 4: Let’s staunchly maintain our anti-imperialist and independent stance! ... 114
Image 5: Korea’s “nuclear bomb” [single-hearted unity!] ................................. 115
Image 6: When provoking a war of aggression, we will hit back, beginning with the US! .......................................................... 120
Image 7: US imperialists, do not make a mistake! ..................................................... 120
Image 8: The fate of US imperialism ........................................................................ 121
Image 9: Let’s not forget the blood-drenched hatred! ............................................ 122
Image 10: Let’s take revenge a thousand times on the US imperialist wolves! .... 122
Image 11: American imperialists are the “Pulgu-Taech’ŏn enemies of our people! 123
Image 12: Fusion ensemble Contemporary Music Ensemble Korea (CMEK) .... 126
Image 13: Female Gayageum quartet Yeoul playing a ‘fusion’ rendition of Led Zeppelin’s Stairway To Heaven .......................................................... 127
Image 14: Members of male fusion quartet, GongMyoung, play their ‘electronified’ Janggu for audiences at their fifteenth anniversary concert With Sea ........................ 129
Image 15: Male fusion quartet, Vinalog ..................................................................... 130
Image 16: Fusion group SOREA .................................................................................. 131
Image 17: Fusion group SOREA with B-boy groups Extreme and Illusion Crew. 133
Image 18: SOREA. Screenshot from Scattered Bounce ......................................... 134
Image 19: Screenshot from Heterogeneous Union .................................................. 134
Figure 1: Korea’s Disputed Maritime Border .......................................................... 157
Image 20: World Beware! Those who challenge our achievements will be our target! ................................................................................................................. 176
Image 21: Let’s crush foreign power and the forces of division through a grand national union! ...................................................................................... 176
Image 22: Death to the enemies of reunification! .................................................... 177
Image 23: A student points a toy gun at a painting of a US soldier during a game on the grounds of Kyongsang Kindergarten in Pyongyang, North Korea on International Children’s Day 2012 .......................................................... 178
Image 24: Children’s Game at Pyongyang Zoo, Pyongyang, North Korea ....... 179
Image 25: Let’s drive the US imperialists out and reunite the fatherland! ........ 198
Image 26: Drive out the American imperialists. Let’s reunify our fatherland! .... 198
Image 27: Let’s thoroughly smash the Team Spirit exercises ................................. 200
Image 28: (1969) Not scared of hardship and death to strengthen war to defend the motherland! ...................................................................................... 211
Image 29: Long live Chairman Mao the Red Sun in the hearts of the people! .... 211
Image 30: American imperialism must be beaten! ................................................. 212
Image 31: Imperialism and all reactionaries are all paper tigers ......................... 212
Image 32: When the US imperialists lash out with guns, we react with cannon! ... 226
Image 33: He who provokes us shall be punished! ................................................. 226
Image 34: Ruthless punishment to U.S. Imperialism! .............................................. 227
Image 35: Our missile program is a guarantee for world peace and security! .... 229
Image 36: US imperialists, do not act rashly! ......................................................... 238
Image 37: Bush: the way of self-destruction! ......................................................... 238
Image 38: The US is truly an Axis of Evil! ................................................................. 239
**Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPVA</td>
<td>Chinese People’s Volunteer Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICOM</td>
<td>International Council of Museums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIG</td>
<td>Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSA</td>
<td>Joint Security Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCBS</td>
<td>Korean Central Broadcasting Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCIA</td>
<td>Korean Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCNA</td>
<td>Korean Central News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCTV</td>
<td>Korean Central Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEDO</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KF</td>
<td>Korea Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNUA</td>
<td>Korean National University of Arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOCIS</td>
<td>Korean Culture and Information Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOFFIA</td>
<td>Korean Film Festival in Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWP</td>
<td>Korean Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWR</td>
<td>Light Water Reactor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Armistice Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assured Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCST</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDL</td>
<td>Military Demarcation Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOCA</td>
<td>National Museum of Contemporary Art (Seoul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Ministry of People’s Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Defence Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLL</td>
<td>Northern Limit Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPR</td>
<td>Nuclear Posture Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeMA</td>
<td>Seoul Museum of Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSD</td>
<td>State Security Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFG</td>
<td>Ulchi Freedom Guardian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USO</td>
<td>United Service Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

Situating Korea within a ‘one nation, two states’ paradigm, this thesis explores what the ideological, political and cultural divergences separating North and South Korea, reveal about the association between policy and culture. Presenting the two Koreas’ engagement with and perception of the outside world as highly indicative of the cultural ‘divisions’ between them, arguments relating to this theorised association are framed within the context of globalisation policy. Of particular interest are South Korea’s Segyehwa (Koreanisation) policy, forwarded by the Kim young-sam administration (1993-1998), and the North Korean Juche idea. With the former regarding globalisation as a process of possible Koreanisation and the latter as one of inevitable homogenisation, Americanisation and/or imperialism, the diametrically opposed perspectives (and objectives) of Juche and Segyehwa are regarded as suggestive of a broader policy-culture nexus within Korea.

In seeking to understand this nexus, this thesis raises questions as to what the globalisation policies of the two Koreas, as well as the history of inter-Korean relations, indicate about the non-physical ‘divisions’ at play on the Korean peninsula. Emphasising the role of regional states China and Japan and superpower the United States, it also gauges the extent to which Juche and Segyehwa are influenced by past and present regional and US-Korea relations. Working to empirically verify the posited association, two cultural artefacts: ‘the museum exhibition’ and ‘music and performance’ are drawn on, with examples from each of the Koreas examined for how reflect an association between the respective policies and cultures of the North and South. In addressing these questions, methodological focus is given primarily to textual analysis, with empirical components pertaining to South Korea, and especially its museums, informed by field research and site visits.
It is found not only that North and South Korea are political and cultural ‘polar opposites,’ but that the political and cultural trajectories they now tread have been, and continue to be, very much shaped by regional and US-Korea relations and interactions. Similarly, with *Juche* and *Segyehwa* found to manifest in the cultures of North and South Korea respectively, North and South Korean ‘museum exhibitions’ and ‘music and performance’ are deemed strongly demonstrative of a clear association between policy and culture, on the Korean peninsula.
Note on Romanisation

Typically, this dissertation uses the Revised Romanisation of Korean system, as adopted by the Republic of Korea’s (South Korea’s) Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in 2000. There are however, some exceptions that warrant mention. As North Korea still makes use of the older McCune-Reischauer system, locations within North Korea are expressed according to McCune-Reischauer conventions (for example, ‘Pyongyang’ rather than ‘Pyeongyang’, ‘Mount Kumgang’ rather than ‘Mount Geumgang’ and ‘Kaesong’ rather than ‘Gaeseong’). Similarly, where the spellings of other North Korean affiliates differ between the North and South, the North Korean spelling is used (for example, Rodong Sinmun not Nodong Sinmun for North Korea’s Labour Daily newspaper). On occasion, deviations from the Revised Romanisation system are also made when directly citing a source in which an alternate Romanisation system has been used. In these instances, the Revised Romanisation equivalent is provided in parentheses following the original transliteration.

With reference to Korean names, as per Korean custom, all names are listed surname first, except in select cases where the reverse is more commonly used and renowned (Syngman Rhee); or where the individual has indicated a preference for Western name order. In addition, following the respective conventions used in North and South Korea, South Korean given names are separated by a hyphen (Young-sam), while North Korean given names are not hyphenated (Il Sung).

On the subject of Chinese Romanisation, the Pinyin system is adopted (for example, ‘Mao Zedong’ rather than ‘Mao Tse-tung’ and ‘Guomindang’ rather than ‘Kuomintang’).
Introduction

With the world watching nervously at the passing of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il at the appointment of his ‘Great Successor’ Kim Jong Un, the affairs of the Korean peninsula have again been thrust into world attention. Bearing a striking resemblance to his grandfather, North Korea’s founding leader Kim Il Sung, ‘Supreme Leader’ Kim Jong Un has recently shot to prominence as rumours of a second North Korean dynastic succession quickly become reality. As power is transferred from North Korea’s recently deceased ‘Dear Leader’ to his third and youngest son, the immediate future of Korea – both North and South – is as uncertain as it is highly speculated. Events in the early part of 2013 confirm these concerns. It is against this backdrop that this thesis presents as a timely and pertinent exploration into the divergent cultural trajectories (and influencing factors) of North and South Korea.

Before introducing the contents of this study however, it must be stressed that although this thesis deals with themes relating to politics and international relations, it is not intended as either a political science or international relations study. Rather, it is a cultural studies project aimed, as stated, at tracing and elucidating the divergent cultural trajectories of North and South Korea. That said, the cultures of the North and South have been, and continue to be, directly influenced by Korean politics and the interventions of external powers with their own strategic and political stakes in Korean affairs.

1While the events of 2013 are certainly pertinent to the explorations undertaken in the thesis, issues of scope, as well as the changeable geopolitical landscape of Korea have seen it necessary to set certain research and time-specific parameters. For this reason, some exceptions notwithstanding, the majority of focus is given to those events occurring between Japan’s official colonisation of Korea (1910) and the December 2011 death of North Korean leader Kim Jong II.
Indeed, the very different post-1945 cultural trajectories of the two Koreas are, by and large, the result of international influence and intervention. Despite their depiction and labelling as polar opposites, North and South Korea are not, at their core, ‘alien’ cultures. The different systems that have been established in the North and South since Korea’s division in 1945 (socialist and capitalist respectively), rest atop a common culture forged over a period of more than one-thousand years (Oberdorfer, 1998: 3). As is reiterated at various points throughout this work, Korea’s division was not a consequence of, or at all related to, the sentiment of Korea itself. Its division was, instead, a consequence of external powers (namely the US and Soviet Union) seeking to serve their own national and international interests. Korea’s division was (and remains) an unfortunate by-product of the Cold War reality: a political compromise made between capitalist superpower, the United States, and its communist counterpart, the Soviet Union (D. K. Kim, 2005: 180).

Importantly, by initially dividing Korea, the US and Soviet Union are responsible for setting Seoul and Pyongyang on the politically/ideologically distinct paths they tread today, which find equal influence in regional neighbours China and Japan. These paths, directed by the politico-economic ideologies of socialism and capitalism, have since formed the foundations around which the cultures of North and South Korea, respectively, have taken shape. A consideration of Korean political history is therefore necessary, inasmuch as the cultures of North and South Korea find their roots in that history.

The same can be said of Korea’s present-day relations and nation-state interactions. Korea’s precarious geopolitical situation and the Cold War confrontation encapsulated by the North-South conflict, sees Korea remain a focal point of world attention and concern as outside parties invested in either side’s
survival (or containment), take an active interest in Korean domestic politics. With Cold War alliances still very much in place (North Korea/China and South Korea/US), foreign relations continue to play a pivotal role in shaping the political (and by extension cultural) landscape of Korea. Thus, the intended cultural focus notwithstanding, an examination of the historical and ongoing roles of key international actors (such as the US, China and Japan), assists in providing a holistic picture of North and South Korean cultures and the factors (and forces) that have come to shape them. Explicitly, it provides testimony to just how diametrically opposed in view and intent the Koreas have become.

In acknowledging that the fate of Korea today remains heavily balanced against international influence, it also needs to be emphasised that this thesis has emerged against a background of ongoing change. In fact, as the final draft of this thesis was being prepared, the passing of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il meant an immediate shift in the research landscape and its key players. Though as discussed throughout, for the foreseeable future one should not expect much of a change in North Korean policy, nor its engagement with South Korea, the US or regional states China and Japan. It is near impossible to predict the course of Korea’s future, or the effects that changes in the domestic and international environments, including administration changeovers in key states such as South Korea and the US, may have on Korea and its relations. However, one thing remains certain: with a formal and permanent peace remaining elusive and reunification unrealised, the ‘tale’ of divided Korea is yet to reach its culmination. Rather, it is a story of great flux and constant development, still being played out even as I and others attempt to reflect upon and narrate it. Owing to the difficulties inherent in negotiating such a changeable landscape, limited by considerations of time and scope, this work is itself necessarily
incomplete. It provides only a snapshot into the complex and tension fraught ‘Korean
Situation,’ which is likely to continue to attract scholarly and popular attention for
years to come.

**Research Focus and Objectives**

Given the unilaterality with which the Korean peninsula was divided, Korea
now exists as one nation bifurcated into two separate ‘antagonistic’ states. As
evidenced by the turbulent post-1945 history of the Korean peninsula, the North and
South Korean governments are now in pursuit of seemingly irreconcilable agendas.
Despite being unified for close to 1300 years, from 300CE to 1945 (Oberdorfer,
1998: 3), six and a half decades post-division an ideological rift reflecting the
country’s geographical divide, continues to widen and progressively whittle away at
the once shared ethos of the Korean people. Focusing its arguments within the frame
of a ‘one nation, two states’ paradigm, this thesis is concerned with tracing and
elucidating the politico-cultural ‘divisions,’ mirroring Korea’s physical divide.

Upon visiting the Joint Security Area (JSA) at Panmunjom on the border
between North and South, as I did in June 2010, the tension and ‘divisions’ between
the Koreas is palpable. Approaching the Military Armistice Commission (MAC)
conference building, which straddles the border, I observed numerous Republic of
Korea (ROK) or South Korean soldiers (all reportedly *Taekwondo* black belts), fists
clenched in readiness, staring toward the North. To the North was ‘*Panmunjak,*’ the
North Korean equivalent of ‘Freedom House’ and the first glimpse of North Korea
from across the border. Standing atop the stairs leading to the *Panmunjak* pavilion
half hidden behind a pillar, was a North Korean soldier. On close inspection a set of
binoculars could be seen glaring from a window to his right as a second soldier
diligently monitored all movement, ready if needed, to raise the alarm.

The scenes inside the MAC conference building were similar. As I entered
the iconic blue building my attention was immediately drawn to the sunglass-clad
ROK soldiers as they stood, in their modified Taekwondo ‘ROK Ready’ stances, at
various points throughout the room. One stood blocking the door leading out into the
North. Another stood with one foot in each Korea, facing the rectangular conference
table, which bisects the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). As each of us took the
obligatory photograph next to a ROK soldier, some (myself included) technically
standing in North Korean territory, the tourist element aside, the seriousness of
Korea’s division could not be ignored. These soldiers, from North and South, who
stood face-to-face on a daily basis, remain at war. Though, more than that, they are
ideologically, politically and culturally speaking, polar opposites.

It seemed (and seems) remarkable that two nation-states of such close
geographical proximity, separated only by a thin raised concrete line, could be
culturally worlds apart. Arguably, Korea’s unique state of division, and the divided
nationalism it engenders, suggests an association between policy and culture. Viewed
through the ‘one nation, two states’ prism, following the reunification of Germany
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Korea is one of few geographical zones
wherein a deeply divided nationalism and culture is observable, amongst a people of
one nation, ethnicity and cultural heritage. As East Asian historian Michael J. Seth
(2010: 271) notes “[m]odern history offers no other example of such an ancient,
homogeneous society growing so apart in such a small span of time.” Extending this

---

2 The “thin raised concrete line” is the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), the line separating the
North and South.
observation, this thesis uncovers what the case of Korea reveals about the nexus between policy and culture.

For the purpose of analysis, ‘policy’ should be taken to refer not only to physical and codified documents and their wording, but also to the broader thrust of government activities, political expressions, ideologies and context that shape and give rise to them. In this vein, this thesis draws on Stephen J. Ball’s (1994) definition of policy as both ‘text’ (physical document) and ‘discourse’ (context and politics of policy text production). According to Ball (1994: 17), as no policy document appears “‘out of the blue,’” or exists in a “vacuum,” ‘policy’ is much more than a specific text or document. Rather, ‘policy’ is itself a culturally embedded and specific product, reflective of particular socio-historical contexts. As such, in definitional and conceptual terms, ‘policy’ should be seen to refer to the physical policy document on the one hand, and the broader sweep of politics from which it emerged on the other. Applying such an idea to the Korean context, ‘policy’ refers not only to North and South Korean policy blueprints, but the broader (and diametrically opposed) political positions, particularly toward the outside world, that they represent: totalitarianism, isolationism and militarism driven by an espousal of socialism in the North, and embracement of capitalism and democracy in the South. For a definition of culture and an explanation as to its usage and application, see Section 1.1.

In the interest of clarity and comparison, the arguments forwarded concerning the association between policy and culture are framed within a particular policy context: specifically globalisation policy. Broadly speaking, globalisation can be thought of as “the widening, deepening and speeding up of the worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999:}
2). Though, as Chapter 1 discusses, beyond this broad definition, there is much contention surrounding how globalisation should be approached and defined. This thesis is concerned primarily with cultural globalisation and the realities and debates concerning the ‘impact’ globalisation is having (and will yet have) on local cultures and the cultural diversity of the world.

The relevance and applicability of these debates is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1 and to a lesser extent in Chapter 2. It warrants noting, however, that globalisation policy has been chosen in that their engagement with, and perception of the outside world, is, perhaps one of the most discernible divergences between the two Koreas. In this way, North and South Korea’s contrary policies toward the phenomenon of globalisation are highly exemplificative of the divided nationalism and politico-cultural ‘divisions’ unfolding within Korea.

In comparatively analysing North and South Korea’s divergent views and policies on globalisation, with regards to South Korea, the focus is the Kim Young-sam administration (1993-1998), its globalisation Segyehwa (literally ‘Worldisation’) policy (Alford, 1999: 143; S. S. Kim, 2000b: 2), and particularly its emphasis on the ‘Koreanisation’ of global forms. In terms of North Korean globalisation, the subject of discussion is North Korea’s espousal of Juche or Kimilsungism (self-reliance).

Notably, although the concepts of ‘Worldisation’ and ‘Koreanisation’ may appear contradictory, as this thesis demonstrates, they are not mutually exclusive. In fact, in the context of South Korea’s globalisation drive, they are symbiotic (Shin, 2006: 208). Demonstrating this, as acknowledged in Chapter 2, Kim Young-sam (1996: 15) ascribed five “principal meanings” to the term Segyehwa, including

---

3 With Segye meaning ‘world’ and ‘Hwa’ being the Korean equivalent of the suffix ‘-isation’ (Alford, 1999: 143).
‘Koreanisation.’ For the purpose of analysis, these “principal meanings” should be understood as conceptual underpinnings rather than literal translations. That is, they should be seen to provide a conceptual understanding of what the Segyehwa policy was intended to entail and mandate. In this way, the designation of ‘Koreanisation’ as a “principal” meaning of Segyehwa simply underscores the policy’s aim to maintain a sense of “[South] Korean originality” to South Korean globalisation through the indigenisation of foreign cultural elements (Y. S. Kim, 1996: 15 – see Chapter 2). Any reference to ‘Koreanisation’ and its relation to Segyehwa, including those occurring in parentheses following the term, should thus be read in this manner.

In emphasising the cultural hybridisation mandate of the Segyehwa policy, it is acknowledged that hybridisation of the South Korean cultural landscape could have occurred without the investiture of the policy. Indeed, the strong concern for the safeguarding of “[South] Korean originality” (Y. S. Kim, 1996: 15) reflected in its aims is driven by South Korea’s lingering memory of pre-division encounters with the foreign, and resulting adverse effects on Korean cultural and political sovereignty. Chapter 4 demonstrates this through discussion of the part that these encounters, particularly Japan’s thirty-five year colonisation of Korea, had in motivating the cultural preservation requisites of the policy. Given this, it is possible that these historical memories of colonisation could have manifested in a different way, or still prompted proactive engagement with the global, had Kim Young-sam

---

4 The four other ascribed “principal meanings” of Segyehwa include “meeting global standards of excellence in all areas,” “rationalizing all aspects of national life,” “unifying” and “an enhanced sense of community with all mankind” (Y. S. Kim, 1996: 15). This thesis emphasises ‘Koreanisation,’ however, due to its examination of the policy-culture nexus within the frame of globalisation policy, and particularly the alignment of ‘Koreanisation’ with the ‘globalisation as hybridisation’ argument (see Chapter 1). Additionally, given North Korea’s contending perception of globalisation as ‘homogenisation/Americanisation,’ a focus on ‘Koreanisation’ provides suitable framing for analysing this association within a one nation, two states paradigm.
not assumed the office of South Korean president, or inaugurated the Segyehwa policy.

The deeply embedded nature of Korea’s colonised past in the South Korean psyche (see Chapter 4) would also suggest that collective memory of Japanese colonial rule carries its own weight, encouraging the maintenance of South Korean cultural identity in parallel to the Segyehwa policy. Nonetheless, the policy’s cultural mandates remain enlightening in that they showcase a broader political attitude towards the foreign and its relationship to Koreanness, whereby ‘Koreanness’ is presented not as contradictory to, but as intertwined with, the global. Thus, the reflection of this attitude in the Segyehwa policy, and its encouragement of cultural hybridity, sees the Segyehwa policy present a strong and examinable frame for gauging the policy-culture nexus in South Korea. Its sharp contrast to the North Korean Juche ideology also ensures that the policy is particularly analytically revealing with regards to examining the association between policy and culture in Korea within a ‘one nation, two states’ paradigm.

Indeed, one of the more obvious distinctions between the concepts of Juche and Segyehwa revolves around how globalisation itself is perceived. For South Korea, globalisation constitutes a process of beckoning opportunity; a process to be harnessed and adapted to serve the benefit of the State. Consequently, its Segyehwa policy defines and promotes globalisation as a process of possible Koreanisation and hybridisation (Y. S. Kim, 1996: 14-15). For the North however, it presents (at least perceptually), as one of inevitable homogenisation, Americanisation and cultural subjugation, to be avoided at all costs (Korean Central News Agency [KCNA], 1 June 1999 – see Chapter 2). As is claimed throughout this work, the contrasting priorities
of Juche and Segyehwa clearly explicate that, in Korea, culture both directs and is affected by policy and broader political position.

As elaborated in subsequent chapters, the framing of these arguments around globalisation policy is strongly dependent on a number of key assumptions about the nature of globalisation processes. The first of these is that globalisation is a multidimensional and mutable process (Held and McGrew, 2007); presumably shaped by a number of subjective factors, including the culturally specific settings of the nation-state. The second is that nation-states, governments and people, are not passive recipients of globalisation, but active participants, capable of interacting with and proactively directing its processes (Appadurai, 1996; Nederveen Pieterse, 2009; 1994). Concededly, though globalisation is location specific and there are, inevitably, subtle regional differences in regards to its effects, this thesis is concerned primarily with the global-national dialectic. While it needs to be acknowledged that globalisation functions on and across various scales, with multilayered effects, the national-scale is privileged due to the juxtaposition of Juche and Segyehwa within a ‘one nation-two states’ paradigm. That is, an analysis of the Koreas within this frame sees the government or State position, and particularly the implementation and manifestation of related policies on a national (or State) level, assume principal importance.

In fact, this privileging reflects a wider tendency in globalisation scholarship to regard the nation-state as the primary actor in the globalisation process. For this reason, academic debates surrounding the phenomenon tend to focus predominantly on its effects and repercussions at the nation-state level. As such, this thesis engages with these broader nation-state-centric debates concerning the relationship between globalisation and nationalism. Though, while engaging with the dominant discourse,
it also offers a unique contribution to existing analyses by way of its ‘one nation-two states’ framing and focus on divided nationalism. Thus, analysed through this lens, globalisation is viewed not as a one-way process whose effects are felt only from the outside in, but as a two-way process where global, state and regional forces co-occur and mutually shape one another. In this vein, the ‘global’ and the ‘national’ are regarded as both objects and agents of globalisation, being shaped by, but also shaping its processes.

In order to focus and empirically ground the arguments presented concerning policy and culture, two cultural artefacts are introduced and studied: ‘the museum’ or ‘exhibition’ and ‘music and performance.’ As elaborated in Section 1.1, this thesis defines and approaches cultural artefacts as tangible products that give materiality to cultural processes and offer an understanding into the otherwise abstract notion of ‘culture’ and its various dimensions, including politics (see Section 1.1 for a more detailed definition). Approached as representative case studies, cultural artefact examples from each of the Koreas are thus discussed for how they showcase and figure as manifestations of the associations posited. Artefact examples from North Korea are examined for how they embody the pro-independence, anti-imperialist and anti-American stance of Juche. They are also analysed for how they perpetuate the Jucheist demand for collectivism and leadership veneration. Conversely, examples drawn from South Korea are studied for how they reflect the cultural emphasis of the Segyehwa policy through a simultaneous embracement of foreign and (South) Korean forms, styles and conventions. Examples from each of these cultural artefact categories are dispersed throughout the thesis to reflect the key points raised, though the final two chapters provide a more in depth analysis of ‘the museum exhibition’ and ‘music and performance,’ respectively.
In attempting to understand the different perspectives and strategies of the North and South, the individual and collective influence of Korea-regional relations is also considered. Mindful that the cultures of North and South Korea have and continue to evolve within an “East-Asian world setting” (D. K. Kim, 2005: 2), subject to strong regional influence, the role of Japan and China in shaping Korea’s divided nationalism is addressed. So too is the initial role of the Soviet Union in North Korea, and the continuing central role of the US in the political and strategic development of both Koreas.

In light of the above, the objectives of this thesis translate into three research questions:

1. What do the globalisation strategies of North and South Korea indicate about the politico-cultural ‘divisions’ at play on the Korean peninsula?

2. How are Juche and Segyehwa influenced by past and present regional and US-Korea relations?

3. Assessed through the frame of the cultural artefacts of the ‘museum exhibition’ and ‘music and performance,’ what does the case of divided Korea suggest about the association between policy and culture?

While these questions are shaped by themes that reoccur at various points throughout this study, the chapter outline following the forthcoming discussion of research methodology explains how these questions fit into the overall scheme of the thesis.

Before moving to discuss the research methodology however, the contribution this thesis offers to existing research must be acknowledged. With regard to the intended cultural focus, despite the acknowledged multidimensionality of the Segyehwa policy (see Chapter 2), to date, there has been limited analysis of the policy, or the Kim Young-sam administration, from a cultural perspective. In fact, with the exception of an article written by Shin Gi-wook and Choi Joon-nak (2009)
acknowledging the *Segyehwa* policy’s simultaneous promotion of global and local culture (based on earlier works by Shin – see Shin, 2003; 2006), the majority of scholarship focuses primarily on its economic performance (see S. S. Kim, 2000a, for example).

To place this in context, in attempting a complete restructuring of the South Korean economy, the Kim Young-sam government pursued a policy of economic liberalisation that was not institutionally supported. This left South Korea vulnerable to the effects of the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, which temporarily crippled its economy and forced it to seek a fifty-seven billion dollar bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Kim and Moon, 2000: 61-62), the then largest in IMF history (S. S. Kim, 2000b: 2). As such, the profound economic failure of the policy is a recurring theme in books such as *Korea’s Globalization* (2000), published amid the fallout of the crisis. For example, contributing to the book, Kim Yong-cheol and Moon Chung-in (2000: 61-62) argue that the *Segyehwa* policy was a “premature . . . incoherent . . . failure” that constituted “an array of policy and institutional mistakes.” Similarly, Samuel S. Kim (2000c: 247) labels the policy “a major economic disaster, [which] started with a bang, but ended in a whimper.”

Arguably, however, although it exasperated its effects, the East Asian Financial Crisis was not a direct consequence of the *Segyehwa* policy itself, but a reflection of wider regional economic conditions and instability. As its title indicates, numerous East Asian countries including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines were hit by the crisis and forced to seek IMF bailouts (Dittmer, 2000: 33). Yet, the timing of *Korea’s Globalization* (2000), published just three years after the crisis, ensured that the *Segyehwa* policy’s potential positive implications for other spheres, including culture (Koreanisation), were overshadowed by its apparent
economic shortcomings and preoccupations with the health of the East Asian economy. Thus, written post South Korea’s economic recovery, this thesis fills a gap in existing research by emphasising that the Segyehwa policy was not a complete or abject failure, economic consequences aside. In this vein, it instead highlights the significance and positive influence of the Segyehwa policy for the cultural sphere, and namely the preservation (hybridisation) of South Korean culture.

That said, while it is true that neither the Kim Young-sam government, nor the Segyehwa policy have been analysed at any great length from a cultural perspective, it must be stressed that much of the significance of this research revolves around its dual focus on both North and South Korea. As revealed in Chapter 1, theoretical research into the globalisation postures reflected by North and South Korea is not necessarily new, neither is the treatment of Juche and Segyehwa as separate concepts. Rather, this thesis finds its originality in its juxtaposition of Juche and Segyehwa within a ‘one nation-two states’ paradigm. As noted, Korea’s state of division is quite unique in that its original partition had “no historical, geographical, cultural or economic logic” (Seth, 2010: 1). This sees the Korean nation (viewed as two states) present as an interesting (and rarely pursued) case study into the association between policy and culture, within a broader socio-political context.

Though links between policy and culture have been identified and debated, Juche and Segyehwa have not yet been juxtaposed, as globalisation policies, potentially providing insights into these links. Moreover, with most analyses of Juche and Segyehwa largely theoretical in scope, the empirical examinations undertaken in this thesis ensure its originality. Namely, by drawing on ‘museum exhibitions’ and ‘music and performance’ as illustrative case studies, this thesis
contributes to existing literature by demonstrating the interplay between policy and culture in the Korean context as it unfolds in practice.

**Methodology**

This thesis adopts a qualitative methodology drawing primarily on case study and textual analysis. In saying that, in order to confirm whether the asserted association between policy and culture is empirically verifiable, some fieldwork in South Korea was also conducted in the form of targeted-site visits (mainly to museums). Before outlining and reflecting on these methodological choices in greater detail however, the multidisciplinary nature of the research must be acknowledged.

Importantly, while the chief focus is on culture, in conceding that the various spheres of life cannot be entirely disassociated, this thesis recognises the influences of a range of life-spheres and areas, which connected to ‘culture,’ have flow-on effects for the ‘cultural’ sphere. Certainly, as is elaborated in the chapters that follow, the policies of Juche and Segyehwa are shaped by a number of multidimensional factors. They are both, for instance, intimately shaped by Korea’s history, including its experience of Japanese imperialism and US involvement on the peninsula (see Chapter 4). Similarly, as indicated by the assessed association between policy and culture, neither can be understood isolated from political considerations.

This is especially apparent in the case of Juche, which as chapters 2 and 5 explain, draws no perceptible distinction between politics and culture. The indivisibility between the two in the North Korean context is particularly illustrated through the Juche-centric military-first politics of Songun. Driving North Korea’s quest to transform itself into an “impregnable fortress” (Becker, 2005: 4), Songun
has seen the military assume such central and direct political power – and all-pervading presence and influence – that North Korean culture strongly reflects and is rooted in (*Juche*-driven) military-first priorities. This is evidenced by the degree to which the imperative of military preparedness permeates North Korean propaganda art (see chapters 2 and 5). It is also demonstrated by the extent to which other military values such as unity, obedience and subordination to the State and collective, dominate the North Korean cultural artefact of music and performance, including its Mass Games (see Chapter 7).

With the policies themselves driven by a host of multilayered influences, an analysis of *Juche* and *Segyehwa* necessitates a comparably multidimensional approach. Thus, cognisant of the inherent complexity of the Korean geopolitical situation and its far-reaching ramifications, this thesis recognises that Korean policy and divided nationalism is implicitly shaped by a variety of different historical and contextual factors. Approaching Korean ‘culture’ therefore as a product of various contextually and historically specific variables (see Appadurai, 1996 – Chapter 1), this thesis is multidimensional, integrating issues and themes from across disciplines including culture, politics, history, international relations, ideology and economics.

Returning now to elaborate on the utilisation of textual analysis, a myriad of primary and secondary sources are employed and scrutinised throughout this work. Among the specific text types analysed are: official government statements from North and South Korea, Korean and foreign expert testimonies, newspapers, documentaries and statistical records. The arguments advanced are informed by several prominent globalisation scholars, whose research provides me with theoretical frameworks on which to base my analyses of North and South Korea (see Chapter 1).
While it is necessary to consider US viewpoints in order to fully grasp the dynamics of North-South and US-Korea relations (see chapters 4 and 5), this thesis reflects a strong focus on Korean-authored scholarship. As well as drawing on a select number of works by Western and American scholars, it also examines sources composed by North and South Koreans, living in their respective countries.

Given the statistical blackout that surrounds North Korea, rather than attempting to source new material, information has been gathered primarily through a re-evaluation of the already published or readily accessible. Namely, information has been obtained from official regime pronouncements and media, as well as from individual researcher contributions. Although a field trip to North Korea was not taken, these sources provide ample and enlightening material for examining the association between policy and culture in North Korea. Though pre-existing, the framing of Korea within a ‘one nation, two states’ paradigm ensures that they are interpreted through a new lens.

With respect to regime sources, two principal sources have been consulted. The first of these include texts published by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Pyongyang, which provides English translations of key North Korean texts. Some of the more comprehensive works drawn on and credited as authored by Kim Jong Il are: *On the Juche Idea* (1982), *On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea* (1995), *On the Art of Music* (2004) and *On Further Developing Mass Gymnastics* (2006). Collectively, these texts and others like them, help to garner an understanding of the origins, philosophical underpinnings, socio-historical significance and fundamental aims of the *Juche* idea and its unfolding in North Korean ‘exhibitions’ and ‘music and performance.’ In addition, this thesis draws heavily on English translations of
North Korean mass media, for the most part provided by North Korean media outlet the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

In noting the reliance on English sources, it is acknowledged that North Korean mass media in English does not always represent a direct translation of internal (Korean) media, often differing in content as well as political aim. Yet despite apparent “significant differences” between internationally disseminated media in English and that intended for domestic consumption (Myers, 2011: 11), the tendency to subject the United States and Japan to “routine vituperation” is one exhibited both internationally and domestically (Myers, 2011: 133). Comparable emphasis is also afforded to the military-first politics of Songun on domestic and international fronts (Myers, 2011: 85). In fact, author on North Korea, Brian Myers (2011: 12) suggests that domestic media is likely to be “blunter and more belligerent” than international releases, which often deliberately “tone down [their] invective” (Myers, 2011: 52). Thus, given that this thesis focuses primarily on these (Jucheist) concepts and their emergence in cultural artefacts – artefacts that attract local and foreign audiences – English translations of North Korean texts and media provide relevant and critical insights into the policy-culture nexus in North Korea.

As Chapter 2 explains, North Korean literature and mass media are controlled entirely by the State, with the North Korean regime enforcing strict control and censorship mechanisms so as to “closely lin[k] the mission of literature and art with the [Juche] revolution” (Missuri, 1978: 201) (see Chapter 2). As Muhammad Missuri (1978: 199) discloses, Kim Il Sung frequently declared that North Korean literature and art be “based thoroughly on the line and policy of the Party.” That is, that it be “Juche-based . . . national in form and socialist in content” (I. S. Kim, 1975: 36). Kim Jong Il (1990: 25) likewise affirmed that “the requirements of the Juche idea on
art and literature must be met in full,” meaning that they must exemplify and align with the teachings of *Juche*. Indications are that Kim Jong Un requires the same. As such, the positions portrayed in North Korean literature, as well as by the exhibition and music and performance pieces analysed, are regarded as indicative of the official State position, rather than that of individual authors and artists. In regards to propaganda art and exhibition pieces especially, this interpretation is supported by the fact that, as elaborated below, individual artists are not generally identified.

On the subject of the chosen artefacts of the ‘museum exhibition’ and ‘music and performance,’ a few additional points require clarification. Firstly, it is necessary to define the specific cultural objects that qualify as ‘museums’ for the purposes of this study. Adopting the broad definition offered by the International Council of Museums (ICOM, 2009: para. 4-5), the term ‘museum’ should be understood to refer not only to museums in the conventional sense; that is, to institutions “designated” as such by the State, but to “monuments and sites” that “acquire, conserve and communicate material evidence of people and their environment.” In the case of North Korea, ‘museums’ thus extend to cultural and historical sites and monuments, including the copious examples of State-sanctioned propaganda (poster) art found throughout the streets of the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. In regards to South Korea, the term also applies to monuments found at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

In regards to the adopted method of analysis, it needs to be noted that the inquiry undertaken in seeking to demonstrate the association between policy and culture in Korea is largely restricted to a ‘politics of representation’ perspective (Pascal, 2012; Tapper, 2002). That is, focus is given to the ways in which the policy mandates of *Juche* and *Segyehwa* manifest in the content and form of North and South Korean cultural artefacts, and particularly museum exhibitions and music and
performance. With regards to the North Korean case, attention is paid to the reflection of the Jucheist principles of leadership veneration, independence, collectivism, military superiority and anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism (see Chapter 2). In the case of the South, discussion is centred around the manifestation of (Segyehwa policy inspired) cultural hybridity. With respect to South Korean museum exhibitions, of interest is the blending of Korean and Western artistic sensibilities, or Korean theme and Western artistic technique (see Chapter 6). In terms of music and performance, focus is given to Korean and Western genre hybridisation and the simultaneous utilisation of Western and Korean instruments (see chapters 2 and 7).

The policy-culture argument of this thesis is thus based on the premise that the manifestation of policy directives is clearly demonstrative of a relationship between policy and cultural artefacts. Aihwa Ong (2006: 14) supports such a position arguing that the nexus between policy and culture cannot be “reduced” to a “uniform global condition of ‘Neoliberalism.’” That is to say, far from being fixed and predictable, the nexus between policy and culture is characterised by mutability and the nation-state’s ability to interact with and hybridise “various assemblages” (Ong, 2006: 14). In this vein, Ong’s dismissal of a global condition of ‘Neoliberalism’ is mirrored in this thesis by way of its rejection of globalisation processes, policies and manifestations as universal and deterministic. It is particularly reflected in the assertion that the absence of a single dominating power in today’s world order has led to flexibility, the blending of boundaries and the fostering of fluid, hybrid identities (Hardt and Negri, 2000 - see Section 1.4.2).

Drawing on these ideas, I argue that the association between the policy and culture must be recognised as involving complex and contextually specific processes. Indeed, approached within the particular policy context of globalisation policy,
divided Korea provides unique analytic potential and insight. Namely, it allows for the direct juxtaposition of contrasting policies – proactive embracement of globalisation (Segyehwa), and professed total rejection of it (Juche) – within what is effectively the one nation. It is in this regard that the case of Korea offers insight into the policy-culture nexus that cannot be gained by way of other case studies. Extending earlier remarks concerning the unique status of Korea, in no other nation can one identify such contrasting policy choices, mirroring opposing sides of an ongoing scholarly debate (globalisation as Americanisation/imperialism; globalisation as hybridisation) as those respectively reflected in Juche and Segyehwa (see Chapter 1). Korea therefore offers a strong case for assessing how these very different policies translate into very different cultures, thus pointing to an association between policy and culture.

As such, a ‘politics of representation’ approach has been taken in that it allows for a variable and nation-state specific (political and cultural) analysis, rather than one confined to a universal condition. Accordingly, this is not a politics of representation that “privileges questions of identity and authenticity” (Varma, 2013: n.pag.), but one that reflects context-specific nexus of policy and culture.

While it is recognised that the policy-culture nexus is often assessed through a consideration of the role mechanisms of governance (see for example Throsby, 2010; McGuigan, 2004; O’Connor, 2011), including cultural institutions, agencies, ministries and bureaucracies, play in influencing cultural production (Griffith, 2009; Homan, 2010; 2008), this line of analysis is not pursued for two reasons. Firstly, the case of Korea presents methodological limitations that make it (close to) impossible to gain the level of information access required to adequately identify and evaluate the policy and organisational mechanisms involved. Although Chapter 2 offers a
broad account of Juche and Segyehwa implementation methods, detailing means of state censorship and control in the North, and efforts to foster cultural hybridity in the South, two stumbling blocks present insofar as specifics relating to featuring cultural artefacts are concerned. The first of these is the closed and controlled nature of North Korea and the general anonymity of key players in North Korean cultural production, including artists and performers, who due to the collectivist ideals of the State are typically made subordinate to the collective. The second is that analysis of both North and South Korean policy was limited by the lack of Korean language proficiency of this researcher.

Certainly, the first of these stumbling blocks is made apparent by the fact that out of the two-hundred and fifty posters reproduced in North Korean Posters: The David Heather Collection (2008) – one of the most comprehensive published collections of North Korean propaganda posters to date, from which the majority of posters drawn on in this thesis are sourced – not a single artist is identified. The same is the case for the propaganda posters appearing in Jane Portal’s Art under Control in North Korea (2005 – see pp. 28, 63, 73) and Exploring North Korean Arts (2011) edited by Rüdiger Frank (see pp. 83, 85, 143). Even websites such as that of London-based North Korean art supplier, gallery and auction house lagalleria.org and North Korean poster stockist dprkcool.com, do not assign artists to posters.

Concededly, artist particulars are often noted on less overtly political works of fine art (such as landscape paintings – see Frank, 2011: 110, 135-136; Portal, 2005: 152-154). This tendency also extends to the North Korean oil paintings and tapestries exhibited on lagalleria.org. Yet, owing to the predominate focus this thesis affords to propaganda posters, the discernible gap in artist information relating to this
medium has, as noted, presented a methodological limitation as far as assessing the policy-culture nexus from a modes of governance perspective is concerned.

Similarly, though central government and Party control and censorship apparatus can be identified in North Korean media, literature and related scholarship, sufficient information as to the steps and policy mechanisms involved in getting a propaganda poster exhibited as street art, or a Mass Games production staged, is lacking. In other words, it is not possible to ascertain the processes that political institutions within North Korea follow that influence or dissuade the emergence of specific cultural products, as with the influence of the Australia Council on cultural policy in Australia (Australia Council, 2000).

Turning to the second stumbling block, that of language, while some information concerning the facilitation of South Korean cultural hybridity by way of government ministries and cultural foundations is available via English language versions of government and organisation websites, its nature and scope is limited. It is therefore not conducive to an analysis of the policy mechanisms employed in the production of the cultural artefacts discussed. While the option of translation is acknowledged, it was not pursued for both pragmatic and analytical reasons. In the first instance, translation was judged unfeasible due both to funding considerations and the difficulties surrounding the identification of relevant sources for a non-proficient speaker of the source language.

These more pragmatic reasons aside, a ‘politics of representation’ approach was privileged due to the ‘one nation-two states’ framing at the centre of this study. As noted, this thesis uncovers what the contrasting policies of Juche and Segyehwa indicate about the politico-cultural ‘divisions’ separating North and South Korea, as well as the association between policy and culture within a ‘one nation-two states’
paradigm. This framing around divided nationalism therefore calls for a balanced juxtaposition of North and South Korea, wherein both are subject to the same variables and conditions of analysis. It is thus owing, in part, to the difficulties associated with accessing comparable sources on North Korea, and an effort to maintain a balanced analysis on both sides, that additional sources relating to the South Korean case were not obtained by way of translation.

These limitations notwithstanding, the chosen method of ‘politics of representation’ is itself particularly enlightening in undertaking such an analysis. Indeed, the pursued aim to analyse the association between policy and culture within the context of globalisation policy lends itself to a ‘politics of representation’ approach. It does so in that this particular policy framing (globalisation and culture), sees the primary line of investigation surround what North and South Korean cultural artefacts reveal about Seoul and Pyongyang’s perceptions of globalisation and the outside world. The primary issue thus lies not in ‘how’ these cultural artefacts come to be in a mode of governance or production sense, but in the ways in which two very different perceptions manifest, and are representative in, the respective cultural artefacts of these two states (see Chapter 2 for an explanation of policy specifics and Chapter 1 for details of their applicability to the globalisation debate).

In this vein, the cultural artefacts of the ‘museum exhibition’ and ‘music and performance’ have been purposely selected due to their ‘exhibitionary’ and performative character. While the ‘museum’ as an institution and artefact concededly also incorporates concerns of museum operation, organisation, curatorship and visitor experience (Carbonell, 2012), ‘exhibitions’ are the focus for one principal reason: they provide tangible expression and evidence of the link between cultural policy and cultural production (Flew, 2012). As the many examples of street and
exhibition art interwoven throughout this thesis illustrate, they do this in that they (as cultural artefacts) reproduce, extol and propagate the policy requirements of Juche and Segyehwa.

Equally, ensemble and solo music performance, together with rehearsed performances such as the North Korean Mass Games, constitute an ‘acting out’ of the relationship between policy and culture. Here policy mandate can be seen to actively direct the unfolding of cultural representation and performance: for example, the hybridity evident in the simultaneous use of traditional Korean and Western instruments in South Korean music (Howard, 2006; Provine, Hwang & Kershaw, 2000; Shim, 2006); and the leadership veneration of North Korean Mass Games, for instance (Gordon, 2005; J. Lee, 2012). In this way, they too lend themselves to a ‘politics of representation’ approach in that they clearly reflect the representative nature of Juche and Segyehwa and showcase how these diametrically opposed policies manifest in North and South Korean cultural artefacts respectively. These themes are discussed in more detail in chapters 2, 6 and 7.

Returning briefly to Aihwa Ong’s (2006) position on the link between policy and culture, Ong is specifically raising concerns about the tendency to associate the nexus between policy and culture with liberalism and to analyse it within this frame. As noted, Ong (2006: 14) warns against any analysis undertaken under the “uniform global condition of ‘Neoliberalism,’” a position that I extend to argue instead for nation-state specific contexts. Vitally, the North Korean case aptly demonstrates the unfolding of the association between policy and culture outside of liberal political settings. North Korea is far from ‘liberal’ and its citizens far from ‘free’ – something detailed in Section 2.2.1 – yet as discussed by way of North Korean museum exhibitions and music and performance, there is a discernible connection between the
policy of the *Juche* idea and North Korean culture; just as there is between the *Segyehwa* policy and South Korean culture.

That said, in acknowledging that the policy-culture relationship unfolds in various political settings the intention is not to present some type of ‘false binary’ whereby South Korea is a definitive example showcasing the policy-culture nexus, or North Korea ‘the exception.’ Rather, I mean principally to underscore that, as with the processes of globalisation, the association between policy and culture is contextually specific and variable. The cases of North and South Korea are thus intended merely to provide insight into how the association between policy and culture manifests within the ‘one nation, two states’ context of the (divided) Korean peninsula. Furthermore, I am also looking to provide the political representation that emerges in the various cultural artefacts identified.

In terms of field work, in seeking to verify the theoretical assumptions of this study, a two and a half week research trip to South Korea was taken between 9 June and 26 June 2010. Whilst there, I visited a number of museums both in Seoul and the surrounding areas of Gwacheon and Suwon. Some of the museums visited include: The National Museum of Korea, Seoul Museum of Art (SeMA), National Museum of Art, National Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCA), Leeum Samsung Museum of Art, and the Korean War Memorial. I also attended various cultural and musical performances, including performances by traditional Korean folk dance troupes (*pungmulpae*) at the Korean Folk Village in Suwon. All of these activities were, of course, geared toward garnering a familiarity of how the principles of *Segyehwa* manifest in South Korean museum ‘exhibitions’ and ‘music and performance’ in the present day. As noted in Chapter 2 for example, demonstrative of cultural hybridity,
*pungmulpae* often feature alongside Western-inspired sounds and performances in music pieces by South Korean fusion groups such as SOREA (see *Image 17*).

I also took part in a United Nations Command (UNC) combined guided tour of Panmunjom and the DMZ as offered by *United Service Organizations* (USO). As part of the tour I visited the JSA, walking right up to the border, standing face to face with North Korean soldiers. Afterwards, I travelled to a less secure area of the DMZ complete with its own museum, train station and viewing platform (the Dora Observatory), from which a glimpse of North Korea could be caught. I also ventured down the Third Tunnel, allegedly dug by North Korea as a means of infiltrating the South (Downs, 1999: 190; Oberdorfer, 1998: 57-58). Vitally, in highlighting the division and divided nationalism at the core of the Korean nation, the information obtained from guides and exhibitions during my joint JSA and DMZ experience, yielded invaluable insights into the complexity of inter-Korean and US-Korea relations, past and present. The extent to which these insights informed my research is elaborated at various points throughout this work.

It must be noted however that while helpful in yielding insights into the complexity of the Korean geopolitical situation, due to the emphasis given to textual analysis, the field trip functioned as more of a supplementary enrichment to the study than an essential element of research design. Indeed, the supplementary role of the field trip is reflected in the fact that, with the exception of two photographs (see *Image 25* and *Image 26*), all pictorial examples drawn on throughout the thesis were taken from already published and readily available sources, including *Art under Control in North Korea* (2005), *North Korean Posters: The David Heather Collection* (2008) and South Korean museum websites. The same applies to the song examples drawn on in Chapter 7. Likewise, rather than depending on data collected
in the field, accompanying analyses were informed either by pre-existing research or a close reading of the texts themselves and their apparent link to relevant policy mandates. In this vein, the field trip served more as an orienting device intended to aid in the teasing out of possible lines of inquiry, than as a means of gathering research data.

**Organisation of the Thesis**

This thesis consists of seven chapters beyond this introduction. With the thesis dedicated to empirically evidencing that *Juche* and *Segyehwa* are, in fact, embedded in the cultural artefacts of North and South Korea respectively, Chapter 1 serves two purposes. The first is to stress the importance of cultural artefacts as objects of study. The second is to demonstrate the relevance and utility of globalisation theory to analysing the association between policy and culture in (divided) Korea, through artefacts.

With respect to the first point, it is argued that, concretely illustrative of the cultural values and ideologies of the state or group from which they emerge, cultural artefacts present as a valuable tool for understanding ‘culture’ beyond the purely theoretical. Importantly, the cultural artefact, essentially a culturally conditioned ‘reality,’ is advocated as a very useful method of gauging how the actual ‘cultures’ of the Koreas correspond to the theoretical constructs (*Juche* and *Segyehwa*) that are said to shape them.

With regards to globalisation theory, Chapter 1 clarifies how two opposing viewpoints of the globalisation debate: (1) that globalisation is a static, inevitably homogenising and highly imperialistic phenomenon, and (2) that globalisation is a mutable, contextually specific and potentially hybridising process, are reflected in
the policies of North and South Korea respectively. In presenting these arguments and positions as contrary, it is asserted that globalisation theory offers an apt frame for studying the policy-culture nexus in Korea through a ‘one nation, two states’ paradigm. Specifically, globalisation theory is forwarded as a revealing collaborative framework, utilised in conjunction with cultural artefacts to facilitate the tangible juxtaposition of North and South Korean politico-cultural ‘divisions.’

Chapter 2 reaffirms the complexity of Korea’s ‘divisions’ through a description and juxtaposition of the opposing globalisation postures of North and South Korea. Divided into three sections, it first elucidates the central tenets of Juche and Segyehwa respectively. Beginning with the North, I explore why Juche, North Korea’s guiding ideology and cornerstone of State policy, has transformed the socialist nation-state into perhaps the world’s most isolated. Explicitly, I offer a brief history of Juche’s rise to monolithic status, before going on to outline its core policy mandates and objectives. Special emphasis is given to the ways in which it manifests as an anti-globalisationist, anti-imperialist and anti-American policy.

Turning next to the case of the South, I then explain South Korea’s culturally specific policy on globalisation: Segyehwa. Positioning Segyehwa within the broader process of South Korean democratisation, I detail how the South Korean government, in adopting globalisation as a top priority for the first time, took proactive measures to turn its country into a competitive and connected, yet culturally unique ‘globalised’ state. In an effort to contextualise South Korea’s active pursuit of globalisation, the chapter elucidates the significance of the Segyehwa policy and the administration responsible for its conception (the Kim Young-sam administration), within the frame of South Korean history.
In this sense, presenting these divergent policies (and perceptions) of globalisation as products of Korea’s divided nationalism, Chapter 2 begins to address the first research question of the thesis by highlighting the “politico-cultural ‘divisions’” separating the North and South. Similarly, by beginning to empirically document how Juche and Segyehwa unfold in practice within divided Korea, Chapter 2 also considers the third research question concerning what Juche and Segyehwa potentially reveal about the nexus between policy and culture.

With the aim of illustrating the scope of the cultural and politico-ideological schism between North and South Korea, Chapter 3 traces the turbulent history of inter-Korean relations from 1971 to the December 2011 death of North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il. As this history testifies, the North-South Korea relationship has, to date, been characterised by a vicious cycle of confrontation and crisis. While this pattern of conflict has intermittently been broken by instances of dialogue and exchange, there appears to be a historical tendency for the Koreas to revert back to a state of high-tension and mutual distrust. Despite numerous promising signs of change, the bulk of ‘milestones’ reached have either been infused with more symbolism than substance, or been largely undermined by one or a combination of internal and external circumstances.

By taking steps toward acknowledging the intricate and fraught terrain on which studies relating to Korea tread, for the most part, Chapter 3 offers some important contextualisation for the thesis as a whole. Specifically, it continues to suggest that the trajectories (and policy choices) of the North and South are informed by very complex, specific and divergent cultural, political and ideological positioning. Drawing on the history of inter-Korean relations to emphasise these divergences, Chapter 3 thus considers what the course of inter-Korean relations
indicates about the ‘divisions’ between North and South Korea; a query posed by the first research question. In so doing, it lays yet further foundation for exploring how these different priorities and objectives shape, and are reflected in, the policies of Juche and Segyehwa.

Chapter 4 ponders the role of Korea-regional relations in moulding the cultures and foreign policy perspectives of the two Koreas. With respect to regional and international actors focus is given to the part Japan, China and the US have played, and may yet play, in affecting the respective globalisation strategies and cultural artefacts of North and South Korea. Given the theorised association between policy and culture, the chapter also offers examples from North Korean propaganda art, illustrating the unfolding of North Korean anti-Japanese and anti-US sentiment in practice.

Attention then turns to North Korea’s greatest ally China, and its past and potential future influence on North Korean cultural artefacts. Namely, through empirical example and comparison it is posited, owing largely to the ideological (socialist) affinity between Pyongyang and Beijing, that North Korean propaganda art finds great inspiration in that of Maoist China, while still retaining unique qualities. Cognisant of the influence of the Soviet Union due to its military occupation of North Korea between 1945 and 1948 (Lankov, 2013: 6), the role of Soviet Socialist Realism in the development of North Korean propaganda art is also recognised. Furthermore, acknowledging the (relative) appeal of the Chinese globalisation model to Pyongyang, China’s potential influencing capacity, as well as the marked Chinese character of past North Korean reform, it is asserted that China may yet influence the development of North Korean cultural artefacts, by
encouraging its socialist neighbour down a somewhat Chinese-inspired (though undoubtedly North-Korean) path to reform.

Continuing the theme of regional influence, Chapter 5 shifts the focus to a discussion of the North Korean nuclear issue and Six-Party Talks process. Working within this setting, it has three sections and interrelated aims. The prime objective of the first is to contextualise the North Korean nuclear issue within the frame of Juche and its pursuit of self-reliance and regime survival. Demonstrative of this connection, the aim of the second section is to illuminate the extent to which North Korea’s nuclear strategy is determined by US policy and political posture toward Pyongyang. Due to its notoriously hard-line approach to North Korea, particular attention is given to the hawkish policy of the (consecutive) George W. Bush administrations (2001-2009), as well as to the reaction elicited from North Korea.

In providing a brief overview of the North Korean nuclear issue, coverage is limited to developments post-2002. As Chapter 5 reveals, Bush’s undisguised contempt for North Korea, as demonstrated through his ‘Axis of Evil’ declaration and various other pronouncements, only succeeded in aggravating the North Korean nuclear crisis and in guiding the evolution of North Korea’s nuclear programs (Joo and Kwak, 2007: 196). In seeking to illustrate the link between US policy and North Korean nuclear ambition, Chapter 5 draws on several North Korean propaganda art examples of a reactionary nature, to underscore the role of US ‘hostile’ intent (real and perceived) in exacerbating the nuclear crisis.

Further exposing the reactionary nature of North Korea’s nuclear strategy, the remainder of Chapter 5 details the patterns unfolding over the history of Six-Party Talks, concerned predominantly with their strong reflection of the Jucheist concerns of sovereignty preservation and regime survival. Drawing on the cyclical
(up and down) nature of disarmament negotiations as evidence, it is argued that there is a clear interrelation between North Korea’s nuclear ambition and its Juche-centric perception of US and regional threat.

As is reasoned, that a hawkish US policy (such as that of the Bush administration) should be habitually met either with threats of nuclear retaliation, or an escalation in nuclear activity, sheds important light on the motivations behind North Korean policy. Significantly, it strongly suggests that North Korea’s engagement policy (of which its nuclear brinkmanship is part), is determined by the international political environment, or more specifically, whether that environment poses a threat to regime survival. It is posited that trends emerging from the nuclear crisis and negotiations denote a tendency on the part of North Korea to employ ‘nuclear intimidation’ as a political bargaining chip; a bargaining chip used chiefly as a means of ensuring its survival. Thus, in identifying regime survival as central to North Korean politics, and indeed existence, Chapter 5 yields valuable insights into the political motivations underlying Juche. That is, it shows that North Korea’s (and Juche’s) anti-globalisationist stance is inextricably bound to North Korea’s quest for longevity.

In view of the above, chapters 4 and 5 are both aimed at further underscoring that Korea’s domestic situation (particularly its politics and culture), is influenced by a number of local, regional and international factors (and actors), which collectively have a bearing on the perspectives and policies of North and South Korea. Accordingly, together they provide a basis from which to investigate the motivations, contextual circumstances and government agendas, shaping (and exemplified by), the policies of Juche and Segyehwa. As such, they contribute to answering the second and third research questions of the thesis. In the former case they achieve this by
assessing the extent to which each policy is informed by Korea’s (past, present and perhaps future) regional relations. In the latter instance, they yield insights into how Juche and Segyehwa manifest in practice within the North and South. This is most noticeable in regards to North Korea, its nuclear program and vocal denouncement of US troop presence in the South, which as discussed, are motivated by Juche.

As noted, this thesis draws on two cultural artefacts to demonstrate how the policies of Juche and Segyehwa mould and manifest in the cultures of the North and South. Chapter 6 extends the empirical component of the study by offering a more in-depth analysis of the first of these artefacts: the museum and ‘exhibition.’ In working to substantiate that there is a discernible link between policy and culture in divided Korea, various museums from each of the two Korean states are examined. In examining South Korean museums, the chapter investigates whether South Korea’s museums align with the Segyehwa policy by exhibiting a ‘Koreanisation’ of foreign influences. With respect to North Korea, it explores the degree to which the tenets of Juche are embodied in, and exemplified by, the themes and content of both the North Korean ‘Museum of Merit’ (a common public exhibition space celebrating North Korea’s leaders) and the State-designated conventional museum. Emphasis again is given to how the US is portrayed as an ‘imperial aggressor.’

Questioning whether the case of ‘the museum’ is representative of a broader, far-reaching trend in Korea, Chapter 7 extends the analysis of earlier chapters to draw on the cultural artefact of music and performance in greater detail. In evaluating the influence of Juche and Segyehwa respectively, several music performance examples from each Korea are analysed. With reference to North Korea, discussion is focused on the extent to which North Korean songs, as well as its ‘Mass Games’ extravaganza: a large-scale choreographed gymnastics
performance of discernable ideological content, satisfy the following broad theoretical requirements of *Juche*: (1) an unabated loyalty to the Party and leader(s), (2) the *Jucheist* value of self-reliance, (3) the command of whole-hearted unity and collectivism, and (4) a deep suspicion of the foreign and the US in particular (see Chapter 2 for an explanation of *Juche* and its requirements).

Similarly, in addressing how South Korean music embodies, shapes, and reflects the objectives of the *Segyehwa* policy, echoing chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 7 concentrates on the ways in which South Korean contemporary music reflects a hybridised style. Drawing on a number of musical examples from a range of genres, it is argued that South Korean artists tend to appropriate (or Koreanise) Western musical forms to create a hybrid East-West musical fusion, that is both foreign and familiar.

In this way, as with previous chapters, chapters 6 and 7 ground the theoretical and speculative in physical and observable reality, revealing that the theoretical ‘blueprints’ of *Juche* and *Segyehwa* do indeed translate into the practical within North and South Korea.

Crucially, as argued throughout these chapters, as well as clarifying the role of agency in cultural globalisation, the case of Korea offers broader insights into the negotiation of cultural nationalism and policy within a global conflict hotspot, such as the Korean peninsula.
With this background, I now turn to argue the importance of cultural artefacts, and particularly ‘the museum’ and ‘music and performance’ as objects of study, through a review of artefact and Korean-specific literature. Given the framing of policy-culture arguments around globalisation policy, I also turn to clarify the suitability of globalisation theory as an analytical framework for studying the association between policy and culture through artefacts.
1. Importance of Cultural Artefacts

Given that a key aim of this thesis is to argue a link between policy and culture in divided Korea, this chapter confirms the importance of cultural artefacts as objects of empirical study within the field of cultural research. Consequently, it confirms the scholarly merit of cultural artefacts, as well as validates the importance of ‘the museum’ and ‘music and performance’ as chosen artefacts of study through a review of artefact and Korea-specific literature. Owing to the framing of policy-culture arguments around globalisation policy, it also isolates and evaluates globalisation scholarship relevant to, and reflective of, the cases of North and South Korea. Specifically, emphasising the need to utilise theory and artefact in combination, globalisation theory is presented as an insightful and collaborative framework for assessing the association between policy and culture in Korea, within a ‘one nation, two states’ paradigm.
1.1 The Scholarly Value of Cultural Artefacts

In moving to recognise the importance of cultural artefacts, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the term. Essentially, a ‘cultural artefact’ is a culturally-laden ‘thing’ (Cahoone, 1988: 219; Miller, 1994: 69; Miller, 2007, 2010). Yet, just as the meaning of artefacts themselves can differ according to context, what might be said to constitute a cultural artefact can differ depending on context and breadth of definition. Adopting a definition quite pertinent to the present study, in an essay entitled “Rhetorical Community: The Cultural Basis of Genre,” Carolyn R. Miller (1994: 69) describes cultural artefacts as:

Products . . . bearers of culture [that] literally incorporate knowledge – knowledge of the aesthetics, economics, politics, religious beliefs and all the various dimensions of what we know as human culture.

The notion of artefact as cultural materiality is supported by Daniel Miller (2007; 2010) in a series of works. In his essay “Artefacts and the Meaning of Things,” for example, Miller (2007: 167) defines artefacts as “a means by which we give form to, and come to an understanding of, ourselves, others, or abstractions such as the nation or the modern” (emphasis added). In a brief explanation of this definition, he adds that artefacts are a “subset of culture” and “form of being-in-the-world,” which brings “materiality of form [to] the cultural process” (Miller, 2007: 168). These arguments are echoed in his later 2010 book Stuff, in which artefacts are similarly defined as “the object world created by humanity” (Miller, 2010: 2), or more broadly, simply as “stuff.” Building on these conceptualisations, the term ‘cultural artefact’ should therefore be understood as a ‘thing,’ which is materially expressive of culture or cultural practice. That is, as a tangible manifestation of the desires, ideologies and resistances of a collective group, society or nation-state.
In applying this definition to the case of divided Korea, cultural artefacts should be viewed as concrete means of measuring if and how the political and cultural mandates of Juche and Segyehwa are practically applied. Moreover, they should be recognised and valued as sites facilitating an examination of cultural difference. Given the contrary positions of Juche and Segyehwa, a juxtaposition of cultural artefacts from the North and South provides material evidence of the cultural, political and ideological divergences separating the Koreas. Korean cultural artefacts thus highlight both how the policy agendas of the Koreas differ, as well as what these differences indicate about the relationship between policy and culture.

Given the definition of ‘cultural artefact’ taken up in this study, the following provides clarification as to how the examined categories of ‘the museum’ and ‘music and performance,’ serve as cultural artefacts. As museum studies scholar Bettina Messias Carbonell (2012: 1) points out, museums are cultural artefacts in that they, from their “permanent collections” to their “retail store” and “restaurant”:

explicitly or unwittingly present the ‘material conditions of existence,’ the ‘representations which produce meanings,’ and the ‘modes of production’ and ‘signification’ which constitute a sound basis for the study of culture.

In simpler terms, the museum exists essentially as a materialisation of culture, with its explicit rendering of culture securing its status as a cultural artefact, as per the definition adopted above.

Equally, drawing on ethnomusicologist Bruno Nettl’s (2005: 253) argument that music is an expression of the “central values of culture in abstracted form,” music is a cultural artefact in that it is a tangible product, bound to, and reflective of, a specific cultural context. In this way, as Nettl (2005: 253) explains, music can assist in the study of culture as it has the capacity to “abstract and distill [sic] [its]
relatively unclear and obscure character” in material terms. This argument is informed by, and in echo of, the earlier pioneering works of Alan Lomax (1968) and John Blacking (1987).

The same can be said of performance more broadly. In fact, Nettl (2005: 47) contends that music is itself comprised of other *culturally-determined* ‘artefacts’ and aspects of performance (such as dancing and speech), which likewise contribute to the elucidation of culture. Applying this latter point to the Korean context and empirical analyses of Chapter 7, mass gymnastics should be regarded as one of the ‘performance’ artefacts typically accompanying music in North Korea.

In view of the above, much of the importance of the cultural artefact thus relates to its validity and usefulness as a *collaborative* research tool; to the insights that can be gained from utilising theory and artefact in combination. Indeed, in the realm of cultural studies, theory and artefact are mutually informative. Certainly, given that cultural artefacts are culturally conditioned objects, theory has a crucial role to play in framing a researcher’s ‘cultural’ understanding and interpretation (Cahoone, 1988: 219; Kreps, 2003: 50; Renfrew, 2003: 55-58). In nurturing a better understanding of the contextual specificities in which an artefact is produced, consumed and embedded, theoretical research provides a means of delimiting and sifting through a myriad of interpretive possibilities.

In the present case, a theoretical understanding of *Juche* and *Segyehwa* provides a specific list of governmental objectives, against which the divergent cultural trajectories of North and South Korea can be better analysed, accounted for and understood. Similarly, globalisation theory offers a frame through which to understand and interpret these specific governmental objectives and their fundamental differences. In acknowledging the crucial role of context and theory,
this framing of cultural understanding is undertaken both later in this and subsequent chapters, particularly Chapter 2.

Correspondingly, the cultural artefact is equally valuable as a provisional cultural ‘access point’ in that it gives ‘culture,’ admittedly an omnibus concept, a physical materiality via which it can be more clearly pinpointed, measured and defined. As anthropologist Grant McCracken (1988: 68) notes, material culture, of which cultural artefacts are part, is “an unusually cunning and oblique device for the representation of fundamental cultural truths” in that “it allows culture to insinuate its beliefs and assumptions into the very fabric of daily life.” In other words, it is precisely its rendering of culture that affords the cultural artefact its scholarly importance and usefulness as a tool of analysis, in that it provides a concrete expression of culture not possible through other means.

Viewed through this prism, cultural artefacts are a worthy addition to the researcher’s tool-kit, in that they offer a complementary perspective to that obtained through theoretical methods and research. Namely, they provide insights as to whether the assumptions formed by way of conventional theoretical wisdom are supported, or countermanded, by material reality. Thus, by either corroborating or disproving theoretical assumptions, allowing for a comparison between theory and fact, cultural artefacts arm the researcher with the necessary tools to arrive at a conclusion, not only theoretically sound, but empirically validated and representative. The contribution of cultural artefacts to this study then is two-fold. Their first contribution lies in their potential to yield otherwise unattainable insight into how the theoretical policy directives of Juche and Segyehwa, as described in Chapter 2, manifest in the cultures of North and South Korea, respectively. Secondly, by providing these cultural manifestations of policy, they present a
tangible means of gauging and substantiating the unfolding of an association between policy and culture in (divided) Korea.

Having established the importance of the cultural artefact, I now turn to the particular value of ‘the museum’ or ‘museum exhibition’ and ‘music and performance,’ through a review of artefact and Korea-specific literature.

1.2 The Museum Exhibition and the Case of Korea

Sociologist Gordon Fyfe (2011: 43) explains that a recent increase in the prominence of museum studies within sociological and cultural research has seen a marked shift toward recognising the museum’s role in the study and understanding of culture. This shift, “informed” by sociological and cultural studies frameworks, has prompted scholars to look beyond the “isolated curatorial object” to consider the social and cultural contexts in which they were produced and are viewed (Fyfe, 2011: 43). This greater awareness of the importance of context to artefact interpretation and interest in examining contextual relationships, has also led to changes in the way the museum itself is conceived. No longer seen as a simple repository of artefacts offering a narration of, or window into the past, as described by Messias Carbonell (2012: 1), the museum has evolved to be considered as a living institution of the present day – itself a cultural artefact.

Importantly, this change stimulated an increase of scholarly inquiry into how the museum, in its totality, could be thought to construct and represent ‘culture.’ In addressing this question, anthropologist and museologist Christina Faye Kreps (2003: 2), contends that much of the museum’s capacity to construct and convey ‘culture,’ is tied to the museum’s status as “an instrument of education,” or to borrow
a term used by fellow anthropologist and museum studies researcher, Flora Kaplan (1994: 3), a “purveyor of ideology.”

The idea that museums constitute “ideologically active environments” was one advanced by art historians Carol Duncan and Alan Wallach (1978: 30) over three decades ago. At the crux of this argument, which continues to be echoed and extended today, is the belief that museums serve very particular social, cultural and political ends. That is, as well as constructing and disseminating national agendas, they have the potential to “impress upon those who see and use them a society’s most revered values and beliefs” (Duncan and Wallach, 1978: 28). Not to discount the visitor’s own interpretive powers and the variation in interpretation engendered, the purposeful assemblage of exhibits, including careful selection as to what is and is not contained within them, has the potential to reveal much about the ‘culture’ being represented. In many ways, it is these choices which compound and define it.

A museum’s ability to control the ‘culture’ it exhibits by including and excluding particular artefacts in its process of culture definition, sees museums function as “powerful identity [and culture] defining machines” (Duncan, 1991: 101-102). As Duncan (1991: 95) explains, “what we see and what we do not see . . . and on what terms and whose authority we do or do not see it” uncovers much about how the culture in question, or at least its designated voice, seeks to define it. That is, by deciding the materials available for consumption and interpretation, artefact selections and omissions place an interpretive frame around the museum-goer’s interpretive licence. This imposition of restrictions, or preference to certain interpretations at the expense of others, thus reinforces the potentially ideological/political and strategic nature of museums and exhibitions.
Take the intentionally exclusionary nature of Pyongyang’s Revolutionary Museum for example. As discussed in the forthcoming pages, the museum advocates Juche by highlighting the ‘greatness’ and ‘invincibility’ of the North Korean leadership and citizenry. Its glorification of Juche however, is only possible through processes of deliberate exclusion. For instance, in an effort to portray North Korea’s Korean War campaign as ‘victorious,’ all references to Soviet or Chinese assistance have been omitted (Becker, 2005: 54). This careful selection of exhibition material clearly demonstrates not only how the North Korean leadership is able to control the ‘culture’ exhibited in its museums, but ensure the propagation of Jucheist themes, which are detailed in Chapter 2.

If one is to believe that museums and exhibitions are “pivotal places for envisaging collective [cultural] identity and national goals” (Kaplan, 1994: 45) as the above would suggest, then it would seem that they are equally ‘pivotal’ places for observing how policies, such as Juche and Segyehwa, actually manifest in the cultures from which they derive. In fact, several scholars and social commentators have noted the Jucheist nature of North Korean museums and exhibitions, as well as South Korea’s general tendency to ‘Koreanise’ foreign influences; a tendency I argue extends to its museums. Consequently, the following reviews the extent to which the respective Jucheist and hybrid character of North and South Korean museums has been, both directly and indirectly, acknowledged in Korea-specific scholarship and literature.

To begin with the North Korean case, as noted, several scholars including Jasper Becker (2005) and Selig S. Harrison (2002), have remarked on the discernibly Jucheist nature of North Korean museums. Though, despite this apparent increasing awareness, most commentary has been made either within the frame of general
Korean scholarship, or by scholars, reporters and members of the general public, writing of their travel experiences in Pyongyang. These observations are supplemented in chapters 2, 4 and 5 through an examination of North Korean propaganda art. They are also extended in Chapter 6, through a specific analysis of North Korean museum exhibitions, for the most part, not cited in the works drawn on below.

That said, Korean antique art expert, Jane Portal, comes closest to an explicit examination of North Korean museums in her 2005 book *Art under Control in North Korea*. As the title of her contribution suggests, Portal (2005) investigates how North Korean art generally, from architecture to paintings, to cinema and dance, exhibits and extols the various requirements of *Juche*. Using art as her frame of reference, Portal (2005: 79) draws on a variety of literary and pictorial examples to demonstrate that Kim Il Sung’s “instruction” to create art of *Juche* character has “prevailed.”

As elaborated in Chapter 2, as well as stressing self-reliance, *Juche* demands a united and unwavering loyalty to the leader and the State (J. I. Kim, 1982: 64). It also manifests as a fervent anti-imperialist struggle against foreign infiltration, particularly (perceived) imperial powers the United States and Japan (J. I. Kim, 1982: 25-26 – see chapters 2 and 4). To begin with the former requirement, this need to demonstrate steadfast commitment to the regime has resulted in an explicit link between *Juche* and leadership veneration; a link that clearly unfolds in North Korean art and exhibitions which, by necessity, denote and personify the complete deification of the North Korean leadership.

Underscoring the link between *Juche* and leadership adulation, Portal (2005) places strong emphasis on how North Korean art serves essentially to bolster the (*Juche*-driven) personality cults of the Kim dynasty. Explicitly, she writes of how art
and exhibition “subject matter . . . is limited and controlled, dominated by the need to show loyalty to the regime and the Great Leader [Kim Il Sung] and Dear Leader [Kim Jong Il]” (Portal, 2005: 168-169 – emphasis added).

Considering that several of the art pieces included in her book (and others like them), appear in the many museums across North Korea, Portal’s observations are widely representative of North Korean museums and exhibitions as a whole. Moreover, with her arguments also applying to non-conventional museums, namely Pyongyang architecture, monuments and street (poster) propaganda (examples from the latter of which are dispersed and scrutinised throughout the thesis), insight is given into the ‘real’ Juche-centricity of North Korean exhibitions and, in particular, their role as manifestations of Kim worship.

While not her predominant focus, Portal does make reference to some museums and exhibitions over the course of her work, providing insight into their Jucheist character. Two of the more notable brought to attention are the Revolutionary Museum of Pyongyang and the International Friendship Exhibition Hall, situated on Mount Myohyangsan, north of the capital. Centring her analysis around leadership veneration, Portal (2005: 95) tells of how the Friendship Exhibition, purposed with the storage and presentation of gifts donated to the North Korean leadership by the international community, plays a central role in legitimising the North Korean way of life. As she explains, comprised of a total of 61,000 exhibits (gathered from representatives from a host of nations), including some dated prior to Kim Il Sung’s presidency as well as post his death in 1994, the Exhibition “giv[es] the impression of great worldwide support for the Kim regime.” In so doing, Portal (2005: 95) deems it to convey a sense that the “adulation of the
North Korean people is insufficient,” to pay homage to the full magnanimity of the Kims.

Also pointing to the link between *Juche* and Kim worship, Journalist and writer, Jasper Becker (2005) recalls experiencing this seemingly all-encompassing leadership adulation during a November 1986 visit to Pyongyang. Specifically, he admits to being swept up in the obligatory idolisation of the Kims, only to find himself “solemnly” pledging a gift to Kim Il Sung in the form of “a large peacock fan and a bag of Mars bars” (Becker, 2005: 116), gifts he speculates may now feature among the thousands on display in the Friendship Exhibition.

Further underlining how the exhibition fulfils the *Jucheist* demand of ‘Kim adulation,’ Portal (2005: 96) remarks of the painstaking efforts made to protect and preserve the museum and the “shrine-like . . . large white wax statue” of Kim Il Sung around which it is focused. As she explains, not only is each visitor made to wear “floor-protecting plastic slippers,” but rooms are kept at a fixed eighteen degrees Celsius (Portal, 2005: 95-96). Certainly, such a generous allocation of electricity is a clear expression of (*Jucheist*) priority given that North Korea is suffering a severe electricity shortage. Such prioritisation shows not only the prominent place afforded *Juche* in North Korean culture, but the place of the International Friendship Exhibition, as well as museums and exhibitions in general, as drivers and reinforcers of the ideology, and closely linked cult of the Kims.

Similarly, although she does not use the term in her description, Portal portrays the Revolutionary Museum of Pyongyang as being particularly oriented to the service of *Juche*. Seeing it as “a telling monument to [Kim Il Sung’s] control” and “deferential” portrayal, she explains how, “with little mention of anyone else,” its seven sections and ninety-two exhibition rooms, spanning 4,500 metres in length,
are devoted entirely to “exaggerating” the Great Leader’s contribution to all facets of Korean history (Portal, 2005: 96-97). In fact, as Portal (2005: 82) reveals, the museum’s “height of Kim reverence” reaches literal proportions, with a twenty metre high “monumental [bronze] sculpture” of Kim Il Sung erected in its forecourt. Constructed in 1972 in celebration of Kim Il Sung’s sixtieth birthday and originally gilded at a cost exceeding US $800 million (Becker, 2005: 69), Portal (2005: 82) describes the statue as “the epitome of Kim Cult Art,” and thus of *Juche* Art.\(^5\) Confirming the Revolutionary Museum’s place as a reinforcer of *Juche*, documenting a 2000 trip to Pyongyang, Nanchu and Xing Hang (2003: 63) write of seeing the “colossal figure” of Kim’s statue “flank[ed]” with “[t]remendous slabs of concrete,” each “decorated with gigantic statues idealizing the *Juche* doctrine.”

Citing this same reverence, Harrison (2002: 14) writes of the Revolutionary Museum’s “most dramatic exhibit”: an amphitheatre showing “a life-sized reproduction” of the Battle of Pochonbo, an anti-Japanese offensive supposedly led and won by Kim Il Sung.\(^6\) As per his account, “[h]ushed audiences” are said to have “sighed, wept and cheered as shifting photo montages were projected onto the stockade backdrop and patriotic songs blared.” Then, in a scene capturing the extent of *Juche*’s idolisation of the North Korean leadership, Harrison (2002: 14) recounts how, after the battle was waged and won (by Kim of course), battle-scenes were promptly and dutifully “followed by Kim’s adoration on the shoulders of triumphant villagers.”

---

5 The statue’s gold coating was removed in the late 1970s (Portal, 2005: 82) after Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping “severely criticized” it as “excessive” (Nanchu and Hang, 2003: 63). Deng was reportedly furious that US $851 million, much of which was Chinese aid, had been “squandered” by the North (Becker, 2005: 150).

6 While the Battle of Pochonbo did take place and Kim Il Sung did lead the raid, its significance to Korea’s general anti-Japanese struggle is grossly exaggerated in the North. As former English language adviser to North Korea and Pyongyang resident, Michael Harrold (2004: 127) explains, the ‘battle’ was “in reality little more than a minor raid on a guard post.”
As Becker (2005: 54) explains, this theme of a triumphant Kim Il Sung and independent North Korea sweeps through the museum, applying also to the Korean War. As he plainly puts it, the Revolutionary Museum is “exclusively devoted” to propagating a “crude edifice of lies” which charges the South with starting the War and credits the North with winning it (see chapters 4 and 6). With the museum and its exhibitions presenting North Korea’s ‘victory’ as one singlehandedly secured by Kim Il Sung, with no recognition of Soviet or Chinese assistance, Becker (2005: 54) argues that the museum is likewise “devoted” to the “aggrandizement” of the Kims, in perfect alignment with the North Korean and Juche agenda.

Such veneration of the Kims notwithstanding, as scholars such as Becker (2005: 116) note, the Juche-centricity of North Korean museums is not confined to a worshiping of the North Korean leadership. In further expression of Juche, North Korean museums, by way of their exhibitions, also portray the US as ‘imperialists’ and strongly warn of the dangers of ‘flunkeyism.’ Again referencing his 1986 trip, Becker (2005: 116) describes how guides to North Korea’s many sites and museums, including its war museum, continue to “speak a stilted archaic language,” whereby the US is defined as its enemy and the South as a US colony of “treacherous puppets.” The extent to which this theme and ‘language’ permeates these sites is such that Becker (2005: 116) acknowledges that, “[a]fter a while the visitor feels that he has fallen through a trap door into another world [where] [h]e starts referring not to Americans but ‘the American imperialists,’ and instead of the South Korean government, ‘the South Korean flunkeys.’”

With regard to South Korea, while it does not appear that much work has been done on the hybrid character of South Korean museums, per se, a general acknowledgement of South Korea’s creative ability to Koreanise foreign cultural
influences, points to the museum as perhaps continuing the trend. Interestingly, scholars focused on the hybrid nature of other ‘artefacts’ have regarded their findings as an “illustration” of a more widely observable phenomenon. As Doobo Shim (2006: 35) contends while writing of the hybrid nature of the South Korean music industry, the tendency for South Koreans to add local “twists” and “indigenous characteristics” to foreign forms, “is clearly a sign of resilience of the subaltern – and of the ‘contamination of the imperial.’” This is especially the case, he argues, when one considers the breadth and growth of foreign and particularly American influence, as well as America’s long-established “domination of global cultural industries” (Shim, 2006: 40).

Corroborating South Korea’s tendency to ‘Koreanise,’ Shin Gi-wook (2003: 6) maintains that there is a “curious mixture” of nationalism and globalisation in South Korea, which though “seemingly contradictory,” presents “no inherent contradiction” in the South Korean context. Thus, echoing Shim’s (2006) contention that South Korea’s Koreanisation is not confined to music, or even popular culture, Shin (2003) suggests that such examples are indicative of a larger, across-the-board proactive appropriation of the foreign. Given arguments indicating the far-reaching nature of this trend, together with the museum’s classification as a potential site of cultural connoisseurship, the museum could provide an interesting ‘new’ avenue for investigating and contributing to, knowledge surrounding South Korea’s ‘Koreanisation’ efforts.

Having argued the importance of the museum and museum exhibition, I turn now to the importance of music and performance, in both a general and Korean context.
1.3 Music and Performance and the Case of Korea

In addition to its wider utility as a tool for observing and assessing the ‘bone and flesh’ of ‘lived’ culture, the fact that music falls within the realm of popular everyday culture is noteworthy for several reasons. While popular culture has traditionally been overlooked, trivialised or viewed as contra-academic, the pioneering works of cultural studies researchers like Stuart Hall (1981), Raymond Williams (1983) and John Fiske (1987, 1989), have seen popular culture evolve, over the past decades, from an “academic backwater” (Mukerji and Schudson, 1991: 1), to a serious and academically applicable object of study.

This move toward greater scholarly recognition and utilisation, particularly within the field of cultural studies, has been due primarily to the realisation that “popular culture is important, first and foremost, because it is popular” (Lewis, 2006: 320). That is to say, as articulated by media and cultural studies researcher, Justin Lewis (2006: 320), its widespread dissemination and reception sees popular culture mould, and thus provide a window into, the “popular consciousness” of the culture(s), society(ies) and nation-state(s) of which it forms an integral part. In this way, music can be used to ascertain whether the (theoretically) purported persuasiveness of Juche, is indeed as deeply rooted in the ‘popular consciousness’ and action of North Koreans as it claims to be. Similarly, with respect to the South, music offers a means of determining how the Segyehwa policy’s emphasis on Koreanisation shapes and is expressed through, the cultural landscape of the nation-state.

Defined by Hall (1981) and Fiske (1989) as a sphere of resistance, popular culture also presents as a particularly useful site for exploring South Korea’s reshaping of Western hegemony. Reflecting the arguments forwarded in the present
study concerning South Korean music, Fiske (1989: 20) defines popular culture as “a site of struggle [demonstrating] the popular tactics by which [forces of dominance] are coped with, are evaded or resisted.” In the same vein, for Hall (1981: 239), popular culture is an “arena of consent and resistance” where a “struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is engaged.” In light of such definitions, an examination of South Korean music, as popular culture, has the potential not only to evidence South Korea’s ability to exert agency in the globalisation process, as expressed through its Segyehwa-inspired Koreanisation of Western influences, but to showcase how this resistance translates into everyday life and practice.

Indeed, adding to the validity of music as an object of study, a number of scholars including Keith Howard (2006) and Doobo Shim (2006) have remarked as to the Jucheist and hybrid nature of North and South Korean music, respectively. The findings of these scholars, elaborated below, are expanded in later chapters. Specifically, the Jucheist nature of North Korean music is assessed in Chapter 7, while the hybridising nature of South Korean music is discussed in chapters 2 and 7.

To begin with the case of South Korea, five notable authors warrant mention for their acknowledgement of the amalgamative nature of South Korean music. These include Rob Provine and co-contributors to “Korea: Our Life is Precisely a Song” (2000), Okon Hwang and Andy Kershaw; editor and author of Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave (2006a) and Perspectives on Korean Music (Vol 1 – 2006b and Vol 2 – 2006c), Keith Howard; and Doobo Shim, with his 2006 contribution “Hybridity and the Rise of Korean Popular Culture in Asia.”

The research of each of these scholars, referred to in turn below, strengthens the examples given in chapters 2 and 7 in two ways. Firstly, it highlights that many scholars working within the field of South Korean popular culture, have identified an
overwhelming tendency among South Korean musicians, to mix Western and South Korean musical elements. Secondly, it elucidates the scope of musical hybridity in South Korea, so as to suggest that the examples analysed are broadly representative of how Western music can be, and often is, Koreanised. In saying that, it must be noted that none of the studies referenced were conducted within the frame of the Segyehwa policy.

This notwithstanding, Provine, Hwang and Kershaw (2000: 166) support the notion that South Korean music reflects the Segyehwa policy, by recognising the prevalence and recurrence of hybridised music in South Korea. Corroborating the arguments advanced in Chapter 7, they contend that “[i]t would be misleading to portray [South] Korean pop music as entirely dominated by foreign influences.” In fact extending this argument, they posit that South Korean music has always been of a hybrid character, and that South Korean musicians have always “successfully adapted indigenous [South] Korean vocal techniques to project [South] Korean musical pathos.” In speaking specifically of the 1990s music scene, emerging during Kim Young-sam’s presidential term, Provine et al. (2000: 166) insist that “efforts to combine Korean traditional music with popular [that is, increasingly Western] musical tastes have always been maintained.”

In order to substantiate this assertion they review the work of Kim Young-dong, a South Korean musician trained in traditional Korean musical arts, whose music fuses sounds from two traditional Korean instruments: the Daegum (bamboo transverse flute) and Gayageum (plucked zither), with those of the Western acoustic guitar. Central to their argument is that Kim Young-dong is only “one of the representative figures of this nationalistic style” (Provine et al., 2000: 166). That is, his work is a singular example of many, which together have ensured that foreign
musical influences are continually positioned amongst “a fresh and exciting world of traditional sounds.”

In the second volume of his “Perspectives on Korean Music,” Creating Korean Music: Tradition, Innovation and the Discourse of Identity, Korean music expert, Keith Howard (2006c: 1), focuses on what he argues is a propensity among South Korean artists to incorporate Eastern and Western flavours into their music; or as he writes, to “integrate themselves [and their music] with the past.” Central to his work is his insistence that, in spite of increasing foreign influence, “elements of the old are frequently incorporated” into South Korean music, as composers “seek a balance between the competing sound worlds of tradition and Western music” (Howard, 2006c: 90). Working to demonstrate this interplay between Western and Korean ‘sound worlds,’ Howard cites a number of South Korean percussion groups, which he argues have succeeded in modernising traditional Korean percussion music through the fusion of Western and Korean instruments. One such group is Durae Pae, which in 1990, offered a composition mutually inspired by Western and Korean culture, by combining a traditional Korean percussion sextet with synthesisers and guitars (Howard, 2006c: 59-60).

Many of these same arguments are advanced in Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave (2006). In his introduction to the edited volume, Howard (2006a: ix) sets the tone for the rest of the book by asserting that one of its core intentions is to “explore difference;” how South Korean music exhibits its own unique and local flavour. “Certainly,” he contends, “[South] Korean pop is distinct” in that Western influences and genres are “made [South] Korean” by local artists and composers (Howard, 2006a: ix). Reemphasising this in his own contribution “Coming of Age: Korean Pop in the 1990s,” Howard (2006a: 82) argues that the 1990s saw Western
music and genres, “appropriated and made Korean in a striking amalgam” of South Korean and foreign musical styles. He follows this up by claiming that “acculturation collapsed the foreign into a vernacular expression” (Howard, 2006a: 91), which transformed South Korean music into a melding of Western and South Korean musical culture. In this sense, as Howard (2006a: 93) insists, the globalisation of the South Korean music industry was (and is) not only about “importing” and embracing “the foreign,” but about imbuing the foreign with “local similarity.”

In echo of Provine et al. (2000) and Howard (2006), this theme of East-West hybridisation also forms the foundation of Doobo Shim’s “Hybridity and the Rise of Korean Popular Culture in Asia.” A key contention underpinning Shim’s (2006: 27) work is that South Koreans “appropriate global goods, conventions and styles, including music . . . and inscribe their everyday meaning into them.” In other words, they Koreanise, or more accurately South Koreanise “global popular cultural forms” in such a way as to “express their local sentiment and culture” (Shim, 2006: 27). In defence of this position Shim (2006: 36-37) examines various South Korean bands and solo artists, including Seo Taiji and Boys, describing how many of their songs employ both traditional Korean and modern Western instruments and style. I extend this analysis in Chapter 7 by analysing a hit single by Seo Taiji and Boys entitled Hayuhga, not mentioned by Shim. Specifically, in underscoring how the song succeeds in Koreanising the global ‘popular cultural form’ of music, I discuss its simultaneous utilisation of Western instruments such as the electric guitar and the traditional Korean double-reed wind instrument, the Taepyeongso (see Chapter 7).

Crucially, Shim’s (2006: 39) observations and research lead him to conclude that “globalization, particularly in the realm of popular culture, breeds a creative form of hybridization that works towards sustaining local identities in the global
In fact, the notion that South Korean popular culture manifests as a site for grappling with and expressing cultural issues, such as hybridity, is also advanced by Lynn Hyung-gu (2007) in his broader work on modern Korean history. Reflecting briefly on the ‘Korean Wave’ (*Hallyu*) – a phrase coined to refer to the “diffusion” of South Korean popular culture throughout Asia and the rest of the world (Lynn, 2007: 70) – Lynn (2007: 80) notes a general proclivity for South Korean artists “to displa[y] their Korean origins proudly on their sleeves.” Therefore, although the examples presented in the above works, with the exception of Seo Taiji and Boys, are not explicitly the subjects of this study, they illustrate that the hybridisation of South Korean music extends beyond the instances offered as evidence in Chapter 7. In this vein, the findings of Provine et al. (2000), Howard (2006) and Shim (2006) are significant in that they validate an underlying assumption of this thesis: that the emphasis placed on the hybridisation and Koreanisation of foreign influence by the *Segyehwa* policy unfolds in South Korean culture, cultural production and practice; or as argued here, in South Korean music.

Turning now to the case of North Korea, though strict government control prevents the North Korean music and performance scene from manifesting as an arena of resistance, what emerges on account of this control is equally enlightening. In actuality, the fact that music and performance is so tightly controlled by the State is what makes North Korean music and performance such a valuable and potentially revealing object of study. Given the status of *Juche* as the State’s monolithic ideology (see Chapter 2), it stands to reason that music (vigorously endorsed, controlled and promoted), should provide crucial insight into how *Juche* manifests in the culture of a State compelled to fervently follow it.
Highlighting this point, several scholars and commentators have remarked as to the very specific and *Juche*-centric nature of North Korean music and performance. In reference to their monotonous uniformity, a monotonity arguably enforced by *Juche*, Keith Howard (2006a: 155) writes of how North Korean songs “offer monochromatic praise of the ‘socialist paradise,’” serving as a “fundamental weapon in [North Korea’s] revolutionary struggle” (Howard, 2006a: 154); a struggle to which the *Juche* ideology is central.

Echoing Howard, in contributing to Provine et al’s (2000) appraisal of North Korean music, BBC Radio DJ, Andy Kershaw (2000: 166), labels North Korean popular music as martial “lush, relentlessly optimistic top-drawer kitsch.” He also observes how the commitment of each North Korean citizen, as a so-called “soldier of the *Juche* revolution,” has ensured that “martial music fills the vacuum that is the absence of social music.” Indeed, as detailed in Chapter 7, the large majority of music in North Korea is martial in character. This is itself suggestive of *Juche* in that it would seem that martial music is utilised in the belief that its vigorousness (or liveliness), will exhort the masses to greater efforts by reinforcing their patriotism, courage and strength of will, to carry out the *Juche* revolution (J. I. Kim, 2006: 9-10).

Kershaw (2000: 166) describes the *Juche*-centric nature of North Korean music in practical terms in recounting a visit to Pyongyang. Emphasising its call to unity and adulation of the North Korean leadership, he writes of having been woken at six o’clock in the morning on his first day by the sounds of martial music, which as he puts it, “crackled spookily from invisible speakers.” Upon investigating, he witnessed “columns of workers” marching in unison to their respective workplaces (Kershaw, 2000: 166). If this crackling of martial music and highly disciplined
militant unison was not enough to convince Kershaw that North Korean music stressed unity and collective synchronicity, (as does the Juche idea), later experiences would reinforce the point. Relating another musical encounter in Pyongyang, Kershaw (2000: 166) reveals that even in regards to music of a lighter character, “North Koreans’ sense of individuality” seemed to extend only to an awareness of their role as “harmonious small components of a massive machine.” In fact, informed by the group musical performances he attended, Kershaw asserts that the North Korean music world is one full of displays of harmonious unity and synchronicity. In referring to group performance in particular, he maintains that, in a perfect demonstration of Jucheist unity, “[e]very movement of the musicians and singers – a lifting of the chin to left, a slight turn of the head to the right, a broad smile – is perfectly synchronised” (Kershaw, 2000: 166).

In keeping to this theme, illustrating how music and in a broader sense performance centres around the personality cults of North Korea’s past and present leaders, Kershaw recalls his tour of the Students’ and Children’s Palace of Pyongyang. Thinking back to the concert to which he was treated at the conclusion of his tour, Kershaw (2000: 166) remembers how scores of military uniform-clad students “swarmed the stage” and proceeded to narrate through dance, music and acrobatics, the ‘feats’ of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, together with the ‘victory’ of the Fatherland Liberation War (Korean War) (see chapters 6 and 7). Further underlining the prominence afforded to North Korea’s Great and Dear leaders, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, respectively, Kershaw (2000: 167) tells of how the image of Kim Jong II appeared suddenly on the backdrop “in a corona of sunbeams” welcomed by “wild applause.” As Chapter 2 details, this collectivism and collective idolisation of North Korea’s leaders are among the pillars of Juche.
The previous studies and findings cited above, relating both to cultural artefacts generally and to Korea specifically, are important for two reasons. Firstly, they substantiate that an examination of cultural artefacts, or in this instance, ‘the museum exhibition’ and ‘music and performance,’ can prove invaluable to the generation and verification of propositions, especially when seeking to determine how the theoretical translates into the practical and everyday. Secondly in so doing, they help to validate the arguments forwarded throughout this thesis concerning the posited association between policy and culture in Korea. That is, they showcase that the policy directives of Juche and Segyehwa have a direct bearing on, and are reflected in, the cultural artefacts of North and South Korea respectively. In the case of the former, they demonstrate that the political mandates of leadership veneration, independence, collectivism, and anti-imperialism/anti-Americanism strongly manifest in the content and form of North Korean exhibitions and music and performance. In the case of the South, they likewise illustrate that the cultural hybridity requirement of the Segyehwa policy unfolds in practice through the simultaneous embracement of both Korean and Western artistic influences, and Korean and Western musical styles.

As noted, these arguments concerning the association between policy and culture in Korea are framed within the context of globalisation policy. Arguably, the ‘diametrically opposed’ positions held by the North and South in regards to globalisation see the globalisation debate, and related scholarship, offer a strong interpretive frame for studying the Korean policy-culture nexus through artefacts. Thus, having established the general and Korea-specific importance of ‘the museum exhibition’ and ‘music and performance,’ the following discusses the suitability of
globalisation theory as a conceptual framework for analysing (by way of cultural artefacts), the inter-relationship between policy and culture in Korea.

1.4 *Globalisation: A Deterministic or Appropriable Process?*

Globalisation and its associated effects have long been a source of much scholarly debate. Controversy continues to surround whether globalisation should be narrowly defined as a purely economic phenomenon (Bhagwati, 2004: 3; Wolf, 2004), or recognised as a multidimensional, multidirectional process (Hardt and Negri, 2004; 2000; Held and McGrew, 2007). Similar discord also exists as to whether globalisation should be approached as a deterministic force with fixed outcomes (Barber, 1996; Friedman, 2000; Fukuyama, 2007; 1992; Ritzer, 2008; 2007), or as a contextually specific phenomenon, capable of being shaped and particularised (Appadurai, 2006; 1996; Held and McGrew, 2007; Hardt and Negri, 2004; 2000; Nederveen Pieterse, 2009; 1994).

Though there are, concededly, multiple ways of conceiving globalisation, the following focuses on two contending conceptualisations. The first is the belief that globalisation ultimately triggers a Westernisation and/or Americanisation of heterogeneous cultures (Barber, 1996; Ritzer, 2008; 2007); or further, that it is, in fact, an imperialist process (McQueen, 2001; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001). On the other end of the spectrum, it considers the ‘hybridisation’ thesis: the claim that, rather than being inherently homogenising or imperialistic, globalisation is an ambivalent process, capable of spurring cultural hybridisation (Appadurai, 2006; 1996; Hardt and Negri, 2004; 2000; Held and McGrew 2007; Nederveen Pieterse, 2009; 1994).
Notably, in limiting the majority of discussion to the above viewpoints, it is not my intention to establish a false binary within globalisation research. While I fully acknowledge that the issues and implications of the globalisation debate are numerous and farther reaching, works pertaining to homogenisation, Americanisation, imperialism and hybridisation are emphasised in that they are the most relevant to framing the concerns and inquiries of my broader research project. Principally, they hold relevance in that they mirror the contrasting positions of North and South Korea, or *Juche* and *Segyehwa* respectively. That is, arguments presenting globalisation as ‘imperialism’ and/or ‘Americanisation,’ mirror the North Korean position, forming the basis of North Korean *Juche* ideology. This can be seen in the fact that *Juche* regards foreign, (and namely US) influence, as tantamount to imperialist infiltration. Equally, the proactive blending of foreign and (South) Korean influences encouraged by South Korea’s *Segyehwa* policy aligns with the hybridisation model (see Chapter 2). Therefore, in establishing such a focus, I seek only to lay the necessary theoretical foundations for assessing the divergent cultural trajectories of North and South Korea and (Korean) association between policy and culture, through artefacts.

With such framing in mind, I now turn to consider the ‘deterministic’ argument and its applicability to the North Korean case. I then discuss globalisation as a malleable and potentially hybridising process and the relevance of this position to South Korea and the *Segyehwa* policy.
1.4.1 Understanding the ‘Deterministic’ Argument

The idea that globalisation is ‘deterministic’ revolves around the belief that its processes, effects and outcomes are predetermined and fixed. In the context of globalisation, such determinism can be viewed either positively or negatively. For pro-globalisation commentators such as Thomas Friedman (2000) and Francis Fukuyama (2007; 1992), the (perceived) ‘inexorableness’ of globalisation is a positive condition, driving democracy and affording more global progress, development, prosperity, pluralism and opportunity “than ever before” (Friedman, 2000: 362). For those who regard globalisation as negatively deterministic, however, its ‘inexorability’ presents as inevitably culturally homogenising, Americanising and/or imperialistic (Barber, 1996; McQueen, 2001; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001; Ritzer, 2008; 2007). While the positive determinism position of pro-globalists is duly acknowledged, owing to North Korea’s negative perception of the phenomenon, the following focuses its discussion on theory relating to negative determinism.

Two proponents of negative determinism theory within globalisation studies are Benjamin Barber (1996) and George Ritzer (2008; 2007). Assuming very similar positions, they argue that globalisation is facilitating the inevitable absorption of cultural diversity by a single Western, and principally American-dominated, monoculture. Barber (1996) refers to this apparent ‘Americanisation’ as the creation of a ‘McWorld,’ while Ritzer (2008) describes it as a process of ‘McDonaldization.’

Ultimately, Barber (1996: xxi) contends that globalisation has triggered such unrestrained cultural homogenisation that it will, over time, “render taste not merely shallow but uniform.” Ritzer (2008: 108) likewise posits that “diversity is on the wane” owing to globalisation, with a myriad of identical products cropping up in various locations, across time and space. As such, both see globalisation and its
‘McDonaldizing’ tendencies as “a largely negative force,” which in supplanting local heterogeneities, is giving rise to greater cultural homogeneity (Barber, 1996; Ritzer, 2008: 180).

It must be conceded, however, that in presenting globalisation as a process of American-led cultural homogenisation, Barber (1996) and Ritzer (2008) do acknowledge the existence of counter-currents, or resistance to the (potentially) Americanising qualities of globalisation. For Barber (1996: 9) this resistance manifests in the form of ‘Jihad,’ which, denoting more of a general struggle than an “Islamic [fundamentalist] zeal,” exemplifies a ‘struggle’ against the culturally neutralising effects of globalisation. For Ritzer (2008: 168-169), it takes the form of ‘glocalization,’ a process whereby ‘global’ and ‘local’ (glocal) influences are combined in a quest to ensure against cultural standardisation. Yet, despite their acknowledgement that globalisation constitutes a battle between the ‘global’ and the ‘local,’ Barber (1996) and Ritzer (2008) nonetheless perceive the absorption of heterogeneous cultures as “unstoppable” (Barber, 1996: 20). That is to say, local resistances are merely regarded as providing “temporary respites” from the ultimately culturally homogenising tendencies of globalisation (Ritzer, 2008: 188).

In deeming globalisation, in spite of local resistances, to be a process of inescapable homogenisation, it would appear that, for Barber (1996) and Ritzer (2008), globalisation represents a strategy of cultural imperialism. More accurately, taking into account the emphasis placed on US dominance and Americanisation, it would seem that globalisation manifests as a form of US imperialism.

---

7 In another one of his works The Globalization of Nothing 2 Ritzer (2007: 18) defines glocalization as a process which “involves the interaction, the implosion, of many global and local cultural inputs to create a kind of ‘pastiche’ . . . or a blend, leading to a variety of cultural hybrids.” It is thus generally associated with heterogeneity.
Vitally, the depiction of globalisation as imperialism has a strong resonance in the context of North Korea. This resonance is owed primarily to the clear correlation between the homogenisation and/or imperialism argument and the independence emphasis of the Juche idea. Notions of US dominance have particular relevance in that they echo the fervent North Korean belief that the US is “the main force” in the imperial world order, and thus the primary target of its anti-imperialist struggle (J. I. Kim, 1982: 50 – see Chapter 2). Arguments associating globalisation with imperialism, together with broader allegations of homogenisation, should therefore be seen not only to fuel, but theorise, North Korea’s anti-globalisationist (anti-imperialist) posture.


Importantly, both identify the spreading of American goods and ideals as a central part of this imperialist process. Namely, Barber (1996: 98) argues that globalisation is ‘imperialistic’ in that its widespread proliferation of American products (from his perspective), causes everything to become so indistinguishable so as to present no discernible alternate choice. Similarly, Ritzer (2008: 2) contends that the widespread diffusion of American culture resembles imperialism in that it has, in his view, “shown every sign of being an inexorable process.” Therefore, for Barber and Ritzer, it is its supposed undermining of the multiplicity of choice that sees globalisation take on an imperialistic character.
Barber (1996) and Ritzer (2008), however, are not the only scholars to equate globalisation with imperialism. Much more explicit in associating globalisation with imperial ambition, James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer (2001) and Humphrey McQueen (2001), contend that globalisation, inaccurate in description, is really (masked) imperialism by another name. Specifically, they argue that the term globalisation has been popularised in a deliberate attempt to obfuscate the imperial (uneven) nature and purposes of today’s global system. Stressing the imbalance of power and advantage inherent in globalisation, Petras and Veltmeyer (2001: 62) assert that ‘globalisation’ serves, essentially, as a convenient “codeword for the ascendancy of US imperialism.” Equally, McQueen (2001: 197) maintains that the painting of globalisation as “ineluctable,” is nothing but “public-relations gloss,” intended “to elude the hostility” and exploitative connotations implicit in ‘imperialism.’ In fact, insisting that globalisation is “classic imperialism in a PET bottle” (McQueen, 2001: 197), McQueen (2001: 210) claims that “one of the few certainties about globalisation is that it is most often Americanisation.” As such, he argues that terms like “coca-colonisation,” and thus Barber’s (1996) ‘McWorld’ and Ritzer’s (2008) ‘McDonalisation,’ are but “light hearted admonition[s]” for “US Admass,” used by scholars “too shy” to use the word “imperialism” (McQueen, 2001: 206).

The writings of Barber (1996) and Ritzer (2008; 2007), together with those of Petras and Veltmeyer (2001) and McQueen (2001) therefore hold relevance in that they serve to highlight the anxieties and fears motivating the North Korean (anti-globalisationist) position. More accurately, the North Korean position can be understood as one mirroring the anxieties and fears expressed in negative determinism globalisation scholarship. Thus, in informing a better understanding of
North Korea’s posture and its motivations, they lay some of the theoretical groundwork for the empirical analyses of the thesis.

North Korea’s position, however, tells but one side of the story. For a complete picture, one must also look south of the 38th parallel, to a markedly different situation and culture. Consequently, the remainder of this chapter examines globalisation scholarship judged relevant to the South Korean case. Specifically, arguing that the hybridity thesis is reflected, in and by, South Korea’s Segyehwa policy, it outlines the contribution of hybridity literature to the globalisation debate.

1.4.2 Hybridity

The above views notwithstanding, globalisation scholarship transcends the seemingly narrow hypotheses of negative deterministic arguments to purport hybridity as a likely outcome of globalisation (Appadurai, 2006; 1996; Held and McGrew, 2007; Hardt and Negri, 2004; 2000; Nederveen Pieterse, 2009; 1994). In essence, the ‘hybridity’ thesis challenges the idea that globalisation is ‘inexorable,’ on the basis that such notions are “fundamentally incomplete,” in that they do not adequately acknowledge the “countercurrents” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2009: 75-76), or “heterogenizing flows” of globalisation (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 46). That is, they fail to consider that globalisation is an interactive process, whose manifestations and effects not only shape the local, but are shaped by it.

In this sense, a core precept behind the hybridity thesis is that local cultures and resistances actively shape and determine how a nation-state interacts with, and is affected by globalisation. Hybridity scholars thus counter the view that nation-state resistance is a source of mere “temporary respite” from the (perceived)
homogenising forces of the phenomenon (Ritzer, 2008: 188). Instead, they argue that
globalisation is “a matter of collusion and not simply collision” (Nederveen Pieterse,
2009: 32 – emphasis added) and that local cultures (as actors and agents in the
globalisation process), are capable of appropriating foreign influences to reflect
internal conditions. In this vein, globalisation is seen not as a process of cultural
homogenisation, but of potential hybridisation, whereby Western and local elements
combine and are consciously worked into each other.

Notably, scholars advocating hybridity do not assume a pro-globalisation
stance, nor do they argue globalisation to be positive, negative or neutral. They
simply argue that it is not deterministic, but complex and nation-state specific. This
does not mean that globalisation is not potentially culturally homogenising or
imperialistic, or that such effects do not occur. Americanisation is observable in
Mexico, for example, with Joseph Contreras (2009: 6) arguing that “Mexico is in the
grips of a potent process of Americanization . . . at all levels of society.” It simply
means that such effects are not inherent and do not occur without exception or
compromise. Some of the more noteworthy scholars to investigate the notion of
cultural hybridity are Arjun Appadurai (2006; 1996), Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri (2004; 2000), David Held and Anthony McGrew (2007) and Jan Nederveen

Importantly, the hybridity thesis depends on the conceptualisation of
globalisation as a complex, multidirectional and multidimensional process that
permeates every social sphere, “from the economic to the ecological” (Held and
McGrew, 2007: 3). In fact, emphasising the interdisciplinary and interdimensional
nature of globalisation, Hardt and Negri (2000: xii-xiv) assert that today’s world
order, which they term ‘Empire,’ is a “decentered [sic] and deterritorializing
apparatus of rule . . . characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries” (emphasis in original). Developing this argument they maintain that the persistent overlapping of territorial boundaries sees global flows no longer “dictated by a single power” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 3), but by the combined and varied influences of “the imperial global rainbow” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xiii). As a result, they and other hybridity scholars, such as Held and McGrew (2007), argue that the multidimensionality and ambiguous potentiality of globalisation points to absolute homogeny, cultural or otherwise, as an unlikely outcome. In contrast, they underscore globalisation as a process that “manages hybrid identities” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii) and can be shaped and proactively indigenised.

On the subject of indigenisation, emphasising the equally complex and arbitrary nature of culture, hybridity theorists likewise affirm that contextual specificities invariably ensure globalisation (and its effects) a multiplicity of potentiality. Theorising culture as difference, Appadurai (1996: 17) insists that nation-state agency potential assures globalisation an indelibly context, culture-specific and “localizing” character (emphasis in original). Crucially, he reasons that this contextual specificity creates favourable conditions for, and encourages, the simultaneous existence of local and global elements, or cultural hybridity. It also, in his view, leaves “ample room for a deep study of specific geographies” (Appadurai, 1996: 17) and their particular interactions with the global. Accordingly, this thesis works to fill some of this residual ‘gap’ by studying the “specific geographies” of North and South Korea, through an analysis of cultural artefacts.

While Modernity at Large (1996) is perhaps Arjun Appadurai’s most recognised contribution to globalisation and certainly hybridity studies, Fear of Small Numbers (2006) reflects similar themes. In tackling the question as to why the
era of globalisation has been accompanied by large-scale war and violence, Appadurai (2006: 4) argues that lingering ideas and pursuits of a “singular national ethos,” are partly to blame. He conceives that the sheer pace and magnitude of cross-cultural movement, triggered by globalisation, together with negative media portrayals of ethnic and religious minorities, has given rise to great social uncertainty as to just who should be regarded as belonging to ‘us’ and ‘them.’ It is in Appadurai’s (2006: 5) view, this inability to definitively separate the minority from the majority and pinpoint a sole national ethos that fuels ethnic antagonisms and conflicts. Thus, though Appadurai does not deal explicitly with cultural hybridity, he does not divert from previously posited arguments surrounding the complexity and fluidity of cultures. Vitally, his avowal that globalisation has resulted in such intense cultural mixing so as to make the identification of the ‘other,’ or any cultural category difficult, reinforces that globalisation can have a hybridising effect on cultures.

To return to earlier points, however, elaboration is needed as to how the ambiguous potentiality of globalisation fosters hybridity, through resistance. Hardt and Negri focus on resistance to globalisation (or Empire), in their follow-up book *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (2004). Specifically, they argue that alongside the “homogenizing” tendencies of globalisation, exist “heterogenizing flows” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 46); a “counter-Empire” that works simultaneously within and against Empire, concurrently contesting, driving, subverting and sustaining it (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xv). As the title of their later contribution suggests, this resistance, or “alternative” logic to Empire, manifests through and by, what they term “the multitude” (Hardt and Negri, 2004: xvii).
Hardt and Negri do not provide a comprehensive or definitive definition for the concept of ‘the multitude’ in either of their works.\(^8\) Their rather expansive and vague definitions notwithstanding, they do attach certain qualities to the multitude that are supportive of the hybridity thesis. Among these is the characterisation of the multitude as a force of political agency, constituted by “pure potential” (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 192). Accordingly, the multitude is subject to boundless “conditions of possibility” that continually alter and mould its nature and structure (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 212). While its indeterminacy and ‘potentiality’ concededly affords it (potential) wider relevance, the current focus is on how the multitude manifests as a struggle against the homogenising tendencies of globalisation.

Interpreted within the frame of resistance to globalisation, as James Arvanitakis (2007: 135) argues, the multitude can be understood as a political process through which a potential ‘alternative,’ or ‘counter-globalisation’ emerges. Arvanitakis (2007: 139) contends that the political agency observable in the counter-globalisation movement, as demonstrated through protests against globalisation and war, can be grounded and find its theoretical underpinnings in, Hardt and Negri’s conceptualisation of ‘the multitude.’ Arvanitakis (2007: 137) claims that the potentiality of the multitude as a concept, yields insights into the potentiality of the counter-globalisation movement. As he explains, “Hardt and Negri do not argue that the multitude is certain to emerge as a counter force and overcome Empire, but that it has the potential to do so” (emphasis in original). This implied dialectical relationship between Empire and counter-Empire is thus significant in that it

---

\(^8\) In Empire, Hardt and Negri (2000: 62) ambiguously define the multitude as “the real productive force of our social life”; as “a multiplicity, a plane of singularities, an open set of relations” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 103). In Multitude Hardt and Negri (2004: xiii) reinforce the idea of the multitude as ‘opposition,’ by defining it as “the living alternative that grows within Empire.” The ambiguity of this definition has resulted in much scholarly frustration, giving rise to harsh criticism (see Passavant and Dean, 2004).
indicates that neither homogeneity nor resistance dominates, but that both (potentially) exist simultaneously and exercise mutual influence. Challenging negative deterministic theory then, this potential mutual influence and resistance suggests that today’s globalised world is also, at least potentially, a hybridised one.

The works of Appadurai (2006; 1996), Hardt and Negri (2004; 2000), Held and McGrew (2007) and Nederveen Pieterse (2009; 1994) are therefore relevant in that their considerations of nation-state agency and cultural acculturation (or cultural hybridity) provide a model around which to organise empirical investigations into the South Korean case. Hardt and Negri’s (2000) analogy of the ‘imperial global rainbow,’ in particular (conjuring notions of cultural intermingling, synthesis and reciprocity), provides a simple, yet effective understanding of cultural hybridity and its application to the South Korean case.

By promoting the simultaneous embracement of (South) Korean and foreign forms and their intermixing, South Korea’s Segyehwa policy is itself a broad empirical illustration of the indigenising capacity to which Appadurai, Hardt and Negri, Held and McGrew and Nederveen Pieterse point (see Chapter 2). Understanding the Segyehwa policy in this way, their arguments are important in that they set the parameters against which to judge the extent of the Segyehwa policy’s unfolding within the South Korean cultural landscape, or in this case, within ‘museum exhibitions’ and ‘music and performance.’

That said, arguments relating to the theorisation of cultural difference and the role of agency also have wider implications for this study. Indeed, the framing of Korea within a ‘one-nation, two states’ paradigm and characterisation of Juche and Segyehwa as diametrically opposed policies, is both substantiative of, and dependent on, globalisation being a mutable and contextually bound process. It is after all, on
account of the nation-state agency Appadurai (2006; 1996), Hardt and Negri (2004; 2000), Held and McGrew (2007) and Nederveen Pieterse (2009; 1994) underscore that North and South Korea have assumed such contrary positions on the globalisation issue: the latter proactively negotiating the phenomenon by promoting cultural blending, the former through complete resistance. As such, their contributions directly frame the analysis and juxtaposition of North and South Korean ‘exhibition’ and ‘music and performance’ landscapes.

Thus, within the frame of the above arguments, the following chapter outlines the contrary positions the two Koreas adopt toward globalisation. In attempting to explain how these different stances (Juche and Segyehwa) have come to be, Juche and Segyehwa are considered products of a broader divided nationalism, suggestive of a nexus between policy and culture in divided Korea.
2. *Juche versus Segyehwa: Divergent Views on Globalisation*

The views expressed by the North and South Korean governments in regards to globalisation can be described as ‘polar opposites.’ The North Korean regime continues to maintain a highly isolationist stance, taking an overt and well publicised anti-globalisationist position (Becker, 2005: 132; Korean Central News Agency [KCNA], 1 June 1999). South Korea, in contrast, has embraced globalisation, simultaneously, yet proactively, countering its challenges, while capitalising on the opportunities it presents (Y. S. Kim, 1996). Consequently, framed around the globalisation scholarship of Chapter 1, and adopting the definition of globalisation set out in the thesis introduction, this chapter juxtaposes South Korea’s globalisation *Segyehwa* (Koreanisation) policy, with North Korea’s *Juche* (self-reliance) ideology.

Specifically, the first section outlines the key political mandates of *Juche* and *Segyehwa*, respectively. Further to this, working to explain the government mechanisms involved in managing their implementation, Section 2.2 clarifies the role of the North and South Korean governments in encouraging, shaping and enforcing the relevant policy of the State.

Concededly, due to limitations of scope, the strategies discussed represent only some of those pursued by the North and South Korean governments in seeking the respective implementation of *Juche* and *Segyehwa*. Although not exhaustive, in the former case, focus is given to the extent to which *Juche* thought and education permeates North Korea, from schooling to compulsory after-hours political meetings and neighbourhood committees, to State controlled mass-media. With respect to South Korea, discussion is centred around organisations and initiatives that
encourage the simultaneous preservation, globalisation and hybridisation of traditional Korean culture.

Additionally, with reference to the North Korean case, conceding that education in the *Juche* idea does not necessarily amount to an uncritical observance of it, Section 2.2 also identifies some of the pressures, rewards and threatened consequences that ‘encourage’ North Koreans of non-genuine belief to ‘act out’ the belief requirements of the State. To this end, it is argued that *Jucheist* requirements are so convincingly performed by North Koreans, not only to the outside world but to each other, that they are, as I will show, indistinguishable from North Korean (performed) culture. Then, demonstrating the tangible results of governmental efforts to transform policy into practice, Section 2.3 explores the unfolding of *Juche* and *Segyehwa* within the cultural artefacts of North Korean propaganda poster art and South Korean music, respectively. As discussed in the methodology section of the thesis, deemed to clearly exhibit and ‘act out’ the relationship between policy and culture in Korea, treatment of the above artefacts is restricted to a politics of representation (form and content) analysis (see Introduction).

Directed by the arguments of Chapter 1 concerning the utility of cultural artefacts as corroborative research tools, this chapter thus draws jointly on theory (policy directives) and practice (cultural artefacts), with three aims in mind. The first is to uncover what the very different globalisation policies of the Koreas reveal about the nation-state’s capacity to proactively engage with, and mould the processes of globalisation. Furthermore, with the opposing standpoints of North and South Korea likely indicative of a broader cultural schism between the North and South, the second is to gauge the cultural, political and ideological ‘divisions’ at play on the Korean peninsula. Finally, the third and ultimate aim is to examine what this
proactive engagement with globalisation (and the proactive policy positions stemming therefrom), might suggest about the association between policy and culture, both in and beyond Korea.

2.1 Deconstructing Juche and Segyehwa

2.1.1 Understanding Juche

North Korea remains one of the most closed and secretive nation-states on the planet. Today, in what is often described as the global epoch, its government continues to oppose the very essence of globalisation and the capitalist designs it purports globalisation to serve and represent (J. I. Kim, 1995: 401-402). North Korea presents an equally interesting and perplexing case in that few governments adopt as resolute and pervasive an anti-globalisationist posture as that adopted by the North Korean government. As international relations scholar Roland Bleiker (2005: ix) aptly argues, North Korea’s self-imposed economic, political and ideological isolationism has seen it become “the inherent ‘other’ in a globalized and neoliberal world order.”

An analysis of North Korea’s anti-globalisationist stance cannot be attempted, however, without first considering and elucidating, inasmuch as is possible, the ideological system that informs and drives many of its policies and much of its culture: the Juche idea. In seeking to define and explain the core principles of the ideology, it must be noted that the intention is not to offer a conclusive definition of Juche. Instead the definitions offered should be approached as exploratory, considered for what they reveal about the role that Juche has played and continues to play, in shaping North Korea’s anti-globalisationist posture.
In essence, *Juche* is “the hallmark of North Korean communism” (Shin, 2006: 23), existing as the omnipresent, “monolithic ideological system” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 38) of North Korea. Historically, it is a creative and distinctly North Korean appropriation of the Soviet model of Marxism-Leninism (J. I. Kim, 1982: 7-9; Shin, 2006: 89-90), which having now shed its Soviet beginnings, advocates and reflects a uniquely North Korean nationalist agenda.

*Juche* was first formally introduced as a concept by Kim Il Sung in December 1955, though was not viewed in an overtly ideological sense until after 1967. In fact, it would be a further five years (December 1972) until *Juche* was constitutionally recognised as North Korea’s ideological platform (Lynn, 2007: 105), despite being accepted as such by the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in 1970 (Becker, 2005: 67). Since then, as evidenced throughout this chapter, *Juche* has progressively permeated North Korean life and culture.

As indicated, the concept of *Juche* is complex and difficult to grasp. Although Western scholars, such as Bruce Cumings (2004), have sought to offer insights into what the *Juche* idea represents to the North Korean people, focus is given to interpretations offered by Kim Jong Il, widely regarded up until his death as the philosophy’s “definitive interpreter” (Becker, 2005: 127; Buzo, 1999: 105). Not only is the majority of in-depth scholarship on the *Juche* idea his, but as the State’s absolute leader for seventeen years, he was also responsible for enforcing the principles of *Juche* as he understood them. The writings and interpretations of Kim Jong Il are, therefore, the most likely to provide a window into North Korea’s *Juche*-centric state of mind.

At its most rudimentary level, *Juche* can be understood to embody a demand for complete and full independence (Cumings, 2004: 125): a “concept of self-defined
national autonomy” (Harrison, 2002: 15), underpinned by the imperative of self-reliance. It demands that State pursuits, decisions and actions be settled upon by North Korea, by its own initiative, without the interference or influence of an external party (J. I. Kim, 1982).

Specifically, *Juche* requires self-reliance and/or independence in three primary areas: politics, the economy and defence (J. I. Kim, 1982). While the latter is discussed below, self-reliance in politics requires that North Korean policies and programs be formulated and implemented independently. Further, it insists that “sovereignty” and “equality” be maintained in all aspects of foreign relations, with agreements and concessions based on the logic of “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 43-44). Similarly, economic self-reliance demands that economic self-sufficiency be upheld through resistance of “economic domination and subjugation” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 48). Importantly, these requirements are ultimately driven by the *Jucheist* belief that “yielding to foreign pressure . . . or acting at the instigation of others,” is a catalyst for regime “failure” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 43).

As highlighted in Chapter 5, this *Jucheist* call for self-reliance in economics and independence in politics underpins North Korean resistance of international pressure to denuclearise within the Six-Party Talks setting. Namely, the *Juche* insistence that “sovereignty,” “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 43-44) be maintained in foreign relations and bargaining is the primary driver behind North Korea’s refusal of the consistent US demand for “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” and unilateral preconditions (*Agence France Presse*, 11 November 2005; Scalapino, 2006: 153). Correspondingly, North Korea’s *Juche*-driven perception of, and struggle against, “economic domination and
“subjugation” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 48) strongly accounts for the fact that US economic hindrance by way of sanctions is a frequent stumbling block for Six-Party negotiations (see Chapter 5).

Vitally, to move on to the question of self-reliance in defence, the stress that Juche places on North Korean autonomy, independence and self-determinism, has seen it become an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist dogma, in practice (J. I. Kim, 1982: 25-26). More accurately, it has evolved to embody a struggle against “servility to big powers,” foreign infiltration, and the United States in particular (J. I. Kim, 1982: 40).

Certainly, the North Korean official news agency: the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA, 1 June 1999) repeatedly depicts “the corrupt capitalist idea” as something “more dangerous than atomic bombs;” the acceptance of which would constitute “a suicidal act of opening the door for imperialist ideology and culture to infiltrate.” Equally, globalisation, as a capitalist venture, is perceived as a US “strategy” and means of ideological “poisoning,” ultimately aimed at “dominat[ing] the world with corrupt ideas” (KCNA, 1 June 1999).

With a fully self-reliant “all people, all nation defence system” presented as the only sure counter-weapon against these ‘designs’ (J. I. Kim, 1982: 52), the Jucheist struggle against US imperialism has given rise to a pervasive military mentality in today’s North Korea. This pervasive military mentality is both fostered by, and manifests in, North Korea’s strong observance of Songun (military-first) politics. Tied to the Juche-centric quest for self-reliance in defence, Songun requires North Koreans to recognise and support the army as the driving force of the revolution, by placing “the army before the working class” and “the gun barrel . . . over the hammer and sickle” (French, 2007: 218). North Korea’s extreme steps to
transform itself into an “impregnable fortress” (Becker, 2005: 4), see it boast some impressive statistics and a highly militant culture (see Section 2.3.1).

That said, the Juche idea requires more from its followers than an unshakable commitment to independence and anti-imperialism. While there is little doubt that Juche is geared toward maintaining North Korean ‘independence,’ to imply that Juche is centred solely around the principles of ‘self-reliance,’ and ‘anti-imperialism,’ would be to under-acknowledge its complexity and all-encompassing reach. Several other mandates of Juche need to be discussed, in that they are observable North Korean culture and are thus important to contextualising how Juche unfolds within North Korean cultural artefacts. These include loyalty to the leader and the State and unity and synchronicity of body, mind and will.

As far as Kim Jong Il (1982: 64) and Juche are concerned, loyalty to the leader and the State forms “the core” of North Korean culture. According to its ‘definitive interpreter,’ a reverent observance of Juche necessitates “infinite devotion” to the Party and the Kim Dynasty, as well as an “indomitable” resolve to surrender to and carry out its will, “without the slightest vacillation” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 64). This expectation of unabated loyalty to the cause and common commitment to the will of the State, in turn, breeds a (genuinely felt for some, staged for others) “single-hearted unity” (J. I. Kim, 1995: 238) among the collective; a propensity to think and act “with one mind and purpose” (J. I. Kim, 1995: 240).

The following section discusses how this “single-hearted unity” (J. I. Kim, 1995: 238) is enforced by the North Korean regime, and why, whether for reasons of belief or self-interest, the majority of North Koreans choose to exhibit it. Similarly, Chapter 7 explores this single-hearted unity as tangibly and culturally expressed through North Korea’s stadium-sized artistic gymnastics extravaganza, ‘Mass
Games.’ As argued in Chapter 7, hinged on the achievement of large-scale perfect synchronicity, performances provide the ideal test and display of (real and performed) commitment to the collective, its leader and the ruling ideology of Juche.

Indeed, to the Juche-faithful, unity and “collectivism” constitute the “lifeblood” of the revolution (J. I. Kim, 1995: 299). This is because Juche preaches that “firm unity” gives North Koreans an “essential superiority” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 69) and “strength” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 55), whereby individually they are vulnerable and physically “finite,” while “rallied” together they are “immortal” (J. I. Kim, 1995: 156). Kim Il Sung clearly and repeatedly articulated the importance of unity to Juche, together with its association with invincibility, during his time as North Korean leader. Striving to encourage a sense of invincibility and enhanced strength in unity, he frequently declared that, armed with “firm unity,” North Korea would be faced with “no insurmountable difficulties” (I. S. Kim, 1980: 187 – emphasis added), with “all shades” of opposition sure to “give way before [North Korea’s] united force” (I. S. Kim, 1980: 187).

Connected to this promise of ‘invincibility’ through unity, is the Juche-orientated view that the masses share a “common destiny” (J. I. Kim, 1995: 204), which is “inseparably linked” to the leader (J. I. Kim, 1995: 194). This notion is both due to and supported by, a series of historical ‘revisions,’ aimed at facilitating the development of personality cults around North Korea’s leaders. The specifics of these ‘revisions’ and ‘embellishments’ of fact are explained in Chapters 6. Nonetheless, they and Juche in general, claim that North Korea’s freedom and good-fortune is tied to its leadership, dependent on and guaranteed under Kim Jong Un’s (as Kim Jong Il’s and Il Sung’s before him), watchful guidance.
As the next section details, whether genuinely expressed or performed for pragmatic or utilitarian purposes, North Koreans are so thoroughly practised in the performance of such ‘beliefs,’ that they thoroughly animate the (performed) culture of North Korea. An understanding of them is therefore crucial to identifying and analysing the association between policy and culture in the North Korean context.

Equally significant to its call for unity, a full and correct observance of Juche is touted to be the one and only “sure guarantee for solving all problems” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 28) and setting the masses “free . . . from their shackles” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 23). According to the teachings of North Korea’s past and present leaders, through a strict and committed observance of Juche, as masters of their own destiny, North Koreans come to harness the power to “transform the world” into one more closely serving their own needs and desires (J. I. Kim, 1982: 12). Alternatively, failure to adhere to Juche’s principles of complete independence is said to swiftly transform a man into “a fool,” and a nation “to ruin” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 40). In this way, Juche and one’s commitment to the cause is inextricably linked, not only to the fate of individuals, but to the fate, freedom and prosperity of the North Korean State.

Notably, Juche and particularly its emphasis on a unified quest for independence and anti-imperialism, has a strong resonance when viewed within context, particularly considering that Korean history is fraught with invasion and colonial abuse. Consider, Japan’s thirty-five year colonial rule over the Korean peninsula between 1910 and 1945, during which time Koreans were subjected to numerous assimilation and ‘Japanisation’ policies (D. K. Kim, 2005: 125-126). Consider also, the subsequent Soviet-US negotiations of 1945, which leading to the division of the Korean peninsula, manifested as yet another instance whereby Korea’s political sovereignty was usurped by external forces (Willis, 2012: 108).
Given this history, as well as the fact that, prior to 1945, Korea “suffered 900 invasions . . . and five periods of foreign occupation” (Oberdorfer, 1998: 3), it is reasonable that there should be a parallel between the Juche idea and North Korea’s fear of imperial domination.

It is also likely that this history partly accounts for North Korea’s anxiety over the United States’ apparent ‘aggressive’ policy toward it, as well as its reluctance to dismantle its nuclear deterrent. After all, from its perspective, muscle flexing and big-powering blustering has typically led to invasion, as with the Russo-Japanese War. Equally, an inability to adequately defend its sovereignty (say through nuclear force), against invasion, has tended to result in decades-long foreign occupation, as in the case of Japan (D. K. Kim, 2005: 125). As such, the United States’ ‘Axis of Evil,’ and ‘outpost of tyranny’ labellings, together with accompanying pre-emptive strike rhetoric, serves only to legitimise and reinforce North Korean fear of imperial attack (see chapters 4 and 5). The ways in which Korea’s ‘imperial’ history may serve as a motivator for Juche and provide important insights into the concept itself, are covered in greater detail in Chapter 4.

Arguably, the “adoption and substance” of Juche is thus “directly linked to a desperate struggle, on the part of North Korea, to retain its sovereignty and control its own fate” (Willis, 2012: 108). Conceiving an acceptance of globalisation to be equal to triggering an unstoppable imperialist infiltration, it was from the North Korean standpoint, “imperative to set up a mosquito net in all realms of social [and cultural] life” so as “to thoroughly block . . . the channels through which the imperialist ideological and cultural poison [could] infiltrate” (KCNA, 1 June 1999). The purpose of this “mosquito net,” active in every sphere, is to let just enough of the world in so as to be beneficial, while guarding against the alleged imperialistic
tendencies of globalisation. In this context, *Juche* can be seen and understood as North Korea’s ‘mosquito net’ (Willis, 2012: 108).

North Korea’s tendency to associate globalisation with imperialism and akin notions of impending cultural ‘invasion,’ implies, as argued in Chapter 1, that North Korea subscribes to the homogenisation and imperialism theses, purported by Benjamin Barber (1996), George Ritzer (2008; 2007), Humphrey McQueen (2001) and James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer (2001). Further, the fact that *Juche* depicts the US as the “ringleader” and “chieftain of world imperialism” (J. I. Kim 1995: 171, 185) and primary target of its anti-imperialist struggle, echoes a basic tenet of these arguments: that globalisation is a US centred imperialist process, where cultural diversity is threatened, and absorbed by, an American-dominated global monoculture (Willis, 2012: 109).

In light of the above, although the *Juche* philosophy is not strictly a globalisation policy, the actions it generates together with the ideals it connotes, offer insights into what constitutes and motivates North Korea’s position on globalisation (Willis, 2012: 110). As C. Kenneth Quinones (2009: 37) argues, “*Juche* lists some of the primary precepts of North Korea’s foreign policy, past present and future.” Thus, in that *Juche* determines the shape of North Korea’s engagement and interaction (or lack there of) with the ‘outside world,’ it provides a lens through which to better understand North Korea’s apprehension and rejection of globalisation. Explicitly, in combination, its pro-independence and anti-imperialist stance suggest, that in the context of globalisation, *Juche* can be regarded as an anti-globalisationist principle. Furthermore, due to its central role in shaping North Korean culture, conceived in this way, *Juche* provides a strong case for analysing the suggested association between policy and culture.
As discussed in later sections, in the North Korean context, this association manifests in the inability to separate politics from culture. Impelled by government mandate and strong censorship and control mechanisms, North Korean cultural artefacts must reflect the Jucheist politics of the State (see Section 2.2.1). As illustrated in Section 2.3.1, Juche thus strongly manifests in North Korean cultural artefacts, such as propaganda (poster) art. Though, with a primary and intended function of these cultural artefacts being to reinforce and propagate the politics which they (by necessity) reflect, North Korean culture fuels State politics to the extent that it is indistinguishable from it. Now deeply embedded in North Korean culture, as forthcoming sections detail, Juche itself exists as an intersection between politics and culture in North Korea. It is therefore in representing and embodying a relation between the two, that Juche is positioned as a strong case for analysing the policy-culture nexus unfolding in Korea.

Pointing to just how ideologically and culturally dissimilar North and South Korea have become, and to the palpable difference sixty-five years of division can make, Juche stands in direct opposition to South Korea’s globalisation policy, known as ‘Segyehwa’ – to which I now turn.
2.1.2 *Scrutinising Segyehwa*

In contrast to its Northern counterpart, South Korea has embraced globalisation. Yet, despite their markedly different policies regarding the phenomenon, the Koreas do share something in common: a conscious effort to adapt policy models and influences to their own contexts. Just as North Korea succeeded in moulding *Juche* to the North Korean context, South Korea has appropriated globalisation to reflect a sense of ‘South Koreanness’ (Willis, 2012: 110). Significantly, not only does this disclose the alterable and context-specific nature of globalisation, but it underscores that policy can have a direct bearing on culture and vice-versa, thus pointing to an association between policy and culture.

South Korea’s *Segyehwa* (Koreanisation) policy was designed and inaugurated by the Kim Young-sam administration, which governed South Korea between 1993 and 1998 (S. S. Kim, 2000b: 2). Kim Young-sam’s election on 18 December 1992 represented a major milestone in South Korean history as the first democratic election of a *civilian* president since the military coup d’état of 1961 (Cotton, 1995: 35; Oberdorfer, 1998: 31). In consequence, his inauguration on 25 February 1993 (Oberdorfer, 1998: 279) is noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, his ascension to the presidency marked the end of more than three decades of dictatorial rule. Secondly, in so doing, it signalled South Korea’s emergence onto the global stage, marking the beginning of the State’s transition from a closed authoritarian society, to an open and democratic one (Willis, 2012: 111).

Importantly, aware that its authoritarian past had long caused it to remain “on the periphery of the world” (Y. S. Kim, 1996: 10), increasing South Korea’s international standing through institutional reform and globalisation was a pronounced aim of the Kim Young-sam administration from its very inception.
President Kim Young-sam (1995a: 6) publicly articulated his intention to utilise
globalisation to enhance South Korea’s global standing and competitiveness in his
inaugural address, in which he promised to build an increasingly sophisticated ‘New
Korea.’ With the twenty-first century fast approaching, he recognised that the ‘New
Korea’ he envisioned could not be realised unless his government embraced an
openness including globalisation, and accepted it as an “imperative of the times” (Y.
S. Kim, 1996: 33). With this aim in mind, Kim formulated the Segyehwa policy,
identifying it as the means through which his ‘New Korea’ ideal would be achieved.

Kim Young-sam first expressed the desire to open South Korea to
globalisation on an international stage on 17 November 1994, during a press
conference following an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit
meeting in Sydney, Australia (S. S. Kim, 2000c: 242-243). Capitalising on the
international spotlight afforded him by the event, Kim (1996: 5) maintained that if
South Korea were to keep pace with the larger and more influential nations of the
world, its political, socio-economic and cultural landscapes needed to be modernised
and made “compatible” with those of the contemporary world.

Segyehwa is the official term for ‘globalisation’ in South Korea (Y. S. Kim,
1996: 5). Like Juche it is specifically Korean and can only be understood as context
specific. Essentially, the purpose of the policy was to ensure that South Korea was
equipped to negotiate the challenges of globalisation. The Segyehwa policy existed
primarily as a written objective, detailing the proposed shape and direction of South
Korea’s unique pursuit of globalisation. Entailing a “strategy for national
development” (Y. S. Kim, 1996: 13), its principal aim was institutional restructuring
and reform. Accordingly, the Segyehwa policy outlined how the various sectors of
South Korean society could be elevated to an internationally comparable and sustainable standard.

Although the Segyehwa policy was concerned with the restructuring of all areas of South Korean society (including political, social and environmental), of particular interest to this thesis is how the policy affected the cultural sphere. Testifying to the nation-state (South Korean) specific nature of the Segyehwa policy, from a cultural perspective, it highlighted the need for South Koreans to maintain their distinct culture in the era of globalisation, through the ‘Koreanisation’ of global forms (Y. S. Kim, 1996: 14-15).

In outlining the aims and cultural significance of the Segyehwa policy, Kim Young-sam (1996: 14-15) cautioned that if South Korea were to benefit from the opportunities presented by globalisation, it needed to embrace its own culture, as well as others. He premised this argument on the fact that globalisation was (and is), “giving rise to increasing friction and tension between indigenous culture and world culture” (Y. S. Kim, 1996: 8), to the extent that it was imperative that nation-states, including South Korea, “even while taking pride in their own culture, accept the world culture with an open mind” (Y. S. Kim, 1996: 8). In the interest of fostering this mutual acceptance of “indigenous” and “global” culture, the Segyehwa policy was “based on a [South] Korean paradigm” (Y. S. Kim, 1996: 20), which consciously appropriated the processes of globalisation to suit South Korea’s history, ideologies, traditions and broader contextual position (Willis, 2012: 112).

The culturally specific nature of South Korea’s globalisation drive was made apparent on 6 March 1995, when its government announced that ‘Segyehwa’ would be retained as the official label of its globalisation policy (S. S. Kim, 2000b: 2-3). Some Korea scholars, such as Samuel S. Kim (2000b: 2-3) and Gi-wook Shin (2006:
convincingly argue that the decision not to translate Segyehwa was made on the basis that Western concepts of ‘globalisation’ were overtly restrictive and limiting, insofar as they could not adequately capture or express the cultural connotations implicit in the Korean term. This contention is substantiated by the fact that, as noted in the thesis introduction, Kim Young-sam (1996: 15) listed “Koreanization” as the fourth of five principal meanings ascribed to the term Segyehwa. It is equally substantiated by the fact that he deemed “Korean originality” to be the “cornerstone” of South Korean globalisation (Y. S. Kim, 1995c: 265).

Kim Young-sam (1996: 15) stressed the importance of “Korean originality” in his blueprint for the Segyehwa policy, in which he argues that an understanding of Segyehwa “must be underpinned by Koreanization,” with the foundation for “successful” globalisation resting on an understanding of traditional Korean culture. As he reasons, in a world where borders are becoming progressively porous, the safeguarding of South Korea’s cultural distinctiveness hinged on the State’s ability to “rediscover the intrinsic richness of [its] traditional culture and blend it with global culture” (Y. S. Kim, 1995d: 272 – emphasis added). Thus, it would appear that the Segyehwa policy’s primary undertaking, from a cultural perspective, was to encourage the fusion of Western and South Korean culture: or cultural hybridity. Indeed, with the Segyehwa policy geared toward the integration of Western and South Korean cultural influences, it would seem that cultural hybridity was not only a likely, but intended outcome of South Korean globalisation.

Vitally, the weight given to the indigenisation of foreign cultural elements by the Segyehwa policy reveals that globalisation can be appropriated to serve a twin agenda, which seeks to confront the global, yet promote the national. Therefore, viewed from within the frame of the globalisation debate, the Segyehwa policy’s
emphasis on South Korea’s need to ‘Koreanise’ the global, suggests that the
Segyehwa policy is highly reflective of the hybridisation thesis, as argued by Arjun
Appadurai (2006; 1996), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004; 2000) and Jan
Nederveen Pieterse (2009; 1994) (see Chapter 1).

Having explained the basic requirements of Juche and Segyehwa, the
following section discusses some of the measures and initiatives pursued by the
North and South to ensure their translation into culture and practice. As noted in the
chapter introduction, attention is given to the heavily Juche-centric nature of North
Korean day-to-day activities, as well as to the pressures, rewards and fears that might
encourage performed ‘belief’ among less genuinely faithful members of the North
Korean populace. On the South Korean side of the equation, focus is afforded to the
government-initiated mechanisms supporting the preservation, globalisation and
hybridisation of traditional Korean culture. With this in mind, I now turn to the
discussions of Section 2.2, beginning with the case of North Korea and Juche.
2.2 The Ins and Outs of Policy Implementation

2.2.1 Enforcing Juche: Social Control, Rewards, Punishment and Performed Belief

Sensationalist images of human rights abuse and a nuclear-hungry, often caricatured leadership notwithstanding, one of the most commonly broadcasted images of North Korea to the outside world is the scene of the North Korean mass parade: that perfectly synchronised, uniform clad and goose stepping mass of soldiery, seemingly loyal and obedient to the Party, its cause and its leader. Certainly, these apparent displays of united loyalty were eerily mirrored in December of 2011, when the world was flooded with scenes of mass-grief as the North Korean State mourned the death of its Dear Leader and General, Kim Jong Il. As pictures and video of mass hysteria emerged through North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and other channels, questions arose as to whether the tears being shed by the North Korean people were falling on account of genuine grief, or fear of certain consequences absent a sufficiently grief-stricken reaction (Park, 2011b; Siddique, 2011; Taylor, 2011).

From the outside looking in, it is impossible to know for sure just how many of those seemingly Party-faithful are genuinely committed to the North Korean revolution and its pursuits, and how many ‘act out’ the Jucheist requirements of single-hearted unity and unabated loyalty in seeking a better life, or for fear of punishment. Importantly, the intention is not to address the question of genuine loyalty, in that this cannot, as conceded, be done with any degree of certainty. Rather, the aim is to emphasise the difficulty involved in distinguishing between genuineness and performance in the North Korean context, so as to underscore the
extent to which Juche (genuinely espoused or not) has come to permeate, and be itself indistinguishable from, North Korean culture.

The following is thus directed toward garnering an understanding of how the policy of Juche has been actively and effectively interwoven into North Korean life and culture. In this vein, it reveals the strict and elaborate methods of Juche indoctrination enforced upon the North Korean population by the leadership and Party apparatus. It also explores some of the reasons why, despite reports of growing disillusionment among the population since the death of Kim Il Sung (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 146-147), most continue to perform and conform to the expectations of the State, and Juche.

To begin with the question of enforcement, one of the primary drivers of Juche implementation, from print and broadcast media, to the cultural fields of art, music, film, literature, education and beyond, is the extent of State censorship and control. Indeed, training centres and institutions in all areas, including music ensembles, publishing houses, art and film studios, as well as television, radio and newspaper outlets, are owned and controlled entirely by the State (Howard, 2004: 35-36; Portal, 2005: 168-169; Yonhap News Agency, 2003: 410-411).

Revealingly, the content and everything produced within these outlets and institutions, is subject to strict censorship by the two “core” and most influential departments of the KWP and their associated committees: the Organizational Guidance Department and the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee (Yonhap News Agency, 2003: 166, 410-411). It must be said that these bureaus, committees and departments are by no means independent, but act directly under the orders of the Party, with the Organizational Guidance Department
described as the leader’s “right arm in realizing the party’s leadership and control over the entire North Korean society” (Yonhap News Agency, 2003: 98).

To give an idea of the extent of State-control exerted over these departments, Kim Jong Il retained the position of head of the Organizational Guidance Department, with the exception of only a few years, from 1974 onwards (Yonhap News Agency, 2003: 98). He also assumed various positions within the Propaganda and Agitation Department at different times during his rise to power and leadership, including chief of the culture and art and publication and press sections, Deputy Director and Director (S. C. Kim, 2006: 39; Lim, 2009: 42-43). As such, the objectives of all North Korean training centres, institutions and outlets strictly align with those of the Party, and their products with the Kim Il Sung issued directive: “Juche-based . . . national in form and socialist in content” (I. S. Kim, 1975: 36).

The following section discusses how the North Korean “Juche-based” (I. S. Kim, 1975: 36) State requirement is reflected in North Korean propaganda art. Additionally, while supplementary examples are drawn on throughout the thesis, chapters 6 and 7 also explore the manifestation of Juche principles in North Korean culture, through an examination of North Korean museum ‘exhibitions’ and ‘music and performance,’ respectively.

These later examples notwithstanding, it is worth briefly highlighting the controlled and Juche-centric nature of North Korean print and broadcast media, as well as the North Korean education system, in that both play a central role in disseminating the Juche idea among the North Korean populace. Beginning with the former, as indicated, all television, radio and newspaper outlets are State-controlled, run by either the Korean Workers’ Party, cabinet or subordinate organisations. In
addition, all material is subject to strict “double or triple censorship” by cabinet and
Specifically, after the approval of the relevant editorial panel where applicable, all
print and broadcast media content is approved by the General Bureau of Publications
Guidance and DPRK Radio and TV broadcasting Committee, respectively (Yonhap
News Agency, 2003: 410-411). It then must gain approval from the appropriate
administration within the Propaganda and Agitation Department, before finally going
to print or air. Notably, the censorship process is reportedly so involved that
newspapers are required to submit all stories and plans a month before their
scheduled publication.

That said, the mechanisms of social control do not end there, with the legal
acquisition of either a television or radio requiring registration with the State
(Harrison, 2002: 5). Further, televisions and radios are modified and pre-tuned to
receive only government channels, though only one television channel, Korean
Central television (KCTV), is widely available in North Korea (Lankov, 2007: 58-
59). With regards to radio, while there may be as little as four million radios
dispersed throughout the country (Oh and Hassig, 2009: 143), most Pyongyang
apartments are fitted with one, which despite being capable of volume adjustment,
cannot be entirely switched off (Lynn, 2007: 125).

This control, and particularly censorship, has ensured the heavy Jucheist
nature of North Korean media content. In terms of television, this is revealed by the
placement of the Juche flame, which represents the Juche revolution, in the upper
left hand corner of all televised content (see Image 1 and Image 2). Geared toward
Juche-education, television content is restricted to pro-Party news, documentaries
telling of North Korea’s apparent feats and successes, and politically appropriate

To offer an example from the latter category, the North Korean animation *A Pencil Cannonball* (2006), strongly reflects the militarist and anti-imperialist tenets of Juche. According to the KCNA (7 November 2004), it is the purpose of children’s programs to “implant into the minds of children warm patriotism and towering hatred for the enemy” (the US). Illustrative of this intention, a far cry from what one of the capitalist world might expect from a standard line-up of children’s programming, the majority of the animation showcases a war (by way of a geometry set and stationery), against the US (Juchekorea, 2006).

The animation begins with a young North Korean school boy, who rather than doing his geometry homework, opts instead to draw and pretend-shoot a US helmet with his pencil-loaded compass. Soon thereafter he falls asleep and scenes from a dream-induced scenario of a US attack fill the screen. Armed with some
stationery and a protractor for measuring aim, the young boy and a group of friends commence their assault on a host of US naval tanks and weaponry; which to aid in the portrayal of the US as ‘imperialist aggressors’ are complete with menacing faces (Juchekorea, 2006 – see Image 1 and Image 2). The boy and his friends seem to be fairing quite well until an inaccurate shot by the boy sees him hit by a US missile. As his friends rush over to him, the boy wakes up from his dream (Juchekorea, 2006).

Certainly, the fact that something as mundane as mathematical skills should be linked to the issue of defence, and that the targeted enemy should be the US, evidences just how ingrained the teachings of Juche are in North Korean culture. So too, given the target audience, does the fact that one of North Korea’s principal aims in the rearing of its children should be to ensure that they grow “to be pillars of Songun” (KCNA, 15 November 2011).

Echoing the Jucheist themes of North Korean television, the regular programming of North Korea’s primary radio station, the Korean Central Broadcasting station (KCBS), together with the content of North Korean Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun, shift between praising the Kims, North Korean ‘prosperity’ and the Juche idea, and criticising South Korea and its ‘occupiers,’ the United States (Lankov, 2007: 50-51, 58). According to a 2000 estimate, 34.2 percent of KCBS programming is devoted to idolising the Kims, 28.8 percent to encouraging hard work, 17.4 percent to promoting and extolling Juche and 12 percent to informing North Koreans of the suffering and depravity of the South under the ‘thumb’ of the US (Lankov, 2007: 51). Given the highly censored and Party-driven nature of media content, North Korean newspapers reflect a similar prioritisation.

I move now to the example of the North Korean education system, which is similarly centred around Juche. In fact, the strict directives of the Education Law of
1999 and the Education Bureau of the People’s Committee at the province and city level (Yonhap News Agency, 2003: 427), ensure that “politics overlays” the entire North Korean curriculum (French, 2007: 21). As North Korea experts Ralph C. Hassig and Kongdan Oh (2009: 156) explain, beginning in Kindergarten, everyday academic subjects “are suffused with ideology and the worship of the Kim family.” Specifically, in the context of North Korean education, “learning to read means learning to read about Kim Il Sung; music class involves singing patriotic songs” (French, 2007: 21) (see Chapter 7); mathematics entails tackling “problems about how many American soldiers North Korean soldiers can kill;” and art class is filled with “pictures of the Kim family home” (Oh and Hassig, 2009: 156), together with “dead, bloodied American soldiers” (J. H. Lee, 2012: para. 28). Students are also instilled with the Jucheist qualities of ‘single-hearted unity’ and loyalty by being required at the close of school every day to march on the spot and salute the portrait of Kim Jong Il (French, 2007: 21), and presumably now, Kim Jong Un.

In light of the above, education in Juche in a general sense, is a paramount concern and practice of the North Korean government. Concededly, although training in Juche requirements does not automatically translate to belief or action, it must be noted that a series of pragmatic reasons continue to motivate North Koreans to practice “the greatness and correctness of the Juche idea” in their daily lives (J. I. Kim, 1982: 1). In addition to the fact that North Koreans are exposed to limited alternate forms of information and entertainment with which to properly assess the validity of what they are taught (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 143), rewards and punishments play a fundamental role in enforcing Juche; as does the fact that the practical application of Juche is, for all intents and purposes, the law.

Testament to government intentions and efforts to implement Juche as the guiding principle of North Korean life and culture, the above ten-point principle stands above the constitution and all else as the governing injunction of North Korea and its citizens, in practice (Lim, 2009: 66). Crucially, its observance is enforced by a system of reward and punishment.

Firstly, in order to understand North Koreans’ continued (perceived) loyalty to the leader and the State, it must be recognised that the level of (relative) comfort and opportunity afforded a North Korean citizen, is determined by their apparent and perceived loyalty to the regime. This is the case in that it partly determines their classification within the North Korean class system. The North Korean class system is organised into three tiers, each consisting of multiple subgroups. The primary classifications include: the ‘core class,’ the ‘wavering class,’ and the ‘hostile class’ (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 133). While one’s classification is heavily influenced by inherited factors such as family history and associations (with certain ‘core’ subgroups comprised of descendents of anti-Japanese fighters, and ‘hostile’ subgroups of descendents of pro-Japanese sympathisers, for example) (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 133-134), displays of overt contempt for the North Korean regime will
see one promptly relegated to the bottom of the social ladder. Therefore, with class classifications determining housing allocation, employment and education opportunities, level of access to medical care, food rations and overall quality of life (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 133), for all, there are reasons aplenty to tow the Party line.

For the elite and privileged ‘core’ class, who are granted relative ‘luxuries’ such as residence in Pyongyang and generally brighter life prospects, the possibility of a demotion in class and banishment to the countryside encourages continued loyalty to the regime (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 129). So too does the possibility that overt demonstrations of loyalty might attract even greater rewards and luxuries, as seen to be the case for Mass Games performer Pak Hyon Sun, featured in the award-winning documentary A State of Mind (2005) (see Chapter 7).

As noted by the documentary’s narrator, Pak’s prominent position and exhibited loyalty in the 2002 rendition of the Games was rewarded with a television, gifted to her by the State (Gordon, 2005). In the North Korean context this ‘gift’ carries much significance in that television sets are “still seen as something special and as a symbol of prosperity” in the North, with estimates suggesting that “less than half of all North Korean families have access to television at home” (Lankov, 2007: 56). Therefore, given Pak’s example and the alternatives of punishment and harsher standards facing the disloyal, ‘core’ class members have everything to gain and maintain (and everything to lose) through loyalty (or dissent).

Equally, for the bulk of the population who find themselves in the ‘wavering class,’ a similar fear of demotion to the ‘hostile’ class and a life of “the least desirable jobs . . . poorest housing . . . few government rations” and near to nil prospects for advancement or betterment (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 134), likewise dissuades most from acts of dissidence. Even for many of the ‘hostile’ class already
leading difficult lives, the threat of being sent to political detention camps, known as 
“control and management centres,” reportedly the worst of all North Korean prisons 
(Oh and Hassig, 2009: 208-209), deters the majority from speaking or acting against 
the regime.

The fear felt by the North Korean populace in this regard is on account of the 
constant surveillance to which they are subjected, both by their fellow-citizens and 
North Korea’s primary security organisations, the Ministry of People’s Security 
(MPS) and the State Security Department (SSD). According to Oh and Hassig (2000: 
137), the reach of these security organisations is extensive.

Testimonies of countless defectors and returned foreigners who lived a time 
in Pyongyang, tell of how a member of the MPS is assigned to, and surveys, every 
workplace, neighbourhood and home, for ‘suspect’ behaviour (Jenkins, 2008: 36; Oh 
and Hassig, 2000: 135-136). They also coordinate and mark attendance at so-called 
‘self-criticism sessions,’ in which citizens confess to weekly ideological 
‘transgressions’ (judged against their observance of the earlier described Ten-point 
Principle) and commit to future improvement (French, 2007: 20; Oh and Hassig, 
2000: 142). In addition, citizens, for fear of being themselves implicated, reportedly 
often also inform MPS members of the transgressions of others, regardless of their 
own personal level of genuine loyalty (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 139-140).

With any suspected behaviour reported to the SSD and running the alleged 
risk of banishment, extensive re-indoctrination, internment, hard labour, and even 
death (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 142), not only for the accused but their entire family, 
and any known associates (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 138-139), genuinely espoused or 
not, the performance of Juche requirements strongly animates North Korean life and 
culture.
While some mechanisms of North Korean control have, by all reports, become less strict since the State’s economic situation worsened in the 1990s (French, 2007: 21), an atmosphere of surveillance persists, as does a climate of fear as non-compliance is fraught with the risk of considerable consequences. It is not yet known how the mechanisms of social control will change, if at all, under the leadership of Kim Jong Un, but it appears, at least for the foreseeable future, that Juche will continue to be enforced in, and animate North Korean culture and the lives of its citizens.

In working to demonstrate how these strict measures of censorship and control ensure the unfolding of Juche in specific North Korean cultural artefacts, the example of propaganda poster art is drawn on in Section 2.3.1. In the interest of equally delineating the South Korean case, however, I turn first to South Korean efforts to facilitate the implementation of the Segyehwa policy. Accordingly, the following explains some of the measures pursued by the South Korean government in an attempt to foster hybridity (as required by the Segyehwa policy) within South Korean culture.
2.2.2 Implementing Segyehwa: Fostering Hybridity

Earlier in this chapter I argued that South Korea has embraced globalisation while still retaining a sense of ‘South Koreanness’ to its culture. Though, as this section illustrates, the hybridity evident in South Korean culture has not emerged organically, but has been aided and encouraged by a series of government ministries, subordinate organisations and associated initiatives. However, in outlining some of the mechanisms that have facilitated the Segyehwa policy’s call for cultural hybridity, as noted in the methodology section of the thesis, the language proficiency of this researcher limits the scope of related analysis. The lack of accessibility with regards to comparable North Korean sources also creates an imbalance that sees a ‘politics of representation’ approach privileged so as to allow for an equal juxtaposition of North and South Korea within a ‘one nation-two states’ paradigm. The following thus provides only a partial overview of the Segyehwa policy’s implementation and is intended to be read against the backdrop of the privileged ‘politics of representation’ perspective.

While recalling that the following account is not exhaustive, some of the more notable facilitators of South Korean cultural hybridity are the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and their respective affiliates, the Korean Culture and Information Service (KOCIS) and the Korea Foundation (KF). Notably, while these ministries and organisations are charged with a range of responsibilities, both within and outside of ‘culture,’ focus is given to those initiatives that are especially relevant to the realms of ‘music and performance’ and the museum ‘exhibition.’

To begin with the MCST, according to its official website, from a cultural standpoint, its objectives revolve around the “restoration and re-creation of
traditional cultural values” through the “creation of national cultural spaces” and “cultural exchange and sharing” (MCST, 2005). Though, as well as emphasising the preservation of traditional culture, the MCST also seeks the “improvement of [South Korea’s] national image” and the “development of conditions conducive to enhancement of the [South Korean] brand” (MCST, 2005).

In this regard, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism reflects the same dual priority expressed by Kim Young-sam in his inauguration speech and Segyehwa policy blueprint (see Section 2.1.2): the simultaneous building of a new globalised Korea with increased international standing and competitiveness and maintenance of traditional culture. As the following reveals, this simultaneous pursuit of globalisation (global competitiveness) and traditional culture preservation sees the MCST actively promote and implement cultural hybridity.

Firstly, in pursuit of its dual and associated aims, the MCST oversees the establishment of, and offers financial support to, various culture, arts and educational centres. Offering an example within the realm of music and performance, the MCST established the National Gugak (Korean Traditional Music) Centre. With three branches across South Korea, in Namwon, Jindo and Busan (National Gugak Centre, 2011a), the National Gugak Centre (formerly the National Centre for Korean Traditional Performing Arts), seeks to preserve and promote Korean traditional music (Gugak), “through education, research and performance” (National Gugak Centre, 2011b: para. 1-2). In working towards this goal, the Centre consists of promotion, research and performance divisions and houses its own museum, educating locals and foreigners of the culture and history of traditional Korean performing arts (National Gugak Centre, 2011a).
Within the latter category of performance, it maintains four performance groups, three specialising in different genres of traditional Korean music and performance. Among the three groups purposed with preserving traditional Korean music are a court music orchestra and dance theatre, promoting Joseon (1392-1910) royal court music and dance, respectively, and a folk music group, safeguarding popular traditional folk songs, instrumental and percussion pieces (National Gugak Centre, 2011c).

Exhibiting a more modern twist to Korean musical tradition, the National Gugak Centre also manages a contemporary (fusion) Gugak orchestra, which combines traditional Korean instruments with Western musical influences to create a modernised (South) Korean musical style (National Gugak Centre, 2011c). The Centre also conducts Korean traditional music classes for foreigners, organises international events and exchange performances and holds international workshops on traditional and contemporary Korean music, locally as well as internationally (National Gugak Centre, 2011b; National Gugak Centre, 2011d).

The establishment of culture, arts and educational centres such as the National Gugak Centre are facilitated by various ten and five-year cultural development plans and related initiatives, implemented by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. As part of its Ten-Year Project for Cultural Development in the 1990s for example, the MCST founded the Korean National University of Arts (KNUA), which officially opened in March 1993 (KNUA, 2012a), not long into Kim Young-sam’s presidential term.

In terms of MCST and Segyehwa objectives concerning the simultaneous preservation of traditional Korean culture and the fostering of cultural hybridity, the KNUA plays an important role, through its School of Korean Traditional Arts,
opened on 9 March 1998 (KNUA, 2012a), two weeks after Kim Young-sam left office. Focusing on the Department of Korean Traditional Music, according to the official KNUA website, the “primary educational goal” of the Department “is to nurture students’ performance and creative capability so that they not only contribute to the preservation of traditional music but also meet the needs of the 21[st] century” (KNUA, 2012b: para. 5). As such, the curriculum is said to “encourage” student genre exposure beyond traditional music so as to allow for the reassessment of the “status of traditional arts” within the “global context” of today’s music industry (KNUA, 2012b: para. 3).

Arguably, interpreted within the frame of MCST and Segyehwa objectives, this reassessment of traditional Korean music against twenty-first century requirements, indicates an active effort to blend Korean (traditional) and Western (global) musical influences. With the KNUA thus educating students in the practical application of Segyehwa policy requirements, backed by the MCST and South Korean government, it is encouraging the cultural hybridisation of the South Korean music industry and facilitating the emergence of fusion Gugak ensembles such as those discussed in Section 2.3.2. In fact, many of the groups featured in Section 2.3.2, including AURA, are graduates from the Korean National University of Arts (KNUA, 2012c).

In addition to encouraging the preservation and hybridisation of Korean culture within South Korea, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism also proactively seeks the globalisation of Korean culture outside of the peninsula. Particularly, with the aim to “introduce Korean culture to the world and uplift the national image of Korea” (KOCIS, 2012a: para. 1), the MCST oversees a subordinate
cultural dissemination and exchange body, known as the Korean Culture and Information Service.

Perhaps the most notable and relevant contribution of the KOCIS to preserving traditional Korean culture and facilitating its worldwide globalisation (and hybridisation), is its establishment of numerous Korean cultural centres worldwide. Existing in nineteen countries, including Vietnam, the United States, Nigeria, Russia and Australia (KOCIS, 2012b), Korean cultural centres are ultimately responsible for fostering a global “‘Korea premium’ brand,” through the blending of traditional Korean, and ‘global’ cultures of the world (KOCIS, 2012a: 4).

In this sense, the purpose of KOCIS international Korean cultural centres aligns quite strongly with the Segyehwa policy’s call for the simultaneous embracement of traditional Korean and global culture, or for cultural hybridity.

Consider Australia’s Korean cultural centre, located in Sydney, as a case in point. Opened in April 2011 near Museum Station, the Sydney Korean Cultural Office is promoted as a centre for bringing the cultures of (South) Korea and Australia together. Seeking the proliferation of Korean culture and its preservation (hybridisation) beyond the borders of Korea, the Sydney Korean Cultural Office offers an array of traditional and contemporary culture classes. These range from traditional Korean cooking and instrument courses, to language and K-pop dance lessons. The centre also hosts exhibitions and performances (traditional, modern and fusion), together with regular events including weekly Korean film and monthly ‘Party’ nights filled with K-drama, K-film, K-pop, as well as cultural and live band performances (Korean Cultural Office, 2012).

In addition to its regular events, the Sydney Korean Cultural Office also organises and supports special events such as the Korean Film Festival in Australia.
(KOFFIA). Launched in 2010 in Sydney and since expanding to Melbourne, this (so far) annual event showcases South Korean mainstream, classic, independent, documentary, short and art house film, against a backdrop of traditional and modern performances (Korean Cultural Office, 2012). It also sponsors one-off commemorative events, such as the Super K-Pop Concert held in Sydney on 12 January 2011. Convened in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of Korea-Australia diplomatic relations, the concert brought South Korean and Australian personalities, including K-pop stars Shin Seung-hun, Son Ho-young and SHINee and Australian Neighbours actor Sam Clark, together in a mutual celebration of South Korean and Australian music (Korean Cultural Office, 2012).

The Korea Foundation under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade also works “to promote awareness and understanding of Korea,” including Korean culture “throughout the international community” (Korea Foundation, 2011: 1). With regards to culture in particular, it claims to seek “the globalization of Korean culture” through the use of “globally competitive,” that is, culturally hybrid “cultural contents” (Korea Foundation, 2011: 21). To this end, also mirroring the Segyehwa policy’s simultaneous promotion of Korean and foreign influences, it initiates and supports a number of international cultural exchanges of a mixed “traditional and modern . . . Korean and Western” flavour (Korea Foundation, 2011: 20).

Often in association with relevant local embassies and organisations, the Korea Foundation also organises and finances exhibitions and performances within South Korea itself. In regards to the former, its cultural centre in Seoul hosts an estimated twenty exhibitions annually, purposed with introducing international art styles and conventions to Korea (Korea Foundation, 2011: 25). Three such
exhibitions hosted include *Modern Art of Zimbabwe, WEARABLE ART*, an exhibition on Indonesian Batik Cloth in 2010 (Korea Foundation, 2011: 25) and *UNPOLISHED*, an exhibition on Polish design, in 2012 (Korea Foundation, 2012). Though, as well as hosting exhibitions of its own, the Foundation also provides free “gallery space” to independent exhibition organisers (Korea Foundation, 2011: 25).

With reference to the latter, local performances are staged quarterly and aim to either expose foreigners to Korean traditional and modern music, or introduce foreign performance to Korea. For instance, in June 2010, the Korea Foundation organised a concert for foreign residents. Held at Seoul Namsan Theater, in a display of South Korean cultural hybridity, the concert showcased “the fusion” of traditional and modern musical sensibilities (Korea Foundation, 2011: 26).

On the other side of the equation, the KF also supports the annual Seoul International Music Festival, which brings international artists from a range of countries and musical genres to Korea, to perform alongside South Korean acts (Korea Foundation, 2011: 26). In 2010 it featured the coming together of international stars such as Israeli violist Avri Levitan, Canadian-born pianist Jan Lisiecki, French clarinettist Michel Lethiec and French-Cypriot pianist Cyprien Katsaris with local South Korean acts, including child clarinettist Kim Han, Marimbist June Moon-kyung Hahn and the Suwon Philharmonic Orchestra (H. W. Lee, 2010).

Supplementary to the above, the South Korean government also uses its ‘Year of Friendship’ and ‘Visit Korea Year’ initiatives to foster cooperation and cultural exchange between itself and other countries, ultimately encouraging cultural hybridity. As part of its ‘Year of Friendship’ initiative, the South Korean government, in partnership with relevant representatives from the country in
question, designates particular years as ones in which the South Korean government will work especially hard to strengthen ties and cultural exchange with particular countries. The year of 2011 marked the Australia-Korea Year of Friendship, as designated by then South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in 2009 (Yoon, 2011). The year of 2013 is the Year of Korea-Indonesia Friendship (Hwang, 2012a).

These years of friendship are typically celebrated by a series of cultural exchanges, events and performances, scattered throughout the year. For instance, in commemoration of the Korea-China Year of Friendship, in April 2012, the KOCIS hosted a Korean-Chinese performance of the traditional Korean folktale *Chunhyangjeon*, which combined traditional Korean opera (*Pansori*) with Chinese *Pingtan* performance (Hwang, 2012b). Then in June, the Korea-New Zealand Year of Friendship was commemorated by a performance in Wellington which featured South Korean fusion ensemble GongMyoung and breakdancing group Gorilla Crew, alongside traditional New Zealand musical contributions. This was then followed by joint orchestral performances in July, a *Taekwondo* demonstration in October and a Korean film festival in November (Choi, 2012).

Although also implemented for its tourism and economic benefits, South Korea’s ‘Visit Korea Year’ initiative likewise promotes Korean culture, cultural cooperation and hybridity. Vitally, a connection between ‘Visit Korea Year,’ the *Segyehwa* policy, and its vision of cultural hybridity is suggested by the fact that Kim Young-sam designated 1994, the year of the policy’s inauguration, as not only a ‘Visit Korea Year,’ but as a ‘Year of Traditional Performing Arts’ (Y. S. Kim, 1995b: 131). As such, “vigorous efforts to globalize [Korean] culture” (Y. S. Kim, 1995b: 131), were undertaken alongside equal efforts to ensure a sense of (South)
“Korean originality” to South Korean globalisation (Y. S. Kim, 1995c: 265).

Notably, a ‘Visit Korea Year’ initiative recently drew to a close in South Korea, having been promoted and implemented between 2010 and 2012 (Visit Korea Committee, 2012).

According to the Visit Korea Committee, one of the key aims of the 2010-2012 initiative was to “improve the national brand value of Korea by promoting Korean culture around the world” (Visit Korea Committee, 2012: para. 4). Read against the mandates of the Segyehwa policy as well as the earlier described objectives of the MCST (2005) to simultaneously globalise and preserve Korean culture, the ‘Visit Korea Year’ fosters cultural hybridity by way of a three-part agenda. That is, an agenda to: (1) promote Korea and Korean culture globally; (2) encourage the further introduction of foreign interest and influence in Korea and (3) educate the world of the richness and uniqueness of Korean culture so as to aid its preservation and globalisation.

Consequently, through support of performance centres such as the National Gugak Centre and international Korean galleries, including the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, Sweden and the Cleveland Museum of Art, the United States, South Korea is preserving traditional Korean culture (Korea Foundation, 2011: 18). Equally, by hosting foreign art exhibitions including those on Zimbabwean modern art and Polish design, as well as initiatives such as the International Music Festival, South Korea is simultaneously introducing foreign influence into South Korea. Though further to this, by blending Korean tradition with twenty-first century (global) requirements in art, performance and education (KNUA), South Korea is proactively ensuring the facilitation of cultural hybridity.
Having outlined North and South Korean efforts to implement the policies of Juche and Segyehwa respectively, Section 2.3 illustrates how the above detailed encouragement and enforcement of these policies, has ensured their respective manifestation in Korea’s North and South. It begins with the North Korean case, drawing on the example of propaganda (poster) art. It then turns to discuss South Korean ‘fusion Gugak’ music as an embodiment of the Segyehwa policy’s required embrace of Korean (local) and foreign (global) influences.

2.3 Policy as Artefact: Cultural Manifestations of Juche and Segyehwa

2.3.1 Juche in Propaganda Poster Art

Owing to the elaborate methods of social control enforced by the North Korean government in implementing Juche (see Section 2.2.1), North Korean propaganda is highly reflective of the ideology. The case is no different with North Korean propaganda (poster) art, which as this section illustrates, typically embodies one (or more) of its core principles.

Before proceeding to specific examples, however, it must be recalled that art pieces, as with all print and media, are “produced for and ordered,” as well as “limited and controlled” by the State (Portal, 2005: 168-169). That is, the studios with which artists are affiliated and work, some of the more renowned including the Mansudae, Minky, Paekho and Central Art Studio (Bonner, 2009: 106), are not only run by State organs, but are also under the ‘guidance’ of the culture and art section of the Propaganda and Agitation Department.

As noted, Kim Jong Il acted as chief of this section for a time during his rise to the position of appointed successor and supreme leader of North Korea.
Importantly, he was elevated to this position by his father and then leader Kim Il Sung in 1967 (Lim, 2009: 42), the same year Juche was first regarded in an ideological sense by the leadership (Lynn, 2007: 105) (see Section 2.1.1). Thus, with Kim Jong II in charge of cultural products such as film, music, novels, opera, theatre and art (Lim, 2009: 44) at a time when Juche was being established as the ‘monolithic’ ideology of the State, Kim Jong II’s primary focus and “main contribution” was to ensure that North Korean products and artefacts, including propaganda art, reflected and promoted the Juche idea (Lim, 2009: 42-43). This included ensuring leader loyalty and legitimacy through the elevation of the entire ruling family to the position of ‘revolutionary heroes’ in all facets of art and literature. It also entailed the portrayal of “model citizens” as representative “figures of self-sacrifice, who were eager to fulfil what the leader ordered without fail” (Lim, 2009: 44). In light of the overt anti-imperialist and anti-American nature of Juche, and as confirmed by the images that follow, it also meant characterising Japan, the US and South Korea as enemies of the State and Juche revolution.

In seeking to showcase the establishment of these Jucheist themes in North Korean propaganda art in particular, a selection of North Korean propaganda posters is categorised, pictured and analysed below. In echo of the methodological section of the thesis, taking the above censorship and conditions of reward and punishment into account (see Section 2.2.1), pieces should be seen as expressive not of individual artist beliefs, but of State policy and requirement.

Though there is, concededly, some overlap in categorisation, Images 3 through 5 reveal the emphasis afforded to the independence stance of the Juche idea. Image 5 also reflects the Jucheist promise that “single-hearted unity” and collective loyalty to the leader and the cause (J. I. Kim, 1995: 238), will grant North Korea an
“essential superiority” and invincibility among its enemies (J. I. Kim, 1982: 69) (see Section 2.1.1). Similarly, images 6 to 8 highlight the tendency for North Korean cultural artefacts to portray the US as the “ringleader” and “chieftain of world imperialism” (J. I. Kim, 1995: 171, 185). Reinforcing these ideals, images 9 to 11 represent the Juche-induced North Korean perception of the US as warmongers; a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the North Korean State. Notably, posters from the final two categories are contextualised within the broader frame of North Korean Songun (military-first) politics and its influence over, and permeation of, North Korean culture. Importantly, the examples featured are but a small sample of the works which line the streets of Pyongyang, with the purpose of rallying the North Korean populace to the patriotic struggle against foreign powers, imperialism, ‘flunkeyism’ and in particular, the United States.
This philosophical ‘call to arms’ to forge a shared commitment to the preservation of Juche socialism among the North Korean populace is strongly reflected in Image 3 and Image 4. As Image 3 reveals, this commitment is a two pronged one, entailing both a maintenance of ideological education or ‘inheritance,’ as well as a ‘development’ of Juche’s ideological and practical applications. Testifying to the Juche-specific quality of the example, the image features an artistic representation of the Juche idea: The Tower of the Juche Idea. The Tower of the Juche Idea is a monument erected in central Pyongyang, created to symbolise the ‘greatness’ of the Juche revolution. One-hundred and seventy metres high and topped with a flame-shaped torch (the Juche flame – the symbol of the Juche revolution), it is the tallest structure of its type in the world (Portal, 2005: 141-142).

In Image 3, the tower is positioned in the background, though remains easily identifiable. Its inclusion, together with the contented patriotism evident on the faces of the three party faithful, pictured in the foreground, (all of whom are wearing party badges; one a Juche flame), sees Image 3 aptly personify the promise of contentment and prosperity inherent in the Juche ideology.
These same notions are equally expressed in Image 4. The focal object in its case is the *Juche* flame. As noted above, the *Juche* flame, along with the tower it tops, is the symbol most widely used in North Korea to identify, advance and conjure the spirit of *Juche*. At its crux, the flame symbolises the ‘light’ of *Juche*; light not only in the sense of legitimacy and ‘correctness,’ but of the hopeful promise that the *Juche* pursuit of complete independence will engender the reward of national sovereignty and supremacy. In this vein, the use of doves in the piece evokes a similar promise. Specifically, doves are shown in the background, flying over the Korean peninsula. Traditionally and regularly associated with the ideals of peace, hope and freedom, in this context, they can be said to connote the same promise of freedom, peace and independent sovereignty, as that of the *Juche* flame.

As demonstrated by the three hands holding the flame, the freedom *Juche* promises is not an individual freedom, but freedom focused on solidarity. It is a State freedom and independence that can, as *Juche* teaches, only be achieved through fervent commitment to the *Juche* revolution (J. I. Kim, 1995: 238-241). In this regard, it is its emphasis on State-wide loyalty to the cause, which ensures that this
example of propaganda art is a fitting embodiment of the principles of the *Juche* idea.

The “validity and vitality” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 14) of the *Juche* idea and its promise of a prosperous future is similarly expressed in *Image 5*, through the portrayal of ‘assured’ North Korean superiority, invincibility and ultimate victory against imperialism. In this particular instance, outsiders to the *Juche* revolution (capitalists/imperialists – characterised by Americans and Japanese) are looking upon North Korea through a viewing scope. Seen through this scope is the Tower of the *Juche* Idea, a three-figure statue of a brush, hammer and sickle, and scenes of a celebratory North Korean mass parade, complete with balloons. The tower and its flame are intended to “symbolize *Juche* thought shining throughout the world,” while the statue represents the unity of the peasant, intellectual and worker, reflecting North Korean society at large (Portal, 2005: 142-144). These images of so-called “single-hearted unity” are described as the “nuclear bomb” of North Korea. Starkly contrasted with those of cowering (seemingly defeated) Japanese and American ‘imperialists,’ they strongly reflect the *Jucheist* teaching that “collectivism” constitutes the “lifeblood” of the revolution and is the


In addition to the images themselves, this idea is conveyed by the use of colour and particularly by the fact that the scenes of North Korean celebration and ‘victory’ are bathed in socialist red (De Ceuster, 2008: 14), while the caption stretched across the ‘defeated’ American and Japanese, is painted blue. The use of blue for the caption carries significance in two ways. Firstly, as a contrasting colour to socialist red, it can be seen to connote capitalism. Secondly, given the nature of the caption’s message regarding the importance of single-hearted unity as the “nuclear bomb” of North Korea, read against the viewing scope and outside images, the blue also connotes the “peace” promised to North Korea (in the face of imperialist threat) through an observance of single-hearted unity (De Ceuster, 2008: 15). Thus, through the association of defeat with capitalism and victory with Juche socialism, Image 5 intends to reinforce the professed “correctness” and “essential superiority” of Juche (J. I. Kim, 1982: 1, 69), and urge North Koreans to carry on its cause with “single-hearted unity.”

Turning to the self-defence tenet of Juche and its unfolding in North Korean culture, as noted in Section 2.1.1, the promulgation of “full [military] preparedness” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 52) as the most effective weapon against imperialism, has given rise to a strong military mentality and culture in North Korea. On the material level, State efforts to transform North Korea into an “impregnable fortress” (Becker, 2005: 4) have certainly seen it take position as one of the most militarised and fortified states on the planet, as evidenced in the following statistics. North Korea allocates the world’s highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) percentage, estimated at between twenty-five and thirty-one percent, to its military (Fuqua, 2007: 113; Seliger, 2011: 116).
135). As a result, it has the fourth largest army (Seliger, 2011: 135) and one of the largest air defence systems in the world. In its capital city of Pyongyang, anti-aircraft guns are installed roughly every five hundred metres, on the rooftops of each apartment, factory or government office (Becker, 2005: 152). North Korea is also purported to have between eight and fifteen thousand underground installations and five hundred miles of tunnels, each filled with ships, factories and planes, at its army’s disposal (Becker, 2005: 4).

In terms of specific army personnel numbers, it is estimated that approximately five percent (1.1 million) of North Korea’s entire population is officially enlisted in the army, with its “reserve force” numbering between 4.7 and 7.5 million people (Fuqua, 2007: 113; Seliger, 2011: 136). Given that North Korea’s entire population is estimated to number no more than 23 million (Hwang, 2010: 177), combined, these statistics suggest that “one in four North Koreans qualify as military personnel” (Seliger, 2011: 136).

Revealingly, the primary reason accounting for North Korea’s mass mobilisation of soldiers is that upon adopting military-first politics in 1998, Kim Jong II took special steps to make the civilian and military cultures of the State indivisible. He achieved this by elevating the Chairman of the National Defence Commission (NDC), or head of the (North) Korean People’s Army (KPA), to the Head of State position (S. H. Kim, 2011: 35; Seth, 2010: 217). This in effect, saw the NDC (that is, the Army) “supplant the party” as the “the primary decision-making body in the government” (Cha, 2012: 91-92). With such a high percentage of the population in the army and the army put in charge of everyday activities and

---

9 Prior to his death in December 2011, Kim Jong II held the then Head of State position as Chairman of the NDC. Though, proclaimed the “Eternal Chairman” in April 2012, constitutional revisions saw the “First Chairman” post become the new head of state position, currently filled by Kim Jong Un (KCNA, 13 April 2012a; KCNA, 13 April 2012b).
services, including things as mundane as “unclogging the toilets,” it was granted and continues to exert “uninterrupted influence” over North Korean society and culture at large (Cha, 2012: 92). It is therefore on account of the indivisibility of North Korean politics and culture, prompted by the Jucheist requirement of “full [military] preparedness” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 52), that North Korean cultural artefacts strongly reflect self defensive capacity and militarism (see images 1-2 and 6-7, for example).

Echoing the concession of Section 2.2.1, influence, education and overwhelming presence does not automatically equate to belief or practice. Though with “self defence” constitutionally defined as the “supreme duty and honour” of North Korean citizens (Naenara, 2003: para: 86), lending service to national defence is (relatively) handsomely rewarded, carrying a special allure in the North Korean context. One of the greatest allures is that enlistment in the armed services is “an important qualification for party membership,” and therefore a quicker “path to a comfortable life in North Korean society” (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 123).

Consequently, while North Korean men are conscripted into the army for a ten year term, a third of North Korean women also serve voluntarily (Yoncheva, 2003), perhaps in search of better life prospects for themselves and their families.

The apparent omnipresence of the army notwithstanding, as “the single most important prerogative of the [S]tate,” the military-first politics of Songun has, on account of the earlier cited State control and reward and punishment system, been “deeply integrated into the lives of the masses” (S. H. Kim, 2011: 35). In many ways military culture is North Korean culture (Cha, 2012: 92), which in reflection of Jucheist requirements, revolves around the military values of patriotism, unity, solidarity, obedience, synchronicity and loyalty and devotion (Kershaw, 2000: 166-167). Using the example of ‘music and performance’ elaborated in Chapter 7 as a
case in point, the large majority of North Korean songs reflect a strong militarism, extol *Juche* and/or *Songun* and praise the military exploits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il as models to follow. Similarly, its ‘Mass Games’ gymnastics displays are not only performed with military precision, but are thematically geared toward demonstrating the State’s military might and determination in revolutionary struggle (see Chapter 7).

More everyday activities are also highly militant in nature. With the NDC in charge and people encouraged through punishment and reward (see Section 2.2.1) to “emulate the revolutionary spirit of the military” in their everyday lives (Lim, 2009: 154), the *Jucheist* policy of *Songun* has and is, transforming the cultural landscape of North Korea by way of a very specific and enveloping militant values system. As remarked, ordinary North Koreans march to work to the sounds of martial music every day (Kershaw, 2000: 166) (see Chapter 1), while school children are made to march on the spot and, like soldiers to a commanding officer, salute their leader (French, 2007: 21).

With North Korean propaganda art produced amid this consciously enforced military atmosphere, by (censored) artists, it is not surprising that North Korean art should express military (and particularly anti-US, given its identification as the primary target and motivator of its military campaign) themes. In seeking to demonstrate the clear anti-imperialist character of *Juche* and its unfolding in North Korean culture, six artworks showcasing the ferocity with which North Korea ‘targets’ US ‘imperialism’ and views the US as the ‘enemy’ of its socialist revolution, are drawn on below.
In a clear expression of anti-US sentiment, *Image 6* shows a recognisably American icon (the Capitol Building), being destroyed by a barrage of North Korean missiles, the American flag in tatters. Correspondingly, *Image 7* pictures a member of the Korean People’s (or North Korean) army (KPA), crushing the ‘might’ of the US (represented by US army missiles) under the weight of his boot. Accordingly, not only is North Korea’s antipathy for the United States evident, but so too is its readiness and resolve to fiercely defend its sovereign independence, as instructed by *Juche*. 

*Image 6.* When provoking a war of aggression, we will hit back, beginning with the US! [poster], Gouache and Acrylic. From *North Korean Posters: The David Heather Collection* (pg. 138) by David Heather and Koen De Ceuster, 2008, Munich and London: Prestel.

That said, out of the three posters pictured, the anti-American pursuits of the *Juche* revolution are perhaps best embodied by *Image 8*. Featuring a coffin with the letters ‘USA’ inscribed into its front, draped in an American flag and topped with what is presumably the helmet of a deceased US serviceman, North Korea’s intention to ‘destroy’ the US is clear. Surrounded by a myriad of skulls, cross-marked graves and a lone crow, a fundamental teaching of the *Juche* idea exudes from the image: that the US is an imperial nation and that US imperialism must be defeated. This is plainly echoed by the accompanying caption, wherein the images of ‘doom’ and ‘death’ portrayed, are said to reflect “The fate of US imperialism.”
Perpetuating these perceptions further, North Korean propaganda has built on the image of an imperialist US to depict US troops as merciless colonisers, who indiscriminately massacre all whom they encounter. Images 9 to 11 show North Korean citizens, with an emphasis on women, children and the elderly, being slaughtered at the hands of the US. Each of these examples of North Korean propaganda art can be seen as expressions of Juche, in that they recall the history of the Korean War as viewed through its prism. As mentioned in Chapter 4, under the guidance of Juche, political education and ideological indoctrination in North Korea has succeeded in painting a history in which the US is solely responsible for Korea’s initial and continuing division, as well as the tragedy of the Korean War. To quote
the caption of Image 9, this has bred a “blood-drenched hatred” of the US, which fuels the cause of the anti-US *Juche* revolution.

Additional propaganda posters of an anti-US and anti-Japanese nature are offered in Chapter 4.

The nine propaganda posters analysed thus thoroughly mirror *Juche*-centric themes and objectives, reflecting self-determinism, unity and the ‘correctness’ of the *Juche* revolution, as well as anti-imperialist and anti-American rhetoric. As such, they are important for two reasons. Firstly, with reference to their anti-imperialist nature, by communicating a clear association between the ‘foreign’ (and the US) and imperialism, the artworks evidence and provide insight into North Korea’s perception of globalisation as an imperialist process. Secondly, the examples drawn on collectively offer a greater understanding of how the *Jucheist* principles of independence, anti-imperialism, single-hearted unity and collective loyalty to the leader and cause, manifest in practice within North Korean cultural artefacts, such as North Korean propaganda art. In consequence, they provide a means of assessing and empirically...
demonstrating the argued association between policy and culture, that is Juche and its unfolding, within the North Korean context.

The North Korean case aside, one must also consider how the political mandates of the Segyehwa policy manifest and come to be expressed in, South Korean culture. Consequently, again guided by the arguments of Chapter 1, I now turn to assess how the cultural hybridisation advocated by the Segyehwa policy, is tangibly observable in South Korea by way of the South Korean music scene, a case returned to at various points throughout this thesis. Within this frame, of particular interest is the emergence and popularisation of ‘fusion’ ensembles, which actively and quite successfully combine traditional Korean music (Gugak) with Western and global musical influences to proactively maintain a sense of Korean originality in South Korean music.
2.3.2  Segyehwa and fusion ‘Gugak’

South Korean efforts to promote the “restoration and re-creation” of traditional Korean culture (MCST, 2005) through a range of initiatives, from the National Gugak Centre and Korean National University of Arts, to cultural exchanges and overseas Korean cultural centres (see Section 2.2.2), has ensured South Korean culture a hybridised, yet discernibly indigenous character. As the following demonstrates, this discernible cultural hybridity is acutely observable in South Korean music.

Indeed, while efforts to maintain international relevance and ‘popularity’ have seen solo and group acts adopt Western musical instruments and genre, Korean musical tradition continues to be infused alongside these global influences. In fact, highlighting the cultural preservation imperative implicit in South Korean globalisation, the State’s embracement of foreign musical influences has actually triggered a revival of traditional Korean music, and a quest to “popularize, modernize and globalize [t]he Traditional Korean Arts” (SOREA group, 2012a: para. 2).

This quest has, in recent years, resulted in the birth of a new hybrid musical form known as ‘fusion Gugak;’ wherein traditional Korean music (Gugak) is consciously blended with Western musical influences, creating a mutual and simultaneous celebration of the global and the local. The birth of this new style has subsequently led to a surge in the establishment of ensembles whose primary undertaking is the blending of local (Korean) and global (Western) musical forms.
As demonstrated in Image 12 and the featuring of traditional Korean instruments such as the Gayageum (plucked zither), Daegum (large bamboo transverse flute) and Saenghwang (free reed mouth organ), alongside the Western violoncello, clarinet and acoustic guitar, this cultural ‘blending’ is typically achieved through the simultaneous utilisation of Western and Korean instruments. Though, as revealed by the following, it is also achieved through the cultural appropriation of popular Western songs played on traditional Korean instruments.

While specific song examples showcasing this Korean-Western cultural hybridisation are analysed in Chapter 7, for the purpose of empirical demonstration, a selection of ‘fusion Gugak’ ensembles, including renowned groups Yeoul, Sagye, AURA, GongMyoung, Vinalog and SOREA, warrant mention. Though in focusing on the above ensembles, with ‘fusion Gugak’ groups ever-growing in number and
popularity, it must first be acknowledged that they are but a small number of like-minded groups now seeking the coming together of global and local music worlds. Importantly, the aims and repertoires of these groups are both regarded and intended as widely demonstrative of the cultural blending and ‘Koreanisation’ demanded by Kim Young-sam’s Segyehwa policy.

Established in 2003, female fusion quartet, Yeoul, is one such ensemble seeking to “change the flow of Korean traditional music” through a merging of Western and Korean musical style (Park, 2005: para. 8). Specifically, as seen in Image 13, Yeoul seeks to revive the popularity of the traditional Korean twelve stringed plucked zither, the Gayageum, by using the instrument alongside Western instruments such as the standard drum-kit, to create ‘fusion’ cultural appropriations of popular Western songs including Led Zeppelin’s Stairway To Heaven, Frank Sinatra’s Fly me to the Moon, and Bruce Hornsby’s Rainbows Cadillac (Park, 2005).
Yeoul is not alone in its efforts to popularise the traditional zither, with other notable *Gayageum* ensembles, including Sagye and AURA, also combining its traditional sounds with those of a more Western/global flavour (Cheon, 2005). Setting Yeoul apart for other typical *Gayageum* ensembles however, is its modernisation of the instrument itself. In an effort to extend their genre reach, and ensure that the sounds of the *Gayageum* were not unduly dominated by Western sounds, members Ki Sook-hee, Lee Su-eun, Ahn Na-rae and Park Min-jung have invented electronic versions of the instrument. Originally assembled by breaking apart several of the traditional variety, Yeoul now performs with slightly modified eighteen string and twenty-five string electronic *Gayageum* (Cheon, 2005; Park, 2005).

Interestingly, these electronic versions of the *Gayageum* are themselves hybrid, taking influence from Western instruments such as the electric guitar, while still retaining “the uniquely clear sound” of the traditional Korean instrument (Cheon, 2005: para. 8). As group member Ahn Na-rae insists, the sounds of the electric *Gayageum* are easily differentiated from those of Western instruments such as the violin and guitar in that its “strings waver in a wide range,” ensuring that “people can feel Korean sentiment . . . even when the [Gayageum] player performs Western classical music or pop songs” (Cheon, 2005: para. 9).
While Yeoul may be the only Gayageum ensemble to have transformed the instrument in this way, similar modifications have been made with other traditional instruments, including the hourglass-shaped drum, the Janggu. In a similar manner to Yeoul, male fusion percussion quartet, GongMyoung, has refigured and ‘electronified’ the traditional drum. Further pointing to the hybrid nature of GongMyoung, this modified and modernised Janggu, shown in Image 14, is used alongside more than thirty other traditional and foreign instruments, including the Korean Piri (oboe) and Buk (barrel-shaped drum), and African Djembe drum and Australian Didgeridoo (GongMyoung, 2012; Limb, 2006). GongMyoung members Song Kyoung-kun, Lim Yong-ju, Park Seung-won and Kang Sun-il have even invented their own bamboo instrument of the same name (GongMyoung) (GongMyoung, 2012; Limb, 2006), fusing its sounds with an array of different musical styles to create a musical synthesis of East and West.

Following the trend to mix Korean and Western musical sensibilities is all-male fusion quartet: Vinalog, a group whose name is itself a hybrid of the terms ‘vinyl’ and ‘analog’ (Aura Corea, 2009). Also formed in 2003, the group, pictured in Image 15, combines the sounds of traditional Korean instruments such as the Daegeum, Sogeum (small bamboo transverse flute) and Janggu, with those of the Western drum-kit, bass guitar, piano and keyboard (Aura Corea, 2009). Finding inspiration in Western genre, they also draw on elements of Jazz, acid jazz and electronica to produce “Koreanized world music” (Lee, 2005: para. 8). That said, as indicated on their management’s website, what makes Vinalog’s music a strong embodiment of ‘fusion Gugak,’ and thus of the ‘Koreanisation’ mandate of the Segyehwa policy, is that it does not merely place musical influences from Korea and the West side by side, “but actually goes a step further to combine [them]” (Aura Corea, 2009: para. 7).

This intention to ‘combine’ Korean and Western sound worlds is clearly expressed through Vinalog’s second album, aptly titled Two Worlds. As its title suggests, Two Worlds offers a striking amalgam of Korean and Western music, as
'fusion' versions of Korean-inspired tracks stand alongside Koreanised appropriations of Western songs; each drawing on “an ensemble of instruments both of the East and West, acoustic and electric” (*Korea Times*, 15 November 2005: para. 9).

Twelve member girl group SOREA has also taken to “combining cultural elements and international trends” (SOREA group, 2012a: para. 6). With the group’s name meaning “Sound of Korea, Symbol of Korea, Soul of Korea,” since forming in 2005, SOREA has made a name for itself by fusing traditional Korean instruments with Western instruments and influence (SOREA group, 2012b). Testifying to this instrumental fusion, in *Image 16*, SOREA can be seen blending the Korean *Gayageum, Daegum* and *Haegeum* (bowed fiddle), with the Western drum-kit. Though as the following discussion reveals, SOREA draws on a host of additional Korean and Western elements, including the sounds of the *Janggu* and the genres of electronica and hip-hop, respectively (SOREA group, 2012b).
Though tellingly, rather than considering itself a ‘fusion’ Gugak group, which founder and manager Ryu Moon argues has negative connotations for cultural preservation and regard, SOREA identifies as a ‘modern’ Gugak group. That is, rather than implying a diminishment of traditional Korean music, SOREA seeks to create a whole new genre, through which the legitimacy of Gugak is reinforced and preserved (SOREA group, 2012b). As Ryu Moon explained in a 2011 interview on the talk show Heart to Heart, broadcast by South Korean network, Arirang TV, “there is no eternal tradition” (SOREA group, 2012b) to Korean music, in that it has always been of a hybrid lineage. Certainly, as he points out, what many consider ‘traditional,’ was itself influenced by Chinese and Mongolian ‘traditions.’ In this sense, as articulated by the group’s Daegujeum player, Eun-seong, SOREA’s music should not be seen as ‘fusion’ or ‘crossover,’ but as a “progressed and evolved Korean classical music” (KBS World, 31 March 2010: para. 17).

This distinction is important in that it points to a way of thinking, also seen through the Segyehwa policy, in which foreign influence is not seen as ‘alien’ or in opposition to (South) ‘Koreanness,’ but as something that exists within and intimately shapes it, simultaneously creating new traditions.
Regardless of the term (‘fusion’ or ‘modern’) used to describe SOREA, the group showcases a discernible coming together of “orientalism” and “trend” (SOREA group, 2012a: para. 6). This ‘coming together’ is aptly depicted in Image 17, a screenshot of the group’s music video In Panic, which merges Korean instruments such as the Gayageum, Daegeum, Haegeum and Janggu with sounds of a conventional drum-kit, human beat-box and scratch and other Western-inspired synthetic beats. However, adding to the hybrid nature of the piece, as pictured, this merging of Korean-Western “sound worlds” (Howard, 2006c: 90) is complemented by performances from a traditional Korean folk dance troupe (pungmulpaes) and South Korean B-boy groups Extreme and Illusion Crew (SOREA group, 2012c).
Importantly, the above provides only a snapshot of SOREA’s repertoire, with the multimedia section of the group’s website featuring several videos of comparable Korean-Western cultural blending. Alongside In Panic and the similarly themed Phantasm (SOREA group, 2012d) are other musical pieces including Scattering Bounce and the appropriately titled Heterogeneous Union, pictured in Image 18 and Image 19 respectively. As can be seen, both seamlessly blend Korean instruments, the Janggu and Gayageum in the case of the former, and the Janggu in the case of the latter, with the Western piano (SOREA group, 2012e; SOREA group, 2012f).

Though as noted, this simultaneous utilisation of Korean and Western instruments is not peculiar to Yeoul, GongMyoung, Vinalog and SOREA, with many other groups now consciously mixing Korean and Western styles. In fact, testifying to the breadth and depth of the trend, in 2010, it was estimated that approximately two hundred ‘fusion’ or ‘crossover’ groups were “active” in the South Korean music scene (KBS World, 31 March 2010: para. 9). This estimate notwithstanding, while the number of self-identifying ‘fusion’ groups would have undoubtedly grown since 2010, the number of artists actually drawing on a mixture of Korean and Western
influences is likely to be markedly higher than this figure suggests. After all, it needs to be emphasised that this tendency to ‘Koreanise’ Western musical influences is not confined to specialist ‘fusion’ groups, but is a wider trend being embraced by an increasing number of solo and mainstream artists. In working to evidence this, ‘fusion’ song examples by such artists are among those examined in Chapter 7.

Given the above indications as to the far-reaching nature of ‘fusion Gugak,’ in substantiation of the findings of Howard (2006) and Provine, Hwang and Kershaw (2000) (see Chapter 1), it would appear that a sense of ‘South Koreanness’ indeed remains preserved in South Korean music, as South Korean sensibilities persist alongside popular Western styles. Thus, as with Juche and its obvious unfolding in North Korean culture, the fact that the theoretical objectives of the Segyehwa policy manifest in South Korean culture through music, strongly suggests that an association between policy and culture is playing out on the (divided) Korean peninsula.
Chapter Conclusion

In view of the above, what do the cases of North and South Korea reveal about globalisation as a process, or the nexus between policy and culture? On the first point, arguably, North and South Korea’s divergent views on globalisation demonstrate that it is a historically and culturally bound process, whose effects are location-specific. Though, recalling the privileging given to the global-national dialectic (see Introduction), analysed within a ‘one nation-two states’ paradigm, Juche and Segyehwa underscore that globalisation is fundamentally determined by, and negotiated according to, the specifics of the nation-state. It is therefore an alterable process. In other words, the contradictory positions of the two Koreas indicate that the complexity of the nation-state sees a variety of factors brought to bear on the globalisation process, guaranteeing that its processes and effects are neither universally clear-cut, nor definitive. Rather, globalisation and its associated effects, are potentially as numerous and heterogeneous as the nation-states and cultures that come to encounter and subsequently shape them (Willis, 2012: 123).

Similarly, the fact that Seoul should regard globalisation as a process wherein ‘Koreanisation’ is possible, while Pyongyang should perceive it to threaten the very essence of ‘Koreanness,’ indicates that the policies of Juche and Segyehwa inextricably influence, and are influenced by, the ideo-cultural positionings of the North and South. This indicates that the association between policy and culture is equally complex and nation-state specific (see Introduction). As such, by pointing to the cultural and political ‘divisions’ between the North and South, the examples drawn on underscore the contextual specificity of the Korean policy-culture nexus and delineate its unfolding within a ‘one nation, two states’ context.
Armed with this knowledge, the following chapter traces the history behind the North-South Korea conflict. Predominately, it considers what the turbulent history of inter-Korean relations might reveal, not only about North and South Korea’s broader divergent trajectories, but the role of these trajectories in moulding the globalisation postures, cultures and cultural artefacts of the North and South.
3. **Historicity of the North-South Conflict**

In the sixty-five years following the 1945 partition of the Korean peninsula, the relationship between the two Koreas has been a complicated and often strained one. Particularly, breaks in overt conflict, or times of improved cordiality, have historically featured as mere periods of respite to the resurgence of open hostilities. Thus, seeking to evidence that the recurring patterns of conflict that repeatedly emerge in Korea are indicative of *divergent* cultural, political and ideological positionings – a widening cultural schism between the North and South – this chapter traces key breakthroughs, setbacks, and events in the history of North-South relations. Notably, focus is on those events occurring between the commencement of (post-division and Korean War) inter-Korean engagement in 1971 and the December 2011 death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. Importantly, by highlighting the non-physical (politico-cultural) ‘divisions’ at play on the Korean peninsula, the forthcoming history affirms Korea’s status as one nation comprised of two ‘polar opposite’ states. Consequently, it lays the foundation for examining the manifestation of these divergences within the respective policies and cultures of North and South Korea.
3.1 Inter-Korean Dialogue and Accords

For close to three decades between 1945 and 1971, with the exception of the Korean War Armistice negotiations from which South Korea ultimately withdrew (Harrison, 2002: 157), there was virtually no dialogue between the Koreas. Changes to the international environment, however, including the unveiling of US intentions to seek a one-third reduction in American troop presence in South Korea (1969), and move toward the normalisation of US-China relations (1971) (C. J. Lee, 2006: 68-71), brought a number of positive developments in inter-Korean relations and dialogue. Specifically, with the South, in principle, no longer able to depend as heavily on US military assistance, and the North concerned that an improvement in Sino-US relations might render it increasingly vulnerable to US pressure and military power, motivated by self-interest, each Korea was prompted to turn its attention across the border.

Against a changing international backdrop, the first official contacts between North and South Korea came in the form of preliminary humanitarian-focused Red Cross talks in August 1971 (Kleiner, 2001: 399). That said, it was the subsequent staging of political secret talks in May and June 1972 that yielded the more immediate reward, leading to the signing of the North-South Joint Statement (Downs, 1999: 175-178; Kleiner, 2001: 399-400). Signed by representatives from the two Koreas and publicly announced on 4 July 1972 (Downs, 1999: 178; B.C. Lee, 2006: 237), the statement represents a “unanimous agreement” on the issue of Korean reunification, proposing three principles through which national reunification should be achieved. These three principles are: (1) the independent and internal realisation of reunification “with no reliance on external forces or interference,” (2)
the peaceful reunification of the peninsula and (3) national unity, transcending ideological and political divergences (see Appendix 3).

As part of the pact, the two Koreas agreed to “cultivate an atmosphere of mutual trust” by taking steps to avoid military and political provocations and pledging a commitment to improved communication and coordination. These commitments would be facilitated through the advancement of Red Cross talks, the installation of a direct phone link between the North and South and the establishment of the North-South Coordinating Commission, responsible for promoting the peaceful reunification of Korea (see Appendix 3).

Progress appeared fleeting, however, when the next (third) session of Red Cross talks between 22 and 26 October (Buzo, 1999: 95), stalled on account of two factors. The first of these concerned inverted priorities, wherein South Korea stressed the resolution of humanitarian problems, while North Korea demanded giving precedence to the procurement of a peace treaty and the withdrawal of US troops from the peninsula (Buzo, 1999: 95-96). The second related to North Korean opposition to South Korea’s ‘National Security Law,’ which designating North Korea as an “anti-state organization” (as cited in Hwang, 2010: 168), was judged contrary to the spirit of inter-Korean reconciliation by Pyongyang (Buzo, 1999: 95).

Angered by the lack of progress and concession, in March 1973, North Korea began to engage in mildly violent military provocations along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) (Buzo, 1999: 96), the incidence of which had fallen dramatically since the commencement of talks and the signing of the joint North-South communiqué. Red Cross discussions continued, in principle, through to the end of August 1973, at which time North Korea unilaterally suspended the dialogue, citing the 8 August kidnapping of political opposition figure Kim Dae-jung by (South) Korean Central
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) agents, as the reason for its withdrawal (Buzo, 1999: 96).\(^{10}\) Red Cross talks remained in a state of suspension until 1985, with a further round taking place from 28 to 30 May (Buzo, 1999: 151).

One of the more tangible outcomes of the 28-30 May 1985 talks was the reaching of an unparalleled commitment to reunite a select number of the many Korean families separated by war and political division (Buzo, 1999: 151). As stipulated in an agreement finalised on 22 August in Panmunjom, the Korean capitals of Seoul and Pyongyang would each host a one hundred and fifty-one member delegation from the other side, including fifty civilians, who would be reunited with family for the first time in four decades (Horne, 1985).

Taking place over three days between 20 and 23 September, out of the one hundred civilians who made the trip across the DMZ for Korea’s first-ever reciprocal family reunions, thirty-five civilians from the South and thirty from the North were granted the opportunity to meet with long-lost relatives (Oberdorfer, 1998: 148). Although this figure was fractional in consideration of the estimated ten million separated family members living North and South of the 38th parallel (Foley, 2003: 48; Jonsson, 2006: 55), in the context of inter-Korean relations, it was a landmark event. As aptly articulated by Don Oberdorfer (1998: 148), “after years of formal meetings, most of them sterile recitations of fixed positions, the emotional reunions of even a few divided families seemed at last to be a tangible payoff for the intra-Korean talks and a promise of better times to come.”

That said, the reunions were not without controversy. In fact, reflecting the generally precarious nature of inter-Korean relations, the agreed family reunions nearly did not take place, on account of two jeopardising events. Demonstrating the

---

\(^{10}\) The KCIA (or ANSP as it is now known) is South Korea’s intelligence agency, modelled very closely on the Russia/Soviet intelligence agency KGB (Oberdorfer, 1998: 15).
link between policy and culture in the North Korean context, the first of these arose at the ninth plenary inter-Korean Red Cross conference in Pyongyang between 27 and 29 August 1985, when the South Korean delegation walked out of a militaristic gymnastic (Mass Games) performance, offended by the overtly political nature of the cultural display (Buzo, 1999: 151). The ideological (Jucheist) nature of Mass Games displays, together with their illustration of the link between policy and culture, is analysed in Chapter 7. Then days before their scheduled start, the much anticipated North-South exchange was at risk once more, when North Korea voiced serious objection to three of the individuals named in the South Korean delegation to Pyongyang. According to the North, the members had perpetrated “unpardonable crimes” (as cited in Chicago Sun Times, 21 September 1985: para. 7) over the course of the Korean War, the specifics of which were not released. The reunions went ahead as planned, however, following the replacement of the members in question.

Then during the reunions themselves, as well as slinging criticism concerning South Korean organisation of the event (The Associated Press, 22 September 1985), North Korea charged visiting South Koreans of trying to push their capitalist agenda as part of “a sinister political purpose” (as cited in The Associated Press, 22 September 1985: para. 4). This accusation is significant in that it invokes North Korea’s wider Jucheist concern of a coordinated Republic of Korea (ROK)-US effort (given South Korea’s portrayal as a ‘stooge’ of the US) to corrupt the ‘correctness’ of the Juche idea with “alien ideas” (Korean Central News Agency [KCNA], 1 June 1999). This preoccupation together with its implications is elaborated in Chapter 4 in connection to the US-ROK Mutual Security Treaty. It is also addressed in Chapter 5 in relation to the nuclear issue and the US-ROK-Japan alliance within Six-Party Talks.
Regardless of the accuracy of this accusation, ensuing criticism revealed that North and South Korea had some inroads to make before achieving mutual acceptance and respect in their relationship. Sadly, for those not chosen to be part of the September 1985 visits, they would have to wait another fifteen years for an exchange of this kind to reoccur. Despite attempts to the contrary, a second agreeable proposal could be neither decided on, nor carried out. The next round of reunions took place in August 2000 (see Section 3.3), followed by comparable events in November-December that year and February 2001. At the time of writing, a further sixteen reunions have been staged, taking the total number since 1985 to twenty. Six live-video reunions have also been conducted since the introduction of the service in 2005 (H. Kim, 2009b; S. Kim, 2010).

Despite the hopes for “better times to come” (Oberdorfer, 1998: 148) fostered by the reunions, all channels of inter-Korean dialogue would soon be suspended following North Korea’s (Juche-induced) demand that ‘Team Spirit’ exercises be indefinitely suspended, and South Korean anti-communism laws, repealed (Buzo, 1999: 152-153); both being unacceptable conditions from the South Korean perspective. North Korea’s (Juche-induced) fear of US-ROK military drills is discussed in Chapter 4.

This quick deterioration in relations should not be seen to negate or diminish the significance of the reunion, in that it remained one of few, if not the only, tangible result to emerge from inter-Korean dialogue. Accords such as the joint 1972 communiqué had, of course, been signed, but represented more of a symbolic gesture than a practical measure. Moreover, as is clarified later in this chapter, it did pave the way for future exchanges of its kind, albeit not for several years. Yet, while the subsequent deterioration of inter-Korean relations does not diminish the significance
of the event, the swift unravelling of the North-South relationship, as well as the more than decade-long stalemate between Red Cross talks, reaffirms Korea’s standing as one nation consisting of two (antagonistic) states. These realities, together with the fact that cultural, political and ideological differences proved stumbling blocks not only to the 1985 reunions, but to the realisation of further reunions for a period of fifteen years, is indicative of sharp politico-cultural ‘divisions’ on the Korean peninsula. As noted in the opening remarks of the chapter, the tumultuous history of inter-Korean relations thus provides a basis for assessing how these ‘divisions’ manifest in the policies and cultural artefacts of Korea’s North and South.

Prospects for more cordial relations and concerted action between the North and South looked brighter on 3 July 1990, when the two Koreas consented to holding the highest level inter-Korean talks since 1945, in the form of prime ministerial negotiations (Buzo, 1999: 182; Oberdorfer, 1998: 223). This progress was due, partially, to then South Korean President Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik policy, which adopted on 7 July 1988, actively sought improved North-South relations through inter-Korean exchanges and trade. In terms of trade, South Korea would endorse trade expansion (of non-military goods) in the North and cease to hinder Pyongyang’s international trading efforts. Under the guidance of the policy, the Roh administration would also work to build diplomatic ties with communist nations and support North Korea in its attempts to normalise relations with Japan and the United States (Buzo, 1999: 178; Oberdorfer, 1998: 187-188).

Five rounds of prime ministerial talks, hosted in Seoul and Pyongyang on a rotating basis, would eventuate over the 1990-1991 period (Jonsson, 2006: 57). In terms of tangible results, the three prime ministerial rounds of 1990 led to the
sponsorship and formation of a single united ‘Korean’ team, at two international sporting events. These included the forty-first World Table Tennis Championships in Japan between 24 April and 6 May 1991 and the sixth World Junior Soccer Championships in Portugal from 14 to 30 June (Jonsson, 2006: 119-120). Vitally, with athletes at the former event bound by a single flag and competing under the banner of ‘Korea,’ this was the first time a joint ‘Korean’ team had been sent by the North and South Korean governments to represent ‘Korea’ as a singular nation (Jonsson, 2006: 119-120).

Then, after a ten-month hiatus following two postponements by the North, in protest of ‘Team Spirit’ and reported cases of cholera in the South (Reuters News, 23 August 1991), a fourth and fifth round of prime ministerial talks took place in October and December 1991, respectively (Oberdorfer, 1998: 261-262). These talks resulted in the formulation of a single broad accord on Korean reconciliation, trade and exchange, mutually endorsed on 13 December 1991 and made effective on 19 February 1992 (Kleiner, 2001: 403). Officially titled ‘The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South’ and commonly known as the Basic Agreement, the accord was intended as a more comprehensive version of the (failed) 1972 joint statement.

Comprising of four chapters and twenty-five articles in total, the Basic Agreement required that each Korea “recognize” and “respect” the belief and political systems of the other, by refraining from meddling in each other’s “internal affairs” by way of slander, vilification, military confrontation or “acts of sabotage” (see Appendix 4 – articles 1-4). Therein, the Koreas also agreed to facilitate freer and easier inter-Korean exchange, travel and contact, and to “together endeavour” to
replace the Korean War Armistice of 1953 with a peace treaty, thus securing a final and “firm state of peace” on the peninsula (see Appendix 4 – Article 5).

Importantly, the above progress can be linked to the Nordpolitik policy’s alignment with the Juche idea. It is not a coincidence that the policy’s facilitation of North Korea’s Jucheist quest for economic self-sufficiency (see Chapter 2), by way of Roh’s commitment to refrain from hindering North Korea economically, induced positive progress in the North-South relationship. In fact as Chapter 5 discusses, economic concerns and particularly the sanctions issue is a principal director of North Korean behaviour, and a key cause of stalemate within Six-Party Talks. Similarly, the normalisation of relations with Tokyo and Washington has been a long-standing quest for Pyongyang, given the Jucheist portrayal of Japan and the US as ‘imperialist aggressors’ (see Chapter 2).

For the same reasons, it is also not a coincidence that North Korea should agree to the signing of inter-Korean agreements (the 1972 joint statement and Basic Agreement) that pledge on the first count, the independent and internal realisation of reunification, and on the second, joint commitment to replacing the Korean War Armistice with a peace treaty. In North Korea’s reading, the former would necessitate the removal of US troops from the peninsula (Mosston et al., 1975: 163 – see Chapter 4), while the latter could guarantee it security assurances against the US, a signatory of the armistice under the umbrella of United Nations Command (UNC) (Harrison, 2002: 155). Thus, the commitments of Roh and the resulting (and preceding) progress of inter-Korean dialogue constitute revealing examples of how Jucheist concerns motivate and shape the North, as well as its interactions with the South.
The Basic Agreement was then supplemented two and a half weeks later by a separate denuclearisation agreement. Signed on the 31 December and brought into force, along with the Basic Agreement on 19 February 1992, as its name suggests, the ‘Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula,’ aimed to rid the Korean peninsula of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear warfare. By mutual consent, North and South Korea vowed not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons,” or “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” Instead, each side swore to use nuclear energy only for “peaceful purposes” and to make concerted efforts “to create an environment and conditions favourable for peace and peaceful [Korean] unification” (see Appendix 5).

Concededly, reinforcing the extent to which Korea is influenced by regional dynamics, the above progress was also due, in part, to the changing international environment. North Korea-Soviet relations were steadily deteriorating in the wake of the formal establishment of South Korea-Soviet relations in September 1990 (D. K. Kim, 2005: 174) and Pyongyang’s unconcealed support of the August 1991 attempted coup against President Mikhail Gorbachev (Buzo, 1999: 188). Likewise, Beijing was seeking relations with Seoul (Buzo, 1999: 188). Therefore, it is likely that, worried that its greatest ally China was also set to abandon it, North Korea sought the betterment of inter-Korean relations in the interest of regime survival.

In any case, implementation of these accords was slow and began to derail in the second half of 1992 due to several factors. The first of these was the discovery of an alleged North Korean spy ring in South Korea in October 1992. The second was the resulting US-ROK decision to hold ‘Team Spirit’ exercises in 1993, which had been cancelled in 1992 as a sweetener for North Korean cooperation (Buzo, 1999:
The third had to do with a rise in international pressure, after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found North Korean plutonium production to exceed the amount declared (Oberdorfer, 1998: 269-270) (see Chapter 5).

These developments and a general failure to agree on the best methods of implementation, particularly where nuclear weapons were concerned, led to a series of intermittent talks, walkouts, false-starts and very little headway. Unfortunately, for North and South Korea, again highlighting the politico-cultural ‘divisions’ between them, this meant that neither the Basic Agreement nor the Declaration on Denuclearisation would come to fruition, having all the semblance of progress, with few practical results.

3.2 Skirmishes, Terrorism and Foiled Assassination Attempts

Pointing to the politico-cultural ‘divisions’ mirroring Korea’s geographic divide, in between dialogue, inter-Korean relations have been marred by war, recrimination and recurring violence. On 15 August 1974, tensions were heightened after an attempt was made on South Korean President Park Chung-hee’s life at a commemorative event in Seoul, marking the twenty-ninth anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan. Fronting an audience of 1,500 people at the city’s newly erected National Theatre, President Park was mid-way through delivering his Liberation Day address, when a would-be assassin opened fire. Park himself escaped injury, his wife, however, was killed after being struck in the head by a stray bullet (Bermudez, 1998: 117; Oberdorfer, 1998: 47-48).

The gunman, captured at the scene, was identified by Seoul investigators as Mun Se Gwang, a Korean resident living in Japan. It was alleged that Mun had
connections to a Japan based pro-North Korean organisation known as *Chongryon* (General Association of North Korean Residents in Japan), and that the foiled assassination attempt had been ordered and engineered by Pyongyang (Bermudez, 1998: 117). North Korea denied any involvement, though its confirmed orchestration of an earlier assassination plot against President Park in January 1968 (Downs, 1999: 121) did little to testify to its innocence. At the time of writing, doubt remains as to whether Mun Se Gwang was indeed affiliated with *Chongryon*.

President Park Chung-hee was not the only South Korean President to become the target of an alleged North Korean-devised assassination plot. His successor, Chun Doo-hwan narrowly escaped death on 9 October 1983, when a strategically placed bomb, said to have been detonated by a North Korean army officer, exploded prior to a welcoming wreath-laying ceremony at the Martyr’s Mausoleum in Rangoon, Burma (Yangon, Myanmar) (Downs, 1999: 162). Seventeen South Korean and four Burmese officials, including the South Korean Ambassador to Burma, Lei Kai-chul, were killed and a further fourteen South Koreans and thirty-two Burmese injured, as a result of the blast (Becker, 2005: 155; Oberdorfer, 1998: 141). President Chun himself, still en-route to the site at the time of the bomb’s detonation, was uninjured (Downs, 1999: 162).

Two North Koreans were eventually apprehended by Burmese police following the attack, while a third was killed trying to evade capture. A confession by one of the accused, Captain Kang Min Chul, revealed in painstaking detail, the meticulous planning that had gone into the strike and how, aided by the North Korean embassy in Burma, the trio had managed to smuggle themselves and their equipment into the country and hide two electrically-activated explosive devices in the roof of the mausoleum (Kleiner, 2001: 201).
There is some uncertainty and speculation as to why the explosives were ignited before Chun’s arrival at the mausoleum. The general consensus is that Major Zin Mo mistook Ambassador Lei, who arrived ahead of the presidential motorcade, in a South Korean flag adorned vehicle complete with an accompanying motorcycle escort, for President Chun (Kleiner, 2001: 201). Though whatever the reason for the premature detonation, the attempted assassination of President Chun exacerbated already strained relations between the North and South, as Chun labelled the bombing and attempt on his life “a grave provocation not unlike a declaration of war” (as cited in Becker, 2005: 155).

Returning promptly to Seoul, Chun convened an emergency meeting to deliberate the nature of South Korea’s response (Oberdorfer, 1998: 143). Though there was no conclusive evidence, at that time, linking North Korea to the attack, North Korea’s chequered past automatically saw it cast as the prime suspect in the view of the South Korean government. Yet, despite Chun’s comments and strong calls for retaliatory action, none was taken (Becker, 2005: 155; Oberdorfer, 1998: 143). North Korea denied all involvement in the Rangoon incident (United Nations General Assembly, 1983).

Somewhat peculiarly, a mere day before the Rangoon Bombing, North Korea approached China requesting that it forward a proposal for tripartite talks to Washington on its behalf. Proposed talks were to involve the two Koreas as well as the US. In principle, this signified a step forward in the North-South relationship, as it was the first time North Korea was willing to accept the South as an equal and legitimate party to peace negotiations (Oberdorfer, 1998: 144). In the past, which is still largely the case today, North Korea demanded to deal only with the US, refusing to recognise South Korea on the basis that it was not a signatory of the Korean War.
Armistice Agreement (Downs, 1999: 267; Harrison, 2002: 156). Importantly, this position can be linked to the earlier cited perception North Korea has of South Korea as a mere ‘stooge’ of the United States, and can thus be read in the context of North Korea’s broader imperialist perception of the US (see chapters 2 and 4). Specifically, it reinforces the Juche-centric view that Seoul is in league with Washington to undermine the sovereignty of the North Korean regime and incite war on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang’s insistence that South Korea’s refusal to sign the armistice is expressive of its desire to maintain a state of war is examined further in Chapter 4, within the frame of continuing US troop presence in the South.

While talks involving the US are beyond the scope of this chapter, the North’s proposal warrants mentioning as the Rangoon bombing guaranteed its unanimous rejection, highlighting how distant a prospect renewed inter-Korean dialogue, in any form, seemed at the time. Though, as the previous section notes, while appearing a most “unlikely prelude” (Buzo, 2007: 139) to North-South talks, somewhat unexpectedly, the years following the Rangoon incident brought a renewal of dialogue and progress, after a decade of stagnation.

The awarding of the 1988 Summer Olympics to Seoul in 1981 would also prove to be a catalyst for a North Korean terrorist attack. After failing in an initial campaign to have Seoul stripped of its hosting rights (Oberdorfer, 1998: 181) and later in a co-hosting bid, North Korea pursued more drastic measures to disrupt Seoul’s Olympic preparations. On 29 November 1987, North Korean agents, posing as Japanese tourists, targeted Korean Airlines flight 858, placing a bomb in an overhead compartment, before disembarking in Abu Dhabi. The plane, continuing on its onward journey to Seoul, exploded mid-flight, killing one hundred and fifteen passengers and crew. Later apprehended, having failed a suicide attempt (Downs,
1999: 207), twenty-five year old North Korean agent Kim Hyun Hui, went on to testify how the attack had been personally sanctioned by son and then heir-apparent to Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, in a last ditch-effort to scuttle the 1988 Seoul Olympics (Downs, 1999: 207). This attempt notwithstanding, Seoul went on to host the Olympics without incident (Kleiner, 2001: 336).

In addition to terrorist and assassination attacks, the history of inter-Korean relations has been marked by a number of skirmishes and infiltration attempts, on the part of North Korea. The discovery of a North Korean-built infiltration tunnel, under the DMZ, by South Korean soldiers in November 1974, was deemed as serious evidence disclosing North Korea’s plan to infiltrate the South. Three others have since been uncovered (Downs, 1999: 190), though intelligence gathered from defectors has led the UNC to estimate that as many as twenty-two more, leading under the DMZ into South Korean territory, could yet remain undiscovered (Oberdorfer, 1998: 57-58).

Concerns surrounding North Korea’s so-called infiltration ‘plans’ have been reinforced by a series of events, occurring over the last several decades. That said, the majority of noteworthy incidents took place in the mid to late 1990s, likely prompted, at least in part, by the lack of respect newly installed South Korean President Kim Young-sam displayed following the death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in 1994. In a move that lay bare the tension and widening schism between the North and South, as well as refusing to extend condolences to Pyongyang (Lynn, 2007: 160-161), he prohibited any South Korean citizens from attending the funeral or offering their own commiserations (Kleiner, 2001: 292). Then adding insult to injury, on the eve of Kim Il Sung’s funeral, he labelled the deceased leader the perpetrator of “a number of national tragedies” and instigator of
the Korean War (as cited in Ihlwan, 1994: para. 3). As detailed below, this led to a sharp downturn in inter-Korean relations and an increase in skirmishes and infiltration attempts, including two separate incidents in October 1995, wherein North Korean agents were discovered within South Korean territory (Choe, 1995; Lim, 1995a).

While it is true that inter-Korean relations had soured leading up to and following Kim Il Sung’s death, famine in the North had (it was thought) helped to thaw the icy relationship between the Koreas, thanks to South Korea’s extension of emergency aid in the form of 150,000 tonnes of rice, by way of regular shipments (Oberdorfer, 1998: 372). Though, with a shipment arriving just ten days before the first apparent infiltration attempt in October 1995, for South Korea, each incident came as a “slap in the face” (Lim, 1995b: para. 2).

Then, the atmosphere of mounting tension and antagonism worsened in the latter half of 1996, after a North Korean submarine ran aground off the east coast of South Korea in September. Eleven members of the estimated twenty-six person crew were found dead nearby, having committed suicide to evade capture. A surviving North Korean, located in the vicinity, was detained by South Korean troops (Oberdorfer, 1998: 387). During a seven week manhunt, thirteen other North Korean sailors and commandos were killed by South Korean forces. One crew member of the suspected twenty-six was never apprehended (Oberdorfer, 1998: 388).

The extent to which relations had sunk was highlighted not only by the actions of North Korea, but by President Kim Young-sam’s reaction. On 8 November, he exclaimed that “unless North Korea sincerely apologize[d] . . . and guarantee[d] that the same kind of incident [would] not be repeated” South Korea would make no effort to assist the North “in rice or other things” (as cited in
Sullivan, 1996: para. 3). North Korea did express regret over the incident, but not for more than three months after the submarine was discovered. On 29 December, in a statement of apology, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that he was “authorized to express deep regret,” and that North Korea would “make efforts to ensure that such an incident [would] not recur” (as cited in Downs, 1999: 264, 302). Although the North’s apology again brought renewed hope for better relations, the mood between the Koreas remained frozen and largely acrimonious until after the expiration of Kim Young-sam’s presidential term and the investiture of his successor: Kim Dae-jung, in February 1998.

Arguably, Kim Young-sam’s example and its fallout carries significance today, with the lessons learnt perhaps guiding Seoul’s more cautious negotiation of the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011. By and large, Seoul has been consciously diplomatic in its public statements, refraining from disparaging North Korea and its leadership. Unlike Kim Young-sam, Lee Myung-bak also extended condolences to Pyongyang and permitted an unofficial civilian delegation to visit the North (*Yonhap English News*, 24 December 2011). The effect of these gestures is yet to be seen.

Due largely to the concessionary postures of the Kim Dae-jung and succeeding Roh Moo-hyun administrations (see Section 3.3), with the exception of two naval clashes in 1999 and 2002 near the disputed maritime border the Northern Limit Line (NLL) (Kim and Kang, 2009: 150), the next decade was relatively

---

11 Though despite these efforts, North Korea was still angered that South Korea convened an emergency meeting upon learning of Kim Jong Il’s death, interpreting it as an attempt to capitalise on a “‘golden opportunity’” to bring about a “‘system change’” in the North. Pyongyang was also angered by the unofficial and restricted nature of the delegation allowed to extend personal condolences (*KCNA*, 30 December 2011).
uneventful as far as military clashes between the two Koreas were concerned. This changed in 2008, however, with the election of South Korean hardliner Lee Myung-bak. While the general implications of the Lee administration are elaborated in the concluding section of this chapter, mounting tension over his less than appeasing position toward the North, led to two of the most serious provocations in the history of inter-Korean relations, both in 2010.

In the first instance, inter-Korean relations were severely shaken when, on the evening of 26 March 2010, the South Korean warship Cheonan was rocked by a mysterious explosion near the disputed NLL. Split in half and sunk, nearly half of the ship’s one-hundred and four member crew were killed as a result of the blast, with forty-six South Korean sailors losing their lives (T. H. Lee, 2010). With the extent of North Korea’s culpability unclear directly following the incident, North-South tensions surged pending an official investigation by the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG).

Composed of international scientific, military and intelligence experts from South Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Sweden (JIG, May 2010: 1), the group found incriminating evidence of North Korean culpability, which it released on 20 May 2010. Evidence included confirmation of North Korean submarine activity in the area, as well as the recovery of torpedo remnants complete with Hangul markings (번 or No. 1 in English), “consistent” with North Korean design (JIG, 2010: 5). Given this evidence, conceiving of “no other plausible explanation,” the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG, 2010: 5)

12 The NLL (maritime Military Demarcation Line) was unilaterally drawn by the UN in 1953 after the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement. As it is not specified in the armistice, North Korea refuses to recognise it, deeming it “illegal” (KCNA, 24 November, 2010). In fact, in 1999 North Korea drew up a borderline of its own (Van Dyke, Valencia & Garmendia, 2003: 143); one South Korea, likewise, does not accept (Van Dyke et al., 2003: 145-146). Hence the year 1999 marked the beginning of regular skirmishes in the area as disagreement over ‘correct’ territorial boundaries habitually led to armed conflict.
“overwhelmingly” concluded “that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean submarine.”

Despite apparent evidence to the contrary, North Korea continues to maintain its innocence, labelling the investigation result “another extremely ridiculous charade” intended “to bring the inter-Korean relations to a collapse” and create an atmosphere of war between the Koreas (KCNA, 21 May 2010). In reflection of its Juche-centric suspicion of the US, South Korea and Japan and their perceived trilateral effort to undermine its sovereignty (see Chapters 2 and 5), Pyongyang also charges that evidence was “fabricated” by the trio, to damage its image, justify further sanctions and undermine its prosperity (KCNA, 21 May 2010). Whatever the case, the sinking of the Cheonan marked a serious downward slide for inter-Korean relations.

This downward slide was further exacerbated on 23 November 2010, when North Korea launched an artillery barrage on the South Korean inhabited island of Yeonpyeong (M. H. Park, 2010). In the first artillery shelling of its kind since the 1950-1953 Korean War (Zeller, 2010), in the space of just over an hour, North Korea fired one-hundred and seventy artillery shells in the direction of Yeonpyeong, located a mere twelve kilometres from the North Korean mainland (H. I. Shin, 2010; Song, 2010). Scurrying in response, issuing its highest military alert for the area (M. H. Park, 2010; Song, 2010), South Korea dispatched eight fighter-jets and mounted an artillery counter-attack, firing eighty K-9 howitzer shells back toward the North (Song, 2010).

North Korea continues to charge the South with having instigated the hostilities, claiming that its moves were “a decisive self-defensive measure” prompted by the firing of shells, by the South, “inside [North Korean] territorial
waters” (KCNA, 24 November 2010). While South Korea maintains to have fired Southward (by its reckoning) into its territory, as part of an annual military drill, North Korea’s rejection of the NLL and designation of its own Military Demarcation Line (MDL) (see Figure 1), saw the North interpret the shelling drills as a “reckless military provocation” (KCNA, 24 November 2010).  

The artillery bombardment and ensuing fire killed two South Korean marines and a further two civilians, with many others wounded (Song, 2010). It reportedly also destroyed twenty-one houses (including warehouses), eight public buildings and an estimated seventy-percent of Yeonpyeong Island’s forests and fields (Dong-A Ilbo 2010).

---

13 While the North does not claim Yeonpyeong Island, or any of South Korea’s other islands as its own, its MDL specifies narrow corridors by which the South should access the islands, meaning that any shelling, directed Southward or otherwise, is likely to land in North Korean territorial waters, as designated by the North (see Figure 1).
South Korean intelligence sources have since confirmed that ten North Korean soldiers were killed and approximately twenty injured as a result of South Korean returned fire (Jeong and Lee, 2012).

There has, of course, been much speculation as to whether the incident arose on account of the legitimate border dispute concerning the NLL, or whether Pyongyang used the dispute as an excuse to attack in service of an ulterior motive. One of the more popular ‘ulterior motives’ suggested is that the attack could have served as a means to bolster the standing of then heir-apparent Kim Jong Un, who able to take credit for the attack, could be seen to take steps toward proving himself to the North Korean people (Agence France Presse, 23 November 2010). Whether the Yeonpyeong Island incident occurred for this, another, or a combination of reasons, the fallout, including South Korea’s subsequent resolve to respond to future provocations with harsher retaliatory measures (Yonhap English News, 25 November 2010), brought inter-Korean relations to yet another low.14

Whatever the reason behind the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, or indeed any of the incidents outlined in this section, that the North-South relationship has been fraught with mistrust and recurring violence illustrates that the Koreas tread very different cultural and political trajectories. As with the start-stop nature of inter-Korean dialogue and its (unravelled) accords, the skirmishes and terrorism to unfold over the history of inter-Korean relations provide important background for examining how the ‘divisions’ separating North and South Korea are reflected in the contrasting policies, and cultural manifestations, of Juche and Segyehwa.

14 Other motivations could have been North Korea’s ongoing distrust over military drills in the South, Seoul’s hosting of the 2010 G20 Summit and the possible garnering of US attention in the push for talks, concessions and progress in the Washington-Pyongyang relationship. North Korea may have also been trying to force the South into negotiations over the NLL (Yonhap English News, 25 November 2010).
3.3 Engaging the North: Summits and Sunshine

Representing a marked change from the skirmishes, infiltrations and terrorism attempts of the preceding decades, the late 1990s ushered in a decade of unprecedented cooperation between the Koreas. This increased cooperation was thanks to the development and implementation of a new policy of engagement with the North, pursued by newly inaugurated South Korean President Kim Dae-jung: the Sunshine policy. As the first opposition progressive candidate to assume the position of South Korean president since the State’s founding in 1948 (Gills and Gills, 2000: 44), Kim Dae-jung took an ‘economy first, politics later’ and ‘give first, take later’ approach to inter-Korean relations (Moon, 2002: 28).

Essentially, the rationale behind the ‘Sunshine policy’ was that persuasion was a better remedy than force. As Kim Dae-jung explained, the policy was intended “to lead North Korea down a path toward peace, reform and openness through reconciliation, interaction and cooperation with the South” (as cited in Kihl, 2005: 249). These ultimate goals would be achieved as part of a three-phase formula. As part of the first stage, the only to ever be realised, Seoul would promote and pursue greater exchange and cooperation, as well as an increased tolerance of ideological and political differences between the two sides. Although never initiated, the second stage was to entail uniting North and South Korea under one confederation, with each half continuing to exercise its individual sovereignty for a period of ten years. The third and final stage was to involve the final and full unification of the Koreas under one government and a South Korean modelled democracy and open-market economy (Becker, 2005: 242; Lynn, 2007: 169).

While North Korea, in line with Jucheist concerns, initially “publicly denounced the ‘Sunshine Policy,’ as a scheme to bring down [its] system and . . .
weaken [its] military readiness” (D. J. Kim 2001: 5), a slow mellowing in this stance saw the policy bring about tangible improvements in the North-South relationship, particularly in regards to economic cooperation. Before detailing the specifics of these improvements it needs to be noted that, as with Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik policy (see Section 3.1), the inter-Korean cooperation of the Sunshine policy was facilitated by South Korea’s soothing of North Korean security concerns. Similar to Roh, in a move that both “surprised and impressed” Pyongyang, Kim Dae-jung publicly recommended that sanctions against North Korea be relaxed (Harrison, 2002: 86). As argued in the case of the Nordpolitik policy and elaborated in Chapter 5, due to the economic self-sufficiency mandates of Juche, the sanctions issue drives North Korea’s interactions with the South and regional states. Kim Dae-jung’s recommendation thus undoubtedly helped to alleviate some of Pyongyang’s fears concerning (perceived) US-ROK attempts to topple its regime, and convince Pyongyang of Seoul’s good intentions (see chapters 4 and 5).

It is also possible that the United States’ refusal to engage in bilateral talks with North Korea absent North-South collaboration (S. S. Kim, 2001: 211), likewise contributed to the mellowing of North Korea’s stance. If this was the case, this is equally enlightening insofar as Jucheist perceptions of the US as ‘imperialist’ are concerned, in that North Korea’s push for bilateral talks is motivated by a wider quest to normalise relations with Washington and procure security assurances against the perceived US threat (see Chapter 5). The tangible outputs of the Sunshine policy should therefore be understood in connection with North Korean Jucheist concerns. Some of the ‘tangible’ outputs of Kim Dae-jung’s ‘Sunshine’ policy, and indeed of the comparable ‘Peace and Prosperity’ policy initiated by his successor Roh Moo-hyun, are elaborated below.
The first payoff of the Sunshine Policy came in 1998 in the form of a joint tourism project, made possible by the finalisation of a $942 million deal between Hyundai Asan, a member affiliate of Hyundai group and Pyongyang (Harrison, 2002: 86). As part of the initiative, Hyundai was granted the “exclusive right” to manage and run tours in North Korea’s eastern Mount Kumgang (Diamond Mountain) region for thirty years (Harrison, 2002: 86). The trip included a four day escorted tour of the region, which transformed into a resort area, allowed South Koreans to partake in a range of activities, including shopping, hiking and an array of resort-like indulgences.

While North Korea has undoubtedly benefited economically from the scheme, with the resort complex strategically separated from the North Korean populace and surrounding areas (Kihl, 2006a: 21), it is open to question whether tours have done much to induce it to change, which was a publicised goal of the Sunshine policy from the outset. These doubts notwithstanding, the Mount Kumgang tours did, as the South Korean government had hoped, encourage additional shared enterprises, the specifics of which are outlined later in this chapter. The tangible and practical value of the project aside, it cultivated an atmosphere of improved understanding and mutual respect between North and South Korea.

Regrettably, indicative of the existence of deep-seated and persisting politico-cultural ‘divisions’ on the Korean peninsula, this atmosphere of mutual respect has turned to one of contempt and distrust. Tours are currently suspended due to the death of a South Korean tourist in July 2008 (S. Y. Kim, 2008) and despite the staging of numerous talks to negotiate their resumption, remain shelved (S. H. Kim, 2010a). In the ten years leading up to the tour’s suspension, it is estimated that more

---

15 As per the arrangement, the agreed amount would be exchanged over a period of six years, initially in the form of monthly instalments to the sum of $25 million. Subsequent payments would then be made subject to the level of tourist interest (Harrison, 2002: 86).
than 1.9 million (mostly South Korean) tourists, visited Mount Kumgang as part of the Hyundai-run tour (Jin, 2008b). With the emergence of Kim Jong Un in the North and the investiture of Park Geun-hye as South Korean president in February 2013, the future of this once symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation is, at the time of writing, unclear.

The Mount Kumgang Tourism Project aside, two of the greatest successes of the Sunshine policy and the continued efforts of the Roh Moo-hyun administration (inaugurated in February 2003), were the inter-Korean summits of 13-15 June 2000 and 2-4 October 2007, the only two inter-Korean summits to take place in the history of divided Korea, to date (Jonsson, 2006: 72).

Crucially, both the June 2000 and October 2007 summits culminated in the forging of separate inter-Korean agreements, this time signed by the leaders of the North and South themselves. The June 2000 summit agreement, or ‘June 15 Joint Declaration’ as it became known, reaffirmed the need to settle the “question” of Korea’s reunification “independently” (see Appendix 6 – Article 1). It also recognised humanitarian issues, emphasising the importance of continuing family reunions. Although, perhaps most significant, at least for inter-Korean relations, was its commitment to the promotion and implementation of various methods of “cooperation” and “exchange.” Explicitly, the declaration called for a nurturing of “mutual confidence” through collaborations extending beyond the purely economic, to “all fields,” including cultural, social, environmental and other domains (see Appendix 6 – Article 4).

Following this precedent, the inter-Korean agreement of the October 2007 summit: ‘The Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity,’ (more commonly known as the October 4 Declaration),
covered much of the same ground as previous accords. In addition to earlier pledges, however, it also called for the planning and execution of a number of new projects. Included amongst these were (1) the opening of a second economic zone similar to that in Kaesong, in the North Korean west-coast port city of Haeju, (2) the establishment of a joint fishing area around the nearby disputed ‘Northern Limit Line’ sea border, and (3) the collaborative development of the Han River estuary, which bisects the 38th parallel. It also provided for the introduction of “nonstop flight services” between Seoul and North Korea’s Mount Paektu, a place attributed much mythological significance and considered sacred by both the North and South (see Appendix 7).

As had been the case in 1972, public disclosure of these pacts incited much jubilation and optimism among the Korean people. While the less than five month window between the second summit and the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak left insufficient time for the implementation of the October 2007 agreement (see Section 3.4), the 2000 declaration did foster tangible results. Indeed, progress appeared genuine in the months following the first summit with the staging of another round of reciprocal reunions between 15 and 18 August 2000 (Yoo, 2000). Then on 15 September, the spirit of inter-Korean cooperation was reinvoked when athletes from the North and South marched together during the opening ceremony of the Sydney Summer Olympics, the first such display at an Olympic Games (Shin, 2000).

The June 2000 summit also brought about the reconnection of inter-Korean road and rail links, cut since the Korean War. Specifically, two separate inter-Korean rail links and adjacent roadways were reconstructed and reconnected: the Western ‘Gyeongui Line,’ running from Seoul to the city of Sinuiju on the North Korea-China border and the ‘Donghae Line,’ along the East coast (Park, 2002; Park, 2007: 220;
Yonhap English News, 17 August 2005). Construction on all railway lines and road links was completed in 2004 (Lee, 2007; Yonhap English News, 17 August 2005). Various postponements, however, including North Korea’s refusal to provide the South with security guarantees, delayed test-runs of the newly restored railroads until 17 May 2007 (Lee and Yun, 2006).

These simultaneous test-runs, northward from Munsan to Kaesong in the West and southward from Kumgang to Jaejin in the East, signalled the first inter-Korean train trips in fifty-six years (Lee, 2007). Weekday freight train services, servicing the North began on the Gyeongui line from 11 December (Jung, 2007), though were suspended less than a year later by Pyongyang, in response to the “confrontational” policy of the South’s newly elected Lee Myung-bak government (KCNA, 24 November 2008). They are yet to resume.

Aside from the agreements and inter-Korean cooperation facilitated, the summits also achieved a further success: they helped to overturn some of the ‘media-induced’ stereotypes surrounding North Korea and then North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. Up until the first inter-Korean summit in 2000, Kim Jong Il had kept a relatively low profile, shying away from public and media attention (Harrison, 2002: 54). Unfortunately for North Korea, as staff reporter for The Korea Herald, Chon Shi-yong (2000) reveals, this allowed for the perpetuation of a number of stereotypes, fuelled for the most part, by the South Korean media. Lee Bong-su, a Seoul based taxi driver and interviewee of Chon’s admits that, prior to the summit, he dismissed Kim Jong Il as nothing more than “a stupid guy,” believing him to be “an eccentric and unpredictable man . . . addicted to alcohol, women and movies” (as cited in Chon, 2000: para. 3).
Yet, as Chon (2000) writes, opinions of Kim Jong Il quickly began to change, on account of the June 2000 summit. Televised in South Korea and beamed around the world, the occasion provided the international community, and more notably South Koreans, with a rare opportunity to gain insight into this often caricatured figure. Reportedly, the usually reclusive Kim Jong Il “stole the show” and “surprised the world” (Chon, 2000: para. 2-3) with his assured and confident demeanour and welcoming hospitality. In the space of a few short days, in the estimation of Lee Bong-su and fellow South Koreans, Kim Jong Il had evolved from a man characterised by elevated shoes and pompadour hair, to a “knowledgeable, confident, courteous and even quick-witted . . . capable man . . . fit to run a country” (as cited in Chon, 2000: para. 3). Though, as detailed in Section 3.4, these perceptions would unfortunately change for the worse in years to come.

South Korea’s changed (or changing) perspective of the North following the June 2000 summit is relevant in that it triggered a revision of South Korean laws pertaining to North-South exchange, subsequently leading to greater and freer collaboration between the Koreas (Seung, 2000). In particular, it allowed for the establishment of a special industrial zone in the North Korean border city of Kaesong.

Construction on the Kaesong Industrial Complex began on 30 June 2003, with a completion ceremony on a pilot complex held a year later to the day. The complex was then made operational in December 2004 (Yoon, 2007: 939). Forwarded by the same company responsible for the Mount Kumgang tourism project, Hyundai Asan, the 26.4 million square metre complex employs South Korean firms and North Korean workers to assist in the manufacture of a range of products for South Korean consumption (Kim and Kang, 2009: 188-189; Yonhap
English News, 30 June 2003). Day tours from Seoul to the border city of Kaesong, taking in the Complex and its accompanying “industrial city” of 39.6 million square metres, began on 5 December 2007 (Y. M. Kim, 2007; Yonhap English News, 30 June 2003: para. 10). However, as with its sister Mount Kumgang initiative, tours are currently suspended following North Korea’s restriction of overland passage from the South in December 2008 (KCNA, 24 November 2008).

Following North Korea’s announcement that it would “temporarily suspend” all operations at the complex from 8 April 2013 (KCNA, 8 April 2013), the future of the Kaesong Industrial Complex itself also remains unknown, with negotiations pertaining to its normalisation currently underway.

The current status of these various products of inter-Korean cooperation is significant in that, at the time of writing, all are either suspended or facing an uncertain future. Despite all of the breakthroughs achieved during the 1998-2008 decade, effectively, all tangible progress of the ‘Sunshine’ and ‘Peace and Prosperity’ era has evaporated following the election of professed hard-liner Lee Myung-bak in the South. Irrespective of any future switchovers or changes in the status of these inter-Korean initiatives, this quick unraveling of a decade’s worth of engagement and its (fleeting) success, is strongly demonstrative of the fact that North and South Korea are culturally, politically and ideologically divergent in their positionings. As with the previous sections, the manner in which the ‘sunshine’ of the Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) era has been so quickly blotted out by cloud, provides further contextualisation for examining how the politico-cultural ‘divisions’ at play on the Korean peninsula manifest in the policies and cultures of these two diametrically opposed states.
3.4 The Sunshine Fades…

As noted, the election of Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) brought an end to South Korea’s decade-long policy of engagement with North Korea. Taking a markedly different approach to those of his liberal progressive predecessors, Lee set out to pursue a policy of ‘conditional engagement’ with the North. Essentially, this meant that any form of aid given to North Korea by the South, would now be subject to conditions, including North Korean reform and denuclearisation (Hwang, 2010: 32). In other words, economic support would no longer be seen, as during the previous two administrations, as separate from politics, nor would it be offered freely without condition.

Unfortunately, many of the yet to be implemented accords reached in the 2000 and 2007 inter-Korean summits, would also be bound to the same conditions and subject to “review” (Hwang, 2010: 34). Not surprisingly, North Korea reacted vehemently to this development, interpreting Seoul’s perceived reluctance to honour the summit accords of 2000 and 2007, as a reneging on previous commitments; a move North Korea claimed amounted to a policy of “criminal confrontation” (KCNA, 22 October 2008). With the future direction of inter-Korean relations contingent on North Korea’s willingness to dismantle its nuclear program and undergo reform – a condition to which North Korea was neither accustomed (at least not for a decade), nor inclined to accept (see Chapter 5) – inter-Korean relations took a sharp downward turn (Seth, 2010: 232).

As discussed in the previous section, frosty relations between the Koreas became all the more fragile when tours to North Korea’s Mount Kumgang region were suspended following the fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist in July 2008. Though there are conflicting accounts as to what really transpired, the South Korean
woman, identified as fifty-three year old Park Wang-ja, was shot twice and killed after reportedly inadvertently entering a restricted zone while out for a walk in the early hours of 11 July (KCNA, 12 July 2008; S. Y. Kim, 2008). In a move North Korea (arguing South Korean culpability), interpreted as “a challenge” and “intolerable insult,” tours were shelved the following day pending an official investigation (KCNA, 12 July 2008; S. Y. Kim, 2008).

The shooting of Park Wang-ja came at a crucial time for inter-Korean relations. The very same day, President Lee Myung-bak was due to give a speech to mark the opening of the “newly convened” National Assembly in Seoul (Hwang, 2010: 36). It should be noted that although Lee was notified of Park’s death prior to giving his address, the event went ahead as scheduled, with no mention of the incident (The Australian, 14 July 2008). In fact, in what was described by the South Korean media as “a major U-turn” (Kang, 2008: para. 2) from earlier policy declarations, President Lee expressed a desire for inter-Korean relations to “transcend changeovers in administrations,” and progress “from an ‘age of declarations’ to an ‘age of implementation’” (Korea Times, 11 July 2008: para. 34-35). As such, he announced that “the South Korean government [was] willing to engage in serious consultations on how to implement the inter-Korean agreements made so far” (Korea Times, 11 July 2008: para. 30). Though with North Korea already engaged in a war of words over the Mount Kumgang tour incident and suspension, Pyongyang dismissed Lee’s offer as “preposterous” (as cited in The Australian, 14 July 2008: para. 3).

Tensions on the peninsula escalated again when North Korea announced that, in protest of the Lee government, it would be unilaterally restricting border-crossings and terminating tours to Kaesong, effective 1 December 2008 (KCNA, 24 November
Then, on 30 January 2009, North Korea reportedly abandoned all inter-Korean military and political agreements, accusing South Korea of hostile intent (KCNA, 30 January 2009). So, North and South relations were already strained, arguably at their lowest point in a decade, when the March sinking of the Cheonan saw them hit an even greater low.

In view of the incriminating findings of the JIG investigation outlined in Section 3.2, President Lee Myung-bak publicly decreed that his government would be implementing a number of punitive counter-measures against the North. As part of such measures, North Korean passage through South Korean-controlled waters would be banned, inter-Korean trade and other forms of “cooperative activity” would be “suspended” and the future of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, “duly considered” (Yonhap English News, 24 May 2010: para. 8-9). In addition, the case of the Cheonan sinking would be referred to the United Nations Security Council for further deliberation and ROK-US “joint combat readiness,” appropriately strengthened (Yonhap English News, 24 May 2010). ‘Psychological warfare,’ by way of loudspeaker announcements, electronic billboards, radio broadcasts and leaflet distribution across the border, which had been suspended on both sides of the MDL since June 2004 by mutual agreement, would also be resumed (Chosun Ilbo, 26 May 2010; Yonhap English News, 24 May 2010: para. 23).

Having strongly asserted its non-complicity days earlier, vowing to impose “merciless punishment,” including “the total freeze” of inter-Korean relations and cooperation (KCNA, 21 May 2010), should South Korea pursue tough measures against it, North Korea hit back with ‘measures’ of its own. It declared “all relations” between Seoul and Pyongyang “severed” (KCNA, 25 May 2010) and informed that it would not engage in any contact or dialogue with the South for the remainder of
President Lee Myung-bak’s term. As such, all cross-border communication links would be “cut off” and Red Cross “liaison” activities at the truce village of Panmunjom would be “completely suspended” (KCNA, 25 May 2010).

Reflecting this, the North-South Economic Cooperation office of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, purposed with managing the joint economic venture, would be “frozen and dismantled” and all South Korean officials “expelled without delay” (KCNA, 25 May 2010). Likewise, in response to the South’s decision to recommence ‘psychological warfare’ against the North, North Korea vowed an “all-out counterattack.” South Korea’s barring of North Korean ships in Southern waters was also met with a comparable pronouncement that South Korean “passage” through North Korean air and naval space, would be “totally banned.” North Korea added that any “issues arising in the inter-Korean relations” would be henceforth “handled under a wartime law” (KCNA, 25 May 2010), the details and repercussions of which were not elaborated.

After South Korea held firm to its commitment to boost military readiness, conducting anti-submarine manoeuvres utilising a 3,500-tonne destroyer, three 1,200-tonne patrol ships and six high-speed boats, on 27 May (S. H. Kim, 2010b), North Korea declared all inter-Korean agreements aimed at preventing “accidental” naval clashes “completely null and void” (KCNA, 27 May 2010). Calling attention to how low inter-Korean relations had slumped on account of the Cheonan incident, as North and South went tit-for-tat in the wake of the JIG’s findings, public demonstrations were held in each Korean capital.

In Seoul, close to 10,000 protesters gathered around City Hall, setting North Korean flags ablaze and boisterously calling for retribution (Foster, 2010). In Pyongyang’s Kim Il Sung Square, an estimated 100,000 North Koreans rallied in
condemnation of the South Korean decision to blame the North for the Cheonan’s demise, a move North Korea continued to maintain was part of a baseless “smear campaign” (KCNA, 30 May 2010). As speeches denouncing the South rang out of Kim Il Sung Square and shouts of ‘Let’s kill mad dog Kim Jong-il!’ (Foster, 2010: para. 8) echoed throughout the streets of Seoul, followed by further anti-Pyongyang rallies after North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November (Agence France Presse, 27 November 2010), the headway made during the era of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, and the change in public perception that it had brought (at least in South Korea), appeared to completely unravel.

The history outlined above is testament to the ‘up and down’ nature of inter-Korean relations and Korean affairs generally. As Adrian Buzo (1999: 93) explains, despite the “convening” of numerous inter-Korean negotiating sessions, at different levels and on different issues, North and South Korea “have rarely moved past procedural matters.” The hope attracted notwithstanding, the signing of supposed significant agreements has, by and large, been marred by the two Koreas’ inability to settle on “ways and means of implementation.” In cases where progress has been made, including that made following the 2000 inter-Korean summit in particular, ensuing political rigidity and doggedness (such as that of the Lee Myung-bak administration), has sent the Koreas hurtling back to square one. Fuelled by conflicts of ideology, national interest and agenda, this inability (or unwillingness) to compromise has thus far ensured that, in the story of divided Korea’s history, “periods of negotiation,” regrettably, “stand out as interludes against an unchanging background of confrontation” (Buzo, 1999: 93). As noted in the introduction to this chapter and reinforced throughout its sections, this pattern of recurring confrontation underscores that North and South Korea are separated not only by geographical
demarcations, but by political and cultural ‘divisions,’ mirroring the nation’s physical divide. As such, the turbulent history of inter-Korean relations provides a solid background for exploring how these divisions manifest both in the policies (Juche and Segyehwa) and cultures, of North and South Korea.

With the death of long-time North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and the recent inauguration of Park Geun-hye in the South it is yet to be determined whether the sunshine blotted out during the Lee administration will emerge from behind the cloud. One thing though is almost certain: the future of inter-Korean relations will be fraught with complexity and ambiguity, as the two Koreas continue, at least for now, on their clashing ideological, political and cultural trajectories.

With the aim of understanding the opposing trajectories of the Koreas, the following chapter assesses the influence of Korea’s past and present regional relations on the policies of Juche and Segyehwa, and by extension, Korean cultural artefacts. It also considers China’s influence on North Korean propaganda art, and potential role in future North Korean cultural artefact development, through encouragement of North Korean reform.
4. Korea’s Regional Relations: Influence and Impact

Extending the themes of the previous chapter, I now turn to discuss the complex and changing relationships North and South Korea share with the US and influential neighbouring states China and Japan. Recognising these states and their interactions with Korea to be significant, I analyse the historical, continuing and possible future influence of Korea-regional relations on both the globalisation policies of Seoul and Pyongyang, and the argued association between (Korean) policy and culture. Recalling the importance of cultural artefacts (see Chapter 1) and following the politics of representation approach laid out in the thesis methodology (see Introduction), I assess this influence through reference to how Korean regional relations are represented in North Korean art.

Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three sections. Drawing on cultural artefacts, Section 4.1 gauges the degree to which the principles and objectives of Juche and Segyehwa are cognitively rooted in the memory of Korea’s colonised past. Explicitly, it argues that a trajectory can be traced between Japan’s (attempted) assimilative colonisation of Korea, the emphasis Juche affords to self-sovereignty and self-reliance and the Segyehwa policy’s proactive safeguarding of South Korean identity. It also looks at North Korean allegations of US imperialism, identifying the war in Iraq as a primary source of fear for North Korea, particularly given its designation as part of President George W. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil.’

Acknowledging the reach and significance of US influence in Korea, Section 4.2 explores the military alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK – South Korea). Pondering the implications for Juche and Segyehwa, it pays special attention to the US troop presence in South Korea, and the impact this
has on US-Korea, inter-Korean and regional relations. Together, the arguments advanced pertaining to Japan’s colonisation of Korea, Northern perceptions of US imperialism and US troop presence in the South, are presented as collectively informing the globalisation policies (and cultural artefacts) of North and South Korea.

The third and final section deals with the influence North Korea’s key ally, China, has on the socialist State. Namely, focusing on the socialist (ideological) affinity China shares with North Korea, it acknowledges the influence of China (and especially Maoism and Maoist art) on North Korean propaganda art. Conceding that Maoist art was itself influenced by Soviet (and particularly Stalinist) Socialist Realist art, the influence of the Soviet Union on the development of North Korean art is also considered. Reflecting on China’s potential influence on the future direction of North Korea and North Korean culture, the section also examines China’s potential sway over North Korean reform.
4.1 Historical Imperialism: Real and Potential!

As Korean scholar Adrian Buzo (1999: 190) remarks, North Korea exhibits an “intensity” toward Japan and the US “that often beggar[s] belief.” Thus, working to reaffirm North Korea’s lingering historically-informed ‘imperialist’ perception of Japan and the US (see Chapter 2), this section begins by offering additional tangible evidence as to the manifestation of anti-Japanese and anti-American sentiment in North Korean cultural artefacts. Moving to recall the South Korean fusion music examples of Chapter 2, it then explores some of the possible and legitimate reasons for the proactive stances taken by the North and South Korean governments concerning interactions with the outside world.

While Chapter 2 empirically demonstrates the extent of North Korea’s intensity and “towering hatred” (Korean Central News Agency [KCNA], 7 November 2004) for the US (see images 6 to 11, for example), the identification of Japan as the second primary target of Pyongyang’s anti-imperialist campaign (see Chapter 2), sees the Japanese case require equal consideration. Consequently, for the sake of corroboration, three additional North Korean poster art examples, expressive of mutual anti-Japanese and anti-American sentiment (images 20 to 22), are pictured and discussed below.
In the first example, Image 20, two missiles are seen through a North Korean gun-sight; the flag on each seeing them unmistakably identified as American and Japanese in origin. Similarly, Image 21 features both a US and Japanese soldier, together with, it would seem, a South Korean government official (perhaps even the president), each of whom is being ‘crushed’ by the ‘fist,’ or ‘might,’ of North Korea. Equal in its disdain toward the US and Japan, Image 22 presents a US and Japanese soldier transfixed by a bayonet.
In line with the teachings of _Juche_, Japan and the US are depicted as missile-wielding aggressors, as explicitly shown by the missiles pictured in _Image 20_, as well as the fact that the Japanese and US soldiers of _Image 21_ are in possession of a sword and bomb, respectively. Meanwhile, the inclusion of a South Korean figure in _Image 21_ is demonstrative of the North Korean view that South Korea and its government have been reduced to ‘puppets’ and servants of US imperialism, wherein South Korea is grouped and judged as an extension of the US and its supposed imperial designs (Missuri, 1978: 126).

These images notwithstanding, the accompanying captions themselves reinforce the link between Japan, the US and imperialism. The caption of _Image 22_ does so by defining the two states as “enemies of [Korean] reunification,” and thus of the _Juche_ revolution and its campaign to secure Korea’s independent sovereignty, without outside interference or influence, such as US troop presence in the South
(see Section 4.2). Moreover, North Korea’s caution that the “world beware” or become its “target,” as set forth in the caption of Image 20, epitomises North Korea’s complete independence and self-defensive military line, which is ultimately driven by its view of an imperialist outside world, headed by Washington and Tokyo (see Chapter 2).


Testament to the imperialist portrayal of the US in North Korean cultural artefacts, Associated Press journalist, Jean H. Lee (2012: para. 13), writes of how US soldiers are frequently “depicted” in North Korean art and artistic representations “as cruel, ghoulish barbarians with big noses and fiendish eyes” (see images 23 and 24).
In the context of Juche and imperialism, the artistic choices surrounding the depiction of the US soldiers in Image 23 and Image 24 are revealing. First and foremost, that both have been painted with a hook-nose is significant given the connotations of ‘wickedness’ generally attached to this facial feature in art and animation (J. H. Lee, 2012). Interpreted within the frame of North Korean perceptions of US historical imperialism, including its role in Korea’s division and the Korean and Iraq wars, this ‘wickedness’ translates to ‘imperialist aggression.’

Furthermore, while not necessarily expressive of wicked intent, the inclusion of tears and blood in Image 24 is suggestive of US defeat and can be linked back to the “essential superiority” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 69) and military invincibility Juche is claimed to guarantee. Recalling too that Juche is, at its base, a “revolutionary struggle . . . against imperialism and dominationism” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 25-26), the portrayal of the US as ‘defeated,’ clearly designates the State as a target in the struggle and a perpetrator of these ‘crimes’ (see Chapter 2). Additional North Korean artistic representations depicting ‘US defeat’ and North Korean purported military superiority are analysed in Chapter 6.
Certainly, the fact that anti-Americanism should be so freely and explicitly expressed in such artistic representations, is suggestive of how broad and deep such feelings are throughout North Korean culture. A similar level of pervasiveness and vehemency, though perhaps less intense given the United States’ history in Korea and rise to global superpower status, can be supposed for Japan as well. As noted, some of the specifics concerning the United States’ role in Korea and beyond (Iraq) are discussed later in this chapter. That said, for reasons soon to be elaborated, Japan still very much registers as an ‘imperialist threat’ to North Korea, with its colonisation of the peninsula undoubtedly shaping the globalisation postures of both the North and South.

The above examples therefore hold significance because they embody Juche’s overt condemnation of servility to big powers, underscoring the association it draws between big powers, foreign influence and imperialism (see Chapter 2). Moreover, as products of North Korean culture, in elucidating the anti-globalisationist/anti-imperialist character of Juche, these examples also clearly illustrate a nexus between policy and culture playing out within North Korea.

Given the illustrated “intensity” North Korea harbours toward Japan and the US (Buzo, 1999: 190), the remainder of this section explores some key historical reasons accounting for this distrust, beyond accusations of mere North Korean irrationality and paranoia. Setting the North Korean case aside, South Korea, generally considered neither irrational nor paranoid, except perhaps by Pyongyang, has itself adopted a proactive approach to globalisation that appears to have been influenced by historical factors, such as Japanese imperialism. While ideological, political and cultural differences have, concededly, seen Seoul and Pyongyang react
differently to this influence, Japanese imperialism and the US have had, and continue
to have, a very real role in shaping both Juche and Segyehwa.

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, North Korean images of independence, anti-
Americanism and resistance of the outside world, are juxtaposed with images of
South Korean fusion music ensembles combining Korean and Western musical
flavours. Though it may be easy to question and dismiss the concerns of an outlier
state such as North Korea, the proactive character of South Korea’s globalisation
drive underscores that there are real historical reasons that affect both the North and
South, which need to be considered in order to fully understand the association
between policy and culture unfolding in Korea. With this in mind, I now turn to
Japan’s colonisation of Korea, pondering the impact of this colonisation and Japan’s
cultural assimilation efforts on Korean cultural identity. Specifically, I argue that
Japan’s attempts to undermine Korean culture are partly accountable for both the
cultural emphasis of South Korea’s Segyehwa policy, and the anti-globalisationist
posturing of North Korea’s Juche idea (J. I. Kim, 1997: 12-13; Y. S. Kim, 1995d:
269-270).

It would appear that, rather than having an assimilative effect on Koreans,
Japan’s geographical and cultural proximity, brutal assimilation attempts and strong
focus on military action, reinvigorated the national will of Koreans, “reviving their
sense of nationality” (McKenzie, 2006: 7). Approached in this way, this revived
“sense of nationality” (and willingness to maintain it), manifests in the proactive
policies North and South Korea adopt toward globalisation in the present day.

To clarify, the claim that Korea’s colonial past had a part in moulding the
globalisation policies of North and South Korea, can be understood through the lens
of the homogenisation/Americanisation argument (Barber, 1996; Ritzer, 2008; 2007).
As detailed in Chapter 1, homogenisation/Americanisation theorists such as Benjamin Barber (1996) and George Ritzer (2008; 2007), consider globalisation to be little more than a process of cultural imperialism. That is, a process presenting the same inherent danger as imperial rule: the danger that one culture, subject to the domination of another, will be overridden and undermined by it. Viewed through this prism, it can be argued that Juche and Segyehwa represent a conscious effort on the part of Pyongyang and Seoul, respectively, to counteract the potential threat globalisation poses to national and cultural identity.

While an account of Japan’s acquisition of Korea is beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that, following a lengthy power struggle with Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan seized Korea and made it a protectorate in 1905, annexing it in 1910 (D. K. Kim, 2005: 119-121; Oberdorfer, 1998: 4-5). Japan then exercised ultimate sovereignty over the Korean peninsula until its defeat in the Pacific War in 1945.

Fundamental here are the assimilation policies that Japan inaugurated after annexing Korea, which were directed at “the entire absorption of the country” (McKenzie, 2006: 107) and the complete substitution of ‘Koreanness’ with all things Japanese. Extending to every aspect of Korean life, these assimilation policies saw the rights and freedoms of Koreans severely and brutally curtailed (Willis, 2012: 108). Koreans were stripped of their most basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press and assembly. They were even denied the right to use their native language, study their own history, culture and geography, dress in traditional costume, or practice their own religions (D. K. Kim, 2005: 126). Japanese replaced Korean as the nation’s official language, Korean cities were renamed to reflect the Japanese pronunciation of Chinese characters (Ku, 1985: 11) and the Korean public
was ordered to adopt Japanese style surnames (D. K. Kim, 2005: 137). In addition, between 200,000 and 300,000 books relating to Korean history and geography were seized and destroyed (Sohn, Kim & Hong, 1982: 250). Koreans were also forced to pledge their allegiance to the Japanese emperor and coerced on a monthly basis to visit Japanese Shinto shrines (D. K. Kim, 2005: 137).

While Japan’s colonisation of Korea reflected broader colonial practices of the time, Japan’s rule over Korea has been characterised by several scholars, including Kenneth B. Lee (1997: 146), as “unique in its notoriety and viciousness.” Much of this characterisation is owed to the Japanese tendency to exert ultimate control over its colonies through a policy of total absorption (McKenzie, 2006), ensured by a “preponderance of military power” (Myers and Peattie, 1984: 27), which has been described as “unusual” in its “intensity” (Myers and Peattie, 1984: 514). 16

Admittedly, other European states including France and Germany, adopted “intrusive” cultural assimilation models that aimed to “change the cultural fabric” of colonised places and peoples (Caprio, 2009: 48). Even against these notably assimilative models, Japanese colonial rule was all the more “centralized” (Myers and Peattie, 1984: 515) and arguably, all the more authoritarian. This has led Lee (1997: 146) to argue that the “viciousness” of Japanese colonialism in Korea, is “unmatched anywhere or anytime in the history of mankind, except perhaps in Nazi Germany.”

This especially brutal characterisation is perhaps due to the fact that there was no clear economic, social or cultural distinction between the Japanese as coloniser and the Koreans as the indigenous colonised peoples (Eckert, 2000: 136). In fact,

16 According to Ramon Hawley Myers and Mark R. Peattie (1984: 78) Japan maintained a ratio of 1 policeman per 1150 Koreans during its rule over Korea, with the statistic becoming even more impressive (at 1:400), when including the Japanese gendarmerie.
Koreans considered themselves superior to the Japanese (Ku, 1985: 82). Therefore, absent the presumption of Japanese superiority or the prospect of Korean advancement, a “draconian” style of enforcement may have been the only way Japan could impose its rule (D. K. Kim, 2005: 125-126).

From this historical perspective, it is not surprising that North Korea should emphasise independence and the safeguarding of national autonomy through an observance of Juche and the ‘military-first’ politics of Songun (Willis, 2012: 108). Nor is it surprising that South Korea should safeguard South Korean cultural identity from the potentially homogenising effects of globalisation, which could see its culture threatened as under Japanese rule (see Chapter 2).

Revealingly, there is evidence to indicate that Japan’s colonisation of Korea plays a specific part in fuelling both North Korea’s suspicion of the outside world and South Korea’s proactive globalisation drive. In fact, a textual analysis of public declarations given by former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and South Korean president Kim Young-sam, imply a strong connection between the policies of their respective administrations and Korea’s history of Japanese domination.

Beginning with the North Korean case, during his time as North Korean leader Kim Jong Il directly cited Japanese imperialism as a “lesson” guiding the rationale and objectives of the Juche idea. Speaking of the evils of imperialism and against a reliance on foreign powers, he proclaimed:

That flunkeyism and the idea of dependence on foreign forces lead to the ruin of the nation is the serious and bitter lesson our nation learned through a long history of national suffering. Our country was occupied by the Japanese imperialists, the early communist movement failed, and the nationalist movement suffered frustration, in the final analysis, because of flunkeyism which meant disbelieving its own strength and grovelling before big powers . . . depending on foreign
forces is a foolish act which is tantamount to putting one's neck into the noose of slavery of its own accord (J. I. Kim, 1997: 12-13 – emphasis added).

That a dependence on “foreign forces” could, in the North Korean context, be equated to “putting one’s neck into the noose of slavery” or bringing about the “ruin of the nation,” indicates that “North Korea’s foreign policy is crafted [in part] against the backdrop of Korean history” (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 148). In other words, it signals that Korea’s history of subjugation, namely at the hands of the Japanese, informs the self-reliance and ‘military-first’ mantra of North Korea’s Juche idea and the strides it takes toward making itself an “impregnable fortress” (Becker, 2005: 4 – see Chapter 2).

Similarly, moving on to South Korea, President Kim Young-sam gave several indications that the history of Japanese colonialism in Korea, in part, encouraged the identity preservation emphasis of the Segyehwa policy. In a speech entitled “Outlining the Blueprint for Globalization,” President Kim Young-sam (1995d: 269) discussed his government’s active pursuit of globalisation in direct relation to Japan’s occupation of Korea. Firstly, he equated the “waves of change” presented by globalisation, with those Korea experienced leading up to its annexation by Japan. He then went on to reveal that the Segyehwa policy was designed to actively deal with the challenges of globalisation, owing to Korea’s failure to protect itself in the past, namely against the Japanese. Highlighting the lessons to be learnt from Korea’s past, he declared:
About one hundred years ago, [Korea] faced a similar global tide of change.\(^1\) At that time Korea failed to cope with it wisely . . . and, in consequence, lost its sovereignty and suffered humiliation and hardships for decades . . . we must not repeat our folly and suffering at the turn of this century (Y. S. Kim, 1995d: 269-270 – emphasis added).

Echoing the above points, the fact that Kim Young-sam discussed Japanese imperialism in reference to the Segyehwa policy, suggests that South Korean identity was consciously promoted in an effort to prevent a repeat of the past. Given this, it can be plausibly argued that the South Korean government, learning from the errors of Korea’s past, adopted a proactive stance toward globalisation to ensure that its culture and sovereignty were not undermined a second time, this time by the West. In the words of Kim Young-sam (1997: 167) himself, “history is the source of [Korea’s] wisdom, and it is controlling [Koreans’] lives with its invisible force.”

These views are further substantiated in a later speech, delivered by Kim Young-sam on 1 March 1996. Significantly, this address coincided with the anniversary of an anti-Japanese movement known as the March First Movement, through which Koreans protested against Japanese rule, asserting their right to independence.\(^2\) This speech is noteworthy, because in discussing the contemporary relevance of the movement and its “spirit of independence” (Y. S. Kim, 1997: 167), Kim Young-sam conceded a link between the cultural emphasis of the Segyehwa policy and Japan’s dominion over Korea. In particular, he intimated that the purpose

---

\(^1\) President Kim Young-sam is referring to the failure of Korea’s first modernisation attempt in 1894. As the South Korean government at the time was “divided between those favoring [sic] the status quo and those advocating modernization” (Y. S. Kim, 1995d: 269), it could not jointly pursue modernisation. Consequently, according to Kim Young-sam, Korea was left vulnerable to Japanese invasion.

\(^2\) Hailed as one of the most significant, large scale anti-Japanese demonstrations to take place during Japan’s colonisation of Korea, the March First Movement began 1 March 1919. Lasting for approximately one year and engulfing the entire nation, the movement involved the formulation, signing and public reading of a Korean Declaration of Independence and a series of nation-wide demonstrations against the Japanese (Ku, 1985: 68-69).
of the Segyehwa policy was to provide the South Korean government and populace with a means of dealing “resolutely with any moves that infringe upon [Korean] sovereignty or defame [Korean] national esteem” (Y. S. Kim, 1997: 169). As Kim Young-sam made this declaration in the context of the March First Movement, it is argued that Korea’s history of Japanese imperialism was indeed a “driving force” (Y. S. Kim, 1997: 167) behind the Segyehwa policy.

The perceptible role of Japan’s colonisation of Korea notwithstanding, Korea’s history of Japanese imperialism is not the only ‘driving force’ behind the policies of Juche and Segyehwa. With reference to Juche in particular, although hatred and distrust for Japan still endures, the United States’ position as a world superpower and military presence in South Korea has seen it, from the North Korean perspective, supplant Japan in its historic role as primary coloniser (J. I. Kim, 1982: 50 – see Chapter 2). Seeking to understand and contextualise the North Korean perception of the US as ‘imperialist,’ the following details some of the historical causes of North Korean antipathy toward the United States. Approached from the North Korean perspective, the United States’ part in Korea’s division, the Korean War, as well as the war in Iraq, are analysed for their individual and cumulative role in shaping North Korea’s attitude toward globalisation. As is elaborated, North Korea took the US ‘invasion’ of Iraq as a clear expression of its ‘imperial’ intentions and considered itself the next target in the US so-called ‘War on Terror.’

Despite the tendency for Western (capitalist) governments, scholars and media to dismiss North Korean concerns as the ‘crazy paranoia’ of an irrational and
often caricatured leadership, 19 North Korea’s fear of being a US military target was not unsubstantiated. In fact, various representatives of the Bush administration were quite boisterous about not ruling out a pre-emptive attack as a means of dealing with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Thus, North Korea’s anxiety following its ‘Axis of Evil’ designation and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq was, arguably, not the result of mere paranoia, but a legitimate fear response to a genuine threat. Mindful of North Korea’s overarching suspicion of the US, it is perhaps a little too quixotic (at a time when the Iraq War was underway and pre-emption was identified as a viable ‘strategic’ option), to expect North Korea to shrug off Washington’s remarks as simple ‘bluff’ and scare tactics.

Consider the following series of overtly hostile statements by prominent members of US Congress, for example. Indicating US readiness to take similar military action against North Korea, in December 2002, then US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, declared that the US was “capable of fighting” and “winning” in two simultaneous “major regional conflicts” (as cited in Clover, Spiegel & Turner, 2002: para. 3). These sentiments were later echoed by key Bush advisor, Richard Perle – the reported “architect” of the US invasion of Iraq (Monaghan, 2003: para. 1) – who cautioned that the US government was prepared to “consider all the alternatives” (as cited in Ju, 2002: para. 1), including the possibility of a “surgical strike” (as cited in Rosenberg, 2003: para. 3) in tackling the North Korean nuclear issue. This preparedness was also cited by then Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton (2003: para. 4, 32) who insisted that “all options remain[ed] on the table,” with the US ready to call on “more

---

19As Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang (2003: 2-3) explain, North Korea is frequently referred to as “mad,” “rogue,” and “a country full of ‘crazy’ people.” For example, former South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan labelled North Korea an “irrational, bellicose group” (as cited in Cha and Kang, 2003: 2), while in 2006, political psychologist Jerrold Post described Kim Jong Il as “crazy like a fox,” characterised by “paranoid tendencies” (as cited in Sherwell, 2006: para. 4, 6).
robust techniques,” including “preemptive military force,” should “the language of persuasion” prove ineffective.

These pronouncements notwithstanding, the option of pre-emption was not confined to rhetoric. It was an alternative formally and officially recognised as part of US strategic policy, included in its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), released in December 2002. In the document, the US put forth “a comprehensive strategy” to deal with the threat of WMD “in all of its dimensions” (US Department of State, 2002: 1). It reiterated a warning to all known and suspected WMD offenders that the US “reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – including through resort to all of [its] options – to the use of WMD,” or, under certain circumstances, undertake “preemptive measures” (US Department of State, 2002: 3).

Certainly, these realities were not helped by the fact that Kim Jong Il, North Korea’s then leader, was a man President Bush openly and publicly despised (see Chapter 5). Indeed, it is hard to dismiss North Korean fear of a US attack as baseless paranoia, when even eighty percent of the South Korean population at the time was concerned that North Korea might be the next US target, which if true, could potentially lead to the outbreak of a second Korean War (C. J. Lee, 2006: 268).

In the months following the US 20 March 2003 attack on Iraq these preoccupations became a regular feature of reporting from the official North Korean media outlet, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). It was argued that the fact that the US had likewise termed it as “part of ‘an axis of evil’” and accused it of being a nuclear-armed sponsor of terrorism, while choosing to pursue military action in Iraq and Afghanistan, clearly designated the State as the Bush administration’s “next target” (KCNA, 13 May 2003). As far as North Korea was concerned, Iraq and
Afghanistan represented only two phases of the US war plan, which if proven successful, would “no doubt” trigger the opening of a “third act on the Korean Peninsula” (*KCNA*, 28 March 2003). In reference to Iraq in particular, the fact that the US occupied Iraq with the alleged intention of ridding the country of “weapons of mass destruction” (*KCNA*, 12 May 2003), while concurrently seeking the urgent disarmament of North Korea (see Chapter 5), was, by North Korean interpretation, indicative of a US plot “to spark” a “second Iraqi crisis” in Korea (*KCNA*, 25 March 2003).

North Korea’s fear of a US attack is palpably portrayed in the (usually) *defensive and reactionary* posture of North Korean propaganda posters, such as that of *Image 20*, which promises to “target” those who “challenge” North Korea’s “achievements,” or threaten its longevity. As Chapter 5 elaborates in arguing the defensive purposes of North Korea’s nuclear program, their showcasing of North Korean military ‘might’ and capability appears geared more toward *deterring* US pre-emptive action than vowing North Korean initiated-aggression. Interpreted within the frame of US threats of pre-emption, North Korea’s stance (and the posters representative thereof), should be understood as direct products of, and responses to, the United States’ hostile posture toward Pyongyang.

Importantly, much of North Korea’s fear of the US, at least among the general populace, stems, in part, from the belief that the US started the Korean War. While a comprehensive explanation of the reasoning behind North Korea’s accusation is beyond the scope of this chapter, North Korea dismisses the broadly held belief that the Korean War was initiated by a ‘southward invasion’ (Brune, 1996: 159), as “vociferous propaganda” (Ho, Kang & Pak, 1993: 104). Instead, it
argues that it is “an unshakable fact” (Ho et al., 1993: 1) that South Korea, “wire-pulled by the US government” (Ho et al., 1993: 80) ignited the conflict.

In disseminating this view, North Korea alleges that upon its arrival in 1945, the United States was more interested in “taking over from Japanese imperialism” (Mosston, Ferrucci & Dachet, 1975: 152), than in aiding Korean liberation from the Japanese. Citing the (supposed) banning of political expression, and even the arrest and murder of dissenters (Ho et al., 1993: 24-25; I. S. Kim, 1986: 8-9), North Korea contends that the US consciously assumed the position of ‘dictator’ in South Korea to “perpetuate Korea’s division” (Ho et al., 1993: 47) and launch an offensive against the whole of Korea (Ho et al., 1993: 18). Consequently, North Korea maintains that any actions taken by its government on and after 25 June 1950 were retaliatory. Chapter 6 discusses the ways in which these views are propagated through North Korean museum exhibitions.

Today, in retrospect, we know that the US did not, and has not, pursued military action against North Korea, as it did Iraq. Yet, this does not necessarily diminish the threat in the North Korean mindset. Nor does it negate the effects it may have had on the North Korean psyche and its perception of the US – especially if North Korea was genuinely convinced of the legitimacy of the threat – a threat, which considering the uncertain status of North Korea’s nuclear programs, could (as far as it knows), be at “any time” (KCNA, 3 April 2003) acted upon.

Although President Bush is no longer in office and his successor Barack Obama has unveiled a somewhat ‘softer’ nuclear strategy, the US position on North Korea remains largely unchanged. In his April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), aimed at “reducing nuclear risks” to the United States, its “allies and partners, and the international community” (US Department of Defense, 2010: 49), Obama
pledged “not to use or threaten” nuclear force against “non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT [Non-Proliferation treaty] and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations” (US Department of Defense, 2010: viii).

Though pivotally, as the next chapter details, North Korea is no longer a member of the NPT, nor does it consider itself bound to international non-proliferation standards. In short, North Korea is an exception to the ‘rule’ of the NPR, meaning as explained by then US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, that “for them, all bets are off” (as cited in Kruzel, 2010: para. 4). For Pyongyang this signalled that the United States’ “policy of nuclear threat,”” is still very much ‘alive,’ and that “a preemptive nuclear strike” on North Korea, is for the US, “an invariable scenario” (KCNA, 5 August 2010).

It is this belief that the North could be subjected to a US pre-emptive or surprise attack at “any time” that accounts for its permanent state of military readiness and resultant militarised culture, courtesy of Songun (see Chapter 2). As evident in the examples already offered, this is well captured in North Korean poster art, as well as music and performance (see Chapter 7). Supplementing these examples, the following section discusses and empirically illustrates how North Korea’s fear of the so-called ‘US threat’ is doubtlessly bolstered by lingering US troop presence on South Korean soil.
4.2 US Troop Presence and its Impact

Since its part in the Russo-US decision to divide the Korean peninsula, the United States has established itself as a key player in the region, heavily influencing the political situation (and stability) of Korea. In examining the relationship the US has with each Korea, together with its ‘impact’ on relations between the Koreas themselves, this section centres on the affiliation between the US and South Korean governments and the resultant US military presence in South Korea. Importantly, North Korea’s reaction and objection to the US-ROK military alliance and US troop presence in the South, is rooted in its collective memory of imperialism, which is clearly portrayed in the poster art I have discussed. That is to say, more than the product of paranoia, it is politically informed and historically legitimated. The arguments of this section must therefore be contextualised against the backdrop of Section 4.1.

Feeding “a climate of indefinite confrontation” (Harrison, 2002: 109), enduring US military presence in South Korea has long been a source of tension and potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Nearly sixty years after the conclusion of the Korean War, close to 30,000 American soldiers remain stationed South of the 38th parallel (Jin, 2008a). While their mission is clearly stated as one to defend the South against possible Northern aggression (Harrison, 2002: xix), North Korea interprets US presence very differently, seeing it as indicative of US-ROK imperial designs against its State.

To provide a background, US military presence in South Korea is a product of the US-ROK Mutual Security Treaty, which was formulated on 8 August 1953, signed on 1 October and made effective on 17 November 1954 (Quinones, 2001: 22). The agreement, in which the US made an indefinite commitment to defend the South,
was part of a reassurance package offered to then South Korean president Syngman Rhee, in return for his support of the Korean War Armistice (Harrison, 2002: 155).

As noted in the previous chapter, unable to accept the perpetuating division of Korea and unwilling to sanction any agreement mandating anything other than Korean reunification under Southern control, Rhee actively opposed the armistice (Fehrenbach, 2000: 446-447; Harrison, 2002: 157). With Rhee standing as the only obstacle to its procurement and final signing (Fehrenbach, 2000: 445-446), following the United Nations Command (UNC), China and North Korea’s agreement to armistice terms on 4 June 1953, the US-ROK Mutual Security Treaty was pledged as a means of ‘persuading’ Rhee to refrain from jeopardising the Korean War Armistice Agreement (Chay, 2002: 266).

Although Rhee did not block the armistice, which was signed on 27 July 1953 (Harrison, 2002: 155), South Korea was not among the signatories. From the North Korean perspective, this fact is representative of South Korea’s general desire to maintain a state of war on the peninsula, through the continued stationing of US forces in the South (Checa, 1975: 17-18).

Arguably, the US-ROK Mutual Security Treaty further attests to the fact that while perhaps exaggerated, North Korea’s fears of US invasion are founded on more than mere paranoia. After all, in granting the US authority to station its troops on South Korean soil, the treaty extended the US “the right” to organise its forces throughout the South, in a manner “determined by mutual agreement” (see Appendix

---

20 On 18 June, in an effort to sabotage peace and express opposition to agreed armistice terms concerning the mutual repatriation of Prisoners of War (POWs), Rhee violated the term by ordering the South Korean Army to engage in the forceful release of 27,000 anti-communist North Korean prisoners (Harrison, 2002: 157).

21 As the agreement has not yet been replaced by a peace treaty, the Korean War is still, technically and legally, in effect (An, 2003: 76; Bleiker, 2005: 9-10; Cumings, 2004: 3). Despite Seoul and Washington arguing that South Korea is represented by way of the UNC signature, that South Korea did not sign the armistice remains a central obstacle to the procurement of a peace treaty, due to North Korea’s refusal to recognise Seoul as an original signatory and necessary party in peace treaty negotiations (An, 2003: 89; Downs, 1999: 92; Lee, 2000: 184).
8 – Article 4). Under the terms of the accord, the US was also afforded peacetime control over joint US-ROK forces, which it relinquished under pressure in 1994 (Harrison, 2002: 156). Though, at the time of writing, the US still maintains wartime operational control over South Korean military personnel, with South Korea the only place where a “four star general” exercises wartime operational control over foreign forces (Harrison, 2002: 182). Indeed, as reflected in Image 21 and its grouping of South Korea as part of the US “forces of division,” North Korea uses the fact that the US maintains wartime operational control to argue that the US-ROK Mutual Security Treaty relegates South Korea to nothing more than “a mistress and plaything of the United States” (M. C. Kim, 2001: 149).

In fact, the North Korean government claims that the US and its constant interference in the internal affairs of Korea, is not only a principal cause of tension on the peninsula, but is indicative of a wider “sinister [imperial] design” (Fall, 1975: 174). While reinforced by a number of factors, including those addressed in the previous section, this fear is fuelled by North Korea’s perception that continued US troop presence is knowingly and deliberately in contravention of both the Korean War Armistice Agreement of 1953 and the North-South joint statements of 1972 and 2000.

As well as setting forth a number of conditions for ceasefire and demarcation, the armistice agreement stipulated, or rather ‘recommended,’ that an inter-Korean meeting be convened after a period of three months to discuss the removal of foreign troops from the Korean peninsula. As laid down in Article Four, Paragraph Sixty:

---

22 Originally, a 2007 agreement between the US and South Korea saw Seoul set to reclaim wartime control of its forces in April 2012. This deadline was postponed to December 2015 in June 2010 however, amid worsening tensions (S. H. Kim, 2010c).
In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc (as cited in B. H. Kim, 1994: 86-87 – emphasis added).

Given the inclusion of this proviso in the Korean War Armistice Agreement, the North Korean government maintains that the prolongation of US military presence in South Korea constitutes a “gross violation,” not only of the agreement itself, but of the “territorial sovereignty and integrity” of the entire Korean nation and its people (Mosston et al., 1975: 163).

North Korea forwards a similar argument in regard to South Korea’s alleged breaches of the North-South joint statements of 1972 and 2000. As discussed in the previous chapter, both joint statements emphasise the internal settlement of Korea’s reunification (see Chapter 3). Given this, it is North Korea’s position that US presence South of the 38th parallel denotes a direct failure on the part of South Korea, seen to be manipulated by the US, to adhere to those points stipulating the “independent” pursuit of Korean reunification (Mosston et al., 1975: 163).

North Korea also argues that there is no cause for the US to remain in the South as the last of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA – an ally of North Korea during the Korean War), crossed back into China in 1958 (Bleiker, 2005: 47; Yoshiie, 1975: 38). In the context of the withdrawal of Chinese soldiers from North Korean soil – a gesture North Korea professes was made in the spirit of the armistice – US presence is interpreted as a deliberate non-reciprocation of this same spirit. In
North Korea’s view, this ultimately unveils a joint US-ROK scheme preventing the peaceful reunification of Korea (Fall, 1975: 174-175).

The decades-long demand of Pyongyang that US troops be expelled from the South is frequently expressed in North Korean literature, media and propaganda art. This is clearly articulated by Mosston et al. (1975: 155), who identified “the presence of US armed forces on [South Korean] territory” and their resultant “constant interference in Korean affairs,” as “the main obstacle to a reduction in tension . . . [and] military confrontation” between the Koreas. Testament to the longstanding (and serious) nature of North Korea’s petition, over thirty-five years later, US troop presence in South Korea is still being described as “the root cause of war on the Korean peninsula” (I. B. Kim, 2010: para. 9); or as “a cancer-like entity” (KCNA, 8 September 2010), presenting the “biggest hurdle” to improved inter-Korean relations and the reunification of the peninsula (KCNA, 17 December 2010).

North Korean propaganda art expresses specific disdain for lingering US military presence in the South. Offering two reproductions of such art, Image 25 and Image 26 exist as merely two examples wherein North Korea’s quest to ‘drive out’ US forces from South Korea is portrayed as “the basic task of the Korean revolution” (Missuri, 1978: 148), and the “touchstone principle for Korean reunification” (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 171-172).
While the anti-American imagery they convey is, concededly, comparable to previously offered examples, their accompanying captions communicate a clear and steadfast pursuit to “do away with” (Missuri, 1978: 148) US military presence in the South. Exhibiting only a slight difference in word order, the two image captions are virtually identical:

“Let’s drive the US imperialists out and reunite the fatherland!” and

“Drive out the American imperialists. Let’s reunify our fatherland!”

Vitally, Pyongyang’s vehement objection to US forces South of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) is driven by the persistent allegation that such an arrangement serves as “a revelation of [the United States’] criminal intention to keep [S]outh Korea under permanent occupation and ignite a war of aggression against the
DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – North Korea]” (KCNA, 17 December 2010). Regular joint US-ROK military displays bolster this belief (see Chapter 3).^23

Accordingly, as with opposition to US troop presence, resistance to joint US-ROK military drills is rife in North Korean media and propaganda art. Turning first to examples of the former, in 2010, party newspaper Rodong Sinmun (Labour Daily) purported joint ‘Key Resolve’ military manoeuvres to be “a dangerous nuclear test war,” evidencing “the ulterior aim” of both states, “to invade the [N]orth.” Labelling South Korean soldiers “puppet bellicose forces” and American troops “U.S. imperialist aggressor[s],” it accused Washington and Seoul of being “in collusion” against Pyongyang, arguing that “no one [could] vouch” that the exercises would “not develop . . . into an actual war of aggression against the [N]orth” (KCNA, 12 March 2010).

Significantly, the comments made by North Korea in March 2010 are not atypical. In truth, virtually every statement to come from North Korea, both in reaction to US-ROK military exercises and the US in general, echoes these same sentiments. For example, in March 2009, Pyongyang described ‘Key Resolve’ as “an undisguised challenge to the [North] Korean nation” and “a serious provocation intended to seize the DPRK by force of arms” (KCNA, 9 March 2009).

^23 For the purpose of clarification, these joint military manoeuvrings were first referred to as ‘Team Spirit,’ taking on the name of ‘Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, Integration’ (RSOI) in 1994 (Pike, 2007), and adopting the codename ‘Key Resolve’ from 2008 onwards (Yonhap English News, 1 February 2008).
Moving to an example of the latter, as evidenced by Image 27, the belief that US-ROK military drills mask wider US imperial intentions is also strongly propagated in North Korean propaganda art. As with Image 25 and Image 26, the pictured imagery of the poster is not uncharacteristic of North Korean anti-American artistic representations, which tend to depict recognisably American icons, the American flag and US-wielded weapons, being ‘crushed’ by the ‘fist,’ ‘boot’ or ‘might,’ of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) (see chapters 2 and 5). Yet, as with the two previous examples, its accompanying caption expresses particular and direct contempt for US-ROK military manoeuvrings, vowing to “thoroughly smash the Team Spirit Exercises.” That said, the inclusion of a sign featuring the numbering ’38,’ amid a ‘crushed’ American flag, US tanks and missiles, is particularly relevant.

In the context of North Korea’s perception of US-ROK military drills, the image bolsters, as well as embodies, the North Korean belief that US-ROK military exercises are “a product of the U.S. and the [S]outh Korean authorities’ invariable ambition to invade it” (KCNA, 18 August 2011).

Feeding North Korean fear that a war could be waged against it at any time, US-ROK military drills and continuing US troop presence, therefore fuel North Korea’s fervent observance of Songun and militant culture. This is clearly expressed through images 25 to 27, wherein both issues prompt pictorial displays of North Korean military strength, power, superiority and victory. It is also reflected in the fact that joint drills have always been met with threats of retaliatory action from Pyongyang. As the 2010 Key Resolve/Foal Eagle exercises were underway, for instance, Pyongyang promised to unleash “merciless punishment” (KCNA, 12 March 2010) if they were not immediately discontinued.

The seriousness of Pyongyang’s threats may well have been proven by the March 2010 sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan (see Chapter 3), which was scuttled a mere week after the conclusion of the drills, as separate joint exercises were in progress (Jelinek, 2010; Yonhap English News, 18 March 2010). Whether or not North Korea is to blame for the ship’s sinking, the Cheonan incident lays bare the fragility of the political and military power balance at work on the Korean peninsula. Not forgetting North Korea’s resentment of the hardline posturing of the US and South Korean governments, if North Korea was indeed the perpetrator, ‘Key Resolve’ is likely to have been a factor behind the attack. If it was not, the subsequent flexing of US-ROK military muscle in the form of the then largest ever joint drills (Moore, 2010; Song, 2010), and its triggering of a North Korean vow to

---

24 The joint US-ROK anti-submarine exercise (taking place one-hundred and twenty kilometres away) commenced the night before the Cheonan sinking, ending at 9pm the next night, following word of the incident (Jelinek, 2010).
incite a “Korean-style sacred war for retaliation” (KCNA, 25 July 2010), certainly reveal just how significant an impact the US-ROK military alliance has on the stability of Korea and US-Korea-regional relations.

Equally, not to discount other possible motivations, it is not likely a coincidence that North Korea’s first shelling of a South Korean civilian area since the Korean War (that of Yeonpyeong Island) (see Chapter 3), took place the day after annual (usually) joint US-ROK ‘Hoguk’ military exercises began. While the US did not participate in naval drills as planned due to unspecified scheduling conflicts (Jung, 2010), North Korea’s perception of the South as ‘US puppets’ would have, presumably, seen it hold firm to the belief that the exercises were a US-masterminded prelude to war.

It is equally possible that Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) – a supplementary “computer assisted-simulation command post exercise” to Key Resolve (Bryan, 2011: para. 3) – was responsible for an (alleged North Korean initiated) artillery exchange between North and South Korea near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) on 10 August 2011 (Park, 2011a). After all, the alleged shelling occurred less than a week before UFG exercises were set to begin and two days after the North had warned the US and South Korea to cancel them, describing them as “hideous provocations,” which Pyongyang was willing to “counter . . . with the toughest stand” (KCNA, 8 August 2011). Admittedly, North Korea denies shelling the NLL, insisting that the sounds emanating in the area were caused by “normal blasting” from a nearby construction site (KCNA, 10 August 2011). Though, if North Korea did fire towards the NLL as South Korean authorities and military personnel claim (Park, 2011a), the upcoming staging of UFG was almost certainly a key motivator behind the provocation.
South Korea’s military alliance with the US, North Korea’s position concerning it, and the lingering presence of US troops, is also testimony to the political balancing act faced by South Korea; a balancing act it must sustain in an effort to maintain relations with two nation-states (the US and North Korea), more often than not at loggerheads with one another. South Korea’s continuing efforts to walk a tightrope between and ‘balance’ Washington and Pyongyang are drawn out in greater detail in Chapter 5, where the effects of President George W. Bush’s hostile policy toward North Korea are considered in relation to the nuclear issue.

Having focused to this point on the effect of the US and Japan on North Korean foreign policy and cultural artefact, the following section ponders the influence of China on both policy reform and propaganda art. With respect to the latter point, the influence of the Soviet Union is also elaborated.
4.3 The Influence of China and the Soviet Union

Sharing a strong ideological affinity with Pyongyang and assuming the unique position of mediator between North and South Korea and North Korea-United States, China has arguably more potential influence over North Korea than any other nation-state. Recognising China as a key player on the Korean peninsula, this section acknowledges and ponders China’s past and potential influence on North Korean foreign policy, culture and cultural artefacts. Specifically, it considers this issue in parallel with the discernible influence of China (namely Maoism) on the content and form of North Korean propaganda art. Exploring the potential influence of China on the future direction of North Korean culture and cultural artefact development, it also reviews the possible application of the Chinese globalisation model to the North Korean case, and its potential cultural implications. Importantly, China’s capacity to influence and encourage (limited) reform is contextualised in relation to its broader emergence as a world and regional power.

From the 35,000 North Korean soldiers offered to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) war effort in the Chinese Civil War, to the 1,010,300 recorded Chinese casualties in the subsequent Korean War (Li, 2007: 110-112), the North Korea-China ‘socialist brotherhood’ is one “bonded by battlefield blood” (Chang, 2005: 46). This socialist brotherhood and shared revolutionary struggle has meant that China has had a discernible influence on both the development of North Korean Jucheist culture, and the form and content of North Korean cultural artefacts.

In saying that, it must be acknowledged that the Socialist Realism reflected in North Korean, and indeed Chinese, cultural artefacts are both “national variations” of that created and disseminated by the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin in the 1930s.
In fact, with the exception of its reference to Juche, Kim Il Sung’s (1975: 36) directive that North Korean cultural artefacts be “Juche-based . . . national in form and socialist in content,” is identical in wording to a comparable directive issued by Stalin, and strikingly similar to Chairman Mao Zedong’s decree that Chinese arts be “national in form, new democratic in content” (as cited in Portal, 2005: 27).

It is no surprise that North Korea should draw example from the Soviet Union given that, between 1945 and 1948, Pyongyang operated entirely under its auspices (Lankov, 2013: 6). It is also worth noting that while Kim Il Sung was schooled in China and fought for the Chinese before serving in the Soviet Army in the 1940s (see Chapter 6), then Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was perhaps the “main influence” of his youth, and a man “whom he greatly admired” (Portal, 2005: 29). These factors together guaranteed that North Korea would emerge as a “hybrid” state, exhibiting similarities to both the Chinese and Soviet models, though itself infused with national, that is North Korean, characteristics (Portal, 2005: 29).

Continuing with Soviet influence for the moment, testament to the Soviet Union’s initial influence, Stalin is said to have himself edited the draft of the inaugural 1948 North Korean Constitution (Lankov, 2013: 6). This influence without doubt extended to North Korean propaganda art, as well as to the broader development of the personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung (and his son and grandson after him), which according to Russian North Korea expert Andrei Lankov (2013: 18) “obviously followed the Stalinist patterns.”

As Jane Portal (2005: 7) explains, owing to North Korea’s status as a client state of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin was, at that time, able to exercise ultimate “control” over North Korean “cultural output,” including art and exhibitions. This
control was reinforced by the fact that the Soviet Union also sent “thousands” of lecturers and creatives, including artists, together with translations of Soviet literary and artistic works and manuals, to North Korea during the time of its occupation (David-West, 2011: 117).

Certainly, North Korea’s embracement of “public statuary” as epitomised by the grandiose statue of Kim Il Sung erected in the forecourt of the Revolutionary Museum of Pyongyang (see Chapter 1), is in mirror of a Soviet tradition introduced by founding Soviet leader, Vladimir Lenin following the Russian Revolution of 1917. As per Lenin’s directive, statues and monuments would be erected in major cities throughout the Soviet bloc to inspire the masses and educate soldiers (Portal, 2005: 12-13). With the first statue of Kim Il Sung erected in North Korea at a time (1949) when “larger-than-life statues of Stalin abounded” across the Soviet empire (Szalontai, 2005: 242), the Soviet model clearly provided the “prototype for the Kim ‘statuomania’” evident in North Korea (Portal, 2005: 13).

Public statuary aside, Soviet-styled Socialist Realism had and maintains an influence over North Korean art at large. This is particularly true of Stalinist Socialist Realism, which commonly known as Zhdanovism, was designed by cultural tsar to Stalin, Andrei Zhdanov, and embraced in the Soviet Union between 1934 and 1956 (David-West, 2011: 116). With Socialist Realism emerging as the “official cultural policy” of North Korea under Soviet guidance in 1946, its predominance in the Soviet Union at the time assured Zhdanovism considerable influence over the initial development of North Korean literature and art. This influence was primarily facilitated by the 1946 founding of the North Korean Federation of Literature and Art on Zhdanovist socialist realist principles (David-West, 2009: 8), which, at the time of
writing, remains a central bureau of artistic production and control in North Korea (Portal, 2005: 126).

Inspired by the broader principles of Marxism-Leninism, Stalinist or Zhdanovist Socialist Realism was a doctrine imposed on Soviet literature and art by Joseph Stalin in 1934 (Portal, 2005: 21). As articulated by Zhdanov (1977: 21), the doctrine necessitated that literature and art be geared toward “the ideological remoulding and education” of the masses “in the spirit of socialism.” As such, Zhdanovist Socialist Realism required art and literature to be “tendencious” [sic], or to overtly reflect and propagate the views and agenda of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In this vein, it dictated that all works be “impregnated with enthusiasm and the spirit of heroic deeds” so as to “depict reality in its revolutionary development” (Zhdanov, 1977: 20-21). In other words, Zhdanovist Socialist Realism mandated that a “revolutionary romanticism” be evoked whereby the ‘reality’ depicted represented a glorified or idealised ‘truth,’ not of what was, but of “magnificent future prospects” of what would be should the masses faithfully commit to the struggles of the working class and principles of the Party (Zhdanov, 1977: 22).

In this way, the demands of Zhdanovist Socialist Realism on Soviet literature and art were founded on four basic principles: partiinost (‘partymindedness’), ideinost (‘idea-mindedness’), klassovost (‘class-mindedness’) and narodnost (‘peoplemindedness’). This essentially meant that literary and artistic works needed to be accessible to the masses by dealing directly with popular concerns. They also needed to clearly reflect a class consciousness, treat issues of current relevance and concern, and express unconditional faithfulness to the Party (Clark, 1997: 87). As part of a quest to depict a bright future under socialism, works also emphasised the ‘positive hero,’ a figure embodying ideal socialist virtue and belief, whose singleness
As David-West (2011: 116) notes, demonstrating clear and lingering Soviet influence, North Korea continues to follow these “Soviet Stalinist formulas.” In addition to echoing Stalin’s directive that cultural artefacts be “national in form and socialist in content” (as cited in Portal, 2005: 27), the North Korean leadership also draws on the concepts of partiinost (‘partymindedness’), klassovost (‘class-mindedness’) and narodnost (‘peoplemindedness’) through its use of the similar terms dangsŏng (party spirit), rodong kyegŭpsŏng (working-class spirit), and inminsŏng (popular spirit) (David-West, 2009: 8). Importantly, these concepts are directly applied to literature and art in the North Korean context. This is evidenced by the fact that Kim Jong Il mandated that art, or what he termed “Juche realism,” reflect not only the principles of Juche, but “fully embod[y]” the arguably Soviet-inspired concepts of “Party spirit, working-class spirit and popular spirit” as “essential characteristics” (J. I. Kim, 1991: 35-36). Equally indicative of Soviet influence, Kim Jong Il (1991: 36) likewise revealed that, as in Soviet Socialist Realism, “positive heroes” (demonstrative of “[u]nfailing loyalty to the Party and the leader”), feature at the “centre” of North Korean Jucheist art.

Indeed, the concept of the ‘positive hero’ is reflected in Image 3 of Chapter 2 wherein three North Korean citizens (a young boy, girl and elderly man in military clothing) are pictured. The Tower of the Juche Idea and rows of army and Party faithful can also be seen in the distance, bathed in socialist red. As argued in Chapter 2, their obvious contentment and loyalty to the leadership and cause courtesy of their visible party badges is a clear attempt not only to inspire the masses, but to link an observance of Juche and socialism to the promise of happiness and a bright and
prosperous future (see Image 3). The figures of Image 3 thus fulfil the role of ‘positive heroes’ as designated in Soviet Socialist Realism in that they embody characteristics of the ‘ideal’ socialist subject and appear purposed with spurring the masses forward in the socialist struggle. They also act as positive heroes by, in the spirit of revolutionary romanticism, portraying an idealised reality of what will (supposedly) be (contingent on faithful observance of socialism), rather than what is. A similar association between an observance of Juche socialism and the promise of happiness and prosperity is suggested by Image 4, through the simultaneous depiction of doves and the Juche flame (see Chapter 2).

Concededly, despite the initial influence of the Soviet Union, the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and the subsequent emergence of an increasingly “revisionist” Russia in the late 1950s, led Kim Il Sung to distance himself from Soviet influence (Lankov, 2013: 11-12, 43). As Lankov (2013: 18) explains, now viewing the Soviet Union “as a source of dangerously liberal ideas . . . relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union began to deteriorate.” As part of this distancing effort, Soviet advisers were ordered home, North Korean media ceased almost all mention of the Soviet Union and works of Soviet literature and art, including plays, were banned (Lankov, 2013: 18; Myers, 2011: 41). In addition, all North Korean students studying in Russia and the Eastern bloc were withdrawn and North Korean men with Soviet or Eastern European wives were made to divorce, with the women “summarily expelled from the country” (Lankov, 2013: 18). Although North Korean-Soviet relations improved slightly after 1965 (Lankov, 2013: 18), with the official replacement of Marxism-Leninism with Juche in 1972 (Lynn, 2007: 105 - see Chapter 2), all mandates relating to literature and art came to be attributed solely to North Korea, and principally to the North Korean leadership. Yet, despite the rise of Juche and
Pyongyang’s attempts to ‘erase’ Soviet influence, as the above discussion details, the early Soviet occupation of North Korea left a legacy of “decisive cultural exposures” that continue to play an “integral part” in the character and form of North Korean art in the present day (David-West, 2011: 117).

Having recognised the role of the Soviet Union, however, due to China’s preponderant (and lingering) influence following the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc (J. Kim, 2007: 12; Scobell, 2004: 4), remaining discussion centres on the influence of Beijing, drawing particularly on propaganda poster art. In contextualising China’s influence, it is important to recall that the 1967 elevation of *Juche* to ideological status (Lynn, 2007: 105), as well as the subsequent efforts of the North Korean government to ensure the *Juche*-centric nature of North Korean arts (see Section 2.3.1), unfolded against the backdrop of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).
This was a time when Chinese propaganda posters were emphasising “idealized images,” expressive of themes such as “prosperity and security,” heroism and “self-sacrifice” (Portal, 2005: 25), as well as “patriotism,” national defence and the furtherance of the anti-imperialist struggle (Fraser, 1977: 3 – see Image 28). It was also a time wherein Chinese propaganda posters were overt in their veneration of Mao as the “Great Helmsman” of the people (Landsberger, 2008: 16; Portal, 2005: 25), typically portraying him as “a benevolent father, a great soldier, a sympathetic teacher” and “a super-human, faultless and inspirational leader” (Portal, 2005: 25 – see Image 29).

Given the close “paraphrase” of Mao’s decree by Kim Il Sung (Portal, 2005: 27), it is not surprising that North Korean propaganda art should share similarities, also seeking, as noted and illustrated in Section 2.3.1, to depict “model citizens,” ‘revolutionary heroes’ and “figures of self-sacrifice” (Lim, 2009: 44). For instance, Image 28 depicts a similar scene and sentiment of military ardour to that of Image 6 and Image 7 of Chapter 2; a sentiment also reflected in the later examples of chapters
5 and 6 (see Heather and De Ceuster, 2008 for additional examples). Exhibiting further similarity to Chinese propaganda art, North Korean pieces also frequently depict Kim Il Sung as a benevolent, all-providing, “indomitable anti-imperialist fighter” (Missuri, 1978: 39). The extent to which North Korean propaganda art, (mirroring the idolisation of Mao Zedong pictured in Image 29) emphasises leadership veneration, and the portrayal of Kim Il Sung particularly, as an “ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander” (KCNA, 27 July 2010) is empirically demonstrated in Chapter 6 (see images 39-40 and Image 45, for example).

Adding to the thematic similarities between North Korean and Chinese propaganda art, North Korea’s characterisation of Japan and the US as ‘enemies’ of the State, is also common to, and perhaps influenced by, Maoist art. For instance, in featuring a host of US soldiers frightened, defeated, injured and impaled on spikes, Image 30 is expressive of anti-American sentiment akin to (North Korean) images 6
to 8 of Chapter 2, and indeed many subsequent examples, including images 32 to 34 of Chapter 5. The same can be said of its accompanying caption and its declaration that “American imperialism must be beaten!” Likewise, through depicting the Japanese flag and a US army helmet impaled on a Chinese bayonet, *Image 31* is comparable to the North Korean anti-Japanese and anti-American propaganda art examples of Section 4.1.  

Thematic and content-related similarities, such as a shared emphasis on leadership veneration and anti-imperialism aside, there are also a few stylistic and form-based similarities between Chinese and North Korean propaganda art. Some of the more notable of these relate to colour-scheme (specifically the predominance of ‘socialist red’) and the discernible discrepancy in size between the artistic representations of North Korean and Chinese figures vis-à-vis those of their ‘enemies.’ Beginning with colour-scheme, in the case of the Chinese example, *Image 31*, both the sun and mass of soldiery behind the ‘victorious’ bayonet-wielding Chinese soldier, are bathed in a (socialist) red ‘glow.’ The same is the case with the North Korean pieces reproduced in *Image 3* and *Image 5* of Chapter 2. In the former instance, the Tower of the Juche Idea, amassed crowd and hammer and sickle symbol (representative of socialism) featured behind the contented three party faithful, are also bathed in a red glow. In the latter case, scenes of North Korean ‘victory’ against imperialism, including the Tower of the Juche Idea and a mass parade complete with balloons, are again bathed in socialist red. Thus, the colour red is utilised in both Chinese and North Korean propaganda art to link socialism with the promise of superiority, ‘victory’ and “prosperity and security” (Portal, 2005: 25).

---

25 Particular to the Chinese context, the other flag featured in *Image 31* is that of the (anti-communist) Nationalist Party of China (*Guomindang*).
Moving on to the issue of size discrepancy, it is a common tendency in both Chinese and North Korean propaganda art for the respective State’s military and broader superiority to be asserted through a discernible size difference between themselves and their ‘adversaries.’ This is the case in Image 30, wherein a Chinese woman towers over a host of US soldiers. It is also the case with the majority of North Korean examples offered in this chapter, including images 21, 25 and 27, in which designated ‘imperialist enemies’ and their weapons are crushed and overpowered by the ‘hand’ or ‘fist’ of North Korea. It is also true of Image 26, in which weapon-wielding North Korean navy, air force and army officers, together with a female nurse, send US soldiers and their South Korean ‘flunkeys’ (small and weak in comparison), cowering.

Yet, while the inspiration taken from China and particularly Maoism need be acknowledged, it must also be stressed that North Korean propaganda art is nonetheless indigenously unique. Indeed, although itself inspired by Stalin’s Soviet Union, Chinese propaganda art too exhibits a China-specific character (Cushing, 2007: 7; Fraser, 1977: 6; Portal, 2005: 21). In remarking of the uniquely (North) Korean quality of its propaganda art, experts Jane Portal (2005: 29) and Koen De Ceuster (2008: 9-11) remark of how a sense of ‘Koreanness,’ both traditionally Korean and North Korean, has been retained in the North Korean context, including an emphasis on traditional ink painting (Chosonhwa). In view of this, while the influence of China (and beyond) is conceded, the overarching focus is on the North Korean specificity of Juche, its manifestation in North Korean exhibitions and music and performance, and emerging insights and implications for the policy-culture nexus, both in and beyond Korea.
In assessing the influence of Maoism, however, it should be noted that China’s (potential) influence over North Korea did not end with Beijing’s post-1978 pursuit of reforms and the fall of Maoism. As two of the world’s few, and the only Northeast Asian “Communist survivors” (Ong, 2002: 58), North Korea and China remain tied by a broader “revolutionary obligation” (KCNA, 11 July 2011) to safeguard the “political legitimacy” and longevity of the socialist revolution (Scobell, 2004: 2). Moreover, with China providing an estimated seventy to ninety percent and one third of North Korea’s total energy and food aid respectively (McEachern, 2010: 70), Beijing’s influence has, perhaps, not so much dissolved as taken on a different form and potentiality.

Firstly, China’s embracement of regionalism and multilateralism in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the resulting establishment of China-US and China-South Korea relations (Wu, 2009: 58), has afforded Beijing a comparatively rare mediatory capacity (Paltiel, 2007: 97-98; Wu, 2009: 56-57), particularly in the context of Six-Party Talks (see Chapter 5). Though, on the subject of (potential) cultural influence more specifically, despite their seemingly negative impact on Sino-North Korea relations (Lanteigne, 2009: 115), Chinese reforms have the potential to affect the long-term cultural direction of North Korea, as well as the content and form of its cultural artefacts. Namely, Chinese reforms bring potential influence in that the post-Mao Chinese model arguably presents as the most likely guide to North Korean reform. This is particularly the case due to the primary emphasis given to the economic dimension.

While a complete description of Chinese reforms is beyond the scope of this thesis, their perceptible goal is to avoid political, social or cultural transformation (Moore, 2000: 123). Officially, Chinese reforms are “restricted” to, and concerned
“almost exclusively” with, “economic issues” (Moore, 2000: 118, 128). They thus present the safest option for Pyongyang in that the Chinese objective of benefitting economically, while preserving political and cultural sovereignty is a feat North Korea itself would like to achieve.

Though, recalling that life-spheres are permeable and cannot be entirely disassociated (see Introduction), even reform intended “almost exclusively” for the realm of economics is likely to have flow-on effects for the cultural sphere. In fact, writing of Chinese reforms and their affect on the dynamics of China itself, Doug Guthrie (2006) argues that social, political and cultural effects are deeply felt. Therefore, should Pyongyang be persuaded by China’s official restriction to ‘economic restructuring’ (Moore, 2000: 128), to follow a Chinese-style path to reform, China may yet influence the direction and development of North Korean culture and cultural artefact.

That said, North Korea’s specific case poses some challenges to its willingness and ability to successfully emulate the Chinese model. Aside from North Korea’s ideological reservations, one also needs to consider that the North Korean economy is “more Soviet in conception” (although North Korea has made its own modifications), than it is Chinese (French, 2007: 150). This, assumedly, imposes some practical difficulties and limits on just how closely Pyongyang can successfully follow in Beijing’s footsteps. It is also true that the existence of South Korea proves a stumbling block for Chinese-styled reforms. In particular, the level of openness (and loosening of political control) required, is likely undesirable from the North Korean point of view, as it would undoubtedly lead to increased awareness of South Korean prosperity, thus threatening the totalitarian grip of the North Korean regime (Lankov, 2011).
These challenges notwithstanding, North Korea has indicated a preference for Chinese styled reform. While the late Kim Jong Il did initially react with contempt to China’s reforms, criticising them as a betrayal of the socialist revolution (Scobell, 2004: 5), his opinion later softened, at least publicly. This apparent softening of opinion was evident during a visit to China’s Shanghai Industrial Complex in 2001, where he surprisingly labelled the Chinese reform model “correct” (as cited in Burton and McGregor, 2001: para. 3). Testament to this potential influence, China has already enticed North Korea to make small changes in replication of the Chinese model, such as opening itself to foreign investment through special economic zones (S. S. Kim, 2006: 311; S. S. Kim, 2001: 24) and the establishment of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in economic partnership with South Korea (see Chapter 3).

Guided by the reform efforts of late 1970s and 1980s China, between 1992 and 2002, North Korea implemented forty-seven new laws aimed at facilitating economic restructuring. It also heralded new economic concepts such as private ownership and underwent fiscal reform, leading to an increase in wages, as well as the freer establishment of trading markets and economic zones (S. S. Kim, 2006: 311). Admittedly, some of these reforms were forced upon North Korea by mitigating factors, ranging from economic ruin, to famine and flood (Becker, 2005: 97-98, 159; Cumings, 2004: 177, 181). Nevertheless, due to the economic focus described, should North Korea decide, or be compelled to re-evaluate its autarkic styled economy, China may yet feature prominently in the future direction of North Korean reform, cultural development and associated production. Any noteworthy opening of North Korea, however, is likely to take decades.

To return to the limitations that need to be acknowledged, it should be stressed that there are limits to China’s potential influence, as well as its readiness to
exert it. These limits were exposed by a leaked 2010 cable detailing correspondence between then South Korean vice Foreign Minister, Chun Yung-woo and US Ambassador to South Korea, Kathleen Stephens (WikiLeaks, 2010). According to the ‘Secret’ document, “China ha[s] far less influence on North Korea ‘than most people believe,’” with North Korea’s minimal strategic value, leaving Beijing with “‘no will’ to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies and the DPRK leadership” (WikiLeaks, 2010: para. 3-6).

Concededly, due to the fact that this cable is a South Korean source originating from a Seoul embassy, its contents should be viewed with a degree of scepticism. Nonetheless, the documented exchange between South Korean vice Foreign Minister Chun and US Ambassador Stephens, underscores that China’s ability and willingness to influence the direction of North Korean politics and culture is subject not only to limits, but a possible conflict of interest. Therefore, in acknowledging that China will always exert its influence (or not) in service of its own national interests, it needs to be recognised that its potential influence may remain exactly that. With the preservation of regional stability one of China’s predominant concerns (Scobell, 2004: 14), Beijing is unlikely to exert the full extent of its influence for two primary reasons. Firstly, through fear that doing so could prompt a regionally destabilising reaction from Pyongyang, or secondly, that it could cause Pyongyang to sever bilateral ties, taking away China’s option of selective and subtle influence (Scobell, 2004: 2). Given the extent to which China now props up North Korea, China presumably would not want to risk further isolating the State, as such a move is likely to hasten its collapse.

These limitations notwithstanding, China still has the potential to exert subtle influence over North Korea, particularly as its national interests are served by
maintaining the status quo. As indicated earlier, it would become all the more
difficult for the Chinese leadership to justify the socialist foundations on which its
effect entire political system is based, should yet another brother country fall (Scobell,
2004: 14-15). Moreover, the prospect of North Korea’s collapse poses wider
political, economic and security concerns relating to refugees, the possible stationing
of US troops on the North Korea-China border and the loss of North Korea as a

Indeed, if reports that North Korea’s post-2001 reforms were partly motivated
by Kim Jong Il’s anger over “how far Shanghai had eclipsed Pyongyang”
(McEachern, 2010: 144) are to be believed, China’s ‘eclipsing’ advancement may
also encourage the adoption of additional measures in emulation of the Chinese
model. Vitally, even if influenced to a certain degree by China’s globalisation, I
contend that North Korea will, as with Juche (a cultural appropriation of Marxism-
Leninism – see Chapter 2), adapt and indigenise the Chinese model to better suit
itself, reflect the North Korean context and embody a sense of North-Koreanness.
Thus, extending the argument of Kong-dan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig (2000: 70), “in a
watered-down form,” altered to showcase a distinctly North Korean character, the
Chinese reform model, “may be the least destabilizing” choice for North Korea.

However extensive its influence regarding future North Korean reforms,
acting as mediator to some of the more estranged nation-states in the world, with a
potentially stabilising role to fulfil, Beijing is likely yet to play a crucial role in the
goings on and future of the Korean peninsula.

North Korean perceptions of US imperialism, and the strained relationships
that have resulted, are some of the factors that have led North Korea to pursue
nuclear weapons technology, furthering the cycle of political instability and escalating tension that has gripped the Korean peninsula since its division. The following chapter outlines the United States’ well publicised position on North Korean denuclearisation. Specifically, drawing again on North Korean propaganda art, it contemplates the US part in fuelling North Korean military-first politics, nuclear ambition and resulting military culture. Within the frame of (perceived) US imperialism, it also investigates the extent to which the progress (or lack thereof) of Six-Party Talks, is reflective not only of Jucheist concerns, but the entrenched nature of North Korean militant culture along Jucheist lines.
5. Negotiating the Nuclear Issue

The North Korean nuclear issue, which relates to its nuclear aspirations, capabilities and yet to be realised potential, has long made the State the subject of international speculation and condemnation. It has also added another layer of complexity to US-Korea and regional relations, creating an atmosphere of political mistrust and uncertainty. Drawing on the themes of the previous chapter, I now delve further into these complexities by addressing the North Korean nuclear issue and Six-Party Talks process. It should be noted that the intention is not to give an exhaustive account of the nuclear crisis itself, but to explain it within the politico-cultural context of Juche and Segyehwa. In the case of the former, focus is given to what the patterns emerging from North Korea’s negotiating record disclose about its policy objectives and the factors that motivate them. As such, events unfolding as part of the crisis are used to showcase a broader tendency on the part of North Korea to react to, and be influenced by, US and regional policy, especially when it presents as a threat to regime survival.

As with previous chapters, in illustration of North Korea’s reactive motivations, a selection of North Korean propaganda art is reproduced and discussed. Specifically, anti-American poster art is drawn on for its tendency to indicate a self-defensive stance, through a strongly communicated promise of retribution against US-initiated aggression; a stance that I argue is plainly mirrored in, and by, North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability.

The prospect of a ‘nuclear’ North Korea first garnered world attention in 1989 when the New York Times reported the existence of a nuclear power station in the North Korean city of Yongbyon, northwest of Pyongyang (Kristof, 1989). Since that time, North Korea has frequently been painted as a “mendacious . . . loose
cannon” that must be kept in check at all costs (Abramowitz, Laney & Heginbotham, 2003: 32). Though, despite accusations to the contrary, the history of the nuclear issue as well as North Korea’s accompanying pronouncements, indicate that its desire for nuclear capability stems from a perceived overwhelming need to protect itself from a hostile outside world. In fact, its “loose cannon” (Abramowitz et al., 2003: 32) image can itself be seen to serve a calculated self-preservation purpose, wherein North Korea’s portrayal as too unpredictable to test, potentially affords it greater security assurances against foreign forces.

Its boisterous declarations of nuclear capability notwithstanding, Pyongyang has always been steadfast in its insistence that its nuclear weapons “remain [a] nuclear deterrent for self-defence,” rather than offence (Korean Central News Agency [KCNA], 10 February 2005 – emphasis added). It has also made it clear that it “will never use nuclear weapons first,” but retain a nuclear arsenal primarily to ensure that its sovereignty is not “wantonly infringed upon” by the US, or any other state (KCNA, 3 October 2006).

In saying that, it must be noted that I am by no means an apologist for the North Korean regime. In examining the North Korean position on the nuclear issue, it is not my intention to in any way defend, excuse, or in fact, offer any judgement (positive or negative) as to the attitudes and actions of North Korea. Rather, I seek merely to underscore that its motivations are more complex and multi-factored than is often suggested in academic and media discourse.

Importantly, even the most seemingly reckless and irrational behaviour does not occur in a vacuum. Instead, it unfolds within a specific social context in response to particular contextual cues, events, conditions and actions. The aim of this chapter is thus to balance the stereotypical and oversimplified characterisation of North
Korea as ‘irrational’ and beyond reason, by acknowledging, tracing and giving adequate attention to the contextual factors driving North Korean nuclear ambition and showmanship. To this end, it attempts to bring a sense of (North Korean) rationality to North Korean nuclearisation by linking Pyongyang’s quest for nuclear weapons to both the international environment, and the Jucheist pursuits of anti-imperialism and self-reliance. Despite the longer history of the nuclear issue, in an effort to highlight the reactionary nature of North Korean political manoeuvring, predominant focus is given to events occurring from 2002 onwards. The post-2002 period is the focus as it was during this time that the nuclear issue escalated into crisis, reaching its most critical point.

In order to fully appreciate the North Korean point of view, it needs to be understood that the post-2002 history of the North Korean nuclear issue has unfolded alongside intense political agitation and uncertainty. Consider the international environment at the time. As discussed in Section 5.2, the years leading up to the abovementioned escalation in tensions brought a change of administration in the US and a subsequent change in policy toward Pyongyang. They also brought the tragic events of 11 September 2001 (the attacks on New York and Washington D.C.), and saw US President George W. Bush adopt a “hawkish” stance against suspected ‘terrorist states,’ including North Korea (Joo and Kwak, 2007: 10). It was, after all, in 2002 and shortly thereafter that President Bush made his infamous ‘Axis of Evil’ labelling, invaded Iraq (2003) and threatened North Korea with pre-emption. It was also in this period that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed the United States’ hardline stance against North Korea by branding it an ‘outpost of tyranny’ (2005).
Having unfolded, to date, between August 2003 and December 2008 (Jonsson, 2006: 87; Lee, 2008), the Six-Party Talks process also paints a revealing picture of the complexities embroiled in the US-Korea relationship. Consider for example, that all but one of its seven rounds of negotiations took place not only against the backdrop of Bush’s anti-Pyongyang posture, but the conciliatory Sunshine and Peace and Prosperity policies of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations (see Chapter 3); policies with which Bush’s own objectives so obviously clashed. With conditions further complicated by US-ROK military drills in the South (KCNA, 29 August 2005) (see Chapter 4) and a South Korean disclosure of uranium-related activities in 2005 (Jonsson, 2006: 91; Kihl, 2006b: 256), these complexities have together ensured a minefield of challenges in the negotiation of the North Korean nuclear issue.

While there is a tendency to treat these events in isolation, it must be recognised that for North Korea, far from constituting isolated incidents, these events provide continuing proof of an overarching and hostile US plan to ‘topple’ its regime. That is, in the North Korean mindset, they together manifest as threats of total annihilation and conjure fear to that effect. As argued in the previous chapter, though it may be easy, on account of its often stereotypical portrayal, to dismiss North Korean fears of total annihilation as paranoia, the reality of the situation is far more complex. In fact, the legitimacy and genuineness of North Korean fear has even been acknowledged by US representatives, who in dealing with the regime, have conceded a link between North Korea’s right to arms declaration and its fear for regime survival. Following a meeting with North Korean officials in November 2002, former US ambassador to South Korea, Donald Gregg, admitted to being “strongly” convinced “that the North truly fears a possible attack from the United
States.” Citing this real fear, he added that the North Korean leadership appeared genuine in its attempts to secure “assurances” that the US does not “want to blow them out of the water” (as cited in Kwak and Joo, 2006: 174).

Read against this complicated backdrop, the nuclear issue and Six-Party Talks process are therefore significant in that North Korean nuclear ambition presents as the “ultimate symbol of self-reliance” (Chang, 2005: 46) in the face of (real and perceived) threat. This notion holds even greater resonance given the deterioration of North Korea-Soviet relations, the withdrawal of reliable Soviet protection and China’s marked shift toward Seoul (Chang, 2005: 46).

While it is true that China remains North Korea’s greatest ally, with the establishment of Seoul-Moscow relations in 1990 subsequently followed by the latter’s abandonment of Pyongyang (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 167), the normalisation of Seoul-Beijing ties in 1992 (Hagström and Söderberg, 2006: 100) left China’s dependability equally in question. Given US hostile policy, China’s seemingly ever “diverging” interests and the North Korean fear that it “might be abandoned again,” North Korea’s nuclear program represents a sure-fire (self-reliant) defence, whereby the State is guaranteed its “own buttons to push” (Chang, 2005: 46). Accordingly, nuclear ambition is, from the North Korean point of view, a defensive contingency plan against the threat of US imperialism and attack.

Indeed, despite the unmistakable anti-imperialist and anti-US posture of Juche, a significant portion of relevantly themed propaganda art presents ‘threatened’ North Korean military action as largely retaliatory. This is the case in Image 6 of Chapter 2 where scenes of a North Korean attack on the Capitol Building are described by the accompanying caption, as a North Korean attempt to “hit back” against war-provocations. Similarly, the warning given in Image 7 that the US “not make a
mistake!” or be ‘crushed’ by the might of the Korean People’s Army (KPA),
likewise suggests North Korean military action as a consequence of a US-initiated
offensive (see Chapter 2).

Image 32. When the US imperialists lash out with guns, we react with cannon! [poster],


Vitally, this suggestion also unfolds in the supplementary examples of Image 32, Image 33 and Image 34. While the image of the former is certainly menacing in that it features the barrel of a North Korean cannon bearing down upon a US soldier, who frightened in expression, is recoiling from its impending impact, this scene is again presented as reactionary. As the poster’s caption: “When the US imperialists lash out with guns, we [North Korea] react with cannon!” (emphasis added) makes clear, the depicted cannon attack on the US is a threatened reaction should the US
first “lash out with guns” at the State. This idea is reinforced by the fact that the targeted US soldier is armed.

Along similar lines, Image 33 shows another recognisably American icon, the Statue of Liberty, being destroyed by a North Korean missile, the American flag in tatters. Consistently mirroring the self-preservation concerns of previous examples, the caption “He who provokes us shall be punished!” (emphasis added), reveals that the pictured missile barrage against the Statue of Liberty, and indeed the United States, represents ‘punishment’ for ‘provocations’ brought against North Korea.

Correspondingly, portraying a similar scene to Image 6 of Chapter 2, Image 34 again illustrates the Capitol Building and a ripped American flag through a North Korean gun-sight, collapsing amid dust clouds as a KPA soldier armed with ammunition defiantly attacks. Stretched along the bottom of the image and the debris, however, is the text “ruthless punishment to US imperialism!” (emphasis added). Thus, as argued in regards to previous examples, the scenario of Image 34 is
presented not as a pre-emptive offensive, but as a *defensive* manoeuvre, secondary to initial US aggressive action seen to pose a threat to North Korean self-defence and regime survival.

In the case of *Image 32* this threat is directly identified as being of a military nature, by way of its reference to “guns.” In *Image 33* and *Image 34*, the threat remains unspecified, arguably including but extending beyond threats of a military nature, to other but nonetheless threatening actions, such as the imposition of economic sanctions. As clarified throughout this chapter, in the North Korean mindset, sanctions are interpreted by an already economically depleted Pyongyang, as strongly indicative of a US two-fold attempt to undermine its sovereignty and ultimately topple its regime (*KCNA*, 3 October 2006). For North Korea, such threats therefore confirm the United States’ status as an ‘imperialist aggressor,’ consequently reinforcing its perceived paramount need to bolster its self-defence capabilities.

A strong and predominant preoccupation with military security and regime survival therefore unfolds in these posters, whereby their purpose revolves less around disclosing real designs to ‘attack’ and more around reasserting North Korea’s military preparedness as a means of deterring US armed aggression. The unfolding of this reactive tendency is particularly enlightening in the context of the North Korean nuclear issue, in that North Korea’s nuclear ambition and internationally ridiculed pursuit of weapons capabilities can be, and within the frame of *Juche* should be, seen as equally reflective of self-defence concerns.
In fact, mirroring this self-defensive posture, poster art relating to North Korea’s nuclear or missile program suggests that its nuclear arsenal is intended for the purposes of self-defence. Representative of such art is the scene and caption of Image 35. Pictured is a North Korean missile, identified by the North Korean flag on its front, launching against the backdrop of a blue sky, scattered white stars and a thick white centred outline of a dove. Positioned toward the bottom of the image is the top of the world globe, coloured pale blue-grey, and a caption that reads: “Our missile program is a guarantee for world peace and security!”

Notably, the inclusion of a dove, a universal symbol of peace, explicitly showcases the (unknown) artist’s attempt to associate the North Korean missile program with the preservation of “peace and security” along official government and
party lines. Significantly, the use of the colour blue for the sky and world globe, and white for the stars, dove and missile also reinforces this association, connotative of peace and serenity (De Ceuster, 2008: 15). Interpreted together, the image and its caption communicate the North Korean position that North Korean missiles are a counter-force against the (perceived) imperialist aggression of the outside world, and in particular, Japan and the United States.

Revealingly, the notion that nuclear arms should foster the preservation of peace and security, despite their seemingly destructive nature, is not a stance unique to North Korea. In fact, such a view is strongly reflected in the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) (Ball, 2012: 146-147). Essentially, the basic rationale of Mutual Assured Destruction is deterrence through mutual nuclear retaliatory capacity. It is founded on the assumption that a pre-emptive strike is likely to trigger a formidable counter-attack, guaranteeing not only the ‘destruction’ of the original target country, but that of the initial aggressor as well. The effectiveness of MAD as a deterrence strategy thus rests on the understanding that neither party, through fear of risking ‘assured mutual,’ that is their own ‘destruction,’ will initiate conflict (Ball, 2012: 146-147).

While a detailed explanation of the strategy is beyond the scope of this thesis, what needs to be noted is that the logic of procuring nuclear weapons for the purposes of self-defence and deterrence, not that long ago, attracted much credence. Once broadly supported, Mutual Assured Destruction was a cornerstone of US-Soviet military strategy during the 1960s and 1970s, and is still believed to have played an important role in preventing the Cold War from escalating into ‘hot’ conflict (Ball, 2012: 146-148). Similarly, it was advocated by then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1984: para: 19), who in December 1984, attributed the
“unprecedented peace” in Europe at the time, to nuclear weapons deterrence and the MAD doctrine. That is to say, while North Korea’s nuclear ambition may quite literally appear ‘mad’ to some, viewed within the broader policy and historical context of MAD, particularly given North Korea’s fear of a US attack, there is a strategic rationality behind the North Korean quest to bolster its nuclear arsenal: deterrence.

As Victor Cha and David Kang (2003: 118) explain, while war is not in North Korea’s best interests, in Pyongyang’s eyes, neither Washington nor Seoul (or even Tokyo for that matter), can be trusted enough for it not to pursue reliable deterrence. In North Korea’s mind, it is already vulnerable to a US, South Korean and Japanese attack. Therefore, one of the perceived advantages of “Mutual deterrence” (MAD), for North Korea, is that in raising the possibility of retaliation, it “makes both sides vulnerable” and consequently “makes the use of force highly unlikely” (Cha and Kang, 2003: 118).

In working to further demonstrate these points, the following section discusses North Korea’s perceived need for nuclear weapons within the context of the Juche idea, and particularly its emphasis on anti-imperialism and self-reliance in defence.
5.1 North Korean Nuclear Ambition and Juche

Concededly, North Korea’s professed defensive intentions may be difficult to swallow particularly for the US and South Korea, evermore so due to its portrayal as “armed and dangerous” (Feffer, 2003: 154). There is also the possibility of a discrepancy between the messages that are communicated to the North Korean and international populations and the real intentions and agenda of the North Korean government. Yet, while the potential of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program should not be entirely underestimated, when one considers that North Korea has a “limited nuclear material and technical capacity,” especially vis-à-vis the “massive retaliatory capacity” of the United States, a pre-emptive strike on the part of North Korea is unlikely (Park and Lee, 2009: 279).

For this reason, the North Korean nuclear issue is better understood within the broader framework of North Korean politics and strategy, and particularly the Juche ideology of self-reliance. As John S. Park and Dong-sun Lee (2009: 275) explain, Juche and the Jucheist ‘military-first’ politics of Songun (see Chapter 2) are “the key enablers of North Korean nuclear policy.” That is, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are fuelled by the same fears of the US and (imperial) outside world as its broader military mentality and preoccupation with regime security, as evidenced by the fact that it has one of the largest armies and air defence systems in the world (Becker, 2005: 152; Seliger, 2011: 135 – see Chapter 2 for more details).

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and professed defensive intentions should thus be understood in the context of the previous chapter. Specifically, they should be seen as motivated by North Korea’s memory of historical imperialism, the United
States’ ‘Axis of Evil’ and pre-emptive strike rhetoric, as well as the South Korea-US military alliance and resulting troop presence in the South.

Understood within this context as a means of deterrence against US threat and the fear of US imperialism, given North Korea’s perception of the US as “the global hegemon,” it should really come as no “surprise” that North Korea has chosen to pursue a ‘nuclear insurance’ policy (Kwak and Joo, 2006: 183). Moreover, when one considers that Juche symbolises a fervent “struggle . . . against imperialism and dominationism” (J. I. Kim, 1982: 25-26), necessitating an impregnable line of defence against external threat (see Chapter 2), nuclear weapons can quite logically be seen to serve as that defence. That is, by providing deterrence through credible retaliatory capability, nuclear weapons manifest as reliable tools of sovereignty control.

As stipulated by Kim Jong Il (1982: 50) “self-reliance in defence” is not only a “fundamental principle” of Juche, but of “a completely independent sovereign state.” In accordance with the ideology, only through “full preparedness” can a state defend and “guarantee” its political and economic self-reliance against the “imperialist moves of aggression” of the United States and its ‘flunkeys’ (J. I. Kim, 1982: 50). Therefore, guided by Juche, in its mindset, North Korea has a duty to blend the “polityco-ideological superiority” of its regime and people with “modern technology,” including nuclear weapons, so as to become truly self-sufficient and “unconquerable” in the face of external threat (J. I. Kim, 1982: 50).

While acknowledging the extent to which Juche drives North Korean nuclear ambition and ‘nuclear’ strategy offers no ‘quick fix’ in the context of North Korean disarmament, particularly given the divergent state interests to be satisfied, it is important for several reasons. Firstly, it highlights the extent to which the policy
choices, and thus the geopolitical stability of the Korean peninsula, are influenced by a series of local, regional and international factors (and actors). Secondly, in pointing to the divergent national interests at play within the Six-Party framework, the North Korean nuclear issue reveals important complexities about the non-physical divide between the two Koreas and their respective allies. Thirdly and finally, with Juche dominating North Korean military and nuclear mentality so strongly – indicating a farther reaching pervasiveness of North Korean culture at large – the nuclear example provides a greater foundation for analysing the association between policy and culture within the Korean context.

As the following sections reveal, echoing the tendency identified in North Korean propaganda art, North Korea’s ultimate quest for sovereignty and self-preservation is overtly evident in its nuclear brinkmanship. Much of the bargaining and diplomatic manoeuvring exhibited by Pyongyang during Six-Party Talks for example, is inextricably tied to its pursuit of a formal US security guarantee against the threat or use of force by the United States and its allies (see Chapter 4). In fact, the achievements and setbacks of Six-Party Talks can be directly tied to the United States’ acceptance or refusal of North Korea’s three-point demand for security guarantees, an end to the US ‘hostile’ policy and scrapping of economic sanctions (see Section 5.3).

Equally, Jucheist preoccupations of sovereignty and self-preservation also help to explain why the Six-Party format, also involving China, Russia and aligned nation-states the US, South Korea and Japan (Ward, 2003), has always been a cause of much trepidation for North Korea. It has previously been established that Pyongyang regards the US and Japan as the world’s leading and most dangerous of imperial powers and South Korea their ‘stooge.’ Though in extending this, it needs to
be understood that in the North Korean mindset Six-Party Talks are not simply about nuclear disarmament, but function as an extension of the (perceived) “trilateral cooperation” between the US, South Korea and Japan to “‘strangle’ North Korea and end its sovereignty” (Quinones, 2009: 34).

As North Korean expert C. Kenneth Quinones (2009: 34) explains “viewed through the prism of Juche,” the “trilateral cooperation” between the US, South Korea and Japan, including their chorused calls for North Korean nuclear disarmament, serves as a “primary tool” in the execution of more sinister imperial designs. As such, if one applies the (North Korean) logic that the United States’ ‘hostile’ policy toward it is a “coordinated” effort between Washington, Tokyo and a subservient Seoul, it becomes easier to understand both the stop-start nature of Six-Party Talks and North Korea’s reluctance to give up its nuclear capacity without legally binding security assurances. Correspondingly, North Korea’s insistence of defensive intentions and adamant reiterations of its three-point (defensive) demand, reveal that North Korean nuclear ambition is driven by the predominant aims of regime survival and sovereignty preservation, the predominant aims of Juche (see Chapter 2).

In this vein, both the North Korean nuclear issue and Six-Party Talks process yield important insights into understanding how Juche, as an anti-imperialist principle, guides the strategic and policy decisions of North Korea. Similarly, the fervency with which North Korea has defended and continues to defend its right to nuclear arms and by extension self-defence, provides a glimpse into just how extensively Juche and its military mentality, permeate North Korean policy and culture.
In seeking to demonstrate how the nuclear issue is tied to the anti-imperialist endeavours of *Juche* as well as the international political environment (including the movements of key international players), the remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. The first provides a general overview, giving specific attention to the United States’ vocal denunciation of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and its consequences for the region. The second section deals more closely with Six-Party Talks, emphasising how the *Jucheist* concerns of independence and sovereignty preservation are clearly reflected in the progress and stalemates of its history.

Importantly, while North Korea and *Juche* are the primary focus, the nuclear issue has implications for the direction of Korean affairs, policy and culture, beyond the *Jucheist* North. Korea’s cyclical history of nuclear confrontation and negotiation reveals that the political and cultural choices of North and South Korea are informed by a range of differing perspectives and priorities. Creating and underscoring a range of complexities, the start-stop nature of disarmament negotiations and the seemingly irreconcilable differences they bring to the fore, thus further illuminate (and exacerbate) the non-physical ‘divisions’ separating the North and South.

Accordingly, the following traces the progress of the nuclear issue and Six-Party Talks with two aims in mind. Firstly, it works to ascertain the extent to which North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are driven by *Juche* and regional relations. Secondly, acknowledging the above cited complexities, as well as the diametrically opposed state interests that emerge within the Six-Party setting, it further underscores the relationship between policy and culture evident within the Korean context.
5.2 Post 9/11 and George W. Bush

As indicated, unfolding in the aftermath of 9/11, the consecutive presidential terms of George W. Bush, and particularly the threatening policy reactions of his governments, brought much political turbulence to the North Korean nuclear issue. Namely, the branding of North Korea as an ‘Axis of Evil’ and ‘outpost of tyranny,’ amid threats of pre-emption and pre-emptive action in Iraq, fostered and fed North Korean fears for the longevity and survival of its regime.

The extent to which the ‘hawkish’ posture of the Bush administration exacerbated North Korea’s Jucheist concerns surrounding US imperialism and attack is evidenced by the fact that propaganda posters of a specific anti-Bush nature began to emerge from the time of his inauguration, continuing throughout his leadership terms. Three examples of such art were introduced at the beginning of this chapter and a further three are discussed below.
In the first example, Image 36, two North Korean missiles and a bayonet approach from the upper right and centre of the image, on an impact trajectory with a missile-wielding US official, presumably George W. Bush. Its caption warns the US, and more specifically the Bush administration to “not act rashly,” cautioning the then US administration against provoking North Korea.

While Image 36 does not directly reference President Bush or his administration, Image 37 paints both as specific targets. In the latter, a US serviceman can be seen dragging US missiles up a hill toward three cross-marked graves. Imprinted as a trail behind him are the words, in echo of the poster’s caption: “Bush: the way of self-destruction.” As with the general anti-US propaganda posters cited and included above, both Image 36 and Image 37 state that it is the ‘rash,’ that is, provocative and pre-emptive (or threats of pre-emptive) action of the US that will...
incur the wrath of North Korea. By extension, it is these pre-emptive threats that act to feed North Korea’s fear and perception of the United States as ‘imperialist aggressors.’

![Image 38. The US is truly an Axis of Evil! (poster), Gouache and Acrylic. From North Korean Posters: The David Heather Collection (pg. 130) by David Heather and Koen De Ceuster, 2008, Munich and London: Prestel.](image)

That said, perhaps North Korea’s ‘imperialist’ perception of the United States is most obviously communicated in Image 38. A clear reference to Bush’s designation of North Korea as one of three ‘Axis of Evil,’ the caption of the image, reversing the US-levelled accusation, brands the US as the truer “Axis of Evil.” In reinforcement of this claim, the image pictures a long-fingernailed, red-stripe shirted and star cuff ed (mirroring the design of the US flag), uncle Sam, using a compass made out of missiles to measure the distance between the United States and North
Korea. Viewed both in isolation and interpreted within the context of ‘Axis of Evil’ and related rhetoric, the missile compass and attached larger missile with “USA” lettering, plainly portrays the US as the ‘aggressor’ and North Korea as the alleged target. Furthering this portrayal, the long fingernails pressed against and extending beyond the compass, together with the inclusion of exploding nuclear mushroom clouds against a dull grey background, are equally suggestive of supposed US sinister intentions.

With these images again very heavily centred around preoccupations of self-defence, it would appear, as argued and later elaborated, that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and related threats and bluster, are guided more by an overarching fear for self-preservation than an actual desire to take the offensive.

Certainly, North Korea’s fears of US aggression were not assuaged by the fact that President Bush was outspoken in expressing contempt for North Korea and its then leader, Kim Jong Il, whom he openly and publicly disparaged. Making no secret of his ill-feeling for the socialist leader, Bush once (in front of an audience of senators), called him a “pygmy,” equating him to a “spoiled child at a dinner table” (as cited in C. J. Lee, 2006: 220). On another occasion, he is said to have declared to Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward (2005: 340), all the while waving his finger in the air: “I loathe Kim Jong Il,” claiming to have a “visceral reaction” to the “guy,” “because he [was] starving his people” in “a gulag the size of Houston,” Texas (as cited in Becker, 2005: 254). So when President Bush acted on these ill-feelings on 29 January 2002 by famously naming North Korea, along with nations Iran and Iraq, as part of an ‘Axis of Evil’ (Kwak and Joo, 2003: 125; C. J. Lee, 2006: 219), ties between the US and the Koreas were tested and the nuclear issue pushed to the forefront, as North Korea reacted. Notably, this was some nine months before
North Korea admitted to having restarted plutonium production at its Yongbyon facility (Funabashi, 2007: 103), which, as far as the US could prove, had been frozen as per an agreement reached between President Bush’s predecessor Bill Clinton and Kim Jong Il in 1994.

Publishing an official statement two days later, North Korea condemned the Bush administration’s “undisguised threatening remarks,” claiming that Bush’s accusations had “pushed the situation [to] the brink of war” (KCNA, 31 January 2002). It also warned that “the option to ‘strike’ impudently advocated by the U.S. [was] not its monopoly” and that, should the US continue to threaten and “stifle” the North, North Korea would respond by “mercilessly wip[ing] out the [US] aggressors” (KCNA, 31 January 2002). With that, President Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech and North Korea’s reaction set the (adversarial) tone for things to come.

Tensions flared further following a three day visit to Pyongyang by special US envoy, James Kelly, between 3 and 5 October 2002. As Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kelly was the highest ranked US official to visit North Korea since Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, back in October 2000 and the first since the inauguration of George W. Bush (Korea Times, 7 October 2002). He had reportedly travelled to North Korea to convey the United States’ concerns pertaining to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and human rights record, which in the former case included the possibility, as indicated by US intelligence, that the North was already in the process of developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

On 16 October, eleven days after Kelly’s departure from Pyongyang, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher released a statement alleging that, during the course of formal proceedings, North Korean officials had admitted to the
existence of a secret highly enriched uranium program (Funabashi, 2007: 103). The reason for North Korea’s unexpected admission is debatable, though as Tae-hwan Kwak and Seung-ho Joo (2003: 2-3) assert, it may have been an act of political brinkmanship serving as both a punitive response to President Bush’s “hard-line policy” and as a “warning” against US “pre-emptive” action.

Following its alleged admission, members of the international community including the United Nations (UN), South Korea and the US, implored North Korea to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify its adherence to the 1994 Agreed Framework. Under the agreement, forged between the United States and North Korea, the latter would abandon its nuclear ambition through the freezing of its nuclear program and a general commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In exchange, the US would construct and provide two light water reactors (LWRs – to be delivered by 2003), in addition to regular oil shipments, at the “rate of 500,000 tons annually.” The US also committed to a movement toward the normalisation of US-North Korean political and economic relations, as well as to providing formal security guarantees against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons (see Appendix 9).

These pleas notwithstanding, on 25 October, charging that the US had failed to honour its part of the bargain North Korea declared the agreement “totally nullified” (KCNA, 25 October 2002). According to Pyongyang, its accusation was evidenced by the following three points: (1) Production of the two promised LWRs was years behind schedule; (2) The US had adopted a “hostile policy” toward North Korea, contrary to its pledge to pursue the normalisation of US-North Korea economic and political relations; and (3) rather than offering North Korea “formal assurances . . . against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.,” as per the
agreement, the US had identified the North as a “target” of “preemptive nuclear attack” (KCNA, 25 October 2002). North Korea also claimed that the US “unilateral demand” that it open itself to inspection prior to being in possession of the LWRs was in breach of the accord, which in its view only required it to submit to nuclear inspection after being provided with replacement LWRs (KCNA, 25 October 2002).

Arguing the Agreed Framework to be null and void, North Korea proceeded to avow that it was “entitled to possess not only nuclear weapon[s] but any type of weapon . . . so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence from the ever-growing nuclear threat by the U.S.” (KCNA, 25 October 2002). Further, it professed it had “neither need nor duty” to extend any explanation to the US as to its nuclear status, or any obligation to refrain from defending itself in light of the United States’ undisguised hardnosed policy against it. Pyongyang and Washington thus continued to face off as the North Korean nuclear issue persisted unresolved.

The crisis entered a new phase, when on 14 November 2002, the New York based Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) publicised its decision to discontinue heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea beginning December as punishment for North Korea’s concealed nuclear weapons program (Kwak and Joo, 2003: 3). As noted previously, these oil shipments were supplied to North Korea by the US in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework, conditional on the freezing of North Korea’s nuclear plutonium reactor at Yongbyon. Interpreting the move as yet another violation of the 1994 accord and a further attempt to stifle its development, an already struggling North Korea announced to the IAEA, on 12 December, that it would be reactivating its then frozen Yongbyon facility for the purposes of “electric power generation” (as cited in Kwak and Joo, 2003: 29).
Later that month, after requests to remove all UN seals and surveillance equipment from its Yongbyon power plant were denied by the IAEA, North Korea began disabling all IAEA monitoring devices (Kwak and Joo, 2003: 29). The reactor was subsequently reactivated and nuclear activities recommenced. Then on 27 December, arguing that there was “no reason” for IAEA inspectors to remain “[s]ince the freeze on [its] nuclear facilities was lifted” (KCNA, 27 December 2002) and the Agreed Framework only required North Korea to allow IAEA inspections “throughout the freeze,” North Korea expelled IAEA nuclear inspectors from the country.

Working to bring North Korea back into compliance with the NPT, of which it was still a party, the IAEA convened an emergency meeting on 6 January 2003, during which it passed a resolution urging North Korea to “comply promptly and fully” with IAEA safeguards (IAEA, 2003: 2). This meant North Korean acquiescence to demands concerning the full reestablishment of “containment and surveillance measures” and the readmission of UN inspectors (IAEA, 2003: 2). The following day, in a softening of its own position, the US tried to entice North Korea into compliance by expressing a readiness to negotiate. Yet, Washington insisted that it would not offer any “quid pro quos” to ensure North Korean observance of “existing obligations” (as cited in Kihl, 2006a: 19).

Labelling the IAEA resolution “a grave encroachment upon [its] country’s sovereignty,” accusing the IAEA of being “a servant and a spokesman for the U.S.” and the NPT as “a tool for implementing the U.S. hostile policy” (KCNA, 10 January 2003), three days later on 10 January, North Korea announced its “automatic and immediate” withdrawal from the NPT. Justifying its decision as “a legitimate self-defensive measure” prompted by the United States’ anti-North Korea policy, North
Korea declared that its withdrawal left it “totally free from the binding force of the [IAEA] safeguards accord” (KCNA, 10 January 2003). It was therefore, in its mind, no longer required to comply with the 6 January (or subsequent) resolutions, adopted by the IAEA. Despite this, North Korea did assure the international community that it had “no intention to produce nuclear weapons” with its “nuclear activities at [that] stage . . . confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity” (KCNA, 10 January 2003 – emphasis added). Failing to be reassured, the IAEA referred the matter to the UN on 12 February 2003 (C. J. Lee, 2006: 229).

Revealingly, reemphasising the connection between North Korea’s quest for nuclear capacity, Juche and its fear of aggression, a direct link can be drawn between North Korea’s early October admission, withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the War on Terror and question of Iraq. A mere three weeks prior to North Korea’s apparent nuclear ‘confession,’ on 12 September 2002, President George W. Bush (2002: para. 37) stood before the United Nations General Assembly and implored that moves to “deliberately, decisively . . . hold Iraq to account” be taken should the State fail to “disclose, and remove or destroy” its WMD (Bush, 2002: para. 29). Then on 16 October, President Bush signed the ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002’ (Funabashi, 2007: 155). The public law authorised the use of military force against Iraq as deemed “necessary and appropriate” by the President in defence of US “national security” and/or “all relevant” UN resolutions (US Government Printing Office, 2002: 5). Although only a domestic law, from North Korea’s perspective the passing of the Iraq Resolution was undoubtedly a clear expression of intent.

This intention became all more ‘imminent’ with the adoption of Resolution 1441 by the UN Security Council on 8 November 2002. Resolution 1441, passed
unanimously, granted Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations,” or “face serious consequences” (United Nations, 2002: para. 34, 53). While it did not explicitly authorise the use of force should Iraq fail to meet these ‘obligations,’ according to the US interpretation, it did not “constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq” (Negroponte, 2002: para. 6). Rather, in the United States’ view, it was entitled to act under the banner of self-defence and previous resolutions, including Resolution 678 of 1990, which authorised “all necessary means” against Iraq, including force (Bring and Brostrom, 2005: 125; United Nations, 2002: para. 18). Likewise a suspected terrorist and nuclear weapons wielding state and decried ‘Axis of Evil,’ Pyongyang’s nuclear manoeuvring was fuelled by the overarching fear that North Korea would be next.

Linking back to North Korean cultural artefacts, this fear is especially evident in the specific anti-Bush posters to emerge following North Korea’s ‘Axis of Evil’ designation and the War in Iraq (see images 36-38). In particular, interpreted against the backdrop of the unfolding Iraq War, the caution against US ‘rash’ action of Image 36, together with the direct reference to the ‘Axis of Evil’ labelling of Image 38, clearly personify North Korea’s fear of US pre-emptive action. As such, this illustrates that North Korea’s above described perception of the US is not only one that unfolds in rhetoric, but in culture and cultural artefact, thus pointing to an association between policy and culture in the North Korean context.

Such a connection is further supported by the fact that some of the threatening pronouncements of US officials outlined previously, including Donald Rumsfeld’s ‘war on two fronts’ (Clover, Spiegel & Turner, 2002: para. 3) and Richard Perle’s pre-emptive strike rhetoric (Ju, 2002: para. 1) both occurred less than three weeks prior to North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT (see Chapter 4). It is
not likely a coincidence that North Korea’s statement of withdrawal was immediately
followed by an assurance that should the US change its policy toward it, North Korea
may be willing to “prove” by means of “a separate verification,” that it was not in the
process of developing “any nuclear weapon” (KCNA, 10 January 2003).

Arguably, North Korea’s bold tactics of crisis escalation are and have always
been, aimed at securing its tripartite demand that the US recognise it as a sovereign
state, ratify a US-DPRK non-aggression pact and desist from attempting to “hinder”
it economically. This is evidenced throughout history, including the North Korean
nuclear crises of the 1990s, during which North Korea made “remarkably similar”
demands, likewise calling for the abandonment of the US “hostile’ policy,” an end to
economic sanctions and “binding security guarantees” (Martin, 2009: 70). Testament
to the defensive purposes of its nuclear program, the first North Korean nuclear crisis
would be abated after the State secured US agreement to “move toward full
normalization of political and economic relations,” and “provide formal [security]
assurances,” through the 1994 signing of the Agreed Framework (see Appendix 9).

As the soothing of North Korea on receipt of such assurances suggests, and
the following reveals, North Korea’s demands are inextricably linked to the Juche
idea. Namely, they are moulded by North Korea’s fear of (perceived) US imperialist
aggression and a seemingly urgent need to secure legal and formal assurances against
the ‘US threat.’ While happy and willing to accept economic and other concessions
along the way, ultimately the endgame of North Korean nuclear brinkmanship is a
long-lasting security guarantee, procured through the conclusion of a non-aggression
and normalisation treaty with the United States.

History as our guide, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, driven by concerns
over a perceived imperial nation’s (the United States’) apparent hostile policy toward
it, are not likely to be constrained absent the satisfying of its long-held *Jucheist*
demands by way of a drastic change in policy on the part of Washington. Indeed, the
stumbling blocks (and the reasons for them) encountered over Six-Party Talks
negotiations very much suggest this. Some can even be reasonably anticipated and
explained courtesy of a working knowledge of *Juche* and its foremost guiding
principles. Consequently, the following section analyses how the requirements of
*Juche* for a struggle against imperialism as well as self-reliance, particularly in
defence, manifest in the demands made by North Korea over the course of Six-Party
deliberations. The complexities and implications for regional relations created and
underscored by North Korea’s *Juche*-centric demands are also pondered.
5.3 Six Party Talks: A Reflection of Jucheist Culture

In turning to the Six-Party Talks setting, it needs to be stressed that despite the tendency for scholars and commentators to analyse Six-Party Talks within the frame of geopolitics, while certainly geopolitically relevant, Talks are also strongly influenced by, and reflective of, North Korean culture. As emphasised in Chapter 2, courtesy of North Korea’s military-first politics of Songun and the pervasive military mentality it has fostered, there is arguably no perceptible distinction between North Korean militarism (of which the nuclear issue and Six-Party Talks are part) and North Korean culture. As seen in the cultural artefact examples of this, previous and subsequent chapters, military values such as obedience, loyalty, patriotism, collectivism and unity (Kershaw, 2000: 166-167), are heavily ingrained in the culture of North Korea, as is the more overtly militarist struggle against imperialism and its perceived “chieftain,” the United States (J. I. Kim 1995: 185 – see images 6-8, for example). As such, the geopolitical significance of Six-Party Talks notwithstanding, focus is given to how they and North Korea’s nuclear program, in turn, exist as part of a wider Jucheist culture, underpinned by the military-first priorities of Songun.

Specifically, Six-Party Talks demonstrate North Korean efforts (as required by Juche and heavily reflected in North Korean culture – see Image 4 and images 60-62), to maintain independence in politics, the economy and defence (J. I. Kim, 1982 – see Chapter 2). Namely, they showcase how the Jucheist call for self-sufficient defensive capability, economic and political sovereignty and “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit,” ultimately drive North Korean resistance of international pressure to denuclearise (J. I. Kim, 1982: 43-44). Moreover, involving the US, South Korea and Japan (Ward, 2003), Six-Party Talks also illustrate how
North Korea’s fear of the “trilateral cooperation” between these three states (Quinones, 2009: 34) – a fear that permeates North Korean culture at large (see Image 21) – actually manifests in North Korean foreign engagement, as seen through the demands and refusals that emerge within the Six-Party framework (see Table 1). In this vein, mirroring the same sovereignty preservation and longevity concerns expressed in the posters of previous sections, Six-Party Talks offer yet another means of highlighting and examining the association between policy and culture in Korea.

Indeed, as expressed in tabular form below, the patterns to unfold over Six-Party deliberations uncover a clear link between North Korea’s defence of its right to arms and its (culturally-ingrained) Jucheist preoccupation with regime survival. Consider the following:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue/Concession</th>
<th>Round(s) of Talks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korean disarmament set as a precondition before any concessions.</td>
<td>First round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(27-29 August 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal of security assurances and reciprocity by the US, including</td>
<td>Second Round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US rebuttal of North Korean call for US aid, including fuel oil shipments,</td>
<td>Third round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at 500,000 tonnes a year.</td>
<td>(23-26 June 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatening US rhetoric (such as Condoleezza Rice’s ‘outpost of</td>
<td>Fourth round (First Phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tyranny’ labelling).</td>
<td>(26 July-7 August 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Delayed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Sanctions and economic hindrance of North Korea by the US.</td>
<td>Fifth Round (Second Phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(18-22 December 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sixth Round (First Phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19-22 March 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of North Korea as a legitimate sovereign state</td>
<td>Fourth Round (Second Phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral talks</td>
<td>(13-19 September 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normalisation of relations</td>
<td>Fifth Round (Third Phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal from terrorism list</td>
<td>(8-13 February 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifting of sanctions</td>
<td>Sixth Round (Second Phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy assistance</td>
<td>(27-30 September 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent peace negotiations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 1 reveals, talks ended without resolution on four separate occasions due to Pyongyang’s security and energy aid demands being rebuked by the US precondition of North Korean complete, verifiable and “irreversible” dismantlement (rounds 1-3 and 5.1 – *Agence France Presse*, 11 November 2005: para. 7; Scalapino,
Two additional phases of deliberations also concluded without success, after the US blacklisting of North Korean (and affiliated) corporations led to financial sanctions and the freezing of $24 million of North Korean funds (rounds 5.2 and 6.1 – Joo and Kwak, 2007: 22; Kwak and Joo, 2007: 78-80; US Department of Treasury, 2005). The fourth round of talks was also delayed due to the unveiling of US plans to end “tyranny in our world” (Bush, 2005: para. 7) and the US labelling of North Korea as one of six targeted “outposts of tyranny” (Rice, 2005: para. 22)

Interpreted within the prism of Juche, these patterns are significant in that each of these instances reflects one or more of the culturally embedded (Jucheist) suspicions North Korea harbours towards the outside world and the United States in particular. In the first case, the precondition of North Korean disarmament fuels North Korean anxiety of the US “intention to invade it after it is disarmed” (KCNA, 29 August 2003). This fear was then reinforced by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s (2005) branding of North Korea as an ‘outpost of tyranny,’ which North Korea interpreted as a US declaration that its regime “should be terminated” (KCNA, 3 March 2005). Similarly, the imposition of sanctions is clearly contrary to North Korea’s explicit demand that the US desist from hindering it economically, hindrance which North Korea sees as part of wider efforts to undermine its sovereignty and “bring down” its system (KCNA, 3 October 2006).

Notably, these suspicions, together with North Korea’s general imperialist perception of the United States are frequently mirrored in North Korean cultural artefacts. For instance, North Korea’s fear of US imperial aggression manifests in poster art concerning US troop presence in the South (see images 25-27). Its demand for political sovereignty and economic freedom is also a recurrent theme in its posters, evident in Image 20 of Chapter 4, for example, in which Pyongyang
promises to “target” those who “challenge” its “achievements,” or longevity. In this vein, the Jucheist preoccupations with self-defence and sovereignty preservation that unfold in Six-Party Talks, are directly linked to North Korea’s military-first culture, wherein self-defence capability is genuinely heralded (and frequently depicted) as the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty (J. I. Kim, 1982: 50 – see Image 35).

Importantly, the idea that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear capacity is spurred by its Jucheist preoccupation with self-defence and sovereignty preservation is further substantiated by the reasons for progress within Six-Party negotiations. Viewed from a Jucheist perspective, it is revealing that all three signed agreements reached over the history of disarmament negotiations have promised North Korea either (1) security assurances, (2) a movement toward the normalisation of relations through bilateral talks, or (3) energy assistance. Take the signing of the first-ever accord of the Six-Party Talks initiative during the second phase of the fourth round: the September 19 Joint Statement, for example. The product of twenty-days of deliberation (Jonsson, 2006: 91; Kwak and Joo, 2006: 57-58), the statement was the first multilateral, legally enforceable agreement to call for the mutual recognition of the two Koreas as legitimate sovereign states (Paltiel, 2007: 103). In addition, North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons programs was met with a pledge that Washington and Tokyo would “take steps” to normalise relations with Pyongyang, “negotiate a permanent peace regime” and provide North Korea with “energy assistance” (see Appendix 10).

Equally, the second and third agreements formulated gave similar assurances, whereby North Korea’s “eventual abandonment” of its nuclear weapons programs would be rewarded by a series of concessions, including energy aid and the lifting of US-imposed economic sanctions and embargoes (see Appendix 11 and Appendix
Thus, through their promise of sovereignty recognition, the normalisation of DPRK-US and DPRK-Japan relations, energy assistance and lifting of economic sanctions, the agreements signalled a movement toward satisfying North Korea’s three-point security guarantee demand. The fact that the appearing fulfilment of these demands should provide adequate inducement (in principle) for North Korean nuclear disarmament suggests a genuine defensive purpose to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Certainly, the fact that the progress (or lack thereof) of Six-Party Talks has been contingent on the satisfying of North Korea’s (self-defensive) three-point demand, indicates that North Korean nuclear ambition is motivated by the belief that the US poses a threat that must be militarily and politically countered.

Vitally, North Korea also cites issues of sovereignty recognition, sanctions and “escalated military threat” as reasons behind its April 2009 withdrawal from disarmament negotiations, to which it is yet to return (KCNA, 14 April 2009). Specifically, it interpreted the imposition of sanctions following its 5 April satellite launch (largely believed by the international community to be a disguised missile test – McEachern, 2010: 244), as a reneging on the “sovereign equality” pledge reached in the September 19 Joint Statement (KCNA, 14 April 2009). Moreover, it claimed that the US and UN appeared to be applying double standards whereby, as a ‘stooge’ of the US, Japan was permitted to launch satellites, whereas North Korea was not (KCNA, 14 April 2009). In its (Juche-centric) view, this apparent hypocrisy merely proved that the US, Japan and South Korea, were embroiled in a trilateral conspiracy to employ Six-Party Talks as “a platform for encroaching upon its sovereignty . . . and bringing down its system” (KCNA, 14 April 2009).

In this way, North Korea’s April 2009 withdrawal from Six-Party Talks conforms to the already established pattern of Six-Party Talks stalemates in that all
three of its defensive demands appear in jeopardy. In its eyes, its first demand of sovereignty recognition has been undermined by the alleged double standards applied by the US, UN and other Six-Party participants in response to its ‘satellite’ launch. US commitment to non-aggression is uncertain, not only for the above reasons of alleged hypocrisy, but due to President Obama’s (2009: para. 36) declaration that North Korea “must be punished.” Coupled with warnings of possible military inception of its launches, from its perspective, North Korea had reason to be wary.

Finally, its demand that the US and others desist from attempting to “hinder” it economically, is clearly countered by the Japan-imposed and UN call for sanctions. It comes as no surprise then that North Korea should further justify its withdrawal from Six-Party Talks through reference to its military-first policy and culture of Songun and anti-imperialist quest for independence (KCNA, 14 April 2009). These points and that Pyongyang should conduct an underground nuclear test a little more than a month later (KCNA, 25 May 2009), suggest again that North Korea’s nuclear capacity is driven by its Jucheist concern of being “violated and cajoled by big powers” (KCNA, 14 April 2009).

While a more detailed account of the nuclear crisis which continues unresolved today cannot be given here, the patterns emerging to date strongly suggest that the North Korean nuclear issue and related negotiations will continue to be complex and driven by its Jucheist and military-first culture. Nonetheless, as the lack of (enduring) headway produced with respect to North Korean denuclearisation

26 At a press conference on 10 February 2009 US Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, advised that the US would intercept any North Korean launch if it appeared to be a missile or threaten US territory (Hwang, 2009). This intention was reiterated a few weeks later by head of US Pacific Command Admiral Timothy Keating (Raddatz and Sher, 2009). Then in March Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura, asserted that Japan would “intercept any object” which appeared to be heading toward its territory (as cited in Choe, 2009: para: 6).
demonstrates, the North Korean nuclear issue is set to continue to have wider implications for the US-Korea dynamic, with US policy likely to yet exhibit far-reaching influence on the internal politics, culture and stability of Korea.

Concededly, in lieu of an official reversal of North Korea’s indefinite withdrawal, the direct future of Six-Party Talks remains unclear. Nevertheless, changes in Korea, with a new leader in both the North and the South, bring new possibilities for dialogue. Though, arguably, whatever the future of the North Korean nuclear issue and Six-Party Talks process, North Korea is sure to hold firm to its culturally-embedded three-point regime survival and self-reliance demand.

Supplementing the theoretical, historical and empirical evidence offered thus far of a link between policy and culture in divided Korea, the following chapter turns its attention more exclusively to the unfolding of Juche and Segyehwa within the museum exhibition ‘landscapes’ of Korea’s North and South.
6. *Museums and Exhibitions*

As discussed, this chapter further empirically grounds the theorised association between policy and culture by drawing on supplementary evidence from the cultural artefact of ‘the museum.’ Namely, seeking to illustrate the practical applicability of *Juche* and *Segyehwa* within North and South Korea respectively, the following analyses how these competing doctrines are expressed through the themes and exhibitions of various museums, located in the North and South.

The first section, itself divided into two subsections, deals with North Korea. Working within the broad definition of the ‘museum’ set forth in the introduction to the thesis, two museum types are analysed in turn. These include the less conventional North Korean ‘Museum of Merit’ and the State-designated museum. In each case, discussion is centred on how the *Jucheist* principles of leadership veneration, united loyalty, North Korean military superiority and anti-Americanism, manifest in featuring exhibitions (see Chapter 2). Recalling a point made in the methodology section, due to strict state censorship mechanisms and the general anonymity of artists, featuring artworks are approached as representative of the official State position, rather than the personal views of individual artists.

Section 6.2 then turns to the South Korean case, discussing South Korean museums as reflective of the *Segyehwa* policy’s call for the simultaneous embrace of blending of global (foreign) and local (Korean) artistic influences.
6.1 Museums and Exhibitions in North Korea

6.1.1 Museums of the Revolutionary Merit of the Great Leader and the Dear Leader

More formally known as the ‘Museum of the Revolutionary Merit of the Great Leader and the Dear Leader’ and usually attached to another institution or site (such as a university or subway station), North Korean museums of merit are more prevalent than their conventional counterparts. In fact, while data of this kind is generally vague and hard to definitively establish due to North Korea’s status as somewhat of a ‘statistical black hole,’ North Korea specialist Andrei Lankov (2007: 23) reveals that, as of the 1990s, there were approximately sixty museums of merit dispersed at various locations throughout the State. This is compared to a mere six conventionally defined museums (Lankov, 2007: 23).

As their official title suggests, museums of merit centre on the lives and ‘achievements’ of North Korean leaders, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Specifically, reflecting the leadership veneration requirements of Juche and their manifestation in North Korean cultural artefacts, they work to bolster the ‘personality cults’ of the Great and Dear leader, as well as the overall legitimacy of the North Korean regime. Though they will soon be modified to likewise glorify Kim Jong Un as he solidifies his position as North Korea’s newly established leader, focus is given to how the museums venerate the first two of North Korea’s leaders.

Kim Jong Il’s untimely death notwithstanding, the reflected idolisation of the Dear Leader and his father, underscores the crucial role museums play in forming and propagating the Jucheist demand for leadership worship. As such, the examples of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il offer insight into the museums’ expected role in the legitimisation of Kim Jong Un. They also provide direction for considering the
continual evolution of Kim Jong Un’s personality cult and its likely Jucheist foundations, with his legitimisation expected to reflect a continuation of the same trend.

It is important to note before exploring what these museums ‘depict’ that, as revealed in chapters 1 and 2, the histories of both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have been substantially revised so as to paint them in a more virtuous light. As this and the following chapter demonstrate, these ‘revised’ histories have, in turn, become embedded in North Korean cultural artefacts and practices, including museum exhibitions. To begin with Kim Il Sung, according to the North Korean version of history, he is a “a legendary anti-Japanese fighter and pioneer of independence” (Harrison, 2002: 13-14), who singlehandedly guided a “Korean rebel army equipped with tanks” (Becker, 2005: 49) to victory against the Japanese. In the same vein, presumably to ‘prove’ North Korea’s self-reliant capacity and legitimise its Juche-inspired independence, the ‘revolutionary’ exploits of Kim Il Sung during the Korean War, have also been greatly exaggerated. As Jasper Becker (2005: 49) documents, “the role of the Americans, the Soviets, the atomic bombs, the Chinese Communist and Nationalist Parties, and virtually every other historical fact vanishes from the record.” In the North Korean “imagined” rendition of history, the North Korean leadership is afforded sole credit for having won a war that is, in effect, still ongoing.

In reality, this portrayal of North Korea’s first leader was, and remains, a case of deliberate mistaken identity. Upon his arrival in North Korea in 1945 at the age of thirty-three (Becker, 2005: 45; Harrison, 2002: 332), Kim Il Sung, then Kim Song Ju (Downs, 1999: 19), was a relatively unknown figure, who, after leaving Korea for China with his parents some twenty-five years earlier, could barely speak Korean (Becker, 2005: 44-45). While it is true that Kim Il Sung participated in the struggle
against the Japanese, his commitment to the cause of Korean liberation has been “progressively embellished” (Harrison, 2002: 13-14). In actuality, Kim Il Sung was a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who fought to protect Chinese interests in Manchuria, not to free Korea from Japanese colonial rule (Becker, 2005: 46). Yet, in the interest of advancing his standing among the North Korean populace and solidifying his leadership he, Kim Song Ju, would take on the name of a renowned figure of the anti-Japanese resistance (Becker, 2005: 44; Harrison, 2002: 12). The “legendary feats” (Becker, 2005: 51) of this Korean hero would later be elaborated, expanded and disseminated so extensively, as to see a once ‘ordinary’ man elevated to the position of deity (Lynn, 2007: 100).

The life of Kim Jong Il has also been subjected to a vigorous historical rewrite. Despite the fact that all evidence points to him being born in a Soviet army camp in Siberia, official North Korean records insist that Kim Jong Il was born on Mount Paektu (Lim, 2009: 10-11). As briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, Mount Paektu holds mythological significance for Koreans as the mythical birthplace of Korea (French, 2007: 57). Crucially, the North Korean narrative of Kim Jong Il’s birth is equally mythical. As Paul French (2007: 57) recounts, it is said that:

As he came into the world a new star appeared in the sky, a double rainbow appeared, an iceberg on a nearby lake cracked, strange lights filled the sky and a swallow passed by overhead to pass on to the world the news of his birth.

Importantly, this allegorical description of Kim Jong Il portrays him as a ‘great being,’ thus working to sustain his personality cult. While French (2007: 58) argues that the mythological character of Kim Jong Il’s birth is likely understood in allegorical terms by most “ordinary” North Koreans, he does concede that the
grandiosity of the account also “serves to raise the stature of Kim Jong-il and perpetuate the personality cult that surrounds him.”

Likewise, Kim Jong Il’s death is also shrouded in mysticism, with even nature said to have marked and mourned his passing. In an official account reminiscent of that surrounding his birth, his death is reported to have triggered a series of “peculiar natural wonders” (Korean Central News Agency [KCNA], 21 December 2011). Among such wonders included the breaking of layers of ice, a severe snowstorm, strong winds and a red glow to the sky and atop Jong Il Peak. Adding to the leader’s mythic stature, the KCNA (21 December 2011) writes even of a “Manchurian crane” thrice-circling a statue of Kim Il Sung before perching itself in a tree, where it remained “head drooped” in sorrow, before flying away. In keeping with the account, “even the crane seemed to mourn the demise of Kim Jong Il born of Heaven . . . unable to forget him” (KCNA, 21 December 2011).

At the time of writing, the personality cult of his successor and son Kim Jong Un is being established with revisions of his history and accomplishments pending. Though it is unclear exactly what form these revisions will take, in accordance with Juche, they are likely to be equally (and mythically) elevating. In fact, it can be speculated that North Korea’s ‘sabre-rattling’ following its February 2013 nuclear test is aimed primarily at a domestic audience. That is, while simultaneously sending a message to Washington, Seoul and Tokyo, it is ultimately intended to bolster Kim Jong Un’s standing amongst the North Korean military and populace, and by extension, his personality cult.

Notably, the full extent to which the histories of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have been either ‘bent’ or invented cannot be rendered here. Nonetheless, understanding that the reverence attributed to the pair is owed to a series of “colossal
untruths” (Becker, 2005: 44) is important in that the essential basic function of museums of merit is, in many ways, to ‘keep up’ the pretence and legitimise the lie.

In referencing his visit to a particular Museum of Merit attached to a Pyongyang Subway station, Lankov (2007: 23) recalls how the majority of exhibits were not “in any meaningful manner” at all related to the subway. Instead, the first few halls were devoted to depicting the life of Kim Il Sung and immortalising his victorious escapades, as per the North Korean rewrite of history. These included his victory against the Japanese, as well as over the US in the Fatherland Liberation War (Korean War). Vitally, where the displays were not paying homage to the Great Leader, they were retelling and honouring the “heroic deeds” (Lankov, 2007: 23) of his son and heir, Kim Jong Il. As Lankov (2007: 23) observes, even in later halls where pieces relating to the subway did emerge, they were “first and foremost related to the Kims and their constant care for the development of the Pyongyang Subway system.”

No matter the Museum of Merit, in Pyongyang or elsewhere in North Korea, the story and message is remarkably similar. If the Great and Dear Leader are not being hailed for their contributions to the Korean (Juche) revolution or North Korean struggle for independence, they are being praised with grateful acknowledgement for the doting attentiveness they are professed to have given their subjects and their cause. Whether it be by showcasing an item that is believed to have belonged to, or been used by either Kim, such as a rifle, shovel or kitchen ladle (items memorialised by the Museum of Merit of Kim Il Sung University); or a stone rested upon by Kim Jong Il after a “tiring run” at a training camp in the North Korean village of Oundong

27 According to the North Korean version of history, Kim Il Sung led the Korean people’s (North Korean) army to victory against the US in the Korean War (Oh and Hassig, 2000: 101). In fact, Kim Il Sung used North Korea’s perceived victory to ‘prove’ the ‘correctness’ of the Juche idea and elicit the commitment of the masses.
(Lankov, 2007: 24), all museums of merit celebrate Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in some way. In light of this tendency, as Kim Jong Un further asserts his place within the Kim dynasty, copious items somehow connected to the ‘Great Successor’ will undoubtedly find their place amongst the items showcased within North Korea’s museums of merit.

It needs to be emphasised that material feats, however fabricated and superficial, achieve more than the simple reinforcement of North Korea’s leaders and the personality cults surrounding them. The air of myth and divinity attached to the Kims, strengthened by stories of extraordinary and patriotic deeds, fosters an image of a North Korea, which in the eyes of its people is a strong and, in many ways, superior State. Arguably, this succeeds not only in consolidating the power base and control of the ruling elite, but in evoking the imaginations and nationalistic sensibilities of the North Korean populace. To reference the revised history of Kim Il Sung for example, the fact that he has been elevated to the post of Supreme Leader; an indomitable champion of independence, whom no one can conquer (as evidenced by his so-called ‘defeat’ of Japan in 1945 and the US ‘imperialists’ in the Korean War), is presumably a source of intense gratification and national pride for North Koreans.

Ultimately, I contend that museums of merit serve to harness this gratification and pride, direct it toward the cause of Juche and thus perpetuate the Juche ideal. Explicitly, by glorifying the lives and ‘achievements’ of its leaders – achievements said to centre around military conquests and broader assertions of North Korean independence – the museums both reflect and reinforce the Juche ideal of self-reliance (and capacity) in defence and by extension, all other areas of life. Moreover, by depicting a history in which North Korea’s independence and sovereignty was at
stake in the first place, due to the alleged ‘imperialist’ manoeuvrings of Japan and the US, the museums also invoke a core teaching of Juche in that they paint not only these nation-states, but foreign powers in general, in an imperialist light.

Tellingly, these themes and others of an obvious Juche nature are also echoed in many of North Korea’s ‘conventional’ museums. Accordingly, the following section examines two of these museums, describing how they and their exhibitions mirror some of the ideological requirements of the Juche idea.
6.1.2 Conventional Museums in North Korea

Turning to conventional museums in North Korea this section analyses two of North Korea’s State-designated museums. In particular, it gauges the extent to which the character and contents of the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum and the Sinchon Museum, respectively, uphold and advance the principles of Juche.

Covering an area of 52,000 square metres, comprised of eighty display rooms (Burdick, 2010: 267; Victorious Fatherland, 1979: 3) and over thirty exhibition halls (Pang, 1987: 212), the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum is perhaps the most elaborate of North Korean museums. Remembering that ‘the Fatherland Liberation War’ is the title by which North Korea refers to the Korean War, as its name suggests, the museum is focused around telling the ‘story’ of the Korean War from the North Korean perspective. It does, however, also deal with Korea’s ‘history’ of imperialism within a broader frame, with many displays relating to Japan’s colonisation of Korea (Victorious Fatherland, 1979: 3).

As has already been remarked, North Korea’s founding and ‘eternal’ president, Kim Il Sung, is credited with singlehandedly driving Japanese imperialism out of Korea and leading a ‘courageous’ Korean People’s (North Korean) Army (KPA) to definitive victory against the US, in the Fatherland Liberation War.28 In terms of agenda and purpose, as articulated in the museum’s guidebook, the museum is thus intended as “a grand monumental edifice,” showcasing the “Juche-oriented brilliant strategy and tactics” of Kim Il Sung and “their invincible vitality” (Victorious Fatherland, 1979: 3).

28 Kim Il Sung remains the ‘president’ of North Korea. Following three years of national mourning, after his death in 1994, changes to the North Korean constitution in 1998 saw Kim Il Sung become the country’s ‘eternal president’ (Lynn, 2007: 104).
In this vein, the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum is an instrument of cultural and ideological (Juche) indoctrination, directed toward the achievement of three ends: (1) the deification of North Korea’s leaders, (2) the celebration of North Korea’s struggle (and ultimate ‘victory’) against imperialism, and (3) the showcasing of the strength (and invincibility) of the North Korean nation and people. In other words, it is designed to illustrate “the greatness of President Kim Il Sung,” immortalise his “imperishable feats” and present him (and in turn, Kim Jong II and Kim Jong Un), as “an ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander” (KCNA, 27 July 2010), protecting an ever-safe North Korean people under his wise and courageous leadership.

Having reportedly attracted, as of 2010, in excess of 29,650,000 visitors since opening in 1953 (KCNA, 27 July 2010), the museum is undoubtedly a central site for Juche indoctrination. According to the KCNA (27 July 2010), this figure, which averages over 520,175 visitors per year, includes “servicepersons, schoolchildren, overseas Koreans and foreigners.” Though, with a limited number of foreigners visiting North Korea annually (20,000-30,000 Chinese and Japanese Korean and 3,500 Western – Koryo Group, 2013a), and even less actually visiting the museum, this number provides insight into how significant a role the museum plays as a site of (domestic) cultural indoctrination. This role is confirmed when compared with the 2010-2011 Australian War Memorial total attendance figure of 832,242 visitors (Australian War Memorial, 2011). While the Australian figure is higher, when one considers the greater number of foreign visitors likely represented in that total, it would appear that the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum is a clear reenforcer of Juche, intended primarily for an internal audience.
One only need inspect reproductions of the impressive mural of Kim Il Sung that hangs at the entrance to the museum’s main hall, for the indoctrination potential of the site to become clear. Occupying the whole expanse of the wall, due to its size, the mural cannot be reproduced in its entirety here (at least not without compromising the quality and intricacy of the image). In the interest of paying attention to its detail rather than scale, two sections believed to convey the ‘core’ and ‘essence’ of its meaning have been selected and included above (images 39 and 40). Essentially, the mural shows a seemingly triumphant Kim Il Sung leading his citizens (the North Korean populace) in celebration. In the context of Juche, mindful of North Korea’s reshaping of history, the scenes can be interpreted as signifying North Korea’s victory against imperialism. Image 39, which is an enlarged rendering of the left section of the mural, depicts two women approaching the position of (eternal) President Kim Il Sung, an elaborate arrangement of flowers, decorated with red ribbon, in hand. Three children can be seen following closely behind, carrying
smaller bunches of flowers. Kim Il Sung is the obvious recipient, the reason equally apparent: in honour and gratitude of his leadership and guidance to victory of an independent, sovereign Korea. Adding to the commemorative atmosphere of the mural, balloons, North Korean flags, a celebratory banner and scores of followers, make up the background. The artillery visible in the distance is also suggestive of North Korea’s strong ‘invincible’ military capability.

*Image 40*, a close up of the mural’s centre, features a waving Kim Il Sung in the foreground. On either side of him are a young North Korean boy and girl. The boy follows closely behind him as he leads the young girl, who is clutching a set of three balloons, by hand. Behind them is an assembly of army, navy and air force officers, all marching, glancing and smiling in the direction of their ‘Great Leader;’ appreciation and admiration clear on their faces. On the horizon, members of the KPA can be seen raising their arms and rifles in celebration of their ‘victory’ over their enemy(ies). For clarity, the right of the mural, not pictured herein, conveys a similar scene to that of *Image 39*, already described. The remainder of the mural simply reinforces the strength and scale of the KPA, with numbers stretching as far as the eye can see. More victory celebrations akin to those seen in *Image 40* also stretch along the horizon of the full-length mural.

In terms of its overall message, the mural extols the *Juche* idea in that it is intended to exemplify the invincibility of the North Korean people, united around its leader. As noted in Chapter 2, unity around the leader is a cornerstone of *Juche*. As explained by Kim Jong Il (1982: 55), “[t]he strength of the masses lies in unity;” a unity centred around an observance of the *Juche* ideology (J. I. Kim, 1995: 238). The emphasis placed on unity also bolsters the personality cult of Kim Il Sung and by extension, the *Juche* principle of self-reliance. It does so in that the aura of
invincibility surrounding the North Korean leadership instils a sense of confidence and security in the North Korean populace; a sense of not needing to rely on outside forces, what with “an ever-victorious” and “brilliant” (KCNA, 27 July 2010) leader presiding over and protecting the fate of the State.

Aside from its obvious ‘strength in unity’ theme, it is plain that this unity is a unity forged in a common cause against imperialism, and the US and Japan in particular. In this vein, the mural explicitly mirrors the anti-imperialist stance and substance of Juche. Crucially however, as the following demonstrates, this mural is not the only display housed in the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum, to reflect a staunch anti-imperialism. After all, it is at the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum that North Koreans (and any foreign visitors) are told, as per the North Korean version of history, that it was, in fact, the US who ignited the Korean War, not North Korea (see Section 4.1). The museum is filled to the brim with ‘evidence’ to support the ‘fact,’ not only that the US started the war, but that North Korea won the “heroic fight . . . to inflict an ignominious defeat on the U.S. imperialist aggressors” (KCNA, 27 July 2010). Purported as ‘evidence’ are numerous documents, photographs, relics, murals and a myriad of other artistic creations. The museum even boasts a basement full of captured US weaponry, housing everything from “pieces of tanks and jeeps and half tracks” to a seized helicopter (Burdick, 2010: 269-270).

This revisionist view of Korean history explains North Korea’s labelling of the Korean War as the ‘Fatherland Liberation War,’ and its defining and portrayal of the US as ‘the enemy.’ Eddie Burdick (2010: 267) writes of this ‘enemy’ portrayal in his book Three Days in the Hermit Kingdom: An American Visits North Korea, in which he details a trip to Pyongyang. Specifically, he recalls being almost immediately
ushered over to a wall covered with black and white photographs, where he and others were promptly ‘informed’ of a number of alleged US atrocities. According to Burdick’s (2010: 267) account, a museum guide stood by the supposed “damning documents” before proceeding, pointer in hand, to reveal North Korea’s retaliatory and necessary part in the war. In line with North Korea’s official version of history, she is said to have notified Burdick and accompanying visitors of how US troops occupied South Korea and killed 149,000 South Koreans, prior to launching a surprise attack on the North on 25 June 1950 (Burdick, 2010: 267). North Korea’s actions were therefore, as Burdick remembers being dutifully ‘enlightened,’ necessary in that North Korea had both a moral responsibility to avenge these deaths and an obligation to defend North Korean territory from an advancing US attack.

In line with the portrayal of the US as ‘aggressors,’ many of the exhibits focus on the ‘brutal’ tactics employed by the US, including the North Korean charge that the US used biological weapons against the North, despite US denials and no conclusive evidence (Weathersby, 2004: 83-84). Pyongyang continues to maintain that the US dropped disease-laden insects from planes whilst flying over North Korean territory, infecting civilians with a range of diseases, including plague and cholera (Kleiner, 2001: 89). While displays relating to these claims undoubtedly fuel anti-Americanism, in the interest of scope, the following discussion is limited to representations of ‘victory.’ That is, to those displays that depict North Korea as militarily superior to the US or are indicative of US defeat, thus painting North Korea in a victorious light. North Korean allegations of US brutality are addressed in greater detail in the forthcoming examination of North Korea’s Sinchon Museum.
Certainly, there is a recurring trend relating to the way North Korea and the US are represented in the artistic displays on view at the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum. On the one hand, the KPA, that is North Korea, is consistently presented in a heroic, noble and in many ways, glorified light. Conversely, at the opposite end of the spectrum, US soldiers are portrayed, not unexpectedly, as weak, confused, inept and easily overwhelmed, yet brutal. Many displays, such as those pictured in Image 41 and Image 42 for example, focus on the so-called US ‘surrender.’

Though, perhaps the best example and illustration of this comparative tendency is the museum’s cyclorama of the Battle of Taejon (Daejeon in South Korea). Measuring 132 metres in circumference, the North describes the cyclorama as the “world’s largest 360° panorama” (as cited in Burdick, 2010: 271). To provide a brief history, the Battle of Taejon was a battle fought between US infantry forces and North Korea, in the early stages of the Korean War in mid-July 1950 (Springer, 2003: 130). Importantly, it was a battle from which the US was forced to withdraw,
and from which the North did emerge victorious. It is often cited as being the most comprehensive defeat suffered by the US over the entire course of the war.

North Korea has capitalised on this victory, embellishing and sensationalising some facts so as to serve its propaganda purposes. Writing of his cyclorama experience, Burdick (2010: 271) explains of how the museum-goer, standing on a rotating cylindrical platform, is treated to a re-enactment of the battle seen from the North Korean point of view. As the platform rotates, the viewer observes countless scenes wherein US troops are depicted as scrambling cowards; their acts of apparent cowardice juxtaposed with the virtuous “courage and gallantry” of the Korean people’s (North Korean) Army (Burdick, 2010: 271).


*Image 43* and *Image 44*, each featuring in the 360° panorama, exemplify the negative portrayal of US troops not only in the cyclorama itself, but in the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum more generally. In *Image 43*, two members of the US army cower and tremble as a US flag lies in ruins, trampled under the foot of
a North Korean soldier. Beyond the borders of this image, is a devastated US battalion in retreat.

Equally, Image 44 shows another US army serviceman raising his hands in surrender; his back still turned presented as ‘proof’ of his cowardice. All in all a faithful account of the North Korean version of history, the cyclorama tells of how “an immaculately clean and beautifully disciplined” North Korean Army drove “chaotic defeated American troops limping south as quickly as they could limp” (Burdick, 2010: 271), thus securing the freedom of Taejon and its people.
Indeed, as no display is complete without paying homage to the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, the museum’s cyclorama attributes North Korea’s victory against the US in the Battle of Taejon, to him. Amid all of the commotion of war captured by the panorama, is conceivably its most blatant propagandist message of all. As pictured in Image 45, a small section of the diorama shows a group of local citizens gathered around a framed portrait of the North Korean leader, which has presumably been gifted them by a member of the ‘liberating’ North Korean army. Members of the local citizenry would not have been in the possession of any of these portraits as Taejon (Daejeon) was and remains a city in South Korea.

When one considers that a portrait of Kim Il Sung hangs in the house of every North Korean citizen, as issued and required by the State (Portal, 2005: 87), this scene carries a powerful resonance. Specifically, as with all of the examples drawn on so far, it adds further legitimacy to the cause of Juche by strengthening the personality cult of Kim Il Sung and thus underlining the importance of loyalty to the
Party and the leader, each of which is a basic criterion and mandate of the Juche idea (see Chapter 2).

In view of the above, as argued, each display at the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum reflects and advertises the Juche idea in some (or several) ways. It is, however, not alone in its cause. In fact, I would argue that every museum, (together with every monument and public space) in North Korea, exists to ‘tow’ the party line in one way or another. In the interest of substantiating this claim and those already made, I turn now to an examination of North Korea’s Sinchon Museum.

As its name indicates, the Sinchon Museum is located in the North Korean town of Sinchon, south of Pyongyang. Importantly, since the end of the Korean War in 1953, Sinchon has been identified and made known as a site of alleged atrocity and massacre (perpetrated by South Korean and US troops) against North Koreans. As cited by the KCNA (26 November 2008), according to the official North Korean account, “the U.S. imperialist aggressors” (no mention of the South is made) “cruelly killed 35,383 innocent people,” or what it claims to be “a quarter” of the county’s population “in 52 days.” Echoing the accusations reflected in propaganda poster art concerning the alleged indiscriminate nature of US killings during the war (see images 9 to 11 of Chapter 2), 16,234 of those victims are said to have been women, children and the elderly (Ho, Kang, & Pak, 1993: 202). Thus, the Sinchon Museum, opened in 1958 (KCNA, 27 March 2008), depicts the events that took place over those days, as seen from the North Korean perspective.

It must be understood that the intention is not to offer a judgement as to the authenticity of these claims, but merely to scrutinise them for the insights they provide into the theorised link between policy and culture. I argue and seek to demonstrate that the Sinchon museum exists, (irrespective of whether it is
representative of truth, falsity, expediency or sensationalism), to forward the Juche-based image of the US as ‘imperialist’ and further bolster general anti-US sentiment in the North. In the words of the North Korean government itself, “[t]he Sinchon Museum bears witness to the bestial atrocities of the US imperialists” (*Sinchon Museum*, 2009: 3) and in so doing, “serve[s] as a centre for anti-U.S. and class education” in North Korea (*KCNA*, 27 March 2008). In analysing the Sinchon museum, the intended aim is therefore two-fold: to underscore that its exhibitions are illustrative and corroborative of the Juche idea, and by extension, highlight the essentially political or Jucheist nature of both North Korean exhibitions, and cultural artefacts at large.

Housing a range of artistic and pictorial representations, a number of victims’ personal effects and numerous other related relics, salvaged from alleged massacre and burial sites (*KCNA*, 26 November 2008; *Sinchon Museum*, 2009), the Sinchon Museum is claimed to evidence the US troops’ “bestial, vicious and cruel” treatment of North Korean civilians during the Korean War (*KCNA*, 27 March 2008).²⁹ Interestingly, as with the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum, images of so-called US brutality are constantly juxtaposed with those showcasing heroic acts of patriotism on the part of North Koreans (*Sinchon Museum*, 2009: 36-37, 48-49).

That the purpose of the Sinchon Museum is to breed a steadfast anti-Americanism throughout North Korea is clear. It is no coincidence that Image 10, pictured in section 2.3.1 is positioned directly outside the museum, or that other propaganda posters of a similar anti-American nature are strategically placed in the

---

²⁹ To offer an idea of scale, in 1998 the *KCNA* (3 July 1998) put the number of exhibits at the Sinchon Museum at “6,465 items” and “some 450 pictures,” all evidencing the alleged atrocity. Among the relics are cases filled with “swatches of black hair,” purported to have belonged to women drowned, “some still braided and caked with mud” (Wilhelm, 1989: para. 7). On show are also a gasoline canister (labelled with the letters USA), with which US troops are said to have started a massacre fire, and a dagger allegedly used by US soldiers to remove the eyeballs of North Korean civilians (Wilhelm, 1989).
museum’s near vicinity (Sinchon Museum, 2009: 3). The following presents some of the pieces on show in the museum, positing not only that they are Juche-like in theme, but that they are intended to incite a nationalistic fervour in North Korean visitors, uniting them in its anti-American cause.

To set the scene of supposed US indiscriminate killing of young and old in Sinchon, upon their arrival, visitors to the museum are guided to a display entitled ‘Harrison’s Order.’ As Museum Vice Chairman Im Kyon Sun explains in a newspaper interview, ‘Harrison’ refers to D. Madden Harrison, the mysterious US “intelligence unit commander” North Korea claims sanctioned the Sinchon killings (Wilhelm, 1989: para. 19, 21).

The painting, as seen in Image 46, shows a US army officer (Harrison) with four US troops and one South Korean. According to the accompanying text, the
painting is meant to depict Harrison issuing his soldiers with the order to kill the inhabitants of Sinchon. Specifically, the North alleges that, on 17 October 1950, Harrison instructed his platoon to “[d]estroy all red bandits . . . hunt and kill all the communist party members and servants and their families,” including all sympathisers. Then, on 3 December 1950, he is meant to have followed this up with an order that all captured persons be disposed of, and “all capped heads and shaved heads, all their bitches and their bastards” be rounded up and killed. While this exhibit does not itself feature as an illustration of the acts Harrison supposedly authorised, it unequivocally presents US intent as malicious – a charge North Korea continues to advance in regards to US troop presence in South Korea (see Section 4.2) – and a charge on which its Juche idea is founded.

To move to more vivid portrayals of said US brutality, *Image 47* is an artistic rendering of a suspected incidence of mass killing, purportedly carried out by US
troops on Sinchon’s Soktang Bridge against North Korean civilians. A North Korean statement describes the scene as one of repeated carnage, where US troops arrested and killed all who tried to cross the bridge by drowning them, “cutting off [their] heads with swords, striking them down with [their] rifle butts or shooting them” (Sinchon Museum, 2009: 31). In fact, the North asserts that by the time of US withdrawal from the region, “thousands of patriots” had been killed, with the Soktang Bridge featuring as the site of more than 2,000 US perpetrated killings (Sinchon Museum, 2009: 30-31).

The perception of the US as enemy and ‘predatory hegemon’ is further enforced by the confronting nature of Image 48, in which US troops are targeting and murdering unarmed, defenceless women and children. To the right, a young girl can be seen being dragged away from her mother by a US soldier, as several already separated children crowd in the doorway, reaching out for their mothers. Another US soldier is pictured pinning a baby to the floor, face down, with the weight of his boot.
The baby has its arms outstretched in the direction of a woman, presumably its mother, who appears to have already been killed by US troops. To the centre and left of the image, a third US Army serviceman is pictured driving a bayonet into a woman’s forehead with one hand, while dangling a baby in the air, at arm’s length, with the other. To her left, is a woman crouching, babe in arms, as those around her are grabbed and slain in front of her. To this day, North Korea maintains that, as a result of US action, “the hills and air of Sinchon reverberated with the babies’ cries for their mothers and the screams of the mothers calling their darlings” (Ho et al., 1993: 202).

The Sinchon Museum does not concentrate solely on instances of mass-murder, however. In line with the North Korean version of events, it also tells of the
torturous murder of individuals. Image 49 and Image 50 are two of the many paintings on display at the museum, focused around US torture of North Korean civilians. Importantly, they are also apt examples of the earlier cited juxtaposition of US brutality with North Korean defiance and resistance. While attention is given to the depiction of US brutality in the interest of demonstrating the role of North Korean museums as purveyors of anti-Americanism, this juxtaposition is notable in that it reinforces North Korea’s (perceived) collective invincibility. As an exhibited poem composed by “patriotic poet” Kang Sung Hwan before his alleged death at the hands of the US explains:

We will die vexatiously. But we know our death will not be in vain. . . . We ask you to continue to sing our song. In the day when the enemy will be wiped out in this land . . . we will return to life here. And sing and sing (Sinchon Museum, 2009: 37).

As such, as well as inciting a nationalist fervour to carry on the anti-US State struggle, the resistance exhibited is also evocative of the Jucheist belief that united in ideology and organisation, the North Korean people are “invincible” (I. S. Kim, 1987: 38); they may give their lives individually for the struggle, but defiantly united against the brutality of the US around the revolutionary principles of Juche, they will ultimately be triumphant. The resistance and defiance expressed in Image 49 and Image 50 should thus be seen as reinforcing Juche in this way.

Image 49 shows a US soldier cutting off a North Korean woman’s left breast with a knife, as another grips her around the throat to hold her into place; blood pouring from her wound while she looks on defiantly. In a similar demonstration of US depravity, Image 50 depicts a US soldier (identified by his brown combat boots and olive-green army fatigues), crushing the windpipe of, and suffocating, a North
Korean boy. Explicitly, the soldier is pictured standing on, thus applying all of his weight to, a plank of wood positioned across the boy’s outstretched arms and throat. Blood can be seen dripping from the boy’s mouth, down the left side of his face and onto the floor as he stares upward, with equal defiance.

Arguably, as well as demonstrating the abovementioned resistance, these paintings and others like them, are exhibited in an effort to support the North Korean propagandist claim that US “methods of murder were so cruel to make even beasts turn away” (Ho et al., 1993: 202). North Korean sanctioned literature reports of how US troops killed the innocent “after dragging them with their noses and ears run through with wire;” or once having resorted to other “horrible brutal” forms of torture, including “scooping out their eyeballs,” “cutting off [their] nipples,” “dismembering their limbs” and even “rolling tanks over them” (Ho et al., 1993: 204). In the context of these allegations, it can be contended that the above artistic renderings are showcased for one primary purpose. Ultimately, as epitomised by the look of exhilaration and sneering enjoyment on the face of the US soldier, featured in Image 49, they serve to further solidify the North Korean assertion that, “[t]o the US cutthroats, human-slaughter was an amusement and kind of hunting” (Ho et al., 1993: 203).

While these images on their own convey a deeply entrenched anti-Americanism, the museum-goer is exposed to more than mere artistic and visual representations of the alleged Sinchon atrocities. In view of the fact that all visitors to the Sinchon museum must be accompanied by a guide, the stories told, together with the narration given, are also likely to (re)induce the perception of the US as ‘imperialist aggressor.’
Bruce Cumings (1992) and Hugh Deane (1999) retell some of the stories they were told during separate visits to the museum. Referencing his 1987 visit with North Korean Kim Myong Ja, (purported to be one of the sole survivors of the Sinchon massacre), Cumings (1992: 221) writes of how Kim recalled being “herded” along with some four-hundred others into a storehouse and tunnel. Now a part of the museum, Kim stood at the location of the alleged atrocity, telling of how she and others had been made to go without food or drink for days, as US troops attempted to force them to reveal the whereabouts of their husbands and sons. As Cumings (1992: 221) recounts:

According to Mrs Kim, when they begged for water for the children a big American threw buckets of shit on them. After a few days they were doused with gasoline and burned to death, save Kim Myong Ja and a couple of other kids, who found themselves at the top of the heap, near a ventilation hole, when it was all over.

She is said to have concluded her story by “vowing her thousand-fold revenge against the Americans.”

Hugh Deane (1999: 102) reveals being told similar stories by his guide during a 1997 visit to the Sinchon Museum. Among the stories relayed, he was told of how women and children complaining of thirst were given gasoline to drink, which, mistaking it for water, they drank; and of how farmers were machine-gunned by American pilots as they worked in fields. For a North Korean people, whose lives are already awash with anti-US rhetoric and sentiment, the commentary given by guides at the Sinchon museum, would undoubtedly have a corroborative effect on the question of US guilt.

Vitally, all of the accusations levelled against the US by way of the Sinchon Museum, be they through exhibitions, stories or imagery, are regular
pronouncements of the North Korean propaganda machine (they recur in Ho et al.’s (1993) *The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War*, for example). In this vein, with the incidents referenced, presented as “extremely fragmentary examples of the bestial atrocities committed by US imperialism” (Ho et al., 1993: 202), the Sinchon museum exists as a medium through which the North Korean government can perpetuate the view of US troops as ‘imperialist aggressors;’ or as Ho et al (1993: 201) argue, as ‘imperialist aggressors,’ “thoroughly trained in fascist misanthropy.”

Given the above, considered in conjunction with the propaganda posters of previous chapters, I argue that the primary purpose of North Korean exhibitions is to embody and promulgate the teachings of the *Juche* idea. The North Korean ‘museum exhibition’ can indeed, in this way, be seen as a cultural artefact showcasing the ways and extent to which, *Juche* manifests in practice. Moreover, in facilitating the widespread dissemination and acceptance of *Juche*, the museum exhibition serves not simply as an artefact that extols the ideology, but perhaps more pivotally, as one which ensures its very longevity.

Having established that the North Korean museum exhibition clearly exemplifies the ‘spirit’ and character of *Juche*, I now turn to the South Korean case. Consequently, in attempting to further explicate how the policies of *Juche* and *Segyehwa* unfold within divided Korea, the following section demonstrates how South Korean museum exhibitions reflect the aims and vision of the *Segyehwa* policy.
6.2 Museums and Exhibitions in South Korea

Despite its status as a global (or at least ‘globalised’) nation-state, in line with the objectives of the Segyehwa policy (see Chapter 2), South Korea continues to maintain and celebrate its ‘South Koreanness.’ While this is a broad and encompassing trend in South Korea, the following focuses on how South Korean museum exhibitions mirror the priorities of the Segyehwa policy. That is, how they demonstrate not only a general commitment to the preservation of South Korean traditions, but to the indigenisation and ‘Koreanisation’ of foreign influences.

Walking down the streets of Seoul there is no denying that South Korea has embraced both capitalism and globalisation. This general move toward globalisation has seen South Korean museums evolve to take on a more ‘global’ dimension and role. In recent years, the works of international artists have received increased attention from curators of South Korean museums and art galleries. The rise to prominence of international art in South Korea has encouraged a number of permanent, temporary and special exhibitions, dedicated to the showcasing and celebration of the international art scene. Among the museums housing permanent exhibitions of foreign art in South Korea are the Leeum, Samsung Museum of Art, Hakgojae Gallery and the National Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCA).

The former, located close to the centre of Seoul, features a ‘Permanent Exhibition of Modern Art,’ which as well as displaying a range of South Korean works dated from 1910 onwards, is comprised of Western and international art from the 1940s through to the 1960s. The latter, situated on the outskirts of Seoul in the city of Gwacheon, also contains an eclectic collection of international pieces, hung alongside artworks of a more local flavour. In particular, its Circular Gallery exhibits both South Korean and foreign art in an effort to elucidate South Korea’s place
within the broader context of the global art world. In addition, the museum is home to an open air sculpture garden, which shows off a mixture of local and foreign artistic talent. South Korean contributors to the open art art-space include Lee Woo-hwan, Lee Seung-taek and Kwak Duk-jun, with Polish sculptor Magdalena Abakanowicz, American Tal Streeter and Italy’s Mauro Staccioli, featuring among the international names.

As far as temporary and special exhibitions are concerned, to name but a few of the more recent examples, in 2007, the Seoul Museum of Art (SeMA) (which places a perceptible focus on international exhibitions), hosted an exhibition of Dutch post-impressionist painter Vincent Van Gogh, entitled *Van Gogh: Voyage into the Myth*. This was followed later in 2009, by an exposition of the works of American painter, *Andy Warhol: Andy Warhol, the Greatest*. Then, more recently in 2010, SeMA mounted an exhibition centered on French sculptor Auguste Rodin, titled *Rodin: Retrospective* (SeMA, 2011).

The Seoul Museum of Art, however, is not unique in opening its doors to touring international exhibitions. The National Museum of Korea, the National Museum of Contemporary Art, together with Hakgojae Gallery, also host a myriad of them. In the case of the National Museum, some of these include collections relating to the cultures, relics and arts of Uzbekistan, Greece and Peru (or more specifically Peru’s Inca civilisation), which opened for viewing over the 2009 and 2010 period (National Museum of Korea, 2010). Similarly, between 2009 and 2011 the National Museum of Contemporary Art hosted three international special collections. These included *Chalo! India: A New Era of Indian Art* (2009), a celebration of Indian art, *La Sombra Del Habla: Coleccion Macba* (2010), a Spanish contemporary art collection (2010) and *Picasso and Modern Art* (2010/11), a display composed of
several famous works from the Albertina Museum in Vienna (MOCA, 2010a). Hakgojae Gallery also welcomes numerous international exhibitions annually. In 2008 the works of Jean-Pierre Raynaud (France), Giuseppe Penone (Italy), Günther Uecker (Germany), Ian Davenport (England) and French-born Polish painter Roman Opalka were showcased. A year later (2009) saw the artworks of Netherlands’ Fré Ilgen and France’s Bernard Frize displayed, while 2010 brought premiere exhibitions showcasing additional works from many of the same names (Hakgojae Gallery, 2009a).

This international focus notwithstanding, South Korea’s push for globalisation has intensified efforts to ensure that artworks and exhibitions continue to express South Korean cultural sensibilities. The South Korean museum has thus become a site of intercultural mixing and exchange, with museum displays reflecting a hybridised, yet recognisably indigenous character. As illustrated below, whether representative of a fusion between Western style and Korean motif, or of an intercultural mixing of another kind, a discernible proportion of South Korean art and museum pieces are by-products of a creative merging of (South) Korean and foreign styles.

Crucially, South Korea’s embrace of the international and foreign in its museums stands as a stark contrast to the anti-foreign and self-reliance positioning of North Korea, as seen through the Juche-centric contents and nature of its museum exhibitions. In underscoring the cultural, ideological and practical differences between the Koreas, this contrast evinces just how diametrically opposed the globalisation policies of Juche and Segyehwa are, not only conceptually, but practically. In so doing, it empirically grounds the assertion that Juche and Segyehwa
are indicative of a broader association between policy and culture, unfolding within divided Korea.

Interestingly, even the location of some of South Korea’s museums reveal the degree to which the traditional/national and the global/international coexist in today’s South Korea. When conducting research in the South, I was fascinated to find a museum dedicated to Korea’s signature dish: Kimchi, detailing one hundred and eighty-seven varieties of the dish, its history, ingredients and nutritional effects, located next to an aquarium in Asia’s largest underground shopping mall: Seoul’s Coex Mall, housing alongside leading national brands, a variety of international brands such as ZARA, Apple and NIKE.

I found myself similarly struck to discover that South Korea’s National Museum of Contemporary Art was located within Seoul Grand Park, a complex, which among other things, was home to a theme park, zoo, ski lift and camping ground. As I made my way from the park’s entrance to the museum, serviced by its own amusement ride the ‘Elephant Train,’ Seoul Grand Park appeared to embody all of the successes of capitalism and consumerism. Yet, in the midst of it all, stood the museum, which as well as featuring international art (some of which is referenced above), promoted the preservation and circulation of art that was uniquely South Korean.
One of the most striking pieces of South Korean themed (and produced) art I found whilst browsing the museum’s indoor and outdoor exhibits was a bronze and stainless steel sculpture piece entitled ‘Competing Life’ (Image 51) by South Korean sculptor Hwang Hyun-soo. While one might be forgiven for not immediately grasping the Korean significance and undertones of this piece, its close resemblance to another piece I had seen a few days earlier while touring the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) (Image 52), saw its local flavour become abundantly clear. At the entrance to the ‘third tunnel of aggression,’ one of the four North Korean-built infiltration tunnels found dug under the DMZ into the South (see Chapter 3), stood a monument dedicated to Korean reunification. As pictured in Image 52, the monument shows a divided globe, split into two, with the separate halves representing North and South Korea. Positioned on either side are three bronze statues, trying to push the two halves together; a complete globe symbolising a reunified Korea.

Hwang Hyun-soo’s sculpture piece carries the same hopes, with figures surrounding and pushing at a complete globe from all angles, in what would seem a combined concerted effort to keep...
the globe (Korea) whole. As with the reunification monument situated near the Third Tunnel, Hwang’s artwork symbolises the collective hopes and efforts of each Korea, both North and South, as together as one nation, but two separate states, they yearn to be whole again (albeit on their own terms).

In fact, Korea’s division, reunification and the estranged relationship between the North and South, appeared common and recurring themes throughout South Korea’s National Museum of Contemporary Art. This is certainly the case with an exhibition piece titled ‘DMZ in DMZ’ by Lim Young-sun. As seen in Image 53, ‘DMZ in DMZ’ features four life-sized gilded statues, each positioned to face its diagonal opposite. The two statues positioned to the left are South Korean or ‘ROK’ soldiers, easily identified by their helmets, as worn by South Korean soldiers positioned at the Joint Security Area (JSA) on the North-South border. The two statues to the right are North Korean soldiers, sporting the standard military dress hat, typically worn by members of the KPA standing guard, North of the Military
Demarcation Line (MDL). The positioning of the statues is significant in that, as at the North-South border, the soldiers (here represented by statues), are engaged in what is effectively a ‘stare-down.’ Given that the border is a place where soldiers from each Korea come face to face in a battle of wills and intimidation, as each side seeks to prove the superiority of ‘their’ Korea, this exhibit shows the competition and conflict between North and South, at the heart of Korea’s division. In this way, as well as sorrowfully acknowledging the division plaguing the Korean nation, Lim’s ‘DMZ in DMZ’ underscores the importance of striving to overcome these barriers in committing to the path of reunification.

Complementing reunification specific exhibits, the museum also houses works commemorating Korea’s struggles in a more general sense. A piece that can be said to fall within this category is Image 54: ‘Korean Modern History’ by South Korean artist Shin Hak-chul. As seen, Shin’s work is a montage of black and white images arranged in such a way as to resemble the shape of the Korean peninsula. The artwork in its entirety appears to be a tribute and testament to the endurance of Korea’s past generations and their personal and national struggles. Towards the bottom of the work, images of Korea’s peasant populations of old can be seen. These images pay homage

to and acknowledge, the various political and independence movements of early modern Korean history. Some of the more notable movements likely referenced include the anti-government, anti-foreign Donghak Peasant Revolution of 1894 (MOCA, 2010b) and the anti-Japanese March First Movement of 1919.\textsuperscript{30} The remainder of the piece details other phases of Korea’s turbulent history, from war (as seen in the centre with its soldier, anti-tank/aircraft imagery and apparent casualties), to political protest, as depicted by the banner-wielding crowds at the painting’s top.

In dealing exclusively with Korea’s past and national experience, Shin Hak-chul’s ‘Korean Modern History’ carries bitter-sweet, though Korean-specific connotations. On the one hand, it showcases the national solidarity of Korea as a singular nation, as evinced through movements such as the Donghak Revolution and the March First Movement, which are widely renowned as highly demonstrative of national fervour and camaraderie.\textsuperscript{31} On the other hand, it paints Korea’s history and present as somewhat tragic, in that the various ‘solidarity’ movements of Korea’s past stand in nostalgic contrast to Korea’s current state of division. In this way, although Shin’s work is not explicitly themed around the issue of Korean reunification, the sense of nostalgia and tragedy the piece conjures, arguably, works to engender hope that the future of Korea might paint a brighter picture.

Permanent exhibitions such as these, however, are not the only to focus on Korea, Korea’s division and the issue of reunification. Touring temporary and special exhibitions have also embraced these themes. In fact, many South Korean museums hosted special exhibitions to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the outbreak

\textsuperscript{30} As one of the most significant, large scale anti-Japanese demonstrations to take place during Japan’s colonisation of Korea (commencing on 1 March 1919, lasting for approximately one year and engulfing the entire nation), the March First movement is often cited as reflective of Korea’s broader historical revolutionary spirit against oppression (D.K. Kim, 2005: 128).

\textsuperscript{31} The March First Movement in particular is hailed as demonstrative of national solidarity due to its longevity and nation-engulfing nature (D.K. Kim, 2005: 128).
of the Korean War. Some of these museums included the Daelim Contemporary Art Museum in Seoul, which hosted a special large scale (Ministry of National Defence-sponsored) exhibition, the National Folk Museum of Korea and the National Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCA, 2010c; M. Y. Park, 2010). The latter exhibition: *Forgotten War, Division Reality*, opened at the National Museum of Contemporary Art at the very end of my June 2010 tour of South Korea, showing from 25 June, 2010 to 30 September, 2011 (MOCA, 2010c). The exhibition, comprising of two sections, was made up of a collection of artworks by various South Korean artists. The first section was devoted to the works of cartoonist Kim Sung-hwan, detailing the early stages of the war, the capture and recapture of Seoul in 1950. Conversely, the focus of the second section was broader, featuring the works of many different artists, which together reflected the themes of (Korean) war and division in a more general sense (MOCA, 2010c).

According to the museum’s website, the key motivation behind the exhibition was to ensure that, with the passage of time and passing of the elderly, the tragedy of the Korean War did not become something written and read about, but continued to form a part of the national consciousness (MOCA, 2010c). Similarly, it was hoped that such artworks would serve as a reminder, not only of Korea’s tragic past (and in many ways present), but encourage proactive steps toward the betterment of North-South relations.

With South Korean themed temporary and permanent exhibitions placed alongside international works by a host of renowned artists, including Germany’s Joseph Beuys and Gerhard Richter, Frenchmen Claude Viallat and Gilles Aillaud, America’s Bryan Hunt and Peter Halley and Australia’s Sidney Nolan, South Korea’s National Museum of Contemporary Art is in many ways a hybrid space. It is
a hybrid space in that both local and international art is embraced in the one setting; in that there is not a fear of the foreign as seen in North Korean museums, but a keen embracement of it. Adding to the museum’s hybrid character is the fact that this embracement of the foreign appears to come hand in hand with a strong resolution to preserve a discernible sense of ‘South Koreanness’ in art displays.

Aside from this broad embracement of local and global art, some specific art pieces are themselves, in some way, hybrid. An example where this is indeed the case is a piece entitled ‘BanGongYeoHon’ by Byun Young-won, from the touring Forgotten War, Division Reality exhibition. Reproduced in Image 55, this piece, following the general brief of the commemorative exhibition, is focused around the events and effects of the Korean War. Though, rather than being represented in life-like terms, soldiers are depicted in abstract form with periscope eyes and weapon-wielding distorted bodies. In this way, while the theme of the piece is Korean history
and experience, its seemingly Picasso (that is, Western) styled abstractionism, sees Korean theme blended with Western artistic technique.

This same process of fusion can be seen at work in many other South Korean museums. Another such museum that seeks to embrace the ‘old’ and the ‘new,’ or the traditional and the (hybridised) modern, is Hakgojae Gallery in Seoul. In fact, the name of the museum itself exudes this intention, with the definition of Hakgojae being “a house learning the old” (Kong, 2001: 20). Claiming to be purposed toward “knowing the old and pursing the new” (Kong, 2001: 20) and to hold firm to the vision of “creat[ing] things new by mastering things ancient,” the gallery presents itself as a “venue where tradition and modernity coexist” and “harmony” between Korean tradition and Western influence is achieved (Hakgojae Gallery, 2009b: para. 1-2).

While Hakgojae Gallery celebrated traditional Korean art and technique from the time of its opening in 1988, changes coinciding with its twentieth anniversary in 2008 solidified its status as a place of Korean-Western artistic convergence. Most likely influenced by South Korea’s general modernisation and the globalisation (Koreanisation) emphasis of the Kim Young-sam administration, Hakgojae Gallery made concerted efforts to embrace foreign art alongside its, already prized, Korean art pieces. Existing at the time as one Hanok, that is, Korean styled building in Insadong, a neighbourhood in the Jongro-gu district of Seoul, the gallery was relocated to Bukchon Hanok Village, a short distance away (Hakgojae Gallery, 2009b). Perhaps one of the most exemplificative locations in Seoul, as far as South Korea’s simultaneous embracement of ‘Korean’ and ‘Western’ influence is concerned, Bukchon Hanok Village is an iconic Hanok preservation district where
rows of traditional Korean houses can be found preserved, amid the hustle and bustle of Seoul and examples of more modern and Western architecture.

Once relocated in this spot, the gallery’s one Korean-styled building was supplemented with a second building of Western architectural design, which now houses a cornucopia of international art. With the gallery’s front building teaching “lessons of the past” and its back building showcasing a more modern flavour, “shoulder by shoulder” (Hakgojae Gallery, 2009b: para. 1), they and the gallery as a whole, point to a future whereby the old and the new, the Korean and the international, coexist; a future applying not only to South Korean art, but to South Korean cultural development more broadly.

This embracement of (South) Korean and foreign art is a personification of Kim Young-sam’s view on globalisation (see Chapter 2), that for the South Korean art industry and its artists to survive and thrive in an increasingly globalised environment, contemporary art must exhibit a kind of “modernity with root” (Hakgojae Gallery, 2009b: para. 2). That is to say, it must incorporate both (South) Korean and Western artistic style. The two buildings (one Korean, one Western) that make up the Hakgojae Gallery, exemplify this coming together of Korean and Western artistic sensibilities. In the same way, its exterior underscores Hakgojae’s broader efforts to evolve from the centre of Korean traditional art it once was, to a forum of artistic amalgam celebrating neither Korean, nor international art in isolation, but their synthesis, as fostered by South Korea’s proactive globalisation (Koreanisation) drive.

Staying true to this spirit of cultural and artistic fusion, Hakgojae Gallery houses a myriad of traditional Korean and international works. Korean works range from ancient calligraphy and paintings from the Joseon dynasty and nineteenth
century, to modern South Korean pieces by local artists such as Kang Gyung-gu, Kim Ho-deuk and Min Jung-gi (Hakgojae Gallery, 2009b). Then, complementing these is a wide range of international pieces by prominent foreign artists, including America’s Frank Stella and Richard Tuttle, Englishman Julian Opie and Switzerland’s Le Corbusier (Hakgojae Gallery, 2009b). These, together with the temporary exhibitions discussed earlier, have facilitated the introduction of many renowned artists and artworks to the South Korean art scene since 2008.
Following the trend of the National Museum of Contemporary Art, these international pieces are exhibited alongside, and supplemented by, South Korean produced works of explicit Korean and/or South Korean theme. Included among such works are additional pieces by Shin Hak-chul, entitled ‘June Uprising and July, August Labour Struggle’ (Image 56) and ‘Rice Planting’ (Image 57), respectively. Born out of a late 1970s-1990s South Korean social, political and cultural reform movement, known as the Minjung (people’s) Movement, as with Shin’s ‘Korean Modern History’ (Image 54), these works offer critical commentary on South Korean politics and the Korean situation (Hakgojae Gallery, 2009c).

Focusing on the art emerging from this period, as shown by Image 54, Image 56 and Image 57, Minjung Art carried and expressed “sharp criticism” (Hakgojae Gallery, 2009c: para. 1) of South Korean (and US) leadership, presenting as a visual call to arms in South Korea’s drive for democratisation. Strikingly similar in appearance to Image 54, in line with the spirit of Minjung, Image 56 speaks of the “sorrows, joys, and hopes” of the ‘common-people.’ Specifically, it can be seen to express regret and perhaps even anger, that Korea’s history should be one of colonial occupation, “fratricidal” war, partition and “political and social upheavals” (Hakgojae Gallery, 2009c: para. 1).

Image 57: ‘Rice Planting,’ reflects a local theme of its own. As pictured, the top of the painting is framed by fruit bearing shrubbery and a pair of roosting pigeons. To the immediate lower right of the frame is Mount Paektu, which although located in the North, is sacred to both Koreas; its mutual sacredness seeing it in many ways become a symbol of reunification for the whole of Korea (Bank and Leyden, 1989). To the left of the mountain is a lake, surrounded by blossoms. Below this, though still in the upper section of the painting, a group of farmers can be seen, who
together appear to be celebrating with bowls of food and grain, the fruits of a successful harvest. Adding to the celebratory tone of the piece, depicted to their right is a trio of running children, one with an insect net in hand. In contrast to this pleasant and peaceful imagery, the lower section of the painting shows a range of paraphernalia, including cigarettes, missiles, a Japanese geisha, Coca-Cola bottle, remnants of Korea’s division and even then US President Ronald Reagan, being ploughed and shovelled into the sea. By “remnants of Korea’s division” I refer to the pieces of barbed-wire pictured, which clearly reference the numerous barbed wire fences that demarcate the Koreas, as well as the discarded number plate with the lettering ‘38’00.’ The latter is a clear reference to Korea’s division in that ‘38’00’ denotes 38 degrees North, or the North 38th parallel, the recognised geographic coordinates of the Military Demarcation Line. Thus, the shovelling away of each of these ‘remnants’ is meant to symbolise Korean reunification.

In the mind and words of Shin himself, the painting was intended to depict his personal aspirations for Korean reunification. Explaining the intended message of his painting during a 1989 interview, Shin remarked: “I was trying to portray reunification through the planting of rice” (as cited in Bank and Leyden, 1989: para. 12). Using rice planting as an analogy for the reunification process as he envisioned it, Shin continued “[f]irst you have to plow the field for the paddy, then clear away all the unnecessary things from the field” (as cited in Bank and Leyden, 1989: para. 13). To Shin then, the ploughing of the Coca-Cola bottle, missiles etcetera into the sea was intended to symbolise a “get[ting] rid of all the things in the way of reunification” (as cited in Bank and Leyden, 1989: para. 13).

Attesting to the subjectivity and potential plurality of interpretation, however, not all those who viewed the painting subscribed to Shin’s interpretation. In fact, the
artwork was judged by the State as blatantly pro-North Korean. The upper part (or North) of the painting, complete with its celebratory scenes amidst the North Korean landscape of Mount Paektu, was seen to constitute an “enemy-benefiting expression” (Human Rights Committee, 2004: para. 2.2), allegedly “depict[ing] North Korea as a paradise” (Bank and Leyden, 1989: para. 4) and thereby extolling North Korea’s Juche ideology. Similarly, it was claimed that the scenes portrayed in the painting’s ‘South’ section, or the ploughing of so-called ‘symbols’ of Japanese and US imperialism into the sea, was a clear expression of the artist’s hopes that South Korea would one day adopt the North Korean way of life. As such, Shin was charged as a North Korean sympathiser under Article 7 of the National Security Law and was subsequently arrested (Human Rights Committee, 2004: para. 2.2).  

Shin was acquitted by a Seoul Criminal District Court judge on 12 November 1992, though would later face a re-trial after a second prosecutor appeal was upheld by the South Korean Supreme Court on 13 March 1998. He was again convicted on 13 August 1999, placed on probation, his painting re-seized. It was not until the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee ordered the return of Shin’s painting and the “annulment of his conviction” in March 2004, that a final resolution was reached (Human Rights Committee, 2004: para. 9).  

The point to be made by telling Shin’s story is that many South Korean artworks, as with ‘Rice Planting,’ whether intended by the artist, or discernible by the outsider, carry culturally (Korean/South Korean) specific connotations, setting them apart from ‘international’ pieces. Importantly, while South Korean artworks may share some of the conventions, or be influenced by Western art, it does set itself apart. It does so in that it is created and viewed from within different (uniquely South Korean) perspectives.

32 Under Article 7 of the law, those judged to have partaken in “vaguely defined” acts of sedition, including the display of pro-North Korean sentiment, could be sentenced to a maximum term of seven years imprisonment, or in ‘extreme’ cases, even face the death penalty (Harrison, 2002: 93)
cultural and political contexts, seeing it not only take on different subjects, but a completely different character.

In the case of Hakgojae Gallery, just as with the National Museum of Contemporary Art, the placement of such works side by side with ‘foreign’ or ‘non-local’ art sees the gallery simultaneously embrace global and local art forms. In so doing, it sees them and other museums and galleries like them, serve the same twin agenda as the Segyehwa policy. That is, as urged by Kim Young-sam (1996: 8), it sees them take pride in (South) Korean culture, yet “accept the world culture with an open mind.” Or as epitomised by the hybridised exterior of Hakgojae Gallery and the Picasso inspired Korean War scene of Image 55, South Korea’s concurrent preservation of the old and acceptance of the new, ensures that it holds true to a key mandate of the Segyehwa policy: that South Korea “rediscover the intrinsic richness of [its] traditional culture and blend it with global culture” (Y. S. 1995d: 272 – emphasis added).

In view of the above, it can be said that North and South Korean museum exhibitions strongly demonstrate that the divergent principles of Juche and Segyehwa, respectively, manifest in practice within Korea. Specifically, in deifying the North Korean leadership and demonising the outside world (particularly the US and Japan), North Korean exhibitions unashamedly promote the anti-globalisationist position of Juche. Conversely, the eager embrace and circulation of foreign art in South Korean museums, sees them largely reminiscent of Kim Young-sam’s vision of a ‘New Korea,’ where globalisation is actively and consciously pursued. Furthermore, the fact that South Korea not only embraces globalisation, but proactively seeks to preserve Korean tradition and foster a sense of Korean/South
Korean artistic originality in its exhibitions, ensures a (South) Koreanisation of Western artistic influence that is strikingly exemplificative of the Segye-hwa policy.

Given that North Korean museum exhibitions portray globalisation as analogous to cultural imperialism, while those in the South recognise it as presenting an opportunity for localisation, they are clearly indicative of the Koreas’ (contrary) perceptions concerning globalisation. Thus, in keenly underscoring the opposing ideological, cultural and political (policy) agendas of the Koreas, juxtaposed, museum exhibitions in the North and South point to a practically observable association between policy and culture in divided Korea.

With the aim of testing this perceived association further and assessing the extent of its practical affect, the following chapter investigates how the principles of Juche and Segye-hwa manifest in the realm of Korean music and performance.
7. **Music and Performance**

Directed toward illustrating that the case of the ‘museum exhibition’ is representative of a broader tendency for Korean cultural artefacts to illuminate a link between policy and culture, this chapter extends the analyses of previous chapters by drawing on the cultural artefact of music and performance in greater depth. Explicitly, it scrutinises various music and performance examples from the North and South, to ascertain the extent to which they reflect the policies of *Juche* and *Segyehwa*, respectively.

Consequently, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first deals with music and performance in North Korea; the second with the case of South Korea. Within the frame of North Korea, the first section is itself comprised of two subsections. The first looks at how North Korean music exemplifies the *Juche* idea, while the second explores how North Korea’s Mass Games performance is, likewise, a conscious embodiment of *Juche*. As with the previous chapter, discussions of leadership veneration are focused around North Korea’s first two leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, though it is acknowledged that North Korean music and performance will evolve to equally idolise Kim Jong Un.

The second section pertains to South Korea. Specifically, it supplements the fusion *Gugak* ensemble discussion of Chapter 2, offering additional empirical evidence as to the tendency for South Korean music (in line with the Koreanisation mandates of the *Segyehwa* policy), to reflect a simultaneously indigenous and ‘global’ character.
7.1.1 Music in North Korea

Mirroring a broader cultural trend in North Korea, North Korean music is highly reflective of the *Juche* idea. In fact, as well as being recognised by several scholars in the field of Korean studies and music and performance (Howard, 2006a: 154; Kershaw, 2000: 166) (see Chapter 1), the place of music within the *Juche* revolution has been directly established (and indeed demanded) by the North Korean leadership. In setting out the duties of literature and arts in the *Juche* revolution in 1972, ‘eternal’ President Kim Il Sung (1972: 130) proclaimed it the task of all “workers in the field of music,” to “further develop [North Korea’s] national music to suit the sentiments and aspirations of the socialist builders.” Given the regime’s preoccupation with promoting *Juche* and its status as North Korea’s supreme ideology (see Chapter 2), Kim Il Sung clearly intended for music to advance and revere the principles of the *Juche* idea.

Following the lead of his father, in a speech delivered three years later in 1975 and later translated into English, Kim Jong Il called on all citizens to utilise music as a weapon in the *Juche* struggle. He declared that in “making a revolution” North Korea “should inspire the people to the revolutionary struggle by means of songs” (as cited in Howard, 2006a: 155). More recently, in restressing the necessity for songs to be *Jucheist* in content, he affirmed that “*Juche* music alone can embody the essence of [the] times with absolute correctness and faithfully serve the cause of the *Juche* age” (J. I. Kim, 2004: 6). Thus, with the form and performance of North Korean music controlled entirely by the State (Books LLC, 2010: 3; Howard, 2004) (see Chapter 2), at Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s instruction, North Korean music has come to reflect *Juche*-centric themes, pledging unabated loyalty to the leader and the State.
Keith Howard (2006a: 158) clarifies that pre-existing North Korean “texts and music [have been] adjusted to fit doctrine” and extol Juche. All traces of “feudal sentiment” and emotion have been erased, melodies modified and lyrics amended, to “inculcat[e] belief in the land of plenty and the glorious leadership” of the North Korean regime (Howard, 2006a: 158). To ensure a “militant” style of music, musical performance has also transformed to give dominance to brass and woodwind instruments (J. I Kim, 2006: 10-11). With only a few government-sanctioned music ensembles performing in North Korea and a comparably limited number of teaching institutions – all of which indoctrinate students according to the party line (Howard, 2004: 35-36) – music has become a medium through which to promulgate and sustain the personality cults of North Korea’s leaders and their alleged contributions to the prosperity (and freedom) of the State.33

As the examples analysed later in this section show, North Korean music has also evolved to staunchly defend (and celebrate) North Korea’s self-reliant stance, and encourage an unrestrained commitment to self-sufficient and self-contained ways of life. In terms of defence, songs boasting of North Korea’s military capability (and perceived invincibility); spurring the army and populace on to victory against all enemies, have become the norm. As such, they have also come to express a deep distrust for the ‘foreign’ and a feverish contempt for the US. Hence, maintaining the tightest of grips, music in North Korea continues to rally the masses to the cause, by demanding a firm unity around the leader and the teachings of Juche.

In seeking to verify and build on these comments, the following paragraphs offer some additional evidence to support the argument that North Korean music is

---

33 There are three popular music ensembles in North Korea: the Pochonbo Electronic Ensemble, the Wangjaesan Light Music Band and the Mansudae Art Troupe, though there are other orchestras and bands attached to specific institutions (Howard, 2004: 35-36). North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has also recently added to North Korea’s music ensembles by forming the Moranbong Band (KCNA, 7 July 2012 – see Conclusion)
strongly reflective of the *Juche* idea. Explicitly, a selection of North Korean song lyrics are examined and presented as illustrative of a North Korean mandate to ‘live’ in accordance with *Juche* and incorporate its teachings into everyday life.

For the sake of analysis, as well as to demonstrate the extent to which *Juche* permeates North Korean music, the songs under examination have been categorised into two groups, each corresponding to a basic tenet of *Juche*. The first group to be analysed are those songs that venerate one or more of North Korea’s leaders, thus working to sustain the personality cults around them. The second category is comprised of songs that convey an overt suspicion (and even hatred) of the foreign and the US in particular. It should be noted that attention is given to lyrics rather than musical form. While the militant, brass band and choir-dominant nature of North Korean music can be said to capture the collectivist ethos of *Juche*, lyrics are the focus as they are, arguably, more explicit in their reflection of the *Jucheist* themes outlined in Chapter 2.

To begin, three songs have been selected for the first category. These include *Song of General Kim Il Sung*, *Song of General Kim Jong Il* and *No Motherland without You*. As their titles suggest, the first two songs are devoted to immortalising the ‘feats’ of Kim Il Sung the Kim Jong II, respectively, and their contributions to the State and people. Similarly, the third and final song, *No Motherland without You*, broadly considered Kim Jong II’s signature tune (Books LLC, 2010: 7), inextricably links Kim Jong II’s leadership to the survival of the North Korean State.

One only need examine the lyrics of each of these songs to get a sense, not only of the unwavering devotion expressed for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong II, but the credit afforded them, as champion guardians of the State. Take *Song of General Kim Il Sung*, for example. Demonstrating the full extent of North Korea’s historical
revisions as discussed in previous chapters, (and its benefit to the North Korean leadership), the song directly cites Kim Il Sung as the sole guarantor of North Korea’s ‘victory’ against Japan. Holding true to official historical revisions, the lyrics of the piece tout Kim Il Sung as: “the sun of [North] Korea;” who singlehandedly “severed the chains of the masses” and “brought them to liberty,” with deeds “unsurpassed” (see Appendix 13.1). As the song was composed in 1948 (Books LLC, 2010: 11) prior to the Korean War, it is clear that these “deeds unsurpassed” relate to Korea’s struggle against Japanese occupation and not the battle against the US, which began a few years later. Though, Kim Il Sung is credited with victory over the US as well (see Chapter 6).

Referencing the “undying fame” afforded Kim Il Sung by the everlasting memory of his ‘victory,’ the song’s first lines speak of how “[b]right traces of blood on the crags of Changbaek (Jangbaek) [Mountain] still gleam, and “[s]till the Amnok [River] carries along songs of blood in its flow.” For North Korea, these remnants of its battle for independence symbolise Kim Il Sung’s capacity to keep his people “ever flourishing and free.” Furthermore, the fact that these traces of ‘victory’ should continue to “shine splendidly” (see Appendix 13.1), serves to bolster not only the perceived invincibility of the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, but the perceived military superiority of the North Korean army and State.

Although North Korea’s rewrite of history is focused predominantly on embellishing the contributions of Kim Il Sung (see Chapter 6), it conveniently has a trickle-down effect to the benefit of Kim Jong Il (and presumably Kim Jong Un after him). This can be seen in the second piece, Song of General Kim Jong Il, which reflects similar themes, bolstering Kim Jong Il’s image as a strong leader. Testifying to Kim Jong Il’s elevation to the status of ‘brilliant commander,’ the Generalissimo
is described as North Korea’s “champion of justice,” who “[f]ull of iron will and courage” will, or so the song promises, lead North Korea to victory against any foe (see Appendix 13.2).

Importantly, this firm belief in North Korea’s inevitable ‘victory’ is tied to its observance of the Juche idea. Certainly, much of Kim Jong Il’s ‘greatness’ is connected to the fact that he is carrying on “the Sun’s cause.” ‘The Sun’ is a reference to Kim Il Sung, who continues to be regarded as ‘The Sun of the Nation’ (Lim, 2009: 106), as so identified in Song of General Kim Il Sung (see Appendix 13.1). In this vein, Song of General Kim Jong II pays homage to the Dear Leader for carrying on the legacy of his father and defending North Korea in its struggle for independence. As the song purports, “Blue waters of the East and West Seas sing of all he [Kim Jong Il] has done.” In light of North Korea’s vehement independence stance (referenced in the concluding verse of the song), as well as having a wider applicability, this statement extols Kim Jong II’s efforts to uphold the teachings of Juche (self-reliance), despite international resistance to the cause (for example, US sanctions). Though, with the Juche idea also described as something that brings “joy,” Kim Jong Il’s professed glorification of “Juche’s garden,” or the Juche idea, is also presented as the ultimate weapon in North Korea’s continuing standoff with the US and other ‘imperialist’ states (see Appendix 13.2).

The third piece No Motherland without You is also overt in its praising of Kim Jong Il. Clearly underscoring the Dear Leader’s importance and intended adulation, phrases like ‘We are unable to live without you!’, ‘Our country is unable to survive without you!’ and ‘Our country cannot exist without you!’ are repeated often, recurring regularly over the course of the song, which runs for less than two-and-a-half minutes (see Appendix 13.3). These phrases as well as those declaring
“Our future and hope depend on you / The People’s fate depends on you, Comrade Kim Jong II!” are also important in that they echo the Jucheist belief that the masses share “life and death, weal and woe,” with the leader, and that the leader is someone with whom their “destiny [is] inseparably linked” (J. I. Kim, 1995: 194) (see Chapter 2). This notion of an inseparable fate may, at least partly, explain the mass outpouring of grief triggered by the passing of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, as a North Korean populace faced an uncertain future without their guarantor and guardian, Kim Jong Il.

Following Kim Jong Il’s death, the Juche (self-reliance) legacy has now passed on to his son Kim Jong Un, as has the fate of the State and its people. The North Korean music scene is sure to evolve to reflect this change. Before his death, in preparing the way for his son’s succession, Kim Jong Il organised and sanctioned the release of a song centring around the new emerging leader. Entitled Footsteps, the song speaks of how Kim Jong Un “is stepping forward” to take over “the glorious achievements [of February]” (see Appendix 13.5). Read in this context, “February” is a reference to Kim Jong Il, who was born in the month of February (Lim, 2009: 10). The song continues to tell of how Kim Jong Un’s “footsteps” are “ushering in a brilliant future.” Interpreted within the frame of the arguments of this section, this depiction of Kim Jong Un clearly illustrates the pivotal role music in North Korea plays in the development and perpetuation of its leadership personality cults. As Kim Jong Un further asserts his taking of the reins of leadership from his father, the fate of the people will become all the more inextricably bound to him, and he to the ‘greatness’ and ‘correctness’ of the Juche idea. As with Kim Jong Il before him, this connection will be expressed and revered through song.
Each of these three songs and their idolisation of the Kims is directed by

*Juche* and the absolute and “unfailing loyalty to the leader” that “defines” and forms

the “basic content” of *Juche* music (J. I. Kim, 2004: 10). In this sense, they openly

strengthen the legitimacy of the North Korean regime and *Juche*, as the guiding

principle of the Party and State, by fuelling the leadership powerbase on which both

rest and depend. Take the Song of General Kim Il Sung, for instance. In the words of

Kim Jong Il (2004: 111) “[t]he more [North Koreans] sing it, the greater strength it
gives [them] and the more it inspires [them] with national pride and self-confidence

in living and working for the revolution under the wings of the [G]reat [L]eader.”

This is a clear articulation and admission of the role North Korean music has in

bolstering the North Korean regime and its powerbase. After all, given that *Juche*
requires “one’s infinite devotion to give one’s all for the party and the leader” (J. I.
Kim, 1982: 64), there is perhaps no better way to express ‘devotion’ through song,
than through obsequious worship and flattery.

Further demonstrating the role these songs and others like them play in the
validation of the ruling party and ideology, as Eddie Burdick (2010: 248) explains,
they have become “more patriotic” (and elevated) than the North Korean national
anthem. Interestingly, the national anthem (*Aegukka – The Patriotic Song*), boasts
the strength, glory and richness of the State and people, but does not mention Kim Il
Sung or Kim Jong Il at all (see Appendix 13.4). Perhaps this is one of the reasons
why Kim Jong II decided in the 1980s, as Burdick (2010: 248) notes, to “reduce the
significance” of the national anthem and “inflate the importance” of songs such as

*Song of General Kim Il Sung*. Indeed, the tendency for North Korean songs to
venerate the North Korean leadership, in accordance with *Juche*, is certainly

evidenced by the fact that much of the North Korean populace does not even know
the words to the North Korean national anthem (Burdick, 2010: 248). They can, however, recite songs like *No Motherland without You* and *Song of General Kim Il Sung* perfectly and without hesitation. Testifying to the importance of *Song of General Kim Il Sung* in particular, public meetings and rallies commence not with the singing of the national anthem, but with *Song of General Kim Il Sung* (Burdick, 2010: 248), the lyrics of which are even carved into rocks leading to North Korea’s Mount Myohang, purportedly to “inspire walkers” trekking its paths (Portal, 2005: 93).

Given the extent to which a deep seeded contempt for the foreign and more prominently, the US, guides *Juche* and permeates North Korea, the expression and fostering of anti-US sentiment is also a marked preoccupation of North Korean songs. Two songs displaying such a preoccupation are *Soldiers Load your Bullets* and *Let our Righteous Bayonets Strike like Lightning*. As their titles suggest, these songs, which are but two examples from a pool of many, vow military retaliation against the US for its role in sanctioning and perpetuating Korea’s division. As discussed in Chapter 4, the initial US role aside, Pyongyang believes ongoing US troop presence in the South, together with Washington’s resulting continual interference in Korean affairs, to point to broader ‘sinister’ US imperial designs (Fall, 1975: 174).

North Korea’s unwavering and professed ‘eternal’ hatred for the US, as fuelled by these imperialistic charges, is unequivocally, fanatically and at times even frighteningly, expressed in both songs. Turning to the former example first, in *Soldiers Load your Bullets*, North Korea designates the US its “enemy,” promising to militarily ‘destroy’ the superpower for the injustices it believes Washington to have brought against it. Directly indicating North Korea’s intent to seek revenge on the
US for its (perceived) imperial ambitions, the third line of the song’s first verse asks the question: “Are we to forgive the Americans to start a fire of war?”

Then, in a likely reference to the alleged US ‘constant interference’ (Mosston, Ferrucci & Dachet, 1975: 155) in the internal affairs of Korea, (including its part in bringing about Korea’s partition), the second verse enquires: “Can we let live those who impaired our dignity?” Emphatically answering both questions in the negative, the song’s third and final verse vows to “serve” the US “bastards,” who it charges with underhandedly “blocking” Korea’s reunification, “death and carcasses” for their ‘crimes’ (see Appendix 13.6).

This seemingly unwavering disdain for the US is echoed in *Let our Righteous Bayonets Strike like Lightning*. In a similar vein to the previous example, the song’s first verse, again emphatic from the outset, warns that North Korea, with weapons “h[e]ld high . . . sharpened with fire of hatred,” will resolutely defend Korea against the US. It also promises to achieve reunification “under any circumstances” and “by all means” (see Appendix 13.7). Remembering that Pyongyang identifies the “US imperialist aggressors” as the “main obstacle” (Vidal, 1975: 130) to Korean reunification, with North Korea’s troop withdrawal demands unlikely to be met, North Korea’s promise can perhaps only be interpreted as one of war.

Underlining North Korea’s war readiness, claiming that “no peace can exist” with US soldiers – North Korea’s sworn “wicked enemies,” remaining in the South – the song’s second verse declares that the US will “burn . . . like an erupted volcano,” at the hands of North Korea. Testifying to North Korea’s singleness of aim and strength of purpose, the song concludes with North Koreans vowing to “let [their] righteous bayonets strike [the US] like lightning,” until such a day as “final victory” against the US is reached (see Appendix 13.7). True to the general tone of the piece,
thanks to the ‘correctness’ of Juche and the ‘greatness’ of the North Korean leadership, this victory is, of course, portrayed as all but guaranteed.

Given that Juche is, in essence, an anti-imperialist and anti-US principle (see Chapter 2), through their depiction of Americans as “wicked enemies” who robbed Korea of its “dignity,” by dividing the peninsula and “blocking” its reunification (or as clearly ‘imperialist’), both Soldiers Load your Bullets and Let our Righteous Bayonets Strike like Lightning, reflect a discernibly Jucheist character.

Likewise testifying to their Jucheist character, both songs revealingly acknowledge that the feelings felt, and the actions threatened against, the US, are directed by Juche. While it is true that Juche is not explicitly mentioned by name, its role in shaping the content of the songs is nonetheless apparent. In the first case, Soldiers Load your Bullets, for example, North Korea’s ‘war’ against the US is recognised as one constituting an “order” from Kim Jong Il; one “solemnly accepted” and followed “like lightning” by his people (see Appendix 13.6). Equally, in Let our Righteous Bayonets Strike like Lightning, it is described as one informed by “following” the “teachings” of leader, “General,” and “Paektu commander,” Kim Jong Il (see Appendix 13.7). Given that Juche is “the sole guide to all the [State’s] activities” (J. I. Kim, 1995: 148) – a fact backed up by the North Korean constitution – it is fair to assume that the “orders” and “teachings” spoken of are closely aligned with, and informed, by Juche.

Importantly, although additional pieces cannot be analysed due to constraints of scope, it needs to be said that these songs have their place amongst a plethora of others, which, slight variation in wording and imagery aside, mirror those drawn on

34 Kim Jong Il is referred to as the “Paektu commander” due to the official and mythical story of his birth, described in Chapter 6, that tells of the leader being born on North Korea’s sacred Mount Paektu.

35 Article 3 of North Korea’s constitution states that North Korea is “guided in its activities by the Juche idea” (as cited in Oh and Hassig, 2000: 13).
almost identically. One only needs to consider a selection of other song titles to grasp the general Jucheist character of North Korean music. Songs so-entitled Peace is on our Bayonets, We will Hold Rifles More Tightly, or the unequivocally titled, Death to U.S. Imperialist Aggressors are, for example, equally reflective of this anti-Americanism (Korean Central News Agency [KCNA], 26 June 2004; KCNA, 23 June 2006).

Indeed, given the degree to which North Korean music appears reflective of Juche, it would seem that the effect and ‘impact’ of the ideology is as widespread in North Korean culture, as it is deeply felt. Interpreted within the frame of the homogenisation and imperialism theses of Chapter 1 especially – wherein globalisation is identified as malicious, US-centred and imperialist – it would also appear that Juche is as pervasive an anti-imperialist and anti-US principle in practice, as it purports to be in theory. At the time of writing, speculation is swirling as to whether North Korean music will remain as heavily anti-American as under Kim Jong Il, under the leadership of his son and successor Kim Jong Un. The KCNA (7 July 2012) has since reported of the newly installed Kim’s desire to “steadily develop” both “traditional music and popular [foreign] music in a balanced manner” so as to “reflect the breadth of the times,” with some relative movement toward the foreign observable (see Conclusion). Though, as I return to argue in the thesis conclusion, the fact that the legitimacy of Juche, and indeed the North Korean leadership, is heavily predicated on anti-capitalist and anti-American ideals (see Chapter 2) will more than likely keep such movement minimal.

With the aim of further showcasing the extent of Juche’s influential reach within the frame of ‘music and performance,’ the following section examines how
North Korea’s renowned large-scale artistic gymnastics display, commonly known as ‘Mass Games,’ is likewise representative of the *Juche* idea.

### 7.1.2 *Juche Gymnastics: North Korea and Mass Games*

Described by a visiting British documentary crew in 2003 as the “largest choreographed spectacle in the world,” North Korea’s Mass Games exist as the ultimate cultural embodiment of the *Juche* idea (Gordon, 2005). In essence, performed since 1946 and aligning with the same Kim Il Sung (1975: 36) directive as North Korean art: “*Juche*-based . . . national in form and socialist in content” (see Section 4.3), Mass Games are a “Socialist Realism extravaganza” involving three elements: (1) gymnastics, (2) backdrop and (3) music (Gordon, 2005). Due to the focus already given to North Korean music, this section discusses the elements of gymnastics and backdrop. It needs to be noted however, that as per Kim Jong Il’s (2006: 9-10) decree, all music featuring in Mass Games must be “merry and lively,” “forceful and militant” and complement the “ideological content” of the overall performance. The music used as part of the Games should thus be regarded as similar to the examples offered in the previous section where ‘militant’ form is ensured by brass and woodwind instruments and lyrical homage is paid to *Juche* and the Kims.

The result of a combined effort of up to 80,000 gymnasts, innumerable choreographers, trainers, organisers and over 12,000 placard-turning students, who together are responsible for creating the accompanying backdrop – a gigantic mosaic of changing images stretching the length of Pyongyang’s May Day Stadium – the Mass Games truly exemplify the collectivist spirit of *Juche*. To give an idea of the Mass Games’ scope, Pyongyang’s May Day Stadium is one of the largest in the
world, with seating capacity for 150,000 people and more than 207,000 square metres of floor space (Mitchell, 2007: 9-11).

The Mass Games typically take place annually, but more than a single performance, are repeated twice-daily (Gordon, 2005), over the course of several months. The length of show runs vary, with the 2013 rendition of the Games officially announced as 22 July to 9 September (Koryo Group, 2013b), with the possibility of extension. Show runs are generally scheduled to coincide with a national holiday or other such celebratory occasion, such as the formation of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) or Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il’s birthday (Gordon, 2005). In 2013, the Games will mark North Korean ‘Victory Day’ on 27 July, which celebrates North Korea’s so-called ‘victory’ over the US in the Fatherland Liberation War (Lankov, 2007: 119), and the anniversary of the founding of North Korea, which took place on 9 September 1948 (Kwak and Joo, 2006: 139). As such, they afford North Korea with the opportunity to celebrate its achievements, self-sufficiency, ideological unity and above all, the ‘greatness’ of its leader(s).

Underscoring the national significance of the Mass Games, Kim Jong Il, who seldom appeared in public, generally attended (unless detained by matters of State), the opening performance (Gordon, 2005).

The award-winning documentary *A State of Mind* (2005) offers unprecedented insight into how North Korea’s Mass Games stand as “a perfect example” of its *Juche* ideology, lived out in practice. As well as providing a general overview of the workings of the State and the intricacies of its ideology, the documentary follows the day-to-day routines of two North Korean girls (Pak Hyon Sun, 13 and Kim Song Yon, 11) as they prepare to take part in the 2003 rendition of the Games.
As revealed, it is a first-time experience for neither, with Pak Hyon Sun having had the privilege of performing three times previously; Kim Song Yon, twice. Yet, the honour and excitement of the event shows no signs of waning for either girl. Explaining how the thought of being in the presence of Kim Jong Il still stirs a certain anxiety and thrill in her, now fourth-time participant, Pak Hyon Sun, remarks:

> When I think that I will perform in front of the General [Kim Jong Il] . . . my heart trembles and pounds (Gordon, 2005).

Likewise, Kim Song Yon expresses a similar sense of anticipation, when she cites leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il as the driving forces behind her efforts, reporting:

> To strengthen my resolve to do well in gymnastics and school I study with a picture of the Great Leader and the General (Gordon, 2005).

*A State of Mind* covers more than eight months in the lead up to the commencement of the Games, which in this case, were to be repeated twice-daily, for twenty days. The preparation and commitment required is substantial. As director and narrator Daniel Gordon (2005) observes and the documentary clearly shows, for those who strive for Mass Games selection “the Mass Games are an obsession that governs their life.” Along with other members of the so-called ‘Mass Games Club,’ Pak Hyon Sun and Kim Song Yon train for a minimum of two hours a day, with the number of hours allocated to training significantly increased, in excess of six hours, as the scheduled date for the Games draws near. After all, according to Kim Jong Il, technical ability is only one of the prerequisites for Mass Games selection. Another is that those chosen “are unfailingly loyal to the Party and the leader” (J. I. Kim,
Pak Hyon Sun admits that expectations and scheduling are gruelling, but that thoughts of the “glorious day of serving the General” have spurred her to train “with loyalty and sweated devotion.” She adds that although she often hurts herself or experiences aches and pains due to the heavy physical nature of training: “I long for the day when I perform for the General so I train through the pain.” This painstaking and lengthy preparation, together with the almost incalculable amount of time dedicated to preparation and performance, underscores the paramount importance given to the event by the North Korean leadership and people.

In view of the above, it can be argued that the Mass Games both celebrate and necessitate loyalty and devotion to the Party and leader. These are each qualities emphasised and demanded by Juche (see Chapter 2). The level of commitment outlined above plainly demonstrates faithfulness and dedication to the cause. Though, another pivotal aspect of the Mass Games is its call to unity. In the introductory paragraph to this section, it was noted that some 80,000 gymnasts and 12,000 students are required to work as one in order to successfully carry out the coordinated backdrop and floor display. In this sense, the Games can be viewed as a reflection of the Juche idea in that they call for “the subordination of the individual’s desires to the needs of the collective” (Gordon, 2005).

As discussed in Chapter 2, Juche promotes unity in thought and purpose, or a synchronicity of body and mind. In this vein, it is not the physical synchronicity of the Mass Games performance that is of primary importance, but rather the spiritual and ideological unity (around Juche) to which it points. This is made apparent when Pak Hyon Sun speaks of how she and her Mass Games Club classmates perform their
synchronised gymnastics routines with their “hearts in unison.” As she goes on to explain “because you do [the routines] together with classmates, group power develops and individualism completely disappears” (Gordon, 2005).

The Mass Games thus reflect an embodiment of *Juche* in that they reinforce the collectivism inherent in the ideology. As far as individual participants are concerned, the Games mirror *Juche* as they dictate individual submission to the will of the collective. In addition, they also induce a certain degree of dependence on the part of individuals, who must trust others to submit to the same will. A Mass Games performance is comprised of groups of around 6,000 gymnasts, which together make up chapters and, finally, a whole. Performers in the Mass Games, such as Pak Hyon Sun and Kim Song Yon are members of only one group, which having its part to play, must fit seamlessly into the overall story of the Games. Everyone is expected and must, for the Games to be successfully performed, *act as one*. As Gordon (2005) asserts “each of the 6,000 performers is synchronised to the group, each group to the chapter and each chapter to the whole.” This acting as one, with one mind and purpose, is as Gordon (2005) aptly defines it, a material “embodiment of the *Juche* philosophy of self-reliance.”

While Mass Games have been a drawing card for tourists and have received international coverage since the inaugural performance of 1946, just as with North Korea’s celebratory public parades, “the target audience is internal” (Gordon, 2005). Not only are participants in the Games spurred to embrace collectivist ideals, but the audience, comprised predominately of North Koreans, is ‘shown’ the value and power of teamwork; inspired and reinvigorated (in theory and intent at least) to pursue the collectivist goals of the State.
Importantly, the virtues of unity, loyalty and devotion notwithstanding, Mass Games also exemplify other *Juche*-based principles. This is hardly surprising considering Generalissimo Kim Jong Il’s (2006: 4) insistence that the *Juche* idea “must constitute the basic content of mass gymnastic productions;” and so it does. As with North Korean museum exhibitions, a key objective of the Games is to reinforce the personality cults surrounding the leadership, including the revisionist history on which they are based. Consequently, the overall spectacle “shines with the revolutionary exploits of President Kim Il Sung . . . [and his] undying feats” (*KCNA*, 8 September 2008), the particulars of which are outlined in the previous chapter.

So as to undeniably connect the ‘feats’ represented in the gymnastic routines to Kim Il Sung, the Great Leader’s portrait must be depicted on the backdrop.
However, as Kim Jong Il clarified to Mass Games producers in April 1987, the utilisation of his image is subject to a number of conditions and considerations. In the interest of maintaining an atmosphere of reverence, for example, his likeness must be shown “brightly and respectfully” (J. I. Kim, 2006: 7) Though, while obligatory, portraits of Kim Il Sung should only be drawn on sparingly – at only the most pivotal and appropriate moments – through fear that “too frequent display of his image may degrade it” (J. I. Kim, 2006: 8).

With the aim of demonstrating that the showcasing of Kim Il Sung’s professed ‘achievements’ is a recurring preoccupation of Mass Games, as is the reverent exhibition of his portrait, Image 58 and Image 59 respectively, show a seemingly identical scene being acted out as part of the 2005 and 2007 Mass Games.

As in the case of North Korean museum exhibitions, I expect that, in mirroring past trends and wider State efforts to bolster leadership legitimacy (in accordance with Juche), Mass Games will evolve to praise and reflect a strict reverence for North Korea’s third and emerging leader, Kim Jong Un. Recent changes to the North Korean music and performance scene suggest that they could also evolve to take on a relatively more foreign, though still distinctively Juche-centric, flavour (see Conclusion).

Turning attention to the backdrop more specifically, in addition to paying homage to North Korea’s leaders, the array of colourful images complementing the gymnastics floor display, also serve to showcase North Korea’s accomplishments and glorify its ideology. The images featured on the backdrop are thus highly and deliberately Jucheist in orientation. As Kim Jong Il (2006: 7) illuminated in a talk to Mass Games producers:
The backdrop is a major means of visually and vividly expressing the *ideological content* of the mass gymnastics. It consists of a variety of pictures, letters, and three-dimensional, rhythmic descriptions, which explain or supplement the ideas and themes that are difficult to express by means of gymnastic formations and music (emphasis added).

To begin with the hallmark principle of *Juche*: self-reliance, the backdrop is purposefully designed to venerate and endorse North Korean independence. In this way, it works either to encourage a general commitment to self-sufficiency, or to promote a specific pursuit centring around the ideal. *Image 60, Image 61* and *Image 62* illustrate how the policy of self-reliance has been previously represented on a Mass Games backdrop. *Image 60*, reading “Independence, peace, goodwill” featured in the


322
2007 rendition of the Mass Games. Evoking similar imagery to that of Image 4, pictured in Section 2.3.1, the fact that the words “independence,” “peace” and “goodwill” are used together, in that order, gives the impression that independence, or in North Korea’s case complete self-reliance, is the only path to peace and prosperity; and by extension, the only rightful path to follow. The inclusion of flowers and doves also suggests that peace in North Korea is inextricably linked to and, dependent on, the continued observance of Juche and its self-reliance policy.

This ideologically laden propagandist message was repeated the following year during the 2008 Mass Games. In this instance, the slogan portrayed on the backdrop is “Prosper eternally! Kim Il Sung’s Chosun!” (Chosun (Joseon) meaning ‘Korea,’ or in this case, ‘North Korea’). Within the context of Juche, this phrase (and image) serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, by referencing Kim Il Sung, it honours North Korea’s Great Leader and his efforts to build and ‘safeguard’ the Nation and people. On the other, its emblem of ‘eternal prosperity,’ echoes the
Juche-induced belief that the model of self-reliance is “the decisive guarantee for the successful carrying out of the revolution and construction” (Revolutionary Activities, 1970: n.pag.). In other words, it works to ‘prove’ that an adherence to Juche will bring triumph to every endeavour, ensuring North Korean longevity and supremacy.

Correspondingly, Image 62 offers an example of how the backdrop of Mass Games is directed toward promoting a specific regime campaign, centred around the principle of self-reliance. The scene depicts a number of North Korean workers from a range of fields including construction, farming and music, accompanied by the army, advancing forward. The middle-positioned serviceman is carrying a banner that reads “150-day Battle.” To understand the meaning of this image, some contextualisation is necessary. At the time the Mass Games were underway, the North Korean government was in the process of initiating and promoting what it termed a ‘150-Day Battle.’ Essentially, this ‘battle’ entailed an increase in production targets, expected work hours and a number of other government sanctioned construction and building projects (H. Kim, 2009a). It was conceived in an effort to
strengthen the North Korean economy in the face of US-imposed sanctions, but in such a way that aligned with the *Juche* idea and its independence mantra. In this regard, *Image 62*, as indicated by the resolute commitment to the cause expressed in the picture, (through the raised fist, for example), functions to mobilise everyday North Korean workers to contribute to the progress and prosperity of the State, leadership and masses, as demanded by the *Juche* idea. Conceivably, messages of this kind reoccur in one, or multiple forms, throughout Mass Games performances, whatever their year. Accordingly, it is argued that the Mass Games, and its backdrop, clearly project the *Juche* mandate of self-reliance.

Within this scope, in line with the anti-imperialist and anti-American positioning of *Juche*, many of the images forming part of the backdrop are overtly anti-American and to a lesser extent, anti-Japanese. For the sake of brevity, I concentrate on anti-Americanism here. As laid out in *A State of Mind* (2005), “hatred of the US is immortalised in Mass Games.” In fact, as far as representations of the US are concerned, the Mass Games is another well-oiled cogwheel in the North Korean propaganda machine; another forum through which to fuel eternal hatred (Gordon, 2005). In a similar way to the propaganda posters and exhibition pieces of previous chapters, the Mass Games backdrop features as one giant propaganda poster, with one crucial difference. Unlike previously presented examples, the anti-American images of the Games are supported by two additional elements: that of the gymnastics floor display and the accompanying music. In terms of the image itself, however, the discernible meaning and intent is remarkably, though not unexpectedly, akin to that which exudes from images 6 through 8, examined in section 2.3.1. For illustrative purposes, three explicitly anti-American scenes to have appeared on the
backdrop to Mass Games performances (Images 63-65) are pictured and analysed in the coming pages.

The message behind Image 63 does not require much explanation, reflecting similar (anti-American) sentiments to the poster examples of previous chapters. In fact, in a scene remarkably similar to that depicted in the previously drawn on examples of Image 6 and Image 34, it shows a group of three North Koreans advancing, with hostile intent, towards one of the United States’ most recognisable landmarks: the Capitol Building. The centre figure is holding a rifle whose line of trajectory, as shown in the picture, is fixed on the US icon. To the right one can see the Capitol Building destroyed, consumed in flames upon impact. Located in the US national capital of Washington D.C. and the meeting place of US Congress, the Capitol Building in many ways is a symbol of the United States, its government, leaders and ideologies, including ‘freedom’ (as evidenced by the Statue of Freedom which tops its dome). Viewed through this frame, the image clearly confirms North Korea’s resolve to “completely annihilate” (I. S. Kim, 1986: 332) the US, its capitalist tendencies and perceived imperialist ambition.
Vitally, as noted, North Korea’s ‘quest’ to rid the world of US imperialism and its ‘lackeys,’ including other imperial nations (as defined by the North), is one repeatedly referenced through the Mass Games backdrop. Illustrating that Image 63 is not an atypical case, Image 64 likewise alludes to and promises, the United States’ ‘imminent demise.’

![Image 64](image.png)


In this instance, a US serviceman, identified by the ‘US’ lettering on the bow of the ship and the floating American flag, is seen trying to keep afloat after his vessel has been damaged, doubtlessly by a North Korean attack. As in the previous example, North Korean contempt for the US is palpable, as is its intention and readiness to ‘sink’ its US enemy.

The scene depicted in Image 65 is much the same in terms of its overall content. It shows a further two US servicemen surrendering (presumably) to North Korean forces, evidencing, in the minds of North Koreans at least, North Korea’s military readiness, capacity and superiority vis-à-vis the United States.
Hence, on the surface level, the anti-US rhetoric of the image (and that of Image 63 and Image 64 as well), mirror Juche in that the ideology is, as repeatedly asserted, essentially anti-Americanist. Beyond this, however, the images portray North Korea as a State enjoying a position of superior military strength and even invincibility, not only against the US, but conceivably, any other designated enemy of the North Korean revolution. In this vein, they also stress the importance of unity (in defence, but also more generally) and treat self-reliance as a guarantee of national security, success and supremacy, thus echoing some of the basic propositions of the Juche idea (see Chapter 2).

The fact that anti-Americanism is expressed and reaffirmed alongside the Juche-oriented ideas of unity, loyalty and self-reliance, affords the struggle for independence even greater legitimacy within the North Korean context. The US and the ‘foreign’ by extension, is deemed as evil and regarded as the antithesis of Juche; obstacles to the freedom and prosperity Juche is purported to characterise. Yet, at the same time, in the North Korean understanding, adherence to Juche automatically assures victory against such obstacles. With Juche presented as the only means
through which national security and sovereignty can be secured (see Chapter 2), the
cultivation of anti-Americanism and negative perceptions of the US, as seen in
images 63 to 65, solidify the place of self-reliance and collectivism within the North
Korean *Juche* revolution.

In light of the above, the all-encompassing spectacle of the Mass Games can
certainly be described, as in *A State of Mind* (2005) and more importantly, by Kim
Jong Il (2006: 2), as “the embodiment of the [*Juche*] idea.” Within the frame of the
North Korean propaganda apparatus, it also features, as declared by the late North
Korean leader, as “an art work that shows in a great epic picture the line and policy
put forward by [the Korean Workers’] Party on the basis of the *Juche* idea” (J. I.
Kim, 2006: 2). As such, in the North Korean mindset, Mass Games function as a
“major means” (through both practice and performance), of “demonstrating” and
“firmly equipping” the North Korean Party and populace, with “the validity and
vitality” of the *Juche* idea (J. I. Kim, 2006: 1).

With the previous two subsections having sought to establish the extent to
which the *Juche* idea manifests in North Korean music and performance, the
question remains: What of the South Korean case? In attempting to answer this
question, the final parts of this chapter are devoted to investigating how South
Korean music serves as a practical application of the *Segyehwa* policy, and its
emphasis on cultural hybridisation. Consequently, the following section analyses
specific recorded examples from the South Korean music scene, gauging how closely
they exemplify Kim Young-sam’s *Segyehwa* policy, in practice.
7.2 Music in South Korea: K-Pop and the Segyehwa Policy

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, this section illustrates how South Korean music reflects the objectives of the Segyehwa policy by embodying a synthesis of East and West. Working to substantiate this claim, the following draws on a variety of South Korean (group and solo artist) song examples, also appearing in my recently published article “Koreanising Globalisation: Nation-state Agency and the Case of Korea” (2012). Owing to the particular historical framing of the policy, focus is given to those pieces produced and publicly released following the inception of the Segyehwa policy in 1994. Within this scope, a key aim is to explain how these examples, individually and collectively, exemplify the priorities of the Kim Young-sam administration and its globalisation (Koreanisation) policy. Importantly, the examples drawn on are seen as representing a broader cultural direction of South Korea that highlights the hybridity discussed in previous chapters. That is, the musical hybridity reflected, in holding firm to the directives of the Segyehwa policy, can be seen to demonstrate how Western influences can be and often are Koreanised within the South Korean context.

As it is beyond the scope of this chapter to present a large quantity of individual samples, for the sake of analysis, examples have been selected from, and categorised into, separate genres. To this end, I have chosen seven South Korean songs to examine. Their categorisation into different musical genres is deliberate and has been applied in service of two ends. Firstly, with the genres themselves Western in origin, their utilisation alongside traditional Korean musical influences further underscores the hybrid nature of the songs. Secondly, the diverse genre range drawn

36 With the exception of Seo Taiji and Boys’ Hayuhga which was released in mid-1993. However, released during Kim Young-sam’s presidency, it was possibly still influenced by the emphasis his government placed on globalisation and the ‘Koreanisation’ of foreign influences.
on, shows that the cultural hybridisation of South Korean music is not peculiar to any one genre or a few select songs, but is instead a widely observable practice, manifesting in a range of songs and song types. For the purpose of clarity, the titles and names appearing have been Romanised, with English translations given in parentheses where available. With the aim of reinforcing the amalgamative nature of the song selections, their hybrid features are briefly summarised in Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Song Title</th>
<th>Genre</th>
<th>Artist</th>
<th>Hybrid Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Hayuhga          | Heavy Metal | Seo Taiji and Boys | • Traditional Korean double-reed wind instrument (Taepyeongsao) combined with Heavy Metal genre, Western electric guitar, bass, drums and turntable scratching.  
• Korean and English vocals |
| Dala Dala        | Techno     | Lee Jung-hyun   | • Traditional Korean flute (Daeguem), hourglass-shaped drum (Janggu) and plucked zither (Gayageum) play in counterpoint to Western electronic dance and techno rhythms. |
| I believe        | Pop        | Lee Soo-young   | • Hybridised lyrics – usage of the English title phrase ‘I believe.’  
• Music from the traditional Korean Daegum Gayageum and Haegum (bowed fiddle) sound alongside the Western piano, drums and electro-acoustic guitar. |
| Take the A Train | Jazz       | Stone Jazz      | • Cultural appropriation of Western Jazz Standard (Take the A Train).  
• Western jazz trio (piano, bass and drums) utilised alongside three traditional Korean instruments: plucked zither (Gayageum), bowed fiddle (Haegum) and oboe (Piri). |
| Highway Star     | Jazz       | Stone Jazz      | • Korean rendering of Western hit song (Highway Star by Deep Purple).  
• Sounds of Western jazz trio merged with traditional Korean instrument trio (as above). |
| Canon in D       | Hip-Hop    | Lee Chang-yui   | • Appropriation of classical Western score (Pachelbel’sCanon).  
• Juxtaposition of traditional Korean plucked zither (Gayageum) and human beat-box and scratch. |
| Hangugin         | Hip-Hop    | MC Sniper       | • Combining of three Korean folk instruments: the Gayageum, Daegum and Ajaeng (bowed zither), with Western inspired hip-hop beats and rap-style vocals.  
• Genre hybridisation through the simultaneous use of Western 'hip-hop’ and South Korean 'Minjung Kayo.’ |
As can be seen, each of the seven songs analysed showcases Korean/Western musical fusion in some way. I now turn to examine the seven song examples in greater detail, beginning with Seo Taiji and Boys’ *Hayuhga.*

**Hayuhga (What can I do?) Seo Taiji and Boys (Heavy Metal – 1993)**

Released in mid 1993 as the title track of three-man band Seo Taiji and Boys’ second album, *Hayuhga* demonstrates the hybridising potential of globalisation, in that it exemplifies an amalgam of Western and Korean musical qualities. In its particular case, the sounds of a traditional Korean double-reed wind instrument (the *Taepyeongso*), feature alongside Western-oriented instruments such as the electric guitar, bass, drum-kit and turntable scratching. Admittedly, for the most part, the two instrument types are not employed concurrently, but rather in alternation. The *Taepyeongso* recurs on two occasions during the song, each of which is separated by a three minute interval and lasts for approximately twenty seconds.\(^{38}\) The true hybrid character of the song is revealed during each of the *Taepyeongso* solos, when the traditional instrument is heard over electric guitars, drums and hi-hat.

This notwithstanding, *Hayuhga* was deemed significant at the time because, as ethnomusicologist Nathan Hesselink (2004: 2) explains, it “represented the first mainstream popular song to feature the sound of a traditional instrument.” Moreover, the fact that the *Taepyeongso* was played by a notable South Korean folk percussionist by the name of Kim Duk-soo, signalled a coming together, for the first time, of “the traditional and popular music worlds” (Hesselink, 2004: 2). In this

37 The title *Hayuhga* is inspired by a late 14th century Korean poem (*shijo*) of the same name (Hesselink, 2004: 3).
38 The first occurrence is between c.a. 1:34-54; the second between c.a.4:28-48.
respect, Seo Taiji and Boys’ *Hayuhga* provided other South Korean musicians with a model they themselves could emulate.

In addition to the hybridisation of instruments, cultural hybridisation is also evident in the song’s lyrics, in that Korean vocals are supplemented, at times, by English commentary. For instance, the ‘did you enjoy that?,’ which follows the extended guitar riff occurring between c.a. 2:02-2:56, the frequently repeated English word ‘Yeah’ and the common Western rock song phrases, ‘shut up!’ and ‘freak it!’ occurring at c.a. 3:27 and c.a. 0:28; c.a. 3:22 respectively.

**Dala Dala (Moon) - Lee Jung-hyun (Techno - 2002)**

Correspondingly, appearing in 2002 as a hit single from Lee Jung-hyun’s fourth album *I Love Natural*, *Dala Dala* draws on both Korean and Western instruments in a similar manner: infusing traditional Korean music with modern Western techno rhythms. Specifically, it contrasts the sounds of the *Gayageum*, as well as those of a traditional Korean flute and hourglass-shaped drum, known as the *Daegeum* and *Janggu* respectively, with electronic dance elements.

Lee’s usage of these traditional instruments is especially apparent at the commencement of the song, which begins with the introduction of the *Janggu*, followed by the *Gayageum* and *Daegeum* consecutively. The three traditional Korean instruments then play in parallel, unaccompanied for the first thirty seconds of the song, with the exception of a soft metallic pulse, which can be heard as the *Daegeum* starts to sound. These traditional instruments are then joined by mechanical percussion, synthetic beats and Korean vocals. Yet, despite the presence of a synthesiser, drum machine, sampler and keyboard, the Korean instruments remain audible; discernible at various points throughout the song, both in the background
I believe - Lee Soo-young (Pop - 1999)

Lee Soo-young’s 1999 debut single *I believe* also showcases hybridity through its juxtaposition of Korean and Western instruments. Namely, it places traditional Korean instruments such as the *Gayageum, Daegum* and *Haegeum* in counterpoint to Western ones: including the piano, drums and electro-acoustic guitar. As in the case of *Dala Dala*, traditional instruments feature prominently for approximately half a minute at the beginning of the song, although in this instance, rather than being unaccompanied, they are complemented by digital piano.

In this regard, the song demonstrates an East-West amalgamation from its very outset, as the piano, *Haegeum, Gayageum* and *Daegeum* begin in succession, followed soon after by drum-kit and guitar. Importantly, these traditional Korean and Western instruments remain integrated for the entire song, with Korean influence figuring intermittently in both the background and foreground. For example, Korean instruments take precedence over Western ones between c.a. 3:29-33 and at the conclusion of the song, which like the song’s beginning, is heavily informed by Korean musical traditions. Moreover, as with *Hayuhga*, the lyrics themselves are slightly hybridised, though to a lesser extent. In the case of Lee Soo-young’s single, the verses and chorus are sung predominantly in Korean, with the exception of the phrase “I believe”: the song’s title, which is sung in English.

39 While Korean instruments can be heard throughout the song they are particularly noticeable at certain points, including between c.a. 2:12-27; c.a. 3:00-33, and as noted, at the song’s conclusion between c.a. 4:38-45.
Take the A Train - Stone Jazz (Jazz - 2007)

In line with Lee Soo-young, jazz trio Stone Jazz synchronously combines Korean and Western acoustic instruments in their cultural appropriation of Duke Ellington and Billy Strayhorn’s Take the A Train. In fact, each of the eleven albums they have thus far recorded since the release of their debut album in 2006, in some way reveals a convergence of Korean and Western musical culture. Featuring on Stone Jazz’s seventh album On Eastern Angle, unveiled in May 2007 (Stone Jazz, 2011a), the song merges sounds from a typical Western jazz trio of piano, contrabass and drums with those of three traditional Korean instruments: a Gayageum, a Korean two-stringed bowed fiddle, known as a Haegeum and a Korean oboe, or Piri.

Take the A Train begins with a slow and light striking of the snare drum, the drumming becoming progressively louder and faster over the first fourteen seconds of the song. The Haegeum, Piri, piano and hi-hat are then introduced and play together between c.a. 0:14-35 before the Gayageum and contrabass take over, complemented by piano. From that point forward, the six instruments, both Western and Korean, accompany each other in a variety of different combinations, successfully displaying a musical intermixing of East and West.

Consider, for example, the sequence of alternating (yet, hybridised) instrumental combinations occurring over the last two-and-a-half minutes of the song. Between c.a. 2:37 and 3:10, the Gayageum, bass and piano play concurrently, immediately followed by the Haegeum, Piri, piano and drums (hi-hat and snare drum, in alternation) from c.a. 3:11-45. Then, over c.a. 3:51-4:04, all instruments of Korean and Western persuasion, including the Gayageum, Haegeum, Piri, piano, bass and snare drum, can be heard together in a bridge, while the Haegeum, Piri, hi-hat and piano, feature for the remainder of the song, between c.a. 4:05-5:00.
Highway Star - Stone Jazz (Jazz - 2010)

In illustration of Stone Jazz’s overarching tendency to interweave Western styles with Korean sentiment, I now draw on a second and more recent example, the tenth and final track from their 2011 album: The Beyonders’ in Live. As with Take the A Train and indeed the majority of their musical offerings, the track provides a Korean rendering of a well known Western hit song: Highway Star by Deep Purple (Stone Jazz, 2011b).

Blending the same Western jazz trio of contrabass, drums and piano, with the three traditional Korean instruments of Gayageum, Haegeum and Piri, the song is a prime example of musical fusion. Demonstrating over thirteen minutes of Korean/Western musical amalgamation, it begins with the introduction of the drums, followed by the bass, Gayageum, piano, Haegeum and Piri, in that order. For the most part, in the spirit of musical hybridisation, the instruments play in unison, with no one instrument overpowering the performance. That said, the Piri becomes more prominent, relative to the other instruments, between c.a. 5:55-8:05, though the others can still be heard. The Western instruments also become subordinate to the Gayageum, Haegeum and Piri, from c.a. 8:06-10:43, continuing to play only faintly in the background.

Appropriately, the tendency for “Jazz and Korean tradition, Western and Korean [to] heavenly sympathize each other” in their music, has earned Stone Jazz the label “crossover Jazz band” (Stone Jazz, 2011a: para. 5). Renowned as a group whose music manifests as a strong intermixing of traditional Korean and Western musical elements, in the words of Jazz columnist Choi Kyu-yong, Stone Jazz embodies “the harmonization of regionalization and globalization together,” with its
music not only carrying a “Global” flavour, but an identifiably “Glocal” one as well (Stone Jazz, 2011c: para. 8).

**Canon in D - Lee Chang-yui (Hip-Hop - 2006)**

Similarly, Lee Chang-yui’s *Canon in D* also appropriates Western musical forms to incorporate a sense of (South) Korean originality. It achieves this end by taking a Western musical piece and Koreanising it through the use of Korean instruments. Namely, as its title suggests, it models the tune of Pachelbel’s Canon, a score composed and performed in the seventeenth-century by German born Johann Pachelbel. Juxtaposing the traditional Korean zither, the *Gayageum* in counterpoint with human beat-box and scratch, the song fuses Western and Korean elements, which simultaneously present, generate a ‘hybridisation’ of East and West.

A South Korean commercial, featuring Lee’s *Canon in D*, released in advertisement of a Seoul residential skyscraper project (E-Convenient World) visually conveys this Korean/Western hybridisation (AznBoiKevin5o4, 2009). Starring two break-dancers from a local “B-Boy” group known as *Last for One*, a DJ and a beat-boxer, the commercial exudes Western influence. Yet, it also embraces Korean tradition. While the DJ, beat-boxer and break-dancers are clearly Western in origin, these Western representations feature alongside six female *Gayageum* players, who can be seen calmly plucking their instruments to the Western beat. Therefore, despite the presence of the ‘Westernised’ DJ, beat-boxer and break-dancers, the *Gayageum* players, in exhibiting Korean tradition, exemplify South Korea’s ability to maintain a sense of cultural autonomy in a globalised context.

As each member plays their respective part, the camera cuts back and forth between close-ups of individuals and long shots, in which all performers and
instruments are visible (AznBoiKevin5o4, 2009). The clip begins with a long shot, before moving to a close-up of the Gayageum, break-dancers, beat-boxer and DJ in turn; a process which is repeated in varied order throughout the commercial. This continuous alternation between the Gayageum players and Western hip-hop inspired images, confirms that Lee Chang-yui’s Canon in D displays a certain interaction and interdependence between Western and (South) Korean culture.

**Hangugin (Korean/Korean People) - MC Sniper (Kim Jung-yoo) (Hip-Hop - 2003)**

Finally, as with the above examples, MC Sniper’s *Hangugin* also mixes Korean and Western musical style and sensibility. Released in May of 2003 as the sixth track of MC Sniper’s second album *Chohaeng* (First Journey) (Hesselink, 2004: 4), *Hangugin* combines Korean folk instruments such as the Gayageum, Daegeum and Ajaeng (bowed zither) with Western inspired hip-hop beats and rap-style vocals.

‘First Journey’ was a fitting title for the album in that it was the first (of its genre) to attempt the ‘journey’ into the world of musical Korean-Western hybridisation. That is, *Chohaeng* was the first hip-hop compilation to fuse hip-hop rhythms with traditional Korean music (Hesselink, 2004: 4). Listening through the album, MC Sniper’s deliberate emphasis on traditional Korean music and culture is immediately apparent. The introductory track, also entitled *Chohaeng*, exemplifies this emphasis through its usage of only traditional Korean instruments. Although, more of a celebration of Korean musical tradition in its own right than an example of musical hybridisation, the song nonetheless provides a clear expression of intent.
To return to *Hangugin*, the deliberate hybrid nature of the song is encapsulated by the fact that it is described by artist, MC Sniper as “Goguryeo hip-hop” (see Appendix 13.8). Goguryeo was the largest and most powerful of Korea’s ancient ‘Three Kingdoms,’ reigning over Northern Korea and Manchuria (D. K. Kim, 2005: 23-25). The phrase “Goguryeo hip-hop,” as well as alluding to the potential and untapped strength of South Korea, can thus be taken to mean ‘(South) Korean hip-hop,’ where *Hangugin* seeks to give the Western genre of hip-hop a uniquely Korean flavour.

True to this intent, the piece begins with the traditional sounds of the *Gayageum*, which are, after approximately four seconds, joined by those of the *Ajaeng*. The *Gayageum* and *Ajaeng* play in tandem for a further six seconds before the introduction of the *Daegeum*. It is not until eighteen seconds into the song that musical elements of a Western type are audible, first in the form of scratch, then a conventional drum kit (including snare drum, bass drum and hi-hat), rap-like vocals and synthesiser.

From this point forward, musical influences of East and West complement each other, alternating in their dominance. For example, as far as Korean instruments are concerned, the *Gayageum* can be clearly heard between c.a. 0:42-1:02 and c.a. 2:26-45. It also features independently over the last few seconds of the song. Similarly, the *Daegeum* provides the dominant instrumental voice from c.a. 1:03-20; 2:47-3:05 and c.a. 4:10-30, while the *Ajaeng* is the leading instrument between c.a. 2:05-25 and c.a. 4:31-52.

---

40 The remaining ‘Three Kingdoms’ were *Silla* and *Paekche* (D. K. Kim, 2005: 23-25). Korea’s ‘Three Kingdoms’ period is believed to have ran from 57 B.C.E to 668 C.E, though there is some contestation concerning the exact dates (Kwak and Joo, 2003: 78). Despite the ‘Three Kingdoms’ label, other smaller states also existed in Korea for some of that time (Seth, 2006: 27).
Attesting to the hybrid nature of the piece, the respective sounds of the *Gayageum* and *Daegeum* are accompanied by Western beats and vocals. In the case of the *Ajaeng*, however, Western snare drum and hi-hat beats persist, but vocals are absent. Yet, this alternating instrumental dominance notwithstanding, there are times, some more discernible than others, when non-dominant instruments can still be heard, albeit behind the leading instrument.41

Following this same pattern, Western sounds also dominate at particular points during the song. For instance, the sounds of hip-hop ‘synthetic’ beats and digital effects figure, in the place of Korean instruments, along with those of the snare drum, hi-hat and Western vocals, between c.a. 18-41; c.a. 1:44-2:04 and c.a. 3:08-28. Accordingly, the merging of Korean and Western musical style, as discussed above, makes MC Sniper’s *Hangugin* a strong example of musical (Western/Korean) hybridisation.

Interestingly, the lyrics and themes of the song also add to the hybrid nature of the piece, in that they provide a social commentary that reflects a uniquely (pre-division) Korean and South Korean context. His mixing of traditional Korean and Western instruments aside, as an artist, MC Sniper has garnered a reputation for using the Western genre of hip-hop to address and call for, social reform. Particularly, he is known for his tendency to blend a genre of music peculiar to South Korea, known as ‘Minjung Kayo,’ with hip-hop styling. *Minjung Kayo* was employed in the 1980s as part of South Korea’s struggle for democracy and was largely concerned, with “social reform and the arduous lives of the working class” (*Korea Times*, 13 September, 2002: para. 2).

---

41 In those instances where the *Ajaeng* is the leading instrument, for example, the *Gayageum* can be heard in the background, particularly between c.a. 4:31-52.
In an interview with Korea Times (13 September, 2002: para. 3, 7) MC Sniper revealed it to be his intention, in the spirit of Minjung Kayo, to sing about South Korea’s contemporary “social problems;” to “deliver [social] messages and enlighten people” through his lyrics. Fittingly, considering the title of this example (Korean), Hangugin is very much geared toward delivering a South Korean-specific message to a South Korean audience.

Throughout the various verses of Hangugin, MC Sniper attempts to conjure feelings of national pride by portraying South Korea as a strong and resilient nation. Referencing a range of Korean historical periods, he favourably labels South Korea as the “tiger of Chosôn” (Joseon) the “King of Koguryŏ” (Goguryeo) and describes his nation: the “true rising sun of East Asia,” as “a tiny yet powerful boat that will never be capsized” (Hesselink, 2004: 4). As Hesselink (2004: 4) asserts, each of these references is made in an effort to incite South Koreans to “rise up” and “embrace an attitude of power and confidence” in the present-day, by freeing themselves from the shackles and burdens of the past. In so doing, MC Sniper’s endeavour ‘to inspire’ his audiences, adds to the hybrid flavour of Hangugin.

In terms of lyrics and theme, the song is Western in that it clearly draws on the Western genre of rap and hip-hop and its tendency for social commentary. Yet, at the same time, to apply an argument forwarded by Howard (2006a: 82), blending hip-hop with Minjung Kayo (a South Korean mode of social commentary), ensures the song a South Korean character in that it lack[s] the baggage” generally associated with the genre of hip-hop in “the Western World.” As MC Sniper explains (Korea Times, 13 September, 2002: para. 3), there seems to be a pervading assumption in the West that hip-hop is “lousy and low.” Though, by directly referencing Korean (pre-
and post-division) themes and history, *Hangugin* works to elevate the standing of the (now hybridised) genre, or as MC Sniper puts it, to “cut off that stereotype.”

Owing to MC Sniper’s melding of Western and South Korean genre conventions (*Minjung Kayo* and hip-hop), together with his combining of Korean and Western instruments, *Hangugin* exemplifies a uniquely hybridised (South Koreanised) style, that sets it apart from ‘Western’ music.

In light of the above, I argue that these examples, especially when viewed in conjunction with the research of Howard (2006) Provine, Hwang and Kershaw (2000) and Shim (2006) (see Chapter 1), demonstrate that South Korean music displays a hybrid style, which in fusing Western and South Korean influences, remains distinctively South Korean while being simultaneously global in nature. Notably, the appropriations observable in each, suggest that while Western influence is undeniably discernable in South Korea, it is not openly domineering or impervious to resistance or alteration. Instead, each instance indicates that South Korean musicians have managed to retain and continue to exhibit, identifiably South Korean characteristics. Vitally, the apparent cultural hybridity nurtured by the South Korean music scene supports the contention that the objectives and principles of Kim Young-sam’s *Segyehwa* policy are unfolding in practice, within South Korea, as evidenced by the production, performance and consumption of South Korean music.
Conclusion

This thesis has examined three research questions. The first of these focused on what insights the globalisation strategies of North (*Juche*) and South Korea (*Segyehwa*) explain about the cultural ‘divisions’ at play on the Korean peninsula. The second pondered the manner and extent to which past and present regional and US-Korea relations have influenced *Juche* and *Segyehwa*. The third question extended this investigation, assessing what the case of divided Korea suggests about the association between policy and culture by drawing on the ‘cultural artefacts’ of the ‘museum exhibition’ and ‘music and performance.’ The focus of this conclusion is to revisit these questions, reflecting on the core arguments advanced and insights established.

The ‘Divisions’ at Play in Korea

With respect to the ‘divisions’ mirroring Korea’s physical divide, it has been argued that Korea’s status as a divided nation separated into two states, affords it a degree of exceptionality. As asserted, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union, Korea is one of few remaining nations separated in this way, exhibiting such a stark (socialist-capitalist) ideological and cultural divide. It is also one of few examples wherein such a profound divided nationalism, politics and culture exists amongst one ‘nation’ and people of comparable shared cultural heritage and close geographical proximity. The case of Korea is therefore presented as one that provides interesting insight into the cultural, political and ideological divergences that can mirror a nation’s physical divide and the ‘cultural artefacts’ that emerge.
As noted in the introduction to the thesis and re-emphasised throughout, the ‘divisions’ between the North and South were assessed through the frame of globalisation policy and the wider perceptions toward the phenomenon of each Korea: a focus particularly chosen as it highlights perhaps one of their most marked divergences. As established, to the South exists a vibrant and globalised state, whose culture is strongly directed by the simultaneous embracement and indigenisation of the foreign. To the North, exists its polar opposite; a state whose culture is indisputably driven and moulded by an overarching imperative to “thoroughly block” these same ‘global’ influences, even by way of military force (Korean Central News Agency [KCNA], 1 June 1999). Thus, with Juche revealed to be an anti-globalisationist principle, deeming foreign influences as a kind of “imperialist ideological and cultural poisoning” (KCNA, 1 June 1999), and the contrasting Segyehwa policy accepting (indigenised) globalisation as an “imperative of the times” (Y. S. Kim, 1996: 33), the globalisation strategies of North and South Korea clearly point to a number of ‘divisions’ beyond Korea’s geographical divide (see Chapter 2).

In order to demonstrate and understand the widening cultural, political and ideological schism between the North and South elucidated by Juche and Segyehwa, the turbulent history of inter-Korean relations was traced in Chapter 3. Drawing on the complex histories and trajectories of inter-Korean dialogue and accords, I demonstrated that the relationship between the Koreas has been, and continues to be, complicated by the discernibly different priorities, agendas and national interests held by Seoul and Pyongyang. Most notably, their relationship has met frequent impasse due to inverted priorities: wherein South Korea has tended to stress the importance of ‘development’ issues, North Korea has given precedence to security
concerns such as the procurement of a peace treaty and the withdrawal of US troops from the peninsula (Buzo, 1999: 95-96 – see Chapter 3). As discussed, this inability to reach consensus through dialogue has resulted in a series of skirmishes, acts of terrorism and foiled assassination attempts, generally perpetrated by the North against the South.

The relationship has never been stable: from the outbreak of hostilities that led to the Korean War (1950-1953), to the end of the conflict, but without a peace agreement, meaning that these two states are still technically ‘at war’. Although the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun era of ‘Sunshine’ and ‘Peace and Prosperity’ ushered in a new era of cooperation for the Koreas, this quickly unravelled with the election and inauguration of hardliner Lee Myung-bak. Indeed at the time of writing the various symbols of cooperation remain suspended or shelved: ‘the Mount Kumgang tours’; the inter-Korean train services; and, the Kaesong Industrial Complex recently temporarily suspended. This recurring pattern of discord and confrontation, which also extends to North Korean denuclearisation (see Chapter 5), demonstrates that the policies of North and South Korea are guided by very different cultural, political and ideological positions.

Throughout this thesis, I have argued that this turbulent history of inter-Korean relations shapes, and is shaped by the diametrically opposed globalisation of Juche and Segyehwa. This is also evidenced by their cultural manifestations that provide important insights into many unfolding cultural and political ‘divisions’ on the Korean peninsula. The divisions at play are expressed in many ways including the mix of cultural artefacts that are the focus of this thesis.
Juche, Segyehwa and the Influence of US-Korea Regional Relations

The focus of the second research question was to pursue these divisions within the influence of past and present regional and US-Korea relations on Juche and Segyehwa. In so doing, I argued that the divergent agendas of the Koreas notwithstanding, both suites of policies are greatly influenced by neighbouring states China and Japan, as well as the United States.

This thesis has focused predominantly on the United States’ part in reinforcing the anti-imperialist stance of Juche and the North’s Juche-oriented military-first politics of Songun. It has been argued that a series of events and realities, both past and present, individually and cumulatively, reinforce North Korea’s Juche-centric military mentality, feeding its self-preservation concerns and (perceived) need to maintain military capability and readiness. Some of the factors found to influence and perpetuate Juche include American involvement in Korea’s division, the Korean War, continued US military presence and the resultant regular staging of US-ROK military drills in the South. US pre-emptive action in Iraq, US threats of comparable pre-emption against North Korea and otherwise threatening rhetoric (such as naming North Korea as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’) and actions (including the imposition of sanctions) were also argued to play a part in fuelling Juche. As detailed, each of these factors is interpreted as indicative of US ‘hostile’ intent by Pyongyang. This hostility is very much embedded in the cultural artefacts discussed: from the propaganda art to the games and ‘education’ television programs aimed at young children (see chapters 2 and 4).

I argued that each of these factors and occurrences, in the view of North Korea, bolster the image of the US as an ‘imperialist aggressor.’ The first list of factors does this by, as asserted, heightening North Korean fear of the United States’
“invariable ambition to invade it” (KCNA, 18 August 2011): something that took
greater precedence following the US-led invasion of Iraq and the naming of North
Korea as part of the ‘Axis of Evil.’ Similarly, in presenting as challenges to North
Korea’s right to sovereignty and existence, as has been maintained throughout this
thesis, the remaining factors reinforce the anti-imperialist mandate of Juche in that
they, from the North Korean perspective, further ‘evidence’ the United States’
supposed imperialist design to “bring down” its system (KCNA, 3 October 2006 –
see chapters 4 and 5).

As posited, the influence of past and present North Korea-US relations on
Juche, and particularly its anti-imperialist character, is also demonstrated through the
fact that the majority of North Korea’s threats are of a reactionary and retaliatory
nature. In the same vein, their influence is suggested through North Korea’s long-
held three-point Juche-centric (defensive) demand, which prioritises the procurement
of security guarantees, an end to US ‘hostile’ policy and the scrapping of economic
sanctions (see Chapter 5). In this vein, North Korea’s history and current interactions
with the US illustrate that North Korea perceives the US as a threat that must be
militarily and politically countered, and thus as a threat that reinforces and
necessitates the regime and sovereignty preservation aims of Juche. The cultural
artefacts discussed throughout this thesis serve to remind the North Korean people
that this sovereignty can only be maintained by a military-first agenda.

In regards to the United States’ influence on South Korea, the State was
under US military administration from 1945 to 1948 before the formal proclamation
of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The United States was therefore responsible for
setting Seoul on its current capitalist path (K. J. Kim, 2006: 41). Courtesy of its
enduring military pact with, and abiding influence over the South, the US has also
played a significant role in encouraging South Korea’s embrace and conscious indigenisation of globalisation, through exposing the State to American and outside influences by way of its continued military, economic and cultural presence.

The second regional influence in understanding North-South relations and the shape and direction of Juche and Segyehwa is Japan. The influence of Japan must be understood within its colonisation of Korea between 1910 and 1945 (see Chapter 4). I argued that Japan’s particularly brutal and oppressive control over Korea combined with fierce attempts to ‘Japanise’ Koreans, acted as a motivation behind the identity and culture preservation mandates of both Juche and Segyehwa – a motivation which has echoes in the cultural artefacts presented. This was confirmed through a textual analysis of declarations made by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and South Korean president Kim Young-sam (see Chapter 4): revealing that Japan’s colonisation of Korea serves as a lesson guiding the policy choices and agendas of both Koreas.

Specifically, this colonisation created an environment in both the North and South that concerns of (unchecked) globalisation may be little more than a process of cultural imperialism (see Chapter 1). It is from this perspective that the conscious efforts of Seoul and Pyongyang and their respective policies must be seen: while radically different approaches, both countries want to avoid a repeat of the past. Certainly, as maintained, due to their ideologically distinct paths (socialism in the North and capitalism in the South), this proactive attempt to preserve a sense of ‘Koreanness,’ has manifested in different ways. In North Korea it has led to an attempted complete barring of foreign influences (see Chapter 2). In contrast, for the South it has triggered a proactive engagement with globalisation through the conscious ‘Koreanisation’ of global forms.
Equally, China’s influence was also established in Chapter 4, as was, to a lesser extent, that of the Soviet Union. Particularly, China’s ideological (socialist) affinity with Pyongyang, together with its position as mediator, has influenced and may continue to mould the nature, interpretation and manifestations of *Juche*. This is evident in the shaping of *Juche* against the backdrop of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) as the basic aims and priorities adopted – including leadership veneration, self-defence, and anti-imperialism – were strongly influenced by Maoist China (see Chapter 4). This policy priority is captured and reflected in many cultural manifestations including the similarity between the content and form of Maoist and *Jucheist* propaganda art. Both reflect a focus on the bolstering of leadership personality cults, military ardour and superiority, and the propagation of anti-Japanese and anti-US sentiment.

With respect to the Soviet Union, the influence of Soviet Socialist Realism as disseminated by Joseph Stalin in the 1930s was also discussed. Namely, it was argued that due to Soviet control over North Korea between 1945 and 1948 (Lankov, 2013: 6), North Korean propaganda art and broader leadership personality cults drew much inspiration from the Soviet Union that still persists. Specifically, Pyongyang mirrored Moscow’s embracement of “public statuary” (Portal, 2005: 12-13) and the four commonly practiced principles of Zhdanovism, including *partiinost* (‘partymindedness’), *ideinost* (‘idea-mindedness’), *klassovost* (‘class-mindedness’) and *narodnost* (‘peoplemindedness’). It was also noted that North Korean propaganda art continues to draw on the Zhdanovist notion of the ‘positive hero’ (see Chapter 4).

Though China and the Soviet Union have clearly influenced the trajectory and unfolding of *Juche*, I also demonstrated that North Korea maintains a level of
uniqueness to its *Jucheist* cultural artefacts. This uniqueness includes an adapting of thematic similarities such as anti-imperialism to the Korean context (US military presence in South Korea, for example) and an emphasis on traditional Korean ink painting (see Chapter 4).

In regards to North Korean reform and the potential future direction of *Juche*, I argued that, owing to its economic focus, the post-Mao Chinese model perhaps presents as the most appealing guide to any future North Korean reform. In taking this position, I noted that Beijing has already had a degree of influence on North Korean reform, including its establishment of special economic zones (S. S. Kim, 2006: 311; S. S. Kim, 2001: 24 – see Chapter 4). In conceding the past and present influence of China and Chinese reforms, I found that, as with *Juche* itself, North Korea is likely to indigenise the Chinese model to better reflect its own unique context and agendas.

Despite acknowledging the potential influence of China on North Korean reforms, however, it was nonetheless maintained that significant action or movement towards reform is unlikely for the simple reason that Kim Jong Un’s powerbase depends on autarky and isolation (see chapters 2 and 4). As such, the opening up of North Korea would expose the North Korean people not only to South Korean prosperity, but to that of other capitalist states, creating internal instability, and in all likelihood, revolt against the North Korean regime (Lankov, 2011). Although the possible attraction of Chinese styled reforms should be recognised, it should also be conceded that any reforms taken, at least in the foreseeable future, are likely to constitute very small changes with the realisation of any significant change expected to take decades.
With the memory of Korea’s colonial past still resonating in the respective policies of each Korea, China continuing to play an important role as mediator and economic prop to the North, and North Korea still pursuing bilateral negotiations with Washington (KCNA, 16 June 2013) one thing is clear: politics and culture on the Korean peninsula have been, and will continue to be, strongly influenced by past, present and future regional and US-Korea relations.

**Divided Korea and the Association between Policy and Culture**

The third research question that this thesis has also sought to investigate extends the above two by looking at this unique position that Korea occupies through an examination of the policy-culture nexus unfolding in both the North and South. Supplementing the detailed discussions of history and regional influence, two cultural artefacts were offered as empirical cases in point: ‘the museum’ or ‘exhibition’ and ‘music and performance.’ In the first instance, various museums in North and South Korea were analysed to ascertain the extent to which the principles of *Juche* and *Segyehwa*, respectively, emerge in featuring works and exhibitions. North Korean museums examined included the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum and the Sinchon Museum, as well as the less conventional ‘Museum of Merit’ and North Korean propaganda (poster) art. South of the 38th parallel, discussion focused on the National Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCA), Seoul Museum of Art (SeMA), Hakgojae Gallery, Leeum, Samsung Museum of Art, as well as a monument from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

As noted in Chapter 6, a study of these museums reveals that an association between policy and culture is being played out on the Korean peninsula: the mandates of *Juche* and *Segyehwa* are clearly observable, intertwined and shaping the
various cultural artefacts discussed. Specifically, it was found that North Korean museums and exhibitions tended to echo, extol and promote a range of *Jucheist* requirements, including those of ‘self reliance’ (images 3-5), ‘anti-imperialism’ and particularly ‘anti-Americanism’ (images 6-8). Here we also see the anti-imperialism reflecting Japan’s brutal occupation of Korea (images 20-22) and the reflection of South Korea merely as a puppet regime controlled by imperialists (*Image 21*). In addition, they also appeared geared toward the fostering of loyalty and commitment to the leadership and cause, through the bolstering of leadership personality cults and North Korea’s sense of military superiority (images 39-45).

Reflecting the core concerns at the base of *Juche*, I illustrated that North Korean exhibitions typically represent major powers and especially the US and Japan, as ‘warmongers’ and ‘imperialist aggressors’ (images 20-22), who must be staunchly opposed. With regards to the US, a tendency emerged wherein the memory of the Korean War was habitually recalled and US soldiers were painted as ravaging, vengeful, brutal and murderous offenders (images 9-11 and images 47-48), who mercilessly encroached upon the sovereignty and dignity of the North, before being valiantly repelled by its army (*Image 43*).

Similarly, regarding the bolstering of leadership personality cults, artworks were found to typically deify the Kims, surrounding them with flowers and sunshine, signs of elaborate celebration and a hoard of loyal followers (*Image 39, Image 40 and Image 45*). This loyalty is shaped by the ongoing portrayal of the various leaders as near super-human, repelling the imperialist invaders (*Image 43 and Image 45*). Again, these reflect the very core of the *Juche* principles discussed in earlier sections.

By showcasing the practical applicability of *Juche* within the North Korean context – the ways and extent to which the *Jucheist* mandates of leadership
veneration, military superiority and anti-Americanism manifest in practice – I demonstrated that policy (or in this case Juche) has a direct relation to North Korean culture. The policy stance of Juche is clearly embedded in the various cultural artefacts discussed.

Correspondingly, in line with the hybrid vision of ‘Koreanisation’ reflected in the objectives of the Segyehwa policy, the cultural artefacts of South Korea including museums and music and performance reflect this fusion, functioning as sites of global (foreign) and local (Korean) intercultural mixing and exchange. As discussed, South Korean museums have afforded increased attention to international artists and works in their attempts to embrace the ‘global.’ In the spirit of this embracement, many museums have hosted, and continue to host, a variety of ‘international’ permanent, temporary and special exhibitions. Some, including MOCA with its open-air sculpture garden, exhibit art that combines foreign and South Korean artistic talents – the latter of which is increasingly hybrid.

This increased interest and acceptance of the ‘global’ notwithstanding, even the art pieces adopting Western artistic conventions and style, were seen to reflect an identifiably (South) Korean motif. That is, they dealt with overtly Korean themes and issues including Korea’s division (Image 53 and Image 55), Korean reunification (Image 51, Image 52 and Image 57), or other Korean-specific historical struggles, such as the struggle against Japanese imperialism (Image 54 and Image 56). In this way, through their simultaneous embracement of the global and the local and proactive preservation of ‘South Koreanness,’ South Korean museums were judged to strongly fulfil the Koreanisation/indigenisation requirement of the Segyehwa policy. The South Korean museum is evidence that the political ‘blueprint’ of
Segyehwa does indeed unfold in practice within the culture of the State: confirming the association between policy and culture at play on the Korean peninsula.

A similar trend emerges when investigating a second group of cultural artefacts: music and performance. In the North Korean case, certain songs as well as the State-organised ‘Mass Games’ – a large-scale artistic gymnastic performance – exemplify the Juche idea. Explicitly, North Korean songs are found, in line with Juche, to idolise North Korea’s leaders, reinforce their respective personality cults and express an overt suspicion and antipathy for the outside world and particularly the US. Equally, North Korea’s ‘Mass Games’ were also judged a clear embodiment of Jucheist collectivism, leadership loyalty and devotion (images 58-59). They also promote the Jucheist principles of self-reliance (images 60-62) and anti-Americanism (images 63-65), with images conveying such themes featuring prominently on the accompanying backdrop to the floor display. Accordingly, as with the case of the North Korean museum and exhibition, it was established that through offering tangible cultural manifestations of policy (Juche), North Korean music and performance likewise evidences the unfolding of a policy-culture nexus in Korea.

While much too early to assess, the extent of the relationship between culture and policy has emerged in a potential re-shaping of Juche. Recent announcements by the state newsagency, KCNA, indicate that North Korea may be entering a new relatively foreign-flavoured (though likely similarly controlled) era under Kim Jong Un. The KCNA (7 July 2012) has reported of North Korea’s “grandiose plan to bring about a dramatic turn in the field of literature and arts” and usher in “a new phase” in “contents and style,” reflective of “a new century of Juche Korea.” Perhaps a stark contrast to the North Korean music and performance examples of Chapter 7, this
“plan” has led to the formation of the newly unveiled, seemingly hybrid, Moranbong band (KCNA, 7 July 2012) – see Image 66.

![Image 66](https://example.com/image66.jpg)


Purportedly planned and organised by the Supreme Leader himself, “as required by the new century,” Moranbong band is described as both “revolutionary” and “modern and popular in style” (KCNA, 7 July 2012). Consciously seeking to find a balance between the traditional and the popular, performances have thus far featured a combination of North Korean revolutionary and foreign songs, with accompanying vocalists dressed in Western-styled gowns and “little black dresses” (Lee and Kim, 2012, para. 3). Taking on a notable Western flavour, performances have also been supplemented by dancing Disney characters such as Mickey and Minnie Mouse, Winnie the Pooh and Tigger, together with backdrops streaming footage from well-known Disney films including *Snow White, Dumbo, Beauty and the Beast* and *Sleeping Beauty* (Lee and Kim, 2012; Ramstad, 2012) – all clearly illustrated in Image 66.
It is difficult to ascertain Kim Jong Un’s motivation for creating the Moranbong band. Though, it is likely that any motivations stem from his Swiss-education (Roehrig, 2011: 210), a desire to reinvigorate and impress the North Korean populace, together with a strong and persistent need to ‘compete’ with the South. Indeed, as well as being a clear indigeniser of global culture, a trend seemingly (if not superficially) replicated by the Moranbong band, South Korea has long been an exporter of this ‘Koreanised’ global culture, by way of the ‘Korean Wave,’ or Hallyu. As noted in Chapter 1, the ‘Korean Wave’ is the term used to refer to the “diffusion” of South Korean popular culture – primarily music, but also movies, TV dramas and general South Korean lifestyles – throughout Asia and the rest of the world (Lynn, 2007: 70). The ‘Korean Wave’ phenomenon gained momentum and attention in 2001 (Cho, 2005: 149).

South Korea’s status as an exporter state was perhaps no more greatly cemented than through the recent global penetration and popularity of Gangnam Style by South Korean singer-songwriter PSY (Park Jae-sang). Released the same month as the unveiling of the Moranbong band, on 15 July 2012, the song combines Western electro beats with a Korean-specific style of performance, known as ‘gwang-dae,’ in which performers traditionally “offe[r] up satirical commentary on society through their dance, music and repartee” (Yang, 2012: para. 8). With Gangnam being a district in Seoul that is largely considered the wealthiest in South Korea, Gangnam Style and its music video exist as a parody of the affluent lifestyle of Gangnam residents, and by extension, a social commentary on the socio-economic disparities present in South Korea (Yang, 2012). In this way, while possibly less overt to the non-South Korean, Gangnam Style reflects the same “[South] Korean
musical pathos” (Provine, Hwang & Kershaw, 2000: 166) and hybridity as the South Korean song examples of Chapter 7.

Perhaps it is this mixture of Western style beats and “jester-like” ‘gwang-dae’ genre that accounts for the global viral success of Gangnam Style (Yang, 2012: para. 6). Though, whatever the reason behind the song’s success, its music video (see officialpsy, 2012) became the first uploaded on YouTube to reach a billion views (Hewitt, 2012). It is also currently recognised as the most “liked” video to feature on the video-sharing website, of all time. Testament to its global reach, in 2012, Gangnam Style made it to the top of the iTunes charts in thirty countries, including the United States (Shim, 2012), with its soaring popularity leading to a series of international performances by PSY, on programs including Australia’s The X Factor (Korea.net, 17 October 2012), and in locations such as New York City’s Times Square (Jeon and Sohn, 2013).

The unprecedented (South Korean) success of Gangnam Style has also seen PSY honoured with a series of international music awards and nominations. Some of the numerous awards he has received include ‘Best Video’ at the 2012 MTV Europe Music Awards, ‘New Media Award’ at the 2012 American Music Awards and ‘International Song of the Year,’ ‘Music Video of the Year,’ and ‘NRJ Award of Honour’ at the 2013 NRJ Music Awards, France (Bae, 2013; Jackson, 2012). His signature horse-riding dance moves have also seen the accompanying music video to the song itself the subject of several global parodies, in a range of different languages. In fact, the parodying of Gangnam Style has become so internationally popular that it has spawned the creation of an unofficial website: gangnamstyleparodies.net, which is devoted to showcasing a selection of parody
clips from across in excess of thirty countries, including Israel, Lithuania, Egypt, Hungary and the United States.

As expressed by US President Barack Obama in a May 2013 joint press conference with South Korean President Park Geun-hye, this global penetration and success of Gangnam Style solidifies South Korea’s status as an exporter state, demonstrating how people all “around the world . . . are being swept up by [South] Korean culture” by way of “the Korean Wave” (Office of the Press Secretary, 7 May 2013). This is a notion also reinforced by the fact that PSY’s follow-up single Gentleman passed the 500 million view mark on YouTube on 31 July 2013, making it, at the time of writing, the tenth most watched video on the site of all time (Korea Times, 31 July 2013).

Thus, while North Korea, a state very much concerned with ‘appearances,’ may be seeking a share in the attention and recognition the ‘Korean Wave’ has brought the South, its attempts – insular in comparison – yet illustrate a strong 21st century contrast between the North and South, when compared to the example of Gangnam Style and the ‘Korean Wave.’ Though certainly a marked change from the Kim Jong Il era, North Korea’s embracing of the foreign is still, and is likely to remain, narrow and selective. The far-reaching success of Gangnam Style, governmentally supported by agencies such as the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) (see Section 2.2.2) presents the South as a true participant and contributor in today’s global world. In the case of the Moranbong band and North Korea, however – a state where military-first policy/culture and fierce resistance of the outside world persist – despite some cosmetic changes, there is no comparable genuine engagement (or willingness to engage) with the global community. Indeed, superficial symbols of
Western culture notwithstanding, the imperative of regime survival, together with the core self-reliance, anti-imperialist and anti-American mandates of *Juche*, ensure that the opposite remains the case.

While the future direction of *Juche*, for now, remains a topic for speculation, the Moranbong band provides clues that North Korea will continue to stage ‘spectacles’ while creating the semblance of change. Though, for reasons of regime survival, it is unlikely that the foundational principles and manifestations of *Juche* (including anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism) will (markedly) change anytime soon. For this reason, despite what the ‘spectacle’ of the Moranbong band may suggest on the surface, its example provides further evidence of the ‘divisions’ between the North and South, as well as of their lingering diametrically opposed views of the outside world and the phenomenon of globalisation: proactively embraced and promoted in the South, while strictly controlled, limited and (on any meaningful level), rejected by the North. That said, should the character of *Juche* or interpretations thereof transform over time, it is argued, further evidencing the association between policy and culture in Korea, that North Korean cultural artefacts will evolve to reflect such changes.

If the analysis and juxtaposition of North and South Korean artefacts utilised in this thesis succeeds in underscoring anything, it is that North and South Korea are culturally and ideologically divergent. As noted, this is especially evident when one considers that Seoul regards globalisation as a process of possible ‘Koreanisation,’ whereas Pyongyang believes it to pose a dangerous threat to ‘Koreanness’ (see Chapter 2). As discussed, these very different perceptions of the outside world, illustrated in the policies of *Juche* and *Segyehwa*, are certainly indicative of sharp
politico-cultural ‘divisions’ on the Korean peninsula. Though whatever their divergent trajectories, one cannot understand the different paths the Koreas (as two states, one nation) have taken, without first understanding the links between policy and culture that unfold in the Korean context, and which ultimately drive these trajectories. The cultural artefacts presented, together with the links that they underscore, have thus been offered as a means of highlighting just how far apart the Koreas have grown in the six or so decades since their partition.

Testament to the widening ‘divisions’ between North and South Korea, Seoul and Pyongyang continue to clash not only over politico-cultural differences, but their longstanding competition to be regarded as the sole legitimate ‘Korean’ State on the peninsula. Similarly, Washington and Pyongyang continue to face off over Washington’s alleged ‘hostile’ stance toward North Korea, as well as the issue of North Korean denuclearisation. At the same time, South Korea and China retain the awkward and sometimes precarious task of having to negotiate favourable relationships with the in-conflict Washington and Pyongyang, all the while working to advance their own respective national interests.

With the ideological, political and cultural differences that have proved stumbling blocks in their various relationships undoubtedly to persist into the future, this thesis garners an understanding of the fragility and complexity surrounding regional and US-Korea relations. The cultural artefacts discussed also provide important insights into the complex relationships between the Koreas and regional players. Specifically, through analysing Korea’s politico-cultural divisions and their cultural manifestations within the influence of past and present regional and US-Korea relations, this thesis underscores that relationships between the Koreas and key players on the peninsula are clearly complicated by competing interests;
competing interests, that due to enduring Cold War alliances, have a direct bearing on, and are reflected in, the contrasting policies (and cultural manifestations) of *Juche* and *Segyehwa*.

**Scope for Future Research**

North Korea is continually described as a rogue and unpredictable state. While I have not directly disputed this general assertion, I have argued that by contextualising the historical, social and cultural contexts, better insights of the behaviour of the regime may be gained. That said, faced now with a marked period of transition on the Korean peninsula, it is uncertain what the future will bring. With numerous questions and uncertainties hanging over Korea, the potential for future research building on the present study is vast. As the future of Korea, inter-Korean and regional relations unfold, and some of these uncertainties play out, a number of avenues open for exploration. Of course, with focus limited in this case to an analysis of the ‘museum exhibition’ and ‘music and performance,’ much scope remains for investigations into what additional cultural artefacts, practices or institutions, might suggest about an association between policy and culture in divided Korea. Possible case studies for examination include, but are not limited to, Korean films and fashion.

Importantly, as noted in the thesis introduction, this study and any study of Korea or another (ever-evolving) global conflict hotspot, is engaged amidst a background of ongoing change. This complex ever-changing character of Korea, and Korean studies, guarantees that with each new research project, there are yet further developments and questions to be grappled with. With respect to North Korea, as efforts are pooled to bolster the personality cult of Kim Jong Un to a comparable
level to those of his father and grandfather, the North Korean cultural landscape is likely to evolve to reflect those changes. There will thus undoubtedly be scope to consider how the anticipated future idolisation of Kim Jong Un manifests not only within the North Korean ‘museum exhibition’ and ‘music and performance,’ but a host of other cultural artefacts and practices. Similarly, the evolution of Western conventions and styles with time, including the introduction of new technologies, together with the broader evolution of global influence itself, will extend researchers the opportunity to assess how South Korea negotiates its sense of ‘South Koreaanness,’ in this future changing environment.

Furthermore, the possible evolution of inter-Korean, US-Korea and regional relations following the change of leadership in both North and South Korea, as well as others to follow, also creates space for future research. With the affairs, policies and trajectories of the Koreas and their regional relationships very much tied to the international environment, time will bring with it supplementary lines of inquiry concerning the association between policy and culture unfolding on the Korean peninsula. Specifically, future US-Korea and regional relations are likely to be, as they have historically been, complex, unpredictable and highly changeable. These complexities and accompanying changes, whatever their nature, are likely to offer up a number of questions. Representing but a small sample of the questions this thesis and indeed time, as of now, leave unanswered, are the following: What affect will the policies of the Park Geun-hye administration have on South Korea’s relations with the North? Will there be any changeovers or progress on the question of psychological warfare, discontinued railway services, North Korean tours or broader inter-Korean cooperation? Will disarmament discussions be pursued without precondition, or will stalemates and standoffs continue? Similarly, will Kim Jong Un
govern over North Korea with the same iron fist as the Dear Leader and Great Leader before him, or do the small glimpses of ‘change,’ such as the Moranbong band, signal more significant changes in the long-term? Then, there is the crucial question of the affect any of these developments, or perhaps a lack there of, might have on the divided nationalism, policy, culture and related cultural manifestations of North and South Korea. With the answers to these questions not yet apparent and only to become so in time, testifying to the untapped scope and potentiality of Korean studies, these remain questions for future research.

There are many ways to study the complex relationship between North and South Korea – from the economic, to the political and historical. What I have outlined in this thesis is that a close analysis of cultural artefacts provides important insights into the divergent policy and social environments that have emerged. I have combined such an analysis within the specific socio-historical context of the peninsula – insights that add a depth a multi-disciplinarity that can be missing from a single discipline approach.
References


372


Appendices
## Appendix 2
### Timeline of Important Events in Korea’s History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894-95</td>
<td>Sino-Japanese War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Russia rejects Japan’s proposal to divide the Korean peninsula along</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the thirty eighth parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1903</td>
<td>Russia proposes that it and Japan establish a neutral zone in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan declines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1904</td>
<td>Japan declares war on Russia and intimidates the Korean government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>into signing the Korea-Japan Protocol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904-5</td>
<td>Russo-Japanese War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1905</td>
<td>Signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Russia concedes its defeat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 November, 1905</td>
<td>Korea becomes a protectorate of Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August, 1910</td>
<td>Korea annexed to Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August, 1945</td>
<td>The Soviet Union declares war on Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-11 August, 1945</td>
<td>The Soviet Union and the United States divide Korea along</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the thirty eighth parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August, 1945</td>
<td>Japan surrenders. Korea is liberated. Soviet troops occupy the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>north of Korea, and US troops the south.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>A Soviet-supported leadership is installed, including Kim Il Sung.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea’s Communist Party (Korean Workers’ Party - KWP) is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>inaugurated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1948</td>
<td>Korean People’s Army organised in North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May, 1948</td>
<td>UN-supervised general elections held in South Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July, 1948</td>
<td>South Korean constitution adopted by National Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August, 1948</td>
<td>Republic of Korea established in South Korea; Syngman Rhee elected president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 September, 1948</td>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea established in North Korea; Kim Il Sung appointed Premier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1948</td>
<td>The Soviet Union withdraws its troops from North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June, 1949</td>
<td>The U.S withdraws its troops from South Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June, 1950</td>
<td>North Korean People's Army invades South Korea; UN Security Council adopts resolution that condemns the North Korean action; Korean War begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September, 1950</td>
<td>General MacArthur launches Inchon landing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 October, 1950</td>
<td>Chinese Volunteer Army crosses Yalu River and joins the war as North Korean ally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 July, 1951</td>
<td>The first Plenary session takes place in Kaesong at 1100.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November, 1951</td>
<td>Both sides agree in establishing a Demarcation Line along the 38th parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April, 1953</td>
<td>POW repatriation / exchange terms are agreed on by UN and communist forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July, 1953</td>
<td>Armistice signed between North Korea and UN forces. South Korea does not sign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 1960</td>
<td>Kim Il Sung personality cult established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td><em>Juche</em> is formally adopted by North Korea as a guiding principle at the fifth Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July, 1972</td>
<td>The North-South Coordinating Commission established with the signing of the North-South Joint Statement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1972</td>
<td>Red Cross talks between the North and South begin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1972</td>
<td>Kim Il Sung becomes president by new North Korean constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 November 1987</td>
<td>North Korean bombing of Korean Air flight 858.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 September, 1991</td>
<td>North and South Korea join the United Nations, as separate nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>North Korea agrees to allow inspections by international atomic energy agency (IAEA) but refuses them full access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 December, 1992</td>
<td>Kim Young Sam elected South Korean president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1994</td>
<td>Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Pyongyang announces it will no longer abide by the armistice that ended the Korean war, and sends troops into the demilitarized zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 February, 1998</td>
<td>Kim Young Sam’s presidential term ends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-15 June, 2000</td>
<td>Inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang between Kim Jong Il and South Korean president Kim Dae Jung. The first since the country’s division in 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September, 2000</td>
<td>North and South Korea march together for the first time at an Olympic Games, in the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 January, 2002</td>
<td>US President George W Bush includes North Korea in his 'axis of evil'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 November, 2002</td>
<td>KEDO announces the suspension of oil shipments to North Korea beginning December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 December, 2002</td>
<td>Amid mounting nuclear tensions, North Korea announces it will be reopening its Yongbyon reactor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 December, 2002</td>
<td>IAEA inspectors are expelled from North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 January, 2003</td>
<td>North Korea withdraws from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February, 2005</td>
<td>Pyongyang claims its nuclear weapons are for self-defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20 September, 2005</td>
<td>North Korea agrees to give up its weapons in return for aid and security guarantees, but later demands a civilian nuclear reactor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 July, 2006</td>
<td>North Korea test fires a long range missile and some medium range ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 October, 2006</td>
<td>North Korea claims to test a nuclear weapon for the first time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 February, 2007</td>
<td>North Korea agrees to close its main nuclear reactor in exchange for fuel aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May, 2007</td>
<td>North/South passenger trains cross the North-South border for the first time in 56 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>International inspectors visit North Korea for the first time since 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4 October, 2007</td>
<td>Second inter-Korean summit since the division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 December, 2007</td>
<td>Lee Myung Bak wins South Korean presidential election. Vows tougher line on the North.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>North Korea expels South Koreans from Joint Industrial Park after Seoul says it will link its aid more closely to the nuclear disarmament issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>Pyongyang rejects South Korean President Lee Myung Bak’s offer of direct talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 October, 2008</td>
<td>US President George W. Bush removes North Korea from its ‘Axis of Evil’ and Terrorism list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 January, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea tears up all military and political agreements signed with the South, accusing Seoul of hostile intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 March, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea holds its first parliamentary ‘elections’ in six years (only one candidate per seat).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 March, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea cuts communication lines with the South in protest of the joint US-ROK military drills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 March, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea abruptly blocks the border to the joint-industrial zone in Kaesong, leaving hundreds of South Korean workers stranded for four days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea refuses US food aid, ordering select food agencies to be out of the country by the end of the month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 March, 2009</td>
<td>North Korean soldiers arrest two US journalists along the China-DPRK border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea launches what it claims is a satellite. Some argue North Korea is testing its taepodong-2 missile under the cover of a ‘satellite’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 April, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea vows to walk out of six-party talks and orders UN inspectors out of the country, threatening to reactivate its Yongbyon Nuclear reactor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 April, 2009</td>
<td>The first formal inter-Korean talk for more than a year lasts 22 minutes, ending abruptly without consensus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 April, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea says it has resumed reprocessing spent fuel rods at its Yongbyon nuclear plant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 April, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea threatens to carry out a nuclear test unless the UN apologises for its criticism of its rocket launch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 May, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea conducts a second nuclear test, reportedly larger than that conducted in July 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea test-fires short-range missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 May, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea declares it has once again abandoned the truce of the Korean War Armistice Agreement and reportedly test-fires another missile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 June, 2009</td>
<td>The trial for the two US journalists detained in North Korea begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June, 2009</td>
<td>The US warns that it is considering reinstating North Korea as a terrorist state on account of its recent missile tests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June, 2009</td>
<td>US journalists Euna Lee and Laura Ling sentenced to 12 years' hard labour in North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June, 2009</td>
<td>The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopts resolution 1874. Tougher sanctions are imposed including the inspection of North Korean ships, and a wider ban on arms sales.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea test-fires four short-range cruise missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 August, 2009</td>
<td>Detained US journalists, Laura Ling and Euna Lee are pardoned by North Korea after former US President Bill Clinton visits Pyongyang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 August, 2009</td>
<td>South Korea launches its first rocket into space, though its scientific satellite failed to enter into intended orbit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 August, 2009</td>
<td>Red Cross talks between North and South Korea resume after a close to 2 year stalemate, with discussions set to focus on North-South family reunions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 August, 2009</td>
<td>North and South Korea agree to resume inter-Korean family reunions with a select number of reunions to take place between 26 September and 1 October.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 September, 2009</td>
<td>Six days of North-South reunions begin, over which time 200 families will reunite at a North Korean mountain resort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 October, 2009</td>
<td>Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visits Pyongyang to encourage Kim Jong Il to return to six party talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 October, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea test-fires five short-range surface-to-surface KN-02 rockets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 October, 2009</td>
<td>North Korean and U.S. envoys meet in New York to discuss North Korea’s nuclear programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 November, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea’s official news agency (KCNA) reports North Korea has reprocessed eight thousand spent fuel rods - enough plutonium to make at least one atomic bomb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 November, 2009</td>
<td>North and South Korean naval ships clash at sea after a North Korean vessel reportedly crosses a demarcation line. No injuries reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 November, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea announces currency reform, swapping old North Korean banknotes for new ones at a rate of a hundred to one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-10 December, 2009</td>
<td>U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to discuss possible resumption of six party talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 December, 2009</td>
<td>North Korea detains US citizen (Robert Park) after he crosses a frozen Yalu River from China in protest of the North Korean regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 January, 2010</td>
<td>North Korea says it could return to six party talks in exchange for a peace treaty with the U.S. and an end to sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 January, 2010</td>
<td>North Korea accepts an offer of 10,000 tonnes of food aid from South Korea - the first official aid from the South in two years. North Korea threatens to end dialogue with South Korea unless Seoul apologises for an alleged contingency plan to handle North Korea’s collapse. North Korea lifts restrictions on U.S tourists, who had previously only been able to visit during the country’s Mass Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 January, 2010</td>
<td>North and South Korea exchange fire along disputed sea border. No injuries reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 February, 2010</td>
<td>North Korea fires a senior communist party official after currency reform resulted in inflation, social unrest and starvation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 February, 2010</td>
<td>North Korea eases restrictions on private markets in response to increasing social unrest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March, 2010</td>
<td>South Korean warship &quot;Cheonan&quot; sinks just South of disputed sea border ‘the Northern Limit Line’ resulting in the death of 46 South Korean sailors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 April, 2010</td>
<td>Detained US citizen Aijalon Mahli Gomes is sentenced to 8 years hard labour in North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May, 2010</td>
<td>An official investigation concludes that the sinking of &quot;Cheonan&quot; was the result of a North Korean submarine torpedo attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May, 2010</td>
<td>North Korea denies all responsibility of the sinking and threatens to “freeze” inter-Korean relations if actions are taken against it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 May, 2010</td>
<td>South Korea announces punitive measures against the North including the suspension of inter-Korean trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 May, 2010</td>
<td>In retaliation, North Korea “severs” all ties with the South.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 June, 2010</td>
<td>South Korea formally refers the Cheonan incident to the United Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 June, 2010</td>
<td>North Korea sends a letter to the United Nations denying its involvement in the Cheonan incident, warning against punitive action and requesting permission to conduct its own investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 June, 2010</td>
<td>South Korea fails to launch a satellite into space after a satellite rocket explodes moments following take-off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 June, 2010</td>
<td>North and South Korea give separate testimonies at a UN hearing on the Cheonan incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 2010</td>
<td>North Korea threatens to inflict harsher punishment on jailed US citizen, Aijalon Mahli Gomes if the US continues its hostile stance over the <em>Cheonan</em> incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July 2010</td>
<td>The UN issues a statement condemning the sinking of the <em>Cheonan</em> and expresses ‘deep concern’ over the findings of the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group investigation, but stops short of naming North Korea as the perpetrator of the attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July, 2010</td>
<td>The US announces more sanctions against North Korea in response to the <em>Cheonan</em> sinking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August, 2010</td>
<td>North Korea captures South Korean fishing boat, accusing South Korea of illegal fishing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 August, 2010</td>
<td>Former US President Jimmy Carter travels to Pyongyang to secure the freedom of detainee Aijalon Mahli Gomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 August, 2010</td>
<td>Seoul offers Pyongyang $8.5 million in emergency aid following severe flooding in the North. Rice not included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kim Jong Il arrives in China for a 5 day unofficial visit reportedly accompanied by his youngest son Kim Jong Un, fuelling speculation of a leadership succession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 September, 2010</td>
<td>North Korea releases a captured South Korean fishing boat and its seven-man crew (four Korean, three Chinese).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 September, 2010</td>
<td>South Korea’s Ministry for Unification approves further flood aid for the North, including 203 tons of rice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 September, 2010</td>
<td>South Korea delivers rice aid to North Korea for the first time in three years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officials from North and South Korea meet at Kaesong and agree to resume family reunions – stalled since the sinking of the <em>Cheonan</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 September, 2010</td>
<td>Kim Jong Il's youngest son and heir apparent, Kim Jong Un, is appointed four star general.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September, 2010</td>
<td>North Korea’s Korean Workers’ Party convenes its largest meeting in 30 years. Kim Jong Il is reelected as general-secretary (Leader). Kim Jong Un named vice-chairman of the central military commission of the ruling Workers' party; his first known political post.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 September, 2010</td>
<td>The first inter-Korean military talks since October 2008 end without progress when Seoul demands apology over Cheonan sinking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea releases its first official photograph of heir apparent Kim Jong Un.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 October, 2010</td>
<td>North Korea stages its biggest-ever parade to mark the 65th anniversary of founding of the Korean Workers’ Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 October, 2010</td>
<td>Fire is exchanged along the DMZ for the first time since 2007. No casualties reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 October - 1 November; 3-5 November, 2010</td>
<td>The first inter-Korean family reunions since September 2009 are held in Mt. Geumgang Resort, North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 November, 2010</td>
<td>American scientist, Siegfried Hecker reports having visited a newly constructed advanced uranium enrichment plant in North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 November, 2010</td>
<td>North Korea wages artillery attack on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 April, 2011</td>
<td>South Korean troops accidentally fire three machine gun rounds in the direction of the North, angering Pyongyang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April, 2011</td>
<td>North Korea threatens to open fire on the South if its dissemination of anti-North Korean leaflets across the border is not stopped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 April, 2011</td>
<td>South Korea deploys ten rocket-launching systems to its Bangnyeong and Yeonpyeong Islands following the North’s November artillery attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-28 April, 2011</td>
<td>Former US President Jimmy Carter, together with three former European leaders, visit Pyongyang to discuss North Korea’s denuclearisation and food aid needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-26 May, 2011</td>
<td>Kim Jong Il visits China to discuss North Korea’s economic development and a possible resumption of Six-Party Talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July, 2011</td>
<td>Pyongyang stages a mass protest rally against South Korea’s Lee Myung Bak administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July, 2011</td>
<td>North and South Korean chief nuclear negotiators meet for the first time since 2008, in Bali, Indonesia raising new hopes for a resumption of Six-Party talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 August, 2011</td>
<td>The Koreas exchange fire near the Northern Limit Line after North Korean artillery shells allegedly land in South Korean waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-25 August, 2011</td>
<td>Kim Jong Il holds talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Russia on its nuclear programme and economic ties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-25 October, 2011</td>
<td>Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang visits Pyongyang to discuss DPRK-China relations and Six-Party Talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December, 2011</td>
<td>Kim Jong Un assumes Kim Jong Il’s position as supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April, 2012</td>
<td>Kim Jong Il is posthumously given the title of Eternal General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Kim Jong Un is named First Secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 April, 2012</td>
<td>Kim Jong Il is named the Eternal Chairman of the National Defence Commission and Kim Jong Un assumes the position of First Chairman, the new Head of State position. North Korea unsuccessfully attempts to launch a satellite using the Unha-3 rocket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 December, 2012</td>
<td>North Korea successfully launches the Unha-3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 December, 2012</td>
<td>South Korea elects its first female president, daughter of former dictator Park Chung-hee, Park Geun-hye.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January, 2013</td>
<td>The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopts Resolution 2087 in response to North Korea’s rocket launch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 February, 2013</td>
<td>North Korea carries out a third nuclear test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 February, 2013</td>
<td>Park Geun-hye is inaugurated as South Korean president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March, 2013</td>
<td>The UNSC adopts Resolution 2094 on North Korea, enforcing additional sanctions, targeting cash transfers and travel for diplomats. China supports sanctions against North Korea for the first time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 March, 2013</td>
<td>North Korea announces that it is scrapping the 1953 Korean War Armistice in response to UNSC sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 April, 2013</td>
<td>North Korea bars entrance of South Korean workers to the Kaesong Industrial Complex amid rising tensions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April, 2013</td>
<td>North Korea withdraws its workers from the Kaesong Industrial Complex and suspends its operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 April, 2013</td>
<td>Seoul gives Pyongyang twenty-four hours to agree to formal negotiations on the Kaesong complex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April, 2013</td>
<td>North Korea rejects South Korea’s offer of talks on the future of the Kaesong Industrial Complex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May, 2013</td>
<td>All remaining South Korean workers are withdrawn from the Kaesong Industrial Complex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May, 2013</td>
<td>A North Korean patrol boat hijacks a Chinese fishing boat and demands $10,000 ransom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May, 2013</td>
<td>North Korea proposes a peace treaty to replace the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June, 2013</td>
<td>North Korea proposes talks with South Korea on the Kaesong Industrial Complex. South Korea accepts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 June, 2013</td>
<td>North and South Korea hold their first government-level talks in more than two years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July-25 July, 2013</td>
<td>Six rounds of inter-Korean talks on the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex held. All are unsuccessful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August, 2013</td>
<td>Following pleas from South Korea, North Korea announces that it is lifting the temporary suspension of operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and that it will guarantee the safety of South Korean personnel and their businesses. Pyongyang also states that it will prevent the occurrence of future suspensions. Further talks on the Complex are set for August 14.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 3

North-South Joint Statement

4 July, 1972

Seoul’s KCIA Director Lee Hu Rak visited Pyongyang from May 2, 1972 to May 5, 1972 and met with Pyongyang's Director of Cadre Organization Kim Young Ju; and Pak Sung Chul, the 2nd Vice-premier, on behalf of Director Kim Young Ju, visited Seoul from May 29, 1972 to June 1, 1972 and met with Director Lee Hu Rak.

The parties have exchanged their views on the mutual desire for the early peaceful reunification of Korea and made progress in mutual understanding of the other side’s points of views.

The parties have reached a unanimous agreement on the following items for reducing North-South tensions caused by the lack of mutual communication for so long, and for promoting the reunification of the fatherland.

The parties have agreed upon the following principles for the reunification:

- First, the reunification must be achieved with no reliance on external forces or interference. It must be achieved internally.

- Second, the reunification must be achieved peacefully without the use of military forces against the other side.

- Third, both parties must promote national unity as a united people over any differences of our ideological and political systems.

1. The parties agree to implement appropriate measures to stop military provocation which may lead to unintended armed conflicts, to cultivate an atmosphere of mutual trust between North and South by refraining from vilifying the other side.

2. The parties agree to restore the severed national lineage and promote mutual understanding by implementing multi-faceted North-South exchange of information.

3. The parties agree to expedite the North-South Red Cross meetings, currently under negotiation, ardently longed for by the Korean people.

4. The parties agree to establish direct phone contacts between Seoul and Pyongyang in order to prevent accidental military clashes by prompt and accurate resolution of any urgent potential problems.

5. The parties agree to establish the North-South Coordinating Commission, co-chaired by Director Lee Hu Rak and Director Kim Young Ju, in order to implement the items agreed upon above, to resolve North-South issues, and to promote the reunification of our fatherland.

6. The parties solemnly swear to faithfully abide by the agreement, as desired by all of our countrymen.

By the wish of our respective superiors

Lee Hu Rak / Kim Young Ju

Appendix 4

Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South

Effective February 19, 1992

South and North Korea,

In keeping with the longing of the entire Korean race for the peaceful unification of our divided fatherland;

Reaffirming the three basic principles of unification set forth in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972;

Determined to end the state of political and military confrontation and achieve national reconciliation;

Also determined to avoid armed aggression and hostilities, and to ensure the lessening of tension and the establishment of peace;

Expressing the desire to realize multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to promote interests and prosperity common to the Korean people;

Recognizing that their relationship, not being a relationship as between states, is a special one constituted temporarily in the process of unification;

Pledging themselves to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification;

Hereby agreed as follows;

CHAPTER 1

SOUTH-NORTH RECONCILIATION

Article 1
South and North Korea shall recognize and respect the system of each other.

Article 2
South and North Korea shall not interfere in the internal affairs of each other.

Article 3
South and North Korea shall not slander or defame each other.

Article 4
South and North Korea shall refrain from any acts of sabotage or insurrection against each other.
Article 5
South and North Korea shall together endeavour to transform the present state of armistice into a firm state of peace between the two sides and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement until such a state of peace is realized.

Article 6
South and North Korea shall cease to compete with or confront each other, and instead shall cooperate and endeavour to promote the racial dignity and interests of Korea in the international arena.

Article 7
South and North Korea shall establish and operate a South-North Liaison Office at Panmunjom within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement to ensure close liaison and consultations between the two sides.

Article 8
South and North Korea shall establish a South-North Political Committee within the framework of the South-North High-Level Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement to consider concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the agreement on South-North reconciliation.

CHAPTER 2
AGREEMENT OF NONAGGRESSION BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA

Article 9
South and North Korea shall not use force against each other and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other.

Article 10
South and North Korea shall resolve peacefully, through dialogue and negotiation, any differences of views and disputes arising between them.

Article 11
The South-North demarcation line and the areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line provided in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, and the areas that each side has exercised jurisdiction over until the present time.

Article 12
In order to implement and guarantee nonaggression, the South and the North shall establish a South-North Joint Military Commission within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement. In the said Commission, the two sides shall discuss problems and carry out steps to build up military confidence and realize arms reduction, in particular, the mutual notification and control of large-scale movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof.
Article 13
South and North Korea shall install and operate a telephone line between the military authorities of each side to prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed clashes.

Article 14
South and North Korea shall establish a South-North Military Sub-Committee within the framework of the South-North High-Level Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on nonaggression and to remove the state of military confrontation.

CHAPTER 3

EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA

Article 15
In order to promote the integrated and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, the South and the North shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, including the joint development of resources, the trade of goods as intra-Korean commerce and joint ventures.

Article 16
South and North Korea shall carry out exchanges and promote cooperation in various fields such as science and technology, education, literature and the arts, health, sports, the environment, journalism and media including newspapers, radio, television broadcasts, and other publications.

Article 17
South and North Korea shall implement freedom of intra-Korean travel and contact among the members of the Korean people.

Article 18
South and North Korea shall permit free correspondence, movement between the two sides, meetings, and visits between dispersed family members and other relatives, promote their voluntary reunion, and take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues.

Article 19
South and North Korea shall reconnect the railway and the previously severed roads, and shall open sea and air routes.

Article 20
South and North Korea shall establish and link facilities for exchanges by post and telecommunications, and shall guarantee the confidentiality of intra-Korean mail and telecommunications.
Article 21
South and North Korea shall cooperate in the international arena in the economic, cultural and other fields, and shall advance abroad together.

Article 22
In order to implement the agreement on exchanges and cooperation in the economic, cultural, and other fields, South and North Korea shall establish joint commissions for each sector, including a Joint South-North Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission, within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement.

Article 23
A Sub-committee on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement, to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on South-North exchanges and cooperation.

CHAPTER 4
AMENDMENTS AND EFFECTUATION

Article 24
This Agreement may be amended or supplemented by agreement between the two sides.

Article 25
This Agreement shall enter into force from the date the South and the North exchange the appropriate instruments following the completion of the respective procedures necessary for its implementation.

Signed on December 13, 1991

Chung Won-shik
Chief Delegate of the South delegation to the South-North High-Level Negotiations
Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea

Yon Hyong-muk
Head of the North delegation to the South-North High-Level Negotiations
Premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Appendix 5

ROK-DPRK Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

To enter into force as of 19 February 1992

The South and the North, desiring to eliminate the danger of nuclear war through denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and thus to create an environment and conditions favorable for peace and peaceful unification of our country and contribute to peace and security in Asia and the world, declare as follows:

1. The South and the North shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.
2. The South and the North shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.
3. The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.
4. The South and the North, in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, shall conduct inspections of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides, in accordance with procedures and methods to be determined by a South-North joint nuclear control commission.
5. The South and the North, in order to implement this joint declaration, shall establish and operate a South-North joint nuclear control commission within one (1) month of the effectuation of this joint declaration.
6. This Joint Declaration shall enter into force as of the day the South and the North exchange notifications of completion of the procedures for the entry into force of this declaration.

January 20, 1992

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea
Chief delegate of the South delegation to the South-North High-level Talks

Yon Hyong-muk
Premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Head of the North delegation to the South-North High-level Talks

Appendix 6
North-South Joint Declaration

True to the noble will of all the fellow countrymen for the peaceful reunification of the country, Chairman Kim Jong Il of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea had a historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15, 2000.

The heads of the north and the south, considering that the current meeting and summit talks, the first of its kind since the division of the country, are events of great importance in promoting mutual understanding, developing inter-Korean relations and achieving peaceful reunification, declare as follows:

1. The north and the south agreed to solve the question of the country’s reunification independently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation responsible for it.

2. The north and the south, recognizing that the low-level federation proposed by the north and the commonwealth system proposed by the south for the reunification of the country have similarity, agreed to work together for the reunification in this direction in the future.

3. The north and the south agreed to settle humanitarian issues as early as possible, including the exchange of visiting groups of separated families and relatives and the issue of unconverted long-term prisoners, to mark August 15 this year.

4. The north and the south agreed to promote the balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and build mutual confidence by activating cooperation and exchanges in all fields, social, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and so on.

5. The north and the south agreed to hold an authority-to-authority negotiation as soon as possible to put the above-mentioned agreed points into speedy operation.

President Kim Dae Jung invited Chairman Kim Jong Il of the DPRK National Defence Commission to visit Seoul and Chairman Kim Jong Il agreed to do so at an appropriate time.

June 15, 2000

Kim Jong Il
Chairman of the DPRK
National Defence Commission

Kim Dae Jung
President of the
Republic of Korea

Appendix 7

Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity

In accordance with the agreement between President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea and Chairman Kim Jong-il of the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, President Roh visited Pyongyang from October 2-4, 2007.

During the visit, there were historic meetings and discussions. At the meetings and talks, the two sides have reaffirmed the spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration and had frank discussions on various issues related to realizing the advancement of South-North relations, peace on the Korean Peninsula, common prosperity of the Korean people and unification of Korea.

Expressing confidence that they can forge a new era of national prosperity and unification on their own initiative if they combine their will and capabilities, the two sides declare as follows, in order to expand and advance South-North relations based on the June 15 Joint Declaration:

1. The South and the North shall uphold and endeavor actively to realize the June 15 Declaration. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the issue of unification on their own initiative and according to the spirit of “by-the-Korean-people-themselves.”

The South and the North will work out ways to commemorate the June 15 anniversary of the announcement of the South-North Joint Declaration to reflect the common will to faithfully carry it out.

2. The South and the North have agreed to firmly transform inter-Korean relations into ties of mutual respect and trust, transcending the differences in ideology and systems.

The South and the North have agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other and agreed to resolve inter-Korean issues in the spirit of reconciliation, cooperation and reunification.

The South and the North have agreed to overhaul their respective legislative and institutional apparatuses in a bid to develop inter-Korean relations in a reunification-oriented direction.

The South and the North have agreed to proactively pursue dialogue and contacts in various areas, including the legislatures of the two Koreas, in order to resolve matters concerning the expansion and advancement of inter-Korean relations in a way that meets the aspirations of the entire Korean people.
3. The South and the North have agreed to closely work together to put an end to military hostilities, mitigate tensions and guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The South and the North have agreed not to antagonize each other, reduce military tension, and resolve issues in dispute through dialogue and negotiation.

The South and the North have agreed to oppose war on the Korean Peninsula and to adhere strictly to their obligation to nonaggression. The South and the North have agreed to designate a joint fishing area in the West Sea to avoid accidental clashes.

The South’s Minister of Defense and the North’s Minister of the People’s Armed Forces have also agreed to hold talks in Pyongyang this November to discuss military confidence-building measures, including military guarantees covering the plans and various cooperative projects for making this joint fishing area into a peace area.

4. The South and the North both recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime. The South and the North have also agreed to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war.

With regard to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the South and the North have agreed to work together to implement smoothly the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13, 2007 Agreement achieved at the Six-Party Talks.

5. The South and the North have agreed to facilitate, expand, and further develop inter-Korean economic cooperation projects on a continual basis for balanced economic development and co-prosperity on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the principles of common interests, co-prosperity and mutual aid.

The South and the North reached an agreement on promoting economic cooperation, including investments, pushing forward with the building of infrastructure and the development of natural resources. Given the special nature of inter-Korean cooperative projects, the South and the North have agreed to grant preferential conditions and benefits to those projects.

The South and the North have agreed to create a “special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea” encompassing Haeju and vicinity in a bid to proactively push ahead with the creation of a joint fishing zone and maritime peace zone, establishment of a special economic zone, utilization of Haeju harbor, passage of civilian vessels via direct routes in Haeju and the joint use of the Han River estuary.

The South and the North have agreed to complete the first-phase construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex at an early date and embark on the second-stage development project. The South and the North have agreed to open freight rail services between Munsan and Bongdong and promptly complete various institutional measures, including those related to passage, communication, and customs clearance procedures.
The South and the North have agreed to discuss repairs of the Gaeseong-Sinuiju railroad and the Gaeseong-Pyongyang expressway for their joint use. The South and the North have agreed to establish cooperative complexes for shipbuilding in Anbyeon and Nampo, while continuing cooperative projects in various areas such as agriculture, health and medical services and environmental protection.

The South and the North have agreed to upgrade the status of the existing Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee to a Joint Committee for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation to be headed by deputy prime minister-level officials.

6. The South and the North have agreed to boost exchanges and cooperation in the social areas covering history, language, education, science and technology, culture and arts, and sports to highlight the long history and excellent culture of the Korean people.

The South and the North have agreed to carry out tours to Mt. Baekdu and open nonstop flight services between Seoul and Mt. Baekdu for this purpose. The South and the North have agreed to send a joint cheering squad from both sides to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. The squad will use the Gyeongui Railway Line for the first-ever joint Olympic cheering.

7. The South and the North have agreed to actively promote humanitarian cooperation projects. The South and the North have agreed to expand reunion of separated family members and their relatives and promote exchanges of video messages.

To this end, the South and the North have agreed to station resident representatives from each side at the reunion center at Mt. Geumgang when it is completed and regularize reunions of separated family members and their relatives.

The South and the North have agreed to actively cooperate in case of emergencies, including natural disasters, according to the principles of fraternal love, humanitarianism and mutual assistance.

8. The South and the North have agreed to increase cooperation to promote the interests of the Korean people and the rights and interests of overseas Koreans on the international stage.

The South and the North have agreed to hold inter-Korean prime ministers’ talks for the implementation of this Declaration and have agreed to hold the first round of meetings in November 2007 in Seoul.

The South and the North have agreed that their highest authorities will meet frequently for the advancement of relations between the two sides.

Oct. 4, 2007 - Pyongyang

Roh Moo-hyun President Republic of Korea Kim Jong Il Chairman, National Defense Commission Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Appendix 8

Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea

October 1, 1953

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area;
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,

Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

ARTICLE III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
ARTICLE IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington, in the English and Korean languages, this first day of October 1953.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES

[The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty subject to the following understanding:] It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article III of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea.

[The United States communicated the text of the understanding to the Republic of Korea in a note of January 28, 1954, acknowledged by the Republic of Korea in a note of February 1, 1954. The text of the understanding was included in the President's proclamation of November 17, 1954.]

(1) TIAS 3097, 5 UST 23602376. Ratification advised by the Senate Jan. 26, 1954, and ratified by the President Feb. 5, 1954, subject to an understanding; entered into force Nov. 17, 1954.

(2) Ratifications were exchanged Nov. 17, 1954.

(3) TIAS 3097.

Appendix 9

Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Geneva, October 21, 1994

Delegations of the governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.

   – The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.

   – The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this Document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this Document.

   – As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK’s graphite moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

   – Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.

   – Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this
Document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.

3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR’s and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.

– The freeze on the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this Document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.

– Dismantlement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.

– The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

4) As soon as possible after the date of this document U.S. and DPRK experts will hold two sets of expert talks.

– At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.

– At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.

2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other’s capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.

3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear free Korean peninsula.
1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.

2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

**IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.**

1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.

3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

___________________
Robert L. Gallucci  
Head of Delegation of the United States of America, Ambassador at Large of the United States of America

Kang Sok Ju  
Head of the Delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Appendix 10

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks

Beijing, 19 September 2005

The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, China among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America from July 26th to August 7th, and from September 13th to 19th, 2005.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Song Min-soon, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK; Mr. Alekseyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large, the Six Parties held, in the spirit of mutual respect and equality, serious and practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks, and agreed, in this context, to the following:

1. The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

   The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.

   The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.

The ROK reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory. The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.
The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK.

2. The Six Parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations.

The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.

The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

3. The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally.

China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the US stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK.

The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.

4. The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

5. The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

6. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action.”

7. The Six Parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.

Appendix 11

Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement

13/02/07

The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 February 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

I. The Parties held serious and productive discussions on the actions each party will take in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The Parties reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfil their commitments in the Joint Statement. The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of “action for action”.

II. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase:

1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.

2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.

3. The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.

4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK.
In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days. The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be implemented within next 60 days and that they will take coordinated steps toward this goal.

III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement:

1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
2. Normalization of DPRK-US relations
3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations
4. Economy and Energy Cooperation
5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

The WGs will discuss and formulate specific plans for the implementation of the Joint Statement in their respective areas. The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall not affect progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated manner.

The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet within next 30 days.

IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase – which includes provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant – economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK. The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy Cooperation.

V. Once the initial actions are implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia. The Parties reaffirmed that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and will make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of WGs and discuss on actions for the next phase.

Appendix 12

Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement

3 October 2007

The Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 27 to 30 September 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States, attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

The Parties listened to and endorsed the reports of the five Working Groups, confirmed the implementation of the initial actions provided for in the February 13 agreement, agreed to push forward the Six-Party Talks process in accordance with the consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Groups and reached agreement on second-phase actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the goal of which is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

I. On Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

1. The DPRK agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 agreement.

The disablement of the 5 megawatt Experimental Reactor at Yongbyon, the Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) at Yongbyon and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility at Yongbyon will be completed by 31 December 2007. Specific measures recommended by the expert group will be adopted by heads of delegation in line with the principles of being acceptable to all Parties, scientific, safe, verifiable, and consistent with international standards. At the request of the other Parties, the United States will lead disablement activities and provide the initial funding for those activities. As a first step, the US side will lead the expert group to the DPRK within the next two weeks to prepare for disablement.

2. The DPRK agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs in accordance with the February 13 agreement by 31 December 2007.

3. The DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how.
II. On Normalization of Relations between Relevant Countries

1. The DPRK and the United States remain committed to improving their bilateral relations and moving towards a full diplomatic relationship. The two sides will increase bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual trust. Recalling the commitments to begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK, the United States will fulfill its commitments to the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK's actions based on consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Group on Normalization of DPRK-U.S. Relations.

2. The DPRK and Japan will make sincere efforts to normalize their relations expeditiously in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of the unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern. The DPRK and Japan committed themselves to taking specific actions toward this end through intensive consultations between them.

III. On Economic and Energy Assistance to the DPRK

In accordance with the February 13 agreement, economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of HFO (inclusive of the 100,000 tons of HFO already delivered) will be provided to the DPRK. Specific modalities will be finalized through discussion by the Working Group on Economy and Energy Cooperation.

IV. On the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting

The Parties reiterated that the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting will be held in Beijing at an appropriate time.

The Parties agreed to hold a heads of delegation meeting prior to the Ministerial Meeting to discuss the agenda for the Meeting

Appendix 13

Lyrics

Appendix 13.1 – Song of General Kim Il Sung

Bright traces of blood on the crags of the Changbaek still gleam,
Still the Amnok carries along songs of blood in its flow.
Still do those hallowed trees shine splendidly
Over Korea ever flourishing and free.

So dear to all our hearts is our General's glorious name,
Our own beloved Kim Il Sung of undying fame.

Tell, blizzards that rage in the wild Manchurian plains,
Tell, you nights in forests deep where the silence reigns,
Who is the partisan whose deeds are unsurpassed?
Who is the patriot whose fame shall ever last?

So dear to all our hearts is our General's glorious name,
Our own beloved Kim Il Sung of undying fame.

He severed the chains of the masses, brought them to liberty,
The sun of Korea today, democratic and free.
For the 20 Points united we stand fast,
Over our fair homeland, Spring has come at last!

So dear to all our hearts is our General's glorious name,
Our own beloved Kim Il Sung of undying fame.

Appendix 13.2 – Song of General Kim Jong Il

Paektu Mountain reaches across
Shaping up our beautiful land.
Our General, who's hailed by us all
And cheered throughout the land.
He leads our people, the Sun’s cause he carries on

Long live, long live, General Kim Jong Il!

Flower blossoms all around tell
His broad and warm love to us
Blue waters of the East and West Seas sing
Of all he has done.
He's a great artist full of joy, Juche’s garden he glorifies

Long live, long live, General Kim Jong Il!

He defends our Socialist cause
Full of iron will and courage
He spreads the honour of our nation dear
Throughout all of the world.
He's the champion of justice, and independence is his stance

Appendix 13.3 – No Motherland without You

You pushed away the maelstrom
You made us believe, Comrade Kim Jong Il!
We are unable to live without you!
Our country is unable to survive without you!

Our future and hope depend on you.
The People’s fate depends on you, Comrade Kim Jong Il!
We are unable to live without you!
Our country is unable to survive without you!

Even if the world changes thousands of times
The People believe in you, Comrade Kim Jong Il!
We are unable to live without you!
Our country is unable to survive without you!

Our Comrade Kim Jong Il
Our country cannot exist without you!

Appendix 13.4 – North Korean National Anthem - Aegukka (The Patriotic Song) / Achimŭn pinnara (Let Morning Shine)

Let morning shine on the silver and gold of this land,
Three thousand leagues packed with natural wealth.
My beautiful fatherland.
The glory of a wise people
Brought up in a culture brilliant
With a history five millennia long.
Let us devote our bodies and minds
To supporting this Korea forever.

The firm will, bonded with truth,
Nest for the spirit of labour,
Embracing the atmosphere of Mount Paektu,
Will go forth to all the world.
The country established by the will of the people,
Breasting the raging waves with soaring strength.
Let us glorify forever this Korea,
Limitlessly rich and strong.


Appendix 13.5 – Footsteps – Song of Kim Jong Un

Third Verse:

Tap! tap! tap! tap!
We hear the footsteps
Of our Commander Kim
He is stepping forward by taking over
The glorious achievements
Of February
Tap! tap! tap!
The footsteps reverberate
More and more loftily
Ushering in a brilliant future
Tap! tap! tap!

Appendix 13.6 – Soldiers Load your bullets

Prior to the critical match, we have solemnly accepted
the General’s order over the sky, land and waters.
Are we to forgive the Americans to start a fire of war?
Soldiers, gallant soldiers, load your bullets to destroy the enemy

No part of land can we surrender protected with our bloodshed
No one can attack the heaven blossomed through our sweat
Can we let live those who impaired our dignity?
Soldiers, gallant soldiers, load your bullets to destroy the enemy

Following our Great General’s arrow like lightening we go,
Outstretching sheet of flame and total destruction
The bastards blocking the Koreas reunification
We will serve them death and carcasses
Soldiers, gallant soldiers, load your bullets to destroy the enemy

Translation by Shin Yoon Ju

Appendix 13.7 – Let our Righteous Bayonets Strike Like Lightning

For we adore the happiness and peace of our land
We strongly hold high our weapons sharpened with fire of hatred
Let our hearts burn, let our righteous bayonets strike like lightning
Our self-defensive nation, our self-defensive nation is a strong and unbeaten country.
Reunification will be made happen under any circumstances

No forgiveness is granted to those who took half of our land
Let us burn the enemies like an erupted volcano
Let our hearts burn, let our righteous bayonets strike like lightning
Following the General’s teachings, Following the General’s teachings
Reunification will be made happen by all means

No peace can exist with wicked enemies present
On the road of critical battles we go like a storm
Let our hearts burn, let our righteous bayonets strike like lightning
Following the Baek-du commander, following the Baek-du commander
Final victory we will reach

Translation by Shin Yoon Ju
Appendix 13.8 – Hangugin (Koreans) – MC Sniper

CHORUS

Real Reggae hip-hop music bound for Jamaica
Lord have mercy the world end of ages, stormy voyages
Warmth I deliver to you, with MC Sniper
Desperation has the new Buddha baby, hurray hurray

1. Asians in this world and yes I am Korean
   The owner of Chosun tigers needling the way through Siberia
   Aladdin born in a period long long time ago
   And a god with much stronger determination, Goguryeo-in

2. Gwanggaeto, his thoughts of crossing the land of Manchuria
   In it we have done his will and made the peninsula
   Here where there is no such thing as failure
   I stand and breathe in it. Yo! Korea!

3. The endless Eastern turbulent days, in it hard
   Hits the typhoon the Korean dinghy
   Never such a thing as weakness coz you cannot paddle
   An era where we can’t crouch like a sick bird

4. The sunrise from the east is not you but me
   An artist rising within a recurring painting of the world
   Traditional hip-hop, you can’t ask your mummy about it
   My stubbornness is yo! Goguryeo hip-hop!
   Korea true noises let’s stand up
   Hard suffering, bye, uhm—, Good bye—

CHORUS

5. You believe in God, yet you just believe in yourself.
   People in need cry and shiver on the streets
   High skies for the busy, not for the cold and hungry
   The cruel and desolate world doesn’t care

6. People on top only search for utopia
   Yet, still shut their ears from sadness and suffering of commoners
   Korea cries until now coz of painful sorrows
   Making a road of life where you can’t even see it

43 King ‘Gwanggaeto’ (also spelt Kwanggaet’o), known as ‘Great King Yongnak’ during his lifetime, was king of the Goguryeo/Koguryo kingdom from 391-413 (D. K. Kim, 2005: 25).
7. Our country is a good country, hurray Republic of Korea, hurray
   When the sun rises, one by one, two by two will live a courageous life
   In a shady spot lies a dark and dull object without light

8. Let’s all become the east sunrise
   An artist rising within a recurring painting of the world
   Ask MC Sniper about traditional hip-hop
   The life of Koreans Yo! Goguryeo hip-hop!

CHORUS

9. Korea true noises let’s stand up
   Hard suffering, bye, uhm—, Good bye—
   Though we are sad, now Korea can stand up
   Here, Sniper’s sound, the sound of life, is earnestly approaching you

CHORUS

Translation by Shin Yoon Ju
## Appendix 14

### South Korean Songs CD – Track List

Table 3: South Korean Songs CD Track List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Track No.</th>
<th>Song Title</th>
<th>Artist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><em>Hayuhga</em></td>
<td>Seo Taiji and Boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><em>Dala Dala</em></td>
<td>Lee Jung-hyun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I believe</td>
<td>Lee Soo-young</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Take the A Train</td>
<td>Stone Jazz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Highway Star</td>
<td>Stone Jazz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Canon in D</td>
<td>Lee Chang-yui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><em>Hangugin</em></td>
<td>MC Sniper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>